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**THE CRISIS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA**

George Phillip

**THE ANTI-SLAVERY
SOCIETY: THE
PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS**

R. P. H. Davies

EXPLAINING INDIA

John Elsom

**HERBERT SPENCER:
THE MAN VERSUS
THE STATE**

Betty Abel

and other articles together
with a twelve page
Literary Supplement

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THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

by George Philip

At first sight it is surprising that political conflict in Central America should attract so much international attention. The four countries most directly affected—Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala—are small and poor. None has a population of more than 10 million; neither do they have impressive energy or mineral wealth. Costa Rica, with its serious financial problems, will not be considered here because it does not yet have a problem of political violence and its political history is in any case quite different. In the other four countries, however, the crisis can be described as political in its international dimension although it does have some important underlying socio-economic elements.

The countries of Central America have not enjoyed the post-war economic dynamism of Mexico or many South American countries. They have few mineral or energy resources although there is some significant hydro-electric potential, and they are too small to pursue successful strategies of domestic industrialisation. Attempts to industrialise through the Central American Common Market have not been entirely successful due to political conflicts between member governments over the benefits from inter-regional trade and also over more political questions. The limited industrialisation which has taken place has served only to increase the vulnerability of each country's balance of payments, since imports of consumer goods (which could be cut back without damaging the

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domestic economy) have been increasingly replaced by the import of industrial inputs and capital goods (where cut-backs lead directly to unemployment in industry). The heart of each economy, however, is still agriculture. The main exports are plantation crops—bananas, coffee, cocoa and sugar—in which there is a long-run tendency to stagnation in *per hectare* productivity. Attempts to expand the area under cultivation have led plantation owners into conflict with peasant smallholders who generally grow food for domestic consumption. Apart from this conflict, smallholdings are notoriously unable to assimilate population growth without generating a surplus of landless labourers who migrate in order to seek work. Each of these factors tends to generate social conflict as does the acute trade cycle caused by fluctuating export prices.

It is in fact likely that all four economies suffer from a long-term stagnationist tendency which is more acute in over-populated El Salvador than in Honduras and Nicaragua which still retain much uncultivated land. Shortages of land also increase inequalities of income and wealth. Governments in these countries, generally dominated by property-owners, have been fairly passive in economic terms and (apart from the very special case of Somoza's Nicaragua) have also limited their direct social spending. The public sector middle class has therefore remained small.

The social structure combines with those direct economic features to polarise politics. Economic power is (or until very recently was) held by the big agricultural export interests who are by no means specifically committed to agriculture itself; on the contrary, they are active in banking, real estate and, occasionally, in manufacturing. Although US-owned banana companies have earned a certain amount of notoriety in the area, the main export interests are generally domestic. In practice, however, this does not mean much since socially established families tend to look abroad for their tastes and fashions. Their attitudes towards their own compatriots are more often racist than patriotic. They have little, if any, sense of civic responsibility.

While these families (the 'oligarchy') are generally unpopular, it is not unknown (as the recent elections in El Salvador have demonstrated) for Right-wing candidates to win a considerable 'charismatic' vote while receiving their campaign expenses from the oligarchy. More generally, however, the oligarchy expects to keep control of the army which may either rule directly or engage in activity which leaves unrepresentative Right-wing parties in power. Although (as we shall see) the military is not invariably on the far-Right, it does tend to be ill-trained and is often brutal and repressive.

In all of these countries, therefore, there is a hard-Right which is implacably opposed to the sharing of power or even to limited measures of social reform (although the Nicaragua Right must now plot from exile). It will meet challenges to its rule by force; even moderately reformist politicians are in danger of assassination and their parties may be cheated of electoral victory by fraud. The Right rules by repression or not at all.

The political centre is less clear cut in its composition but effective leadership tends to come from military reformists, Christian Democratic Parties and sections of the Church. In Central America by no means all military officers are identified with the hard-Right. Reformist military officers held power in Guatemala between 1944 and the CIA-organised coup of 1954 and have also played a significant role in developments in El Salvador since 1979. Such officers will generally be anti-Marxist but may nevertheless promote policies of land reform and domestic industrialisation. The Church since the 1968 Congress of Medellin has become notably reformist in its political position and many priests (and one martyred Archbishop) have spoken out strongly against abuses of human rights in Central America. Christian Democratic parties—more difficult to suppress than their Marxist counterparts—also play an active political role in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Moderate reformist government, however, is far from providing solutions to all of Central America's political problems. One difficulty which such governments face is their lack of control over political violence; some violence from the Left is likely to continue and the repressive apparatus of the state will act in some measure autonomously of the government. Violence tends to polarise politics as the protagonists (and the victims) tend to lose interest in compromise and middle-of-the-road solutions. A second major drawback is the lack of an effective socio-economic strategy. If these governments attempt to raise living standards without antagonising the wealthy, they will end up by boosting consumption and thus their dependence upon foreign finance. If they do seek to carry out expropriations, they will stimulate capital flight and organised economic resistance and might therefore find it necessary to socialise more than they had originally intended; they will then be open to the accusation that they are closet Marxists. Such accusations may be particularly persuasive when directed towards the United States which has not been friendly to Left-wing reformism in the area.

The Marxist Left clearly realises that its only possible road to power is by armed revolution. As one Left-wing politician said shortly before his assassination 'If it is as dangerous to pick up a pen as it is to pick up a gun, then it is only logical to pick up a gun'. Armed insurgency may at times pick up a surprisingly wide range of social support—a number of businessmen in Nicaragua openly supported the Sandinistas against Somoza. Once armed conflict is under way, political power within the Left will become concentrated within the rebel military structure and the basis of subsequent authoritarianism will thus be laid. Those who win power by force will not easily give it up through the electoral process. Nevertheless, a triumphant Left can encourage genuine popular mobilisation which may take the edge off its more authoritarian aspects. Neither Cuba nor Nicaragua can be regarded as Stalinist in any serious way and both have so far tolerated a small private sector.

Finally, one of the main political forces within the area is not domestic at all. Central America has very much been seen as part of the US

sphere of influence. US policies have involved a mix of strategic and commercial concerns which tended to operate in the same direction—namely the offering of support and protection to Right-wing governments. Cordell Hull's evaluation of the first Somoza—'He may be a son-of-a-bitch but at least he's our son-of-a-bitch'—sums up the thrust of US policy quite concisely. Policy changed briefly in a more reformist direction in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Revolution but after around the mid-1960s reverted to its earlier form. Yet US policy has generally been limited in its scope. The CIA-coup in Guatemala in 1954 did not involve US forces directly, nor did the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. The only time in which US troops were committed directly since the 1920s was in 1965 in the Dominican Republic and this move proved domestically controversial.

If these were the main underlying features, the political crisis in Central America began in 1979 when Sandinista forces successfully overthrew the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas comprised a broad range of opposition groups but they were led from the Left and the Sandinista government is broadly Marxist even if not Communist in the orthodox sense. Following the election of Reagan as US President, the Sandinista government has become increasingly defensive and embattled; with some help from Cuba (although not as much as the US government has suggested), it has now acquired a significant military capacity. In 1979 there was also a military coup in El Salvador in which reformist officers overthrew the Right-wing government and began a serious programme of social reform in alliance with the Christian Democrats and with the strong support of Washington—by now alarmed at the prospect of Revolution in the country. Unfortunately, the new government was not willing to negotiate seriously with the guerrilla movement which was itself growing in strength and confidence following the success of the Revolution in Nicaragua. The government's own reforms were robbed of much of their political effect by the escalating violence and by systematic brutality on the part of the substantial 'unreconstructed' section of the military.

During 1981, therefore, the security position became increasingly unfavourable to the government of El Salvador despite increasing military assistance from the USA. Elections were scheduled for March 28, 1982 in the hope that these would legitimise reformist government (and in particular Duarte and the Christian Democrats) and provide a political setback to the guerrillas. Instead, the results were largely inconclusive. Duarte's Christian Democratic Party received around 40% of the votes which made it by far the largest single party but not large enough to deny an overall majority to the parties of the Right (the Left having boycotted and attempted to disrupt the elections). Washington has virtually demanded the inclusion of the Christian Democrats in an overall Centre-Right coalition and negotiations are continuing. Whichever government comes out of this process will find it extremely difficult to hold off the military challenge of the guerrillas even if the US continues to

provide support.

In Guatemala, the government was in the hands of the hard-Right in 1979. Its President, General Lucas Garcia, had broken with the Carter administration in Washington over the continuing violation of human rights in Guatemala and the high level of repression which was strengthening an existing guerrilla movement. The guerrillas have not yet launched a full scale offensive in Guatemala but may well do so before the end of 1982. Meanwhile, the elections held in March 1982 were so blatantly rigged in favour of the official candidate that all the opposition parties (varying in complexion from the moderate to the extreme Right) demonstrated against the announced results. These disturbances triggered a military coup a few days later whose full implications are still not clear. The coup was apparently made by junior officers who handed power to a more senior military figure—General Rios Montt who had been Vice-Presidential candidate for the Christian Democrats in the 1974 elections (the Christian Democrats having been cheated of victory by manipulation) and had subsequently become a born-again Christian and keen member of a Protestant sect. He has rather taken political observers by surprise since taking power but early indications suggest that he might attempt a brand of moderate reformism.

When one looks at these countries together (and also at Honduras which has not been discussed here for reasons of space) the outlook is for continuing and perhaps escalating conflict. The least likely outcome appears to be a victory for the far-Right and the decisive re-imposition of the pre-1979 *status quo*. This would only be possible with a major US military commitment which, given the state of public opinion within the USA, is not (at least for the moment) practical politics. A clear cut and decisive victory for the rebels is also unlikely in the short-term although the El Salvadorian military, at any rate, appears vulnerable in the longer-term. Rebel victories throughout Central America would be unlikely to pose a broader threat (except perhaps a purely psychological one) to Mexico or the countries of South America but it would be resisted strongly by the local military institutions; the 'oligarchy' could take its money and flee but military officers are rarely so fortunate. What may be the ideal solution—a negotiated settlement between the reformist Centre and the revolutionary Left—is now hard to imagine in El Salvador but is perhaps still just possible in Honduras and Guatemala. The alternative to this can only be continuing and bloody conflict in an increasingly devastated area of the world.

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THE CAUSES OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT

by Peter Calvert

THE Falklands crisis is still in progress. Only two months ago that would have seemed likely to be the most remarkable thing to say about it, but already it is the least. What has been swept away in the meantime, in Britain most of all, have been many of the comfortable assumptions with which we have been living for the past forty years: that people are generally reasonable, that international disputes can be solved without the use of force, and that trouble is something that happens somewhere else. Of course, any armed conflict—and there have been all too many in those forty years—has potentially unpredictable consequences for the maintenance of what Philip Reynolds has recently reminded us is 'the continuous seamless web of international political activity.' But two nations separated by one-third of the circumference of the globe have been placed in a state of armed conflict with one another in the present instance, because they disagree on the interpretation of that fundamental principle of our present world order, the nature of sovereignty, and decisions now taken certainly will affect the nature of that world order for the rest of this century, for better or for worse. Yet the crisis reached this point at a speed that created immense surprise on both sides, and indeed in the outside world, where few took the possibility of such a development seriously.

Yet the Falkland dispute, if not as old as is generally claimed, is not new. Why has it arisen and why has it developed as it has? To answer these questions we must first look at the tangled history of the Falkland Islands themselves, and then look more closely at the two principals to the dispute, Argentina and Britain.

The Falkland Islands consist of two large islands, East and West Falkland, and a number of smaller ones, making a total area of some 4,700 square miles. They lie in the South Atlantic some 300 miles East of Tierra del Fuego, but are geologically unconnected either with it or with the South American continent.

They were first sighted by British sailors and reported by Captain John Davis of the *Desire* in 1592, but it was nearly a century more until a British ship made the first recorded landing on them in 1690 and named them after the then Treasurer of the Royal Navy, Lord Falkland. It was not until 1765, however, after the end of the Seven Years' War between Britain and France, that the Admiralty dispatched Captain John Byron to them to found a settlement and naval base. He took formal possession of West Falkland in the name of King George III and founded Port Egmont on Saunders Island, but so slow were communications even then that a year went by before the settlers learnt that in 1764 Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, seeking to compensate his country for the loss of Canada, had taken possession of East Falkland in the name of Louis XV and founded Port Louis.

Both acts were strongly resented by Spain. After Columbus's first voyage

and the discovery of the West Indies, Spain and Portugal had by the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 agreed to partition the world along a line 370 leagues to the West of the Cape Verde Islands, and the Spanish Pope, Alexander VI Borgia, had formally endorsed the agreement. Had the Spaniards known of the Falkland Islands they would no doubt have claimed them as lying within the zone delimited by the line of 1494. But they did not, and in any case international law and rival sovereigns did not recognise the authority of the grant of 1494 except where it was made good by actual occupation or by subsequent treaty. The 'Spanish' name of the Falklands, *Islas Malvinas*, is in fact only a version of the name given to them in the eighteenth century by French sailors from St. Malo, who called them the *Iles Malouines*.

France, however, was eager to please her ally in the late war, and in 1767 the French Government formally resigned its claim to Spain. Four years later a Spanish force sent by the Governor of Buenos Aires expelled the British settlers from Port Egmont, and brought the two countries to the brink of war. But the Governor's action was disowned by Spain, and Port Egmont restored to Britain, without, however, any prejudice to the question of sovereignty, which was accordingly left undecided. Britain withdrew its forces from Port Egmont in 1774, leaving behind a plaque and a flag as symbols of its claim to sovereignty. In 1811, a year after the declaration of independence from Spain by Buenos Aires, the small Spanish community at Port Louis, which had been renamed Puerto de la Soledad (Port Solitude), was also withdrawn and the islands left uninhabited.

It was not until 1820 that the Governor of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata re-established a presence on the islands in the form of a convict settlement, an action which was disputed by Britain. In 1831 the captain of the USS *Lexington*, angered at the seizure by the inhabitants of three American ships, destroyed the settlement, deported the inhabitants, and declared the islands free of all government. When Buenos Aires sent out a new governor to the islands he was murdered following a mutiny, and the settlement left in the control of the convicts. At this point the British Government decided finally to exercise the rights of sovereignty which it had claimed throughout and in January 1833 the garrison at Soledad yielded peacefully to the request of the captain of HMS *Clio* to leave the islands, which were thenceforth, until 1 April, 1982, peacefully and continuously administered as a British colony.

The history of the islands before 1833, of course, in no way 'explains' the existence of grounds for conflict in 1982. It is a generally accepted principle of international law that the actual effective possession of territory over a period of time in itself constitutes a title to sovereignty, and Britain has been in possession of the Falklands much longer than most of today's independent states have been independent. Britain, therefore, needs no other claim. It can, however, also claim historically the right of first discovery, and it does claim that the present inhabitants of the Falklands showed in their most recent elections to their Legislative Council, only six months before the beginning of the crisis, that they wished British rule to

continue.

The Argentine claim is rather more complicated. It begins with the assumption that the islands were, before 1810, the undisputed possession of Spain under, ultimately, the Papal Award of 1494. It then argues that the rights of Spain passed to the United Provinces as a successor state, and then have been transmitted to the Argentine Republic which was established in 1853. It regards what it terms the seizure of the islands by force by Britain in 1833 as an illegal act which was contested at the time and belatedly rectified by the recapture of the islands in April 1982. There are three weak points in this argument.

Spanish claims to the Falklands were always disputed by Britain and, unlike Spanish possession of Havana or British possession of Gibraltar, they were never the subject of a Treaty between the two countries.

In any case, any such claims, even if agreed, would not necessarily have devolved upon the Government at Buenos Aires. If this was the case, Argentina today could claim rule over both Paraguay and Uruguay. She could not claim sovereignty over Patagonia, the nearest land to the Falklands, which was conquered by Argentina only in the 1880s, after being disputed by Chile for many decades. After the Spanish evacuation of 1811, Britain could in any case equally well claim to be the successor state to the Spanish Empire, in the particular case of the Falklands.

Britain did not seize the islands by force, and the invasion of April 1982, in any case, under today's international law, was in no way justified by any act or omission 149 years previously. Indeed, it constituted a deliberate and flagrant breach of the Charter of the United Nations, accepted by Argentina in 1945.

The fact is that, although it is true to say that Argentine historians have long argued that the Falklands were rightfully Argentinian, the present attitude of the Argentine Government is quite recent, and owes its origin to two factors: frustrated nationalism and the temptations of anti-colonialism.

At the beginning of this century, Argentina, economically the most developed country in South America, seemed destined to become a Great Power. The promise failed to materialise. Instead, under the influence of the Great Depression the country came for the first time under the control of a prolonged period of military government, and its growth languished while that of Brazil, with a much larger population and much greater resources, began to forge ahead. Blame for this state of affairs was diverted towards Britain, whose nationals held a very large state in the country and which, under the terms of the Roca-Runciman Agreement of 1933, remained Argentina's largest trading partner despite her general adoption of Imperial Preference. What was to Britain a generous concession seemed to Argentina a one-sided piece of sharp practice.

Nazi ideas were easily absorbed by the large German and Italian immigrant population of Argentina, which maintained in consequence an uneasy neutrality during the Second World War, though pro-Axis sentiment was strong in military circles. It was manoeuvred into the war on the Allied side

within days of its conclusion so that it could become a member of the new United Nations. By then, General Perón was well on his way to power, borne along by the wave of populist nationalism which was to give him an overwhelming majority, and in which anti-British and anti-American feeling were alike subsumed in a programme of establishing Argentina as a leading power in South America and in the world. It was Perón who, in 1948, began a campaign to inform all Argentines from their earliest school years that the Falklands were rightfully theirs. It was, incidentally, also he who extended the claim to include not only the Falklands and South Georgia, but also the South Sandwich Islands and the Palmer Peninsula in Antarctica and by 1954 was actually arranging for babies to be born in Antarctica so that an indigenous population could be created to 'saturate' it. (Neither South Georgia nor the South Sandwich Islands has ever been anything but British, but if they had not, they would have not been Spanish, but Portuguese.)

Since the fall of Perón in 1955, Peronism has been bitterly divided, and new radical movements have grown up which since his death have, though their adoption of revolutionary aims and terrorist methods provoked the latest period of military rule, initiated by General Jorge Videla. Like its predecessors, the period of military rule has been singularly ineffective in dealing with the country's fundamental economic weakness, a task which in any case its rulers have consistently chosen to leave to civilian ministers who are replaced at a moment's notice. At the same time its success in repressing terrorism, involving the 'disappearance' or death of between 10,000 and 20,000 people, many of whom are known to have been savagely tortured, left the military authorities in a dangerous position, in which the price of their withdrawal from power had to be a law of amnesty for actions committed during it, which civilian politicians were unable or unwilling to guarantee. In March 1981, as a first step in return to constitutional government, therefore, an elected military president, General Roberto Viola, took office under a constitution which restricted the power of any individual member of the ruling junta as far as possible. The displacement of General Viola by General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri towards the end of the year solved neither the political nor the economic weaknesses of the country, and it destroyed what little legitimacy the military government might still claim.

The Falklands issue was the one issue that could be depended upon to bring support to the fragmented junta presided over by General Galtieri. In 1964 an important development had been brought about by the action of an Argentine pilot who landed at Port Stanley and claimed it for his country. By then the movement for decolonisation was well advanced, and his Government claimed before the Committee of 24 that the issue was a colonial one. Consequently the Committee recommended negotiations between Britain and Argentina about the claim, a recommendation which was endorsed in December 1965 by Resolution 2065 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly. Argentine support for this move involved two paradoxes. The movement for decolonisation is based ultimately on the

principle of self-determination for the inhabitants of a colonial territory. Yet when Mr. Michael Stewart (later Lord Stewart of Fulham), the British Foreign Secretary, mentioned in Buenos Aires in January 1966 the importance his Government attached to the wishes of the inhabitants, the Argentine Government dismissed them as irrelevant on the grounds that the islands were already an integral part of Argentine territory. That they were sincere in holding this view was, moreover, shown that down to that time they had made not the slightest effort to woo the islanders. On the contrary, they had made every move to make their lives difficult, such as that mail and supplies had to reach them over a distance of some 800 miles from Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay. It was Britain, not Argentina, which now proposed that the limits on free movement for the islanders to the mainland should be removed.

Much has recently been made of the fact that some 17,000 British subjects live peacefully in Argentina itself. Their influence, and that of the 'old Argentine hands' in Britain, in favour of continued peaceful relations with Argentina despite the problem of the Falklands has in the past been considerable. Whether for this reason or for others, the British Government next embarked on negotiations for a series of agreements with Argentina which were to have very troublesome consequences. These agreements, embodied in an Exchange of Notes in August 1971 and in further agreements in 1972 and 1974, enabled the islanders to travel to Argentina and return without liability to military service or taxation, shared out responsibility for establishing air, sea and postal links, and permitted the Argentina state oil company YPF to market its products on the Falklands. In the meantime the Argentine government continued to press the issue of sovereignty, returning to the Committee of 24 to blame Britain for holding up negotiations. The islanders themselves, who had representation on the British side of the negotiations, were, however, alarmed at what they regarded as a 'drift' into the arms of Argentina. They were particularly alarmed at the fact that the runway constructed at Port Stanley to take aircraft from Argentina was deliberately made too short to take long distance flights from Montevideo or elsewhere, with obvious serious implications for the islands' defence. But they were almost equally concerned by the arrival of Argentine personnel on the islands, and their experiences of Argentina, then in a serious state of internal turmoil, and from 1976 onwards again under military rule, were hardly encouraging. They complained that if Britain were only willing to put more money into the islands, fisheries, agricultural diversification and offshore oil might be developed, to the point at which independence for the islands might become a possible option.

Independence, of course, was the ultimate purpose of decolonisation, but it was not at all what the Argentine Government had in mind. Indeed, the more the islanders made the Falklands seem viable, the more, tragically, they made them seem desirable. This would be especially true if, as was thought, they lay on top of an Eastern limb of the Tierra del Fuego oilfields which make Argentina already virtually self-sufficient in oil. Early in 1982 the Argentine Government issued licences for exploration of the sea bed

lying on the Falkland side of the median line between the two coasts. The British Government protested.

But the British Government was no longer taken seriously in Argentina, where it was felt, rightly or wrongly, that it would only be too happy to be rid of the lingering problem of the Falklands. This impression was, it seems, strengthened by the last talks formally held between the two Governments in New York led by Mr. Richard Luce, but it must be remembered that any Argentine impressions gained from those talks took into account the seemingly endless saga of Britain's economic difficulties since the oil crisis of 1973, the independence of Belize, and the news of the forthcoming withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* from its service in the Antarctic, all of which conveyed to the hotheads in the military that Britain was indeed an old and toothless bulldog that would bark but not bite.

It was, in the end, Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, the naval member of the military junta, who gave the orders that sent Argentine ships, on manoeuvres off Uruguay, steaming for Port Stanley, and so forced the hand of his colleagues on the junta. Even then they might have disowned the action, as Spain had done the action of its commander in 1771, had Britain responded more quickly. At the least the resulting public indignation in Argentina would have brought sorely needed popularity to the junta. That the failure to respond was disastrous has already been accepted by the resignation of Lord Carrington who, as British Foreign Secretary, was ultimately responsible at the time for the conduct of foreign policy. The reason why it happened will, however, have to be determined by a full public enquiry after the crisis has been resolved, for the result, as we all now know, was that the marines on the island were left with no option but to surrender, and by a *fait accompli* the Argentine invasion negated all previously predicted plans for the islands' defence, leaving the islanders in the unenviable position of a conquered people, occupied by a country that professed not to understand what all the fuss was about.

The Argentinians were surprised that Britain responded. They were amazed that the response was so massive and so effective. The exuberance of their propaganda, which has equally surprised and irritated people in Britain, does, however, have one virtue. It should enable them to camouflage a discreet retreat towards reality. Of the final outcome it is still too early to speak, but two points are clear. It is virtually impossible that whatever strategies, military or diplomatic, that Britain adopts, a negotiated settlement can be found. But this does not mean, on the other hand, that endless military conflict need follow. For the most disquieting lesson of the crisis already is the way in which military technology has widened the gap between powers of different ranks—and this should make Britain, as well as Argentina, think very carefully about her future military defence against greater Powers.

Seventy-three days after the invasion of the Islands by Argentine troops, Port Stanley was re-taken by British forces following surrender by Argentine units. A settlement has yet to be reached.

TO TRANSCEND ALL DIVISIONS

**An interview with Javier Pérez de Cuellar,
Secretary-General of the UN Organisation**

by Milos Dromnjak

The Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation, Javier Peres de Cuellar, who assumed this office in January 1982, was kind enough to answer a number of questions concerning the current phase of international relations and the role of the United Nations.

Dromnjak: What are your views on basic processes and tendencies in international relations now that your mission begins as 'the first figure' in world diplomacy?

Secretary-General: At present, we are passing through a very difficult and testing phase of international affairs. This is a matter of general awareness and widespread concern. There are two great chasms: one between East and West and the other between North and South. No aim can be worthier for world diplomacy than to help bridge these gulfs. Fears and suspicions have caused a crisis of confidence. Power relationships which would be conducive to a stable peace are under severe strain. There is a general malaise and a most regrettable drift as far as such great and pressing issues as disarmament and the establishment of more equitable economic relations between the affluent and the disadvantaged sectors of the global society are concerned. I believe that we all must exert our best efforts to ensure a greater recognition of the interdependence of nations, north and south, east and west, which is a perceptible fact of the evolving international life. They all have a common stake in the maintenance of peace with justice. If this manifest community of interest becomes a governing factor in the framing of national policies, then most of our current problems will be put in a different perspective, advancing the prospect of their solution.

Dromnjak: Many hopes have been vested in the United Nations as a universal forum in the struggle for peace, security and co-operation. What do you expect of the UN in the years ahead?

Secretary-General: One's expectations have to be realistic and yet not divorced from the ideals embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. The international environment, fraught with tensions and acute differences, will inevitably be reflected in the debates of the United Nations. It is true, of course, that one seriously considered and workable proposal is far better than a hundred exercises in rhetoric. However, the seemingly endless debates in United Nations forums do not constitute an entirely negative factor either. There is value in providing governments with a channel for articulating their positions on current issues. If no one objects to debates carried on with vehemence in parliamentary and other forums in national contexts, so long as those debates contribute to the shaping of responsible policies, then it is hard to see why the

Process should be viewed with abhorrence in the international sphere. Moreover, debates are only one aspect of the working of the United Nations. One of the major functions of the Organisation is that of conflict management and control. The United Nations is also the only instrument for the formulation of global objectives like those of disarmament and the balanced development of the world community. At times, these functions become somewhat obscured in the public eye but they remain central to the business of establishing a stable international order. As far as the efficacy of the United Nations is concerned, much will depend on whether Member States will treat it as peripheral to their concerns or whether they regard it as a central element in international relations.

Dromnjak: What are your views on non-aligned activities in international relations considering that the aims of the UN Charter are identical with the platform of the policy and movement of the non-aligned?

Secretary-General: The non-aligned movement has been an embodiment of the deep human urge not to let the world be divided into two hostile camps. I consider its aim and purpose to be a powerful reaffirmation of the spirit and substance of the United Nations Charter. Insofar as its activities encourage larger perceptions and an approach towards global or regional issues on their merits, rather than their relation to power alignments, it has a great and continuing potential for the enhancement of world peace and security.

Dromnjak: Problems of economic development and disarmament are constantly present in the United Nations. What may be expected in this sphere in the immediate future, bearing in mind the efforts to launch global negotiations and the convening of a special disarmament session of the UN General Assembly?

Secretary-General: I attach very great importance to the convening of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At the present stage in international affairs, there is a compelling need to make a credible and substantial advances towards arms limitation.

In regard to global negotiations for economic development, the current situation is one of both uncertainty and hope. What is needed for a breakthrough in this effort is political will on the part of all concerned and a restructuring of international economic relations. A greater equity in these relations is essential for a stable peace.

[Milos Dromnjak is Editor of *The Review of International Affairs*, Yugoslavia.]

THE ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

by R. P. H. Davies

WILLIAM Wilberforce died on 29 July 1833 and on his death bed he had the satisfaction of hearing that the Abolition Act, for which he had fought as a parliamentarian for some forty years, had passed its Second Reading; the Act received the Royal Assent the following year. The Anti-Slavery Society will be commemorating the sesquicentenary of the death of Wilberforce and of the passage of the Abolition Act in 1983.

During Wilberforce's lifetime, influential anti-slavery societies had sprung up all over the country and they certainly contributed to that education of public opinion which was necessary before the very profitable slave trade could be put down. The prosperity of such ports as Bristol and Liverpool had been created largely by the slave trade and the whole economy of the country was intimately connected with that trade: the import of cotton, tobacco and other tropical products, the industries depending on those imports, ship-building and even the manning of the Royal Navy itself. The opposition to the abolition of the slave trade was therefore formidable and only makes Wilberforce's ultimate success the more remarkable.

However, the immediate result of the passage of the Abolition Act was that the original anti-slavery societies went into rapid decline since they had achieved the end for which they were founded. It was only a little later that it was realised that the passage of the Act was no more than a first step and that constant pressure would have to be applied if its legal provisions were to be translated into reality and, furthermore, if the British example were to be followed by other colonial powers. Friends of Wilberforce—notably Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton and Thomas Clarkson—were therefore active in resuscitating an anti-slavery society to promote the implementation of the Act and for the furtherance of the Abolitionists' ideals: the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society formally came into being in 1839 and has continued without a break, though with some changes of name, to the present day.

In 1909 the Society merged with the Aborigines Protection Society which had been founded in 1837, two years before the Anti-Slavery Society, and since that time the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples have formed a major part of the Society's interests.

In 1957 the Society's name was changed to the Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights. This change did no more than reflect the reality of the Society's activities since it was virtually the only international society engaged in work in the field of human rights and was certainly the oldest. In the past twenty-five years there has been a very welcome growth in public interest in these matters and societies concerned with particular aspects of human rights have proliferated. Many, like the Anti-Slavery Society, have consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of

the United Nations (ECOSOC) with the right to attend sessions of ECOSOC, of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. I will return later to the question of consultative status.

The matter of the Society's name is one that is constantly brought up by members and in committee: it is also a name which usually surprises members of the general public when they first hear it. The immediate reaction is one of astonishment that such a society still exists and has work to do: it is usually assumed that slavery and William Wilberforce died at about the same time one hundred and fifty years or so ago. It is fairly easy to demonstrate that this is not the case, but it is less easy to convince the sympathetic listener that the Anti-Slavery Society's name is not a liability with its supposed overtones of Victorian paternalism, 'do-gooding' and elitism. Those of us who work for the Society are equally conscious of the Society's distinguished history and of its contributions to a freer and more equitable social system. We are also conscious that much remains to be done and that our vision of an ideal society remains always on the horizon.

Since there are now so many other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in existence with specific aims, it has become possible for the Anti-Slavery Society to restrict itself to a narrower range of human rights interests. Of course, chattel slavery remains one of our most pressing concerns but we also occupy ourselves with the other forms of slavery defined by the UN's Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956). The original Slavery Convention of 1926 required parties to the Convention 'to prevent and suppress the slave trade' and 'to bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms'. The Convention defined slavery as 'the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised'. To these definitions the Supplementary Convention added the following 'practices similar to slavery':

1. Debt bondage.
2. Serfdom.
3. Certain forms of servile marriage.
4. The exploitation of child labour.

It is by these two conventions that the present work of the Anti-Slavery Society is principally defined and the areas covered will certainly provide us with more than enough work for an indefinite future.

At this point I must revert to the matter of the 'consultative status' which the Anti-Slavery Society enjoys with ECOSOC. This status, which is reviewed every four years, entitles the NGO in question to attend sessions of ECOSOC and its dependent commissions and sub-commissions and also to present evidence on particular cases by means of oral or written interventions. Largely as a result of the representations of the Anti-Slavery Society, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities recommended the setting up of a Working Group of Experts on Slavery since there was no one UN organisation or official especially charged

with oversight of these enormous problems. The recommendation was accepted by the Commission on Human Rights and finally by ECOSOC and the Working Group came into being in 1975. It now meets annually for a week before the sessions of the Sub-Commission and it provides a most useful point of entry for the Anti-Slavery Society's researches. During this year's sessions of the Commission on Human Rights the creation of an equivalent Working Group on Indigenous Populations was recommended to ECOSOC and this will provide us with a second most valuable platform for our work in this field.

Our working methods naturally vary with the topic which we are studying but our object remains what it has always been: to inform governments of abuses of particular human rights and to persuade them to create the appropriate laws to protect those rights or, where suitable laws already exist, to insist on the implementation of those laws. This process of persuasion involves the education of public opinion through the Society's own publications and through the media, and by exposing the abuses to world opinion through the United Nations and the regional organisations such as the Council of Europe, OAS and OAU. Depending on the case in question we will usually collaborate with the appropriate UN organisations such as the International Labour Office (ILO), World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) or UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). Representatives of the Society regularly visit Geneva for the spring session of the Commission on Human Rights and the summer session of the sub-Commission and its dependent Working Groups.

As compared with some other NGOs, the Anti-Slavery Society has a certain difficulty in 'selling' itself to the public. This is because we deal largely with broad conditions—the state of the law, customary rights and entrenched traditions—while others deal in individual cases of distress: cases usually produced by those conditions which we are attempting to eradicate. We have in the past tended to assume that the connection between the victim and the condition which produces him is clear enough. Nowadays, however, a more direct appeal to the public's heart-strings may be needed if we are to compete for their attention with other NGOs and the aid-giving agencies. In the television age it is the visual image rather than the reasoned argument which is the more effective persuader.

It is not as though we were short of effective evidence. As I have said, most people are surprised to learn that slavery still exists. It is, of course, endemic in parts of Africa, especially in the sub-Saharan regions of West Africa. Here for more than a thousand years the Nomadic peoples have used slaves to care for their beasts, to grow their crops and to act as household servants: it has to be said that, in material terms, the gap between slave and master is not very great in some of the more arid desert regions. In August 1981 the Anti-Slavery Society presented a report to the Working Groups of Experts on Slavery which showed that about 10% of the population of Mauritania were slaves. After an initial shocked rejection of our claims, the Mauritanian government accepted the positive tenor

of our report and invited the UN to send experts to assess the situation and to make appropriate recommendations. Various UN agencies such as UNDP and ILO have offered their services and there is also the possibility of bilateral aid, so the outlook is promising. Mauritania had in fact promulgated a decree in July 1980 abolishing slavery, so it could hardly claim that it did not exist and our report was intended as an encouragement to the Mauritanian government to proceed with the implementation of the decree. To change a whole way of life overnight with all the concomitant economic and social implications was obviously too much to expect and Mauritania would plainly need outside help. The Anti-Slavery Society has given the process of transformation a shove and we will watch to see that progress continues. And we shall also be encouraging other countries in the region to follow Mauritania's example.

The exploitation of child labour has been the object of our attention for many years and we decided to devote even more of our resources to it at the time of the International Year of the Child (1979). The Society has produced a series of carefully researched country reports covering Asia, Africa, South America and Europe and several more are in preparation. We recognise that child labour in itself is not necessarily harmful: in most parts of the world children have a role to play at harvest time or in looking after animals or poultry. They can contribute to a family's income in urban societies, too, by helping in a shop or in some other kind of family business. It can be argued that such relatively light work as this provides a preparation for adult life as well as increasing the family income. But there are far too many countries where children's labour is exploited to the point where their health is damaged and they are denied the possibility of proper physical, intellectual and moral development. Child labour is cheap, it is unorganised and it is disposable. In some parts of the world—Thailand is a typical example—there is an actual market in children who come in to the large towns from backward country areas and who are disposed of by professional agents into conditions very close to slavery. It is a tragic fact that many of the more attractive children of both sexes are sold for the purposes of prostitution or to the booming pornography industry. Again it is the Society's aim to help the establishment of norms for the employment of children and to encourage countries to subscribe to these norms and to ensure that there is an adequate system of inspection to see that the relevant labour laws are observed. Where vice is concerned there may also be problems of corruption to contend with: the bribery of police and other officials or of local politicians.

The Anti-Slavery Society's role in this vitally important question of the protection of children was generously recognised in the recent UN report on the exploitation of Child Labour undertaken by the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights, Professor A. Bouhdiba. We expect to be intimately connected both with the five-year action programme recommended by Professor Bouhdiba and with further investigations of the incidence of this abuse.

A further cause for serious concern is the effect of development upon the

rights of indigenous peoples. It has become an axiom that all peoples have the right to development and following the Brandt Report few dispute that the developed and developing worlds are interdependent. The problem is that 'development' often means little more than the creation of additional wealth for a very small elite group in the country in question, and perhaps increased profits for a foreign company or a multi-national corporation. Last year the Anti-Slavery Society drew attention to the situation in the Philippines where 15% of the population is composed of tribal groups with a life-style, culture and religious background quite distinct from the remainder of the population. These people's traditional homelands are regarded as fair game by the developers who work in collaboration with the official government agency for indigenous peoples, PANAMIN, to take over and 'develop' forest and mountain areas which are the traditional hunting and agricultural lands of the tribes. Perhaps the forest will be cleared to make way for a cash crop plantation—pineapples for an American canning corporation—or a river dammed to provide hydro-electric power for an international mining enterprise. Either way the dispossession of the tribe and the destruction of its normal food supply will produce a reservoir of available cheap labour. Such ruthless development processes can frequently amount to genocide and the last group to benefit are the peoples concerned who have no taste for tinned pineapple and no use for electric power even if they had the means with which to buy it. This is a world-wide problem which is as prevalent in Central and South America as it is in Southern and South-East Asia. Again, the Anti-Slavery Society does not play a negative role. We recognise that change must come and that progress (if that is the right word) is inevitable. What we try to ensure is that representatives of the tribal people concerned are involved in the planning from the outset and that all development in the area is carried out with their consent. Provision for such consultation should be built into all development projects and there should also be guarantees that the tribes will actually gain material advantage from the project.

The present situation in Central America provides a vivid example of the effect of dispossession and of the exploitation of tribal peoples by an elite of different race. The appalling human rights records of countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala are the result of the ruthless exploitation of the landless many by the wealthy few. Such a situation provides a fertile breeding ground for political extremism of both Left and Right. No satisfactory solution to the problems of Central America will be based on the provision of arms to either side: there are far too many guns in action already. An equitable redistribution of land and the adoption of a new agricultural policy not exclusively devoted to export crops are essential ingredients in any just settlement which must take account of the rights and needs of the original inhabitants of the area. During the past six years the Anti-Slavery Society has intervened four times in debates at the UN in Geneva—most recently in March of this year—in our attempts to draw attention to these facts. So far, I fear, we can claim little positive success for our efforts, although I believe we have contributed considerably to an in-

increased public awareness of the problems.

1. The problem of debt bondage is another evil with deep roots in many societies: estimates of the numbers of bonded labourers in India alone range between five and fifteen million. But the problem exists throughout South and South-East Asia, in South America and in Africa too. And it is less than a century since the last bonded labourers disappeared in Scotland.

Debt bondage arises typically when a small farmer borrows from a more prosperous neighbour or from a money-lender, for the purchase of seed for the new season's crop or of some animal or piece of necessary equipment. He can only redeem his debt by his own labour, but the interest rate is so high that very soon he finds that he is working virtually full-time for the lender and he may have to involve other members of his family too. Such debts are passed on from generation to generation and there is usually no escape. The system encourages large families in the hope that with many children providing extra labour it will be possible to liquidate the debt or some children may even be sold as servants or into prostitution.

In India, repeated attempts have been made to abolish the system of debt bondage, initially by the British and more recently by Mrs. Gandhi. But the system is deeply entrenched and is coupled to the dowry system and to other traditional extravagances, such as weddings far more lavish than the family can afford. The solution to the problem lies partly in land reform, partly in the creation of co-operative banks and largely in the education of the poorer classes. In India, the passive acceptance of hardship and injustice is to some extent encouraged by Hinduism and this makes the resolution of the problem especially intractable there. Debt bondage provides the nearest equivalent to chattel slavery and as such it will remain one of the Anti-Slavery Society's prime targets.

These, then, are the Society's principal interests and we shall continue to campaign for their elimination as long as the abuses persist. There are other matters such as forced marriages or female circumcision with which we are also concerned but which are not so universal as debt bondage, the exploitation of child labour or the infringement of the rights of indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, they are of equal importance and since they place women in a particularly disadvantageous position they can be equated with slavery. The topic of female circumcision is a particularly delicate one since it is a practice deeply ingrained in the societies where it is prevalent, often with religious and moral overtones as well as social pressures which add to the difficulty of eradication. For these reasons we adopt a very discreet approach, believing that female circumcision can only be combatted by the women of the country concerned with professional and technical help from outside. The deliberate maiming of one human being by others—even for what are supposed to be the best of reasons—is hard to comprehend, but at last one feels that there is a genuine movement in Africa towards its suppression. It may in the end come as quickly as the binding of feet was ended in China.

Some of the matters touched on above were dealt with nearly ten years ago in an article written for *Contemporary Review* by my predecessor as



Secretary, Patrick Montgomery. It is a reflection on the unchanging nature of man's inhumanity to man that the situation has remained so much the same in the past decade.

Nevertheless, the efforts of William Wilberforce and his friends did bring about the abolition of slavery and the slave trade, at least in the British dominions, and others followed suit. With constancy, determination and faith there is no doubt that these related evils will also be abolished. The Anti-Slavery Society welcomes new members, depending as it does on voluntary contributions and support.

[Peter Davies, OBE, succeeded Colonel Patrick Montgomery, OBE, MC, as Secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society in October 1980. An Oxford graduate, he served for six years in the Royal Artillery during World War II before joining the British Council. During his thirty years with the British Council he worked in Hungary, Israel, Sarawak, Finland, Chile and India as well as at the Council's London Headquarters. His last post was in Calcutta, a city which provided concentrated examples of all the abuses with which the Anti-Slavery Society is concerned.]

Enquiries regarding the Society should be addressed to The Secretary, 180 Brixton Road, London SW9 6AT, England.

The August number of *Contemporary Review* includes *Debating with Tigers: The Morality of Unilateral Disarmament: Notes on the Recent Debate* by W. J. Stankiewicz, *Roosevelt's New Deal Programme for Unemployed Youth: A Model for Today* by Ann Thedford Lanier, *Keeping Euro-Left: The Italian Communist Party* by Alan Hick and *The Importance of the Personal Vote* by Peter Ebsworth.

MR. PRIOR'S INITIATIVE

D. H. Young

THE past few weeks have been quite fascinating for the student of Northern Ireland politics. It is as if history is repeating itself before our eyes; the worrying thing is that we cannot yet be sure whether we are witnessing the unfolding of a tragedy or a farce. Mr. Prior seems determined to press on with his 'initiative', despite almost unanimous opposition from the Province's political parties, the very organisations one would expect to be the most avid supporters of devolution of any sort.

All the political parties have reservations about Mr Prior's plan; the Official Unionists and the SDLP have declared it to be unworkable, and factions within both these parties have toyed with the idea of boycotting any assembly elections; while the DUP welcome the *idea* of devolution, they oppose any talk of 'parliamentary tiers' to the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, to power-sharing with 'the enemies of Ulster' (i.e. the SDLP), and to the notion of a 'weighted majority'. Yet despite this chorus of protest from the very parties which will be required to operate whatever eventually emerges from the elections, Mr. Prior presses on.

It is said that all Mr. Prior wants, at first, is to get everyone to fight elections. But can even this minimal aim be achieved? Within the Unionist Party, the urge to boycott seems to have been conquered; the integrationist wing of the party, represented by Mr. Molyneaux and Mr. Powell, seems to have bowed to grass-roots pressure. The devolutionist wing (represented by Mr. Taylor and Mr. West) is in the ascendant. The position of the SDLP, however, is much less settled.

The SDLP have been thrown into a turmoil by the intervention of Provisional Sinn Fein. On the 9th of April, 1982, a Provisional Sinn Fein spokesman said this; 'John Hume has said it (Mr. Prior's initiative) won't work, but we have not yet had a decision from them on whether they will contest the election. The SDLP, if they follow the logic of John Hume's statement through, must boycott the election. If the SDLP decide to contest the election and to work the initiative we will not allow them to go unchallenged and masquerade as the voice of the nationalist people'.

If both the SDLP and Provisional Sinn Fein contest the elections, this will almost inevitably reduce the percentage of seats won by the SDLP. This result would throw the whole initiative out of joint, since it is an open secret that *all* the attempts at devolution in Northern Ireland over the past ten years have been designed to involve the SDLP in government as of right; but if the nationalist vote were to be split between the Provos and the SDLP this would be well-nigh impossible to achieve, even with a 70% weighted majority. The various Unionist parties would probably be able to gain 70% without the support of the SDLP, which

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defeats the whole purpose of power-sharing. Of course, if the Pr threat leads the SDLP to boycott the elections, the Unionist parties certainly dominate. It is to cope with situations like this that paragraph 43 of the White Paper (Cmnd 8541) was written. It gives the Secretary of State wide powers to ignore the recommendations of his constituent assembly if they do not have 'cross-community support' no matter the size of the majority backing them. If he likes the look of a recommendation, even if it does not have 70% support, he can put it before Parliament and advise its acceptance; on the other hand, 70% is not enough to secure his approval of recommendations he does not care for.

The White Paper is full of seemingly hard, unequivocal statements which are contradicted elsewhere. Paragraph 61 is entitled 'Sustaining Devolution'. It is concerned with what is to happen when devolved government breaks down. It breaks down when the devolved Executive loses 'the broad support in the Assembly' which led to devolution, in other words if the devolved government can no longer command 70% support in the Assembly. Then the Secretary of State will intervene to try to put it all back together again. But this implies that 70% support will be necessary on all government measures in the Assembly, rather than on votes of confidence. This is in flat contradiction to Paragraph 53 which states categorically that there will be no requirement for 70% support on votes of confidence or anything else.

Why have a devolution initiative at all? A number of reasons have been advanced over the past months by Ministers at Stormont Castle. It is alleged that devolved government is a prerequisite for political stability and economic development. The instability which results from Direct Rule is frightening off British and foreign industrialists who might otherwise invest in the Province. It all seems to have begun with Mr. Prior's speech at the last Conservative Party conference in October, where he expressed himself, and British public opinion in general, exasperated with 'bickering' Ulster politicians who could not agree among themselves. He went on to suggest that this failure to agree was having disastrous effects on the Province's economy. It strikes me as strange for a Minister (who, when at the Department of Employment, spent two years resisting the general direction of the government's economic policy in Cabinet), to come to Northern Ireland and begin to blame 'bickering' local politicians for the state of the Province's economy. Even if a devolved government were established, which I think very unlikely, the Northern Ireland economy would still be subject to the effects of central government economic policy, and there would be nothing that the local politicians could do about it. They would be unable to affect the PSBR; or the tax or interest rates. They could certainly do nothing about the money supply. It is also quite out of the question that any devolved government would be allowed to regain control of the security forces; there would thus be little it could do but complain to the Secretary of State about the campaign of violence. Economic and security matters would continue to be decided at Westminster, where they belong.

Mr. Prior and Lord Gowrie have often expressed their distaste for the unrepresentative nature of their administration. On a recent UTV 'Counterpoint' programme, Mr. Prior discoursed on how wonderful these 'meet-the-people' television programmes were, and how appalling it was that the people of Northern Ireland could not express their opinions more forcefully to him through the medium of a devolved assembly. There was also much self-criticism about the undemocratic nature of the Direct Rule administration, and the fact that all the NIO Ministers were Englishmen (with the exception of Lord Gowrie, who is a citizen of the Irish Republic). All stirring stuff. It would be easy to forget, when wafted aloft on these candid breezes, that Northern Ireland is a part of the UK, and has twelve M.P.s elected to Westminster whose job it is to represent the people of the Province, and to harry Ministers in the interests of their constituents. On the arguments of Mr. Prior, Scotland and Wales are also governed in a highly undemocratic manner which should be remedied forthwith with the introduction of 'rolling devolution'.

Devolution is advanced as a cure for all political and economic ills. Why, then, is it not being pressed upon other areas of Britain—Brixton, for example? Brixton is a good example of the weakness of Mr. Prior's plans. It, too, has its own unique problems, both political and economic. Why should it not be cut off from the general politics of the UK, as Northern Ireland is, by having the major UK political parties withdrawn from the area? The way would then be open for local political parties to emerge, representing the various racial groups of the locality. These parties would inevitably express the real or imagined grievances of each racial group; they could then proceed to 'bicker' furiously with each other. Nevertheless, the government would insist that they share power with each other in their own wee devolved government and would lecture them mercilessly on their failure to agree to do so, all the while blaming the racial tensions and economic problems of the area on the failure of these 'bickering' politicians to agree.

Wouldn't that be the ideal political solution for Brixton? And if it isn't ideal, why should it be considered just the thing for Northern Ireland? In fact, there is only one point of substance in the complaint about the 'undemocratic' nature of Direct Rule, and that is that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland cannot, as things stand, ever be an Ulsterman. The reason for this does not reside in some remnant of colonialism; it resides in the fact that at present neither the Conservative Party nor the Labour Party allow Northern Ireland people to join them, nor do they contest elections in the Province. This means that people in the Province cannot involve themselves in the politics of the UK. They are forced into the provincial, inward-looking parties which infest the Province. It is the major weakness of Direct Rule that, after the abolition of Stormont in 1972, the major UK parties did not organise in Northern Ireland. Had this been done, it would have provided a new outlet for political energy to replace the old, provincial one which had just been closed off. Ulster people are thus restricted to political parties which were formed to fight elections to a Parliament which no longer

exists. Mr. Prior, like Mr. Atkins, Mr. Rees and Mr. Whitelaw before him wishes to give them back a little place where they can fight among themselves once more. But there will still be a Secretary of State. He will still have wide discretionary powers; and he will still not be an Ulsterman because of the exclusion of Ulster people from the parties which can appoint UK governments and appoint Secretaries of State.

It must be asked: what likelihood is there that a compromise will be reached among the parties elected to Mr. Prior's new boxing ring at Stormont? At the elections, all the parties will re-state their basic principles and political aims; the Official Unionists their commitment to majority rule and the return of security powers to Stormont, the SDLP (if they stand) their commitment to power-sharing and the 'Irish Dimension', the DUP their intransigent opposition to both power-sharing and the 'Irish Dimension', the Alliance Party their desire for power-sharing but a very muted 'Irish Dimension', the NILP its commitment to full integration into the UK. Out of this is supposed to emerge a coalition.

Elections in Northern Ireland are turbulent affairs; Lambeg drums are beaten, flutes are played, and Mass-goers are picketed at the chapel gates. Old emotions, loyalties and animosities are stirred. It is not an atmosphere likely to induce a spirit of forgive and forget. Is it likely that in the aftermath of such an election campaign, having spent weeks pouring scorn on the political principles and practices of each other, the elected representatives will then allow themselves to be wooed by their erstwhile nemeses? The idea would be laughable, were it not that Mr. Prior appears resolute in his determination to go ahead with this reckless course of action. Barry White, a political commentator on the *Belfast Telegraph*, neatly expresses the apprehension felt in many quarters in Northern Ireland as the 'initiative draws nearer.

He (Mr. Prior) says he recognises the two identities, which I presume means that one lot will vote for a British Ulster and the other lot will vote for an Irish Ulster. But afterwards, he hopes that the two sets of politicians can get together to make some kind of communal future, even though their political aspirations are pulling in opposite directions... What amazes me is that someone should breeze in from England, ignoring all the advice and evidence—from the 26 council chambers—to the contrary, and decide that power-sharing is possible in the present context... So why bother, except to produce more confrontation and a lot less stability.³

Northern Ireland has seen many of these ambitious schemes for restoring devolved government over the past ten years; all have failed, as this latest one is likely to fail. Their major contribution to politics has been to prolong the IRA campaign, which feeds off the conflict and inter-communal tensions these 'initiatives' stir. It is quite impossible to imagine that any devolved government in Northern Ireland could survive a sustained campaign to raise the sectarian temperature; no devolved government could have survived the hunger-strikes; the last one did not survive the UWC strike. Inter-community conflict of this order would easily split a local power-sharing executive: it is dishonest to pretend otherwise.

It is time the great secret was out—Northern Ireland is a region of the UK which is entirely unsuitable for devolved government because of the

national and religious tensions within it. Stormont ought not to have been set up in the early 1920's; it was no part of the political project of Lord Carson to have a local parliament. But the last sixty years have never eroded the integrationist elements of Unionism. The experience of fifty years of Stormont has replaced the unionism of Carson with a petty and mean-spirited Devolutionism which can only serve to breathe life into irredentist Irish nationalism.

The great achievement of the past thirteen years was the abolition of Stormont. Its restoration in any shape or form is to be deplored; it acted purely as a magnifying glass for the conflict between unionists and nationalists. The introduction of what has become known as Direct Rule has worsened relations between Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland; attempts at devolution can only increase the level of conflict because they rouse old fears and desires. Since Direct Rule removed one focus of unionist-nationalist conflict, it has tended to stabilise Ulster society: Protestants no longer govern Catholics, and it is hard for Catholics to work up the same sort of animus against Westminster that they felt against Stormont. Insofar as Northern Ireland still remains part of the UK it could be interpreted as a victory for 'the Protestants', but it is not a victory that puts the Protestants 'on top'.

It is hard to understand Mr. Prior's haste to get rid of Direct Rule. For all its admitted weaknesses, it has a fairly honourable record when compared to the Stormont period. In fact, this basic acceptability of Direct Rule is recognised in the White Paper. Should devolution lose 'broad support' the Government would have the option of reverting to Direct Rule. Thus Direct Rule is implicitly recognised as the stable fallback position after the collapse of experiments in devolution.

It is tempting to suggest that this might be the last attempt at bringing devolution to Northern Ireland that we will see for a long time. At the next General Election there will be 17 Ulster seats at Westminster; four or five of them are likely to be filled by representatives of the Catholic community. It will be the first time that that community will have been properly represented at the real political centre of the UK. There is no doubt that it will be a novel experience. As Eric Heffer has remarked in another context, the Commons is a great leveller and moderator of views. The presence of a representative block of MP's from the Catholic side of Northern Ireland will mark a step forward in the process of 'creeping integration' of Northern Ireland and its peoples into the social and political life of the UK, and a step away from the introverted sterility of provincial politics.

NOTES

1. *Belfast Telegraph*, 9.4.82.
2. *Belfast Telegraph*, 8.4.82.

[D. H. Young, was born in Belfast and educated at Belfast High School. He is at present engaged in post graduate research at The University of Sussex into aspects of the regional politics of the United Kingdom.]

MILTON FRIEDMAN OR CLARK GABLE?

by Michael Hughes

SIR Geoffrey Howe recently told a joke. Following the precedent set by previous Chancellors of the Exchequer, this was told at the expense of economists—that much maligned group of individuals who have taken to writing in groups. Sir Geoffrey defined an economist as somebody who knew 364 ways of making love but didn't know any women! While the author is anxious to defend his own position he nevertheless agrees with the basic sentiment. Economists have allowed themselves to be placed in a position where they offer more than they can deliver. This is particularly true in the case of the design and implementation of monetary policy.

The control of the quantity of money in the economy has been a central plank of the Tory Government's economic policy. Yet their fourth Budget presented last March contained clues that this was no longer top priority. Have they changed their minds? Have monetary economists misled them? Or have they been so successful that they can now move on to another objective?

The answer depends on whose economic philosophy you believe they adhere to. The most vocal proponent of monetarism has been Milton Friedman and his views and beliefs were often cited during the early days of the Tory Administration. The design of their early monetary policy was, however, little different from that pursued (successfully for the most part) by the previous Labour team. They justified their policy by the need to have a balanced economy devoid of extremes of public spending, taxation or monetary expansion. The Tory team shared these monetary objectives but had extreme plans for spending and taxation. They received qualified support from the great man himself. Milton Friedman¹ in a memorandum to the House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee, wrote 'I strongly approve of the general outlines of monetary strategy' and 'the numerical targets for the growth of the money supply seem to be the right order of magnitude'. He went on, however, to criticise the means whereby the authorities sought to control the money supply. His was the simplest of recommendations. Deny money to the banks and they in turn will not be in a position to pass it on excessively. This was referred to as the control of high powered money. Operationally, however, it was not on, at least, if you wished to maintain some of the oldest established houses in the City of London. Since there was a steady stream of visitors from Westminster and Whitehall to such institutions to witness at first hand how monetary policy worked it did not seem very gentlemanly to remove them from the scene. The mandarins saved any potential embarrassment by arguing that it was the demand for money which should be controlled, not its supply. Friedman disagreed fundamentally and so distanced himself from any comeback should monetarism be seen to fail in the UK. The City was left intact

and watched the authorities attempt to control the supply of money by controlling the demand for it via fiscal policy and interest rates. This route was indirect and imprecise and so for the first two years it was difficult to discern whether it was working or not.

Converts to new monetarism were appalled by the money supply seemingly being out of control. Through 1980 and indeed 1981 the money supply seemed to be heading for the peak growth rates seen during the 'Barber boom' of the early seventies. Students of the monetarists of yesteryear—Ricardo, Blake and Malthus—were less concerned. They had provided two criteria to gauge the ease or tightness of monetary policy. One was the price of gold and the other was the state of the foreign exchanges. The rapid decline in the gold price from its record peak at the beginning of 1980 indicated that monetary policy world-wide was becoming more restrictive. The strength of sterling was a sign that UK monetary policy was more restrictive than those of other economies. That monetary policy was tight and successful has only begun to dawn on the converts now that low single figure inflation is in prospect and an economic recovery is still materialising. For only the second time in twenty years the UK will have an economic growth rate which is higher than the OECD average (the boom year of 1973 was the last occasion). Why then has the Tory administration downgraded monetary policy? It is surely too early to conclude that its policy to date has been so successful that it can afford to focus on other objectives.

To return to an earlier question, could it be that the Friedmanite philosophy was not the overriding policy? It is the author's contention that the longer term objectives of this administration were based on beliefs not adequately or conveniently expressed by any classic economic philosopher. Rather they were borne of concern over the size and role of the public sector and its relationship with the wealth-creating sectors. Reliance on the public sector for something other than pomp and protection is a marked characteristic of the twentieth century. Economic history provides no comparable example. Little wonder then that the economists of previous eras failed to comprehend the implications of a large and rising public sector. Since the financing of the public sector has been the greatest single influence on monetary flows it is hardly surprising that monetary control, in a pure monetarist's sense, should refer to control over the size and functioning of the public sector. But why should there be a direct connection between the size of the public sector and the rate of inflation? The most convincing answer has been provided not in any economics text book but rather by an old black and white cowboy movie called *Honkytonk* starring Clark Gable. Its significance was first realised by American Journalist David Warsh.²

The film portrayed Clark Gable as a two-bit gambler who kept getting kicked out of town for cheating. As time wore on he got tired of this and confided in his side-kick that what they really needed was a town of their own. So they took the train one stop down the line to a town called Honkytonk and there they proceeded to promote *honest* gambling.

The town's crooks were thwarted and the townsfolk became ecstatic. Eventually they were elected mayor and sheriff respectively. Once in office Gable built a church and hired a gang to impose his will. In short, he had created the public sector.

To pay for it he levied taxes on the town's merchants who for a while were quite happy to pay their dues. But a few churches, schools and sub-gangs later they rebelled. They cornered Gable. No more taxes, they cried. He calmed them down as only a gun-toting mayor could. Go back, he told them, and raise the price of Colt 45's and saddles and horses. Honkytonk had law and order but they also had Clark Gable and rising prices.

The moral of the Clark Gable School of Economics is that you can only produce a sustained reduction in the rate of inflation if you can cut taxes and you can only get away with cutting taxes, permanently, if you can reduce public spending.

Therein lies Mrs. Thatcher's hope and her dilemma. Public spending relative to total income has increased throughout the first three years of her term of office. The March Budget statement announced that in the fiscal year 1981-82 public spending accounted for 45% of Gross Domestic Product up from 41% in 1979-80 and in sharp contrast to their original objective of 'below 40%' by 1983-84. As a consequence taxation has increased—not fallen as had been hoped.

The only real progress on the tax front has been the substantial reduction in the marginal rate of income tax from 98% to 75%. The average rate of income tax (including National Insurance Payments) is higher. The government has often expressed the desire to reduce the standard rate of income tax to 25%, but as our illustration demonstrates, this can only be achieved if public spending reduces relative to total output. To get lower taxes there has to be a permanent reduction in the number of Clark Gables.

The March 1982 Budget contained the new forecast that by 1984/85 public spending should be back to 41% of gross output—the starting point for the current Tory Administration. Even accepting the accuracy of this forecast (more on this later) it suggests that no progress will have been made by this Administration in reducing the *relative* size of the public sector. This is not entirely fair for two reasons. Firstly, relative to the public spending plans of the last Labour Administration there have been substantial spending cuts. Secondly, much of the 'overspending' can be attributed to higher costs rather than to the public sector creeping forward. Unemployment, for example, has not only been around 500,000 adults per year higher than had been envisaged but the average yearly cost of an unemployed person is nearly 50% greater than was first estimated. Similarly the average level of interest rates has greatly exceeded their original guesses (and hopes). But nevertheless even allowing for these factors there is a *modest* increase in the size of the public sector at a time when the private sector has visibly shrunk.

Consequently the prospect of taxes being significantly lower at the

end of this government's term of office look slim. Their success lies in changing the composition of taxes and the tax system itself. Indirect taxes (including nationalised industry prices) have increased relative to direct (income) taxes and there has been a shift away from company taxation towards personal taxes. More significantly steps, albeit modest at this stage, have been taken to simplify and update tax legislation. We are still far from producing a one or two page tax return with all but the most basic tax allowances withdrawn and the assessment of income received gloriously simplified. Perhaps the computerisation of the Inland Revenue now promised to the next Administration will facilitate greater advances. But the most significant changes to date concern not the taxation of personal income but company tax legislation and capital gains duty. A Green Paper on Corporate Taxation foreshadows major changes to company tax legislation, probably in the Spring 1983 Budget. The introduction of the principle of indexation to Capital Gains taxation in the March 1982 Budget marks a significant step forward in removing one anomaly inherent in any inflationary era. Clearly, Treasury ministers have not been idle. No reduction in average taxation may have occurred but the changes to the composition and principles of taxation have few precedents. However, what is the danger that taxation, far from coming down even over the long-term, will actually go up?

To return to our earlier assessment, this will only occur if public spending is higher than planned. The March 1982 estimates for spending are difficult to assess. The presentation of their spending plans has been redesigned, indeed so has the general presentation of the overall budget stance. Two-colour tables and 'easy-to-read' pages now hide or generally exclude the really important numbers. Sir Humphrey has done a good job at thoroughly disguising the government's spending plans. Without the necessary back-up details it is virtually impossible to judge whether their spending plans are realistic or, more importantly, compatible with lower taxes. Intuition says they are not. Rough adjustments to the published figures suggest that there will have to be major value spending cuts in fiscal 1983/84 if their plans are to be adhered to. Who would bet on that in an election year? Moreover, the so-called contingency fund—included to cover costing errors or simply acts of God—is not so great that it could match the cost of the likely underestimation of public sector pay and a prolonged conflict in the South Atlantic. At the very least the Falkland crisis should prompt a total review of the Defence programme. Few politicians are going to support a commitment to run down the Royal Navy in the election run-up. The probabilities are therefore mounting that the proposed public sector programme is again underestimated. The conclusion is that taxes will have to be higher still either directly in the form of tax rates or public sector prices, or indirectly in the form of inflation.

This raises one final point. Earlier we drew attention to the excessive growth of the money supply which is indeed similar to the early 1970's. Would Friedman not argue that this signals another bout of rapidly

rising prices irrespective of government spending and taxation policy? Some monetarists, notably those attached to the City of London Business School, are arguing thus. But are they right? It is important to remember that an excessive growth of the money supply need not stimulate higher inflation. It depends on what happens to this excess money. Only three things can happen to it. Either it is spent or saved or it flows overseas. The first channel can be and usually is, inflationary. Large demands for goods and labour have produced domestic 'demand pull' and 'cost push' inflations—the classic pre-seventies text book case. The latter two channels are more relevant for current analysis. The evidence now supports the hypothesis that most of the excess money creation in 1979/81 found its way to personal bank and building society deposit accounts. Provided it could be 'neutralised' in the sense that its immediate impact on demand was minimised there need not be inflationary pressures at least not over the monetarists normal time span. The promotion of National Savings in the March 1981 Budget was designed to do just this. And it succeeded. Fiscal 1981/82 was a record year for National Savings. Most of the excess money growth was successfully neutralised. But there remains the third channel—an outflow of currency overseas. Given that this is the first economic recovery since exchange controls were abolished in October 1979 the importance of this channel should not be underestimated. There is indeed evidence that not only some of this excessive money growth but also part of structural domestic deposits are being diversified overseas. Moreover, in the last six months there is evidence that this is occurring at a greater rate than the benefits of North Sea oil are accruing. Sterling is therefore weakening with the result that inflation will be higher than it otherwise would have been. This inflation input need not be great or lasting. There are already signs that excess money growth is diminishing fast so over the 1979/84 period it may still be that some progress will have been made in securing a lower underlying inflation rate—perhaps by 3-4% per annum. But a more important test of the government's success should be the reduction of taxation. It is this which figures as the number one priority in the unpublished opinion polls. It will take a second term of office to secure this but it may no longer be the case that the electorate is so naive as not to realise this. They may be disappointed in having to wait so long for lower taxes to appear but they do seem prepared to wait.

NOTES

1. Milton Friedman, House of Commons, Treasury and Civil Service Committee Session 1979-80, *Memoranda on Monetary Policy* HC (1979-80) 720, HMSO, London, 1980, paras. 7 and 8.
2. David Warsh, *Forbes*, 'Inflation is now too serious a matter to leave to the economists', November 15th, 1976.

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EXPLAINING INDIA

by John Elsom

WE were standing, the three of us, journalists taking a break from copy, in a museum in Delhi, clutching our guidebooks. 'What I don't understand is this,' said Gwen from Melbourne, a fashion editor. 'Once you've got yourself into that position, how do you get out of it?'

She was looking at an ancient statuette of a dancer, incredibly poised on a lotus with a slightly bent left leg, right knee doubled and turned outwards, the torso twisted into a reverse S, with the swellings of the rounded breasts exactly balancing those of the out-thrust buttocks. 'Maybe,' said Bruce, 'that's why they need all those arms, to untangle themselves.' 'Well,' I suggested, 'I'm sure we can get someone to explain.' They looked at me aghast. 'That's exactly,' said Gwen, 'what we don't want.'

The serious student (as opposed to tourists and journalists) of Indian classical dance has to approach the subject through a deep haze of explanations. Let me explain the explanations, as my guide once tried to do, and why they are, to Westerners, so deeply opaque, referring the reader who just wants to know where to put the feet to a magnificently produced book on the subject from MARG publications of Bombay (*Bharata Natyam*, 1979). The authors, who provide a wealth of technical detail, stress nonetheless that the art is a devotional one, whose aim is spiritual enlightenment.

('If it's devotional,' commented Bruce, 'that explains everything. You can always twist yourself into knots in the service of God.')

In the West, we do not think of dance as a kind of prayer, quite the reverse, still less as a means to achieve that transcendental experience described by Rukmini Devi, the dancer whose range of gestures and postures illustrate the text of *Bharata Natyam*. 'A truly spiritual artist,' she writes, 'is one who forgets himself and in that self-forgetfulness achieves the Bliss which is called *Ananda*. This is why Nataraja's dance is called *Ananda Tandavum*—the final achievement by which He, the Yogi of Yogis, brings body and soul together, heaven and earth together, thereby bringing the world to salvation and blessing it with Liberation or *Moksha*.'

Bruce, a tourist pro who liked the coaches to run on time and knew where the golf courses were, dealt severely with such stuff. He would pull us down behind the parapets of his scepticism, letting the strafe of mystical rhetoric fly harmlessly over our heads. Gwen, however, kept bobbing up and down, inviting the mind-blowing shaft of wisdom to do its worst; whereas I settled down in the muddy trenches of my selective and irrational reason, fingering over the jagged pieces of shrapnel crudely labelled as Facts.

Bharata is supposed to have been an Indian sage who, more than two thousand years ago, formulated a comprehensive framework for the arts, which provides the theoretical basis even today for traditional dance dramas (including temple dancing) in their many regional and local forms. 'Natya' means 'drama with speech', but Bharata Natyam is the generic term for Indian classical dance, particularly associated nowadays with Southern India and whose purest forms can be found in the Tamil districts.

Bharata conceived of theatre as an amalgam of all kinds of media and genre, including music, mime, dance, gestures, decor and costumes, together with details of staging. The aim was the embodiment in theatrical form of spiritual states of being, and he distinguished between naturalistic representation, equivalent to the Greek *mimesis*, and the stylised conventions of the stage (*natya*). Many of his views seem modern. Acting is a way of educating the audience by arousing the latent possibilities of aesthetic appreciation, an idea of which Sir Roy Shaw would no doubt approve; and the Sanskrit word *abhinaya*, which has been borrowed to cover many aspects of the actor's art, means to educate, or 'lead the play towards the audience'. *Abhinaya* is separated in Bharata's teaching into four elements—*Aharya*, which relates to costumes, jewellery and make-up, *Vachika*, to speeches and songs by the actors, *Angika*, to bodily movements and gestures, and *Satvika*, to the expression of psychic states. The coding does not end there. Bharata lists the nine aesthetic emotions which are 'experienced universally', which include the erotic, the heroic, the pathetic, the wondrous, the furious, the fearful, the disgusting and the tranquil, all contained under *Satvika*, and there are manifestations of these emotions considered more appropriate for men rather than women, and vice versa.

On the way back to the Ashok Hotel, I bored Gwen and Bruce by searching for Western analogies. A parallel which immediately sprang to mind was with Aristotle's *Poetics*. Like Bharata, Aristotle sought for a comprehensive description of the Greek theatre of his day, together with a wider justification of *mimesis* as an activity, and his theories, too, provided a theoretical basis for the development of Western drama, gentrified by Boileau, suburbanised by Scribe, rationalised by Ibsen, adapted to the demands of the Oxbridge Eng-Lit courses by Bradley and very nearly gassed to death by Brecht. Like Bharata, Aristotle drew his examples from mythology, which illustrated what he was saying and also provided the supreme heights to which actors should aim. In Greek mythology, too, the gap between godlike and human behaviour is narrow, as it is in Hindu mythology, although the Hindus stress the divinity in all creation.

(Bruce fell asleep in the car, a remarkable feat against the blaring of the horn and the stopping and starting in the crowded streets. 'It's the heat,' he explained. 'He has a blind spot,' said Gwen, 'with anything that you can't hit or eat.')

But frankly I was falling asleep too, with the effort of making com-

parisons, because the more analogies we found, the more obvious and fundamental the differences between Aristotle and Bharata became, and these disparities, instead of confining themselves to two ancient sages better forgotten, seemed to spread outwards to encompass the gulf between Western and Eastern mentalities. They reflected upon those features of India which most irritated Bruce. 'How is it possible?' he would say. 'How can you have one shop selling complicated Japanese cameras, while right next door, they're polishing precious stones on a lathe which consists of one wooden rod and a bit of string attached to a pedal? How can you have kids carrying baskets of stones on their heads, as if pulleys and wheels had never been invented, when you have elevators in every hotel? How can you build palaces, where the rooms are cooled by ducts of water, when you can't irrigate the fields? It's mad. The place is full of learned men, but nobody seems to have learnt anything.'

'It's a different kind of wisdom,' said Gwen. 'Don't explain,' said Bruce, 'I'm tired of explanations.' And so was I, and so was Gwen, but the alternative to explanation was to accept the presence of a mentality so alien to ours that its assumptions continually challenged and undermined our confidence. And so we simply had to go on explaining, and listening to explanations, until we fell asleep, in the attempt to reconcile India to our way of thought, thus proving ourselves superior, for if we could understand them, it might pre-empt the possibility that they had the jump on us.

Aristotle and Bharata was as good a point of departure for this exercise as any, for one was a descriptive theorist, the other prescriptive. Aristotle was concerned with emotional release, Bharata with fulfilment. Aristotle proceeds dialectically, with caution, from point to point, and enters into a debate with a formidable master, Plato. Would Aristotle have propounded his theory of *catharsis*, if Plato had not damned all fiction as causing the arousal of false desire? Aristotle's methods invite counter-argument, which is what they have received, to the present day; whereas Bharata's seek to embrace all points of view, each given its mythological reference, its place in a well-mapped universe where the gods are no less human than men and men no less divine than the gods. In Aristotle, we can detect the origins of the scientific method, including the shedding of theories proved wrong by experience. The concept of evolutionary progress is inherent in Aristotle, absent from Bharata, for whom both theories and experiences are there to be refined by faith.

Aristotle, moreover, was a man, with dates, who could be contradicted with impunity; whereas Bharata is merely the name given to the compiler of the treatise on the stage, the *Natyasastra*, written sometime between the 2nd century BC and the 2nd century AD. Bharata is probably an acronym from three words, Bha (from *bhava*, emotion), Ra (from *raga*, melody) and Ta (from *tala*, rhythm). The *Natyasastra* is a holy scripture, the fifth Veda, and thus not to be contradicted, although it can be adapted, expounded, discoursed upon and, of course, explained *ad infinitum*.

But its mastery of stage detail is extraordinary. The statuette in the museum could be analysed through the *Natyasastra*, as could the poses of Rukmini Devi. You can find out what hand movements signify the Bee or the Snake and how to develop a body language through dance as precise as deaf-and-dumb signs, as elegant as the honeysuckle floating through the breeze.

It is as if our Bible had laid down instructions as to what kind of production would be most appropriate for *The Sleeping Beauty* at Sadler's Wells, and how it would have to be adapted for the Barbican. But it is not so rigid that it does not allow for regional variations nor, of course, for improvisation; and whereas in Western drama we can see how the theatre has progressed from its Greek origins, attuning itself not just to the needs of the times but also to the growing awareness of possibilities, the theatre based on the *Natyasastra* has developed in a different way, by a kind of accretion, layer upon layer of local interpretations built up and moulded like papier mâché on an intricate framework of theory.

When in Britain, we want to produce a Greek tragedy, we have to undertake a massive re-construction job, as Sir Peter Hall did with *The Oresteia*, inventing our own masks (because the Greeks used masks), writing new music (because we know very little about Greek music), attempting to match in modern language the power of the original choruses and affecting a sophisticated tolerance towards ideas (such as the belief that the woman is merely the nurse to the male seed) which we know to be misguided. The result is something less than imitation, little more than a humourless parody. In India, however, not only can you find dance-dramas in villages whose pattern and identity have remained recognisably similar to those of their Vedic origins, and yet still vital, still attended by crowds; but also dancers who observe and train on the disciplines of Bharata.

Hence, Westerners are confronted not just with a sub-continent, with more nations and languages than we find in Europe, but also one which has preserved different historical stratas, existing side by side, a country whose past does not have to be unearthed and pieced together from archaeological sites, but parades itself around us, timeless in the midst of change. In rural towns in Italy, in Greek villages, one can sense something of such continuity, which may partly derive from the nature of country life; but in India, with 70% of its population living under (by Western standards) the most primitive peasant conditions, the demands of precarious survival operate against the taking of chances, hence experiment leading to development. Galbraith, a prototype Western liberal (for the sake of example), has described the Indian economy as 'functioning anarchy'; but his gloomy fears that the agricultural revolution would not reach India in time to meet the demands of its growing population, were, he now admits, exaggerated. For reasons obscure to Western minds, India works, aided not so much by technology, still less by investment, but by its sustaining culture.

The paradoxes of India were an affront to Bruce's sense of logic. If

he'd stayed there much longer, he would have madly tried to tidy India up, to take on that Herculean task of 'clearing the crap' from Indian stables, crap which formed part of the plaster of the walls in Indian villages, fed their fires, fertilised their ground. He left Delhi for Jaipur and came back in a high state of indignation, but laden with what he called trinkets. 'There's an observatory there. It was built in the seventeenth century and it's laid out in a garden. You can calculate all the angles of the sun and moon from it, the positions of the stars, the shade required by buildings. Now you'd think, wouldn't you?, that a country so scientifically advanced three hundred years ago would have learnt by now how to use solar energy to power electric generators. What do they use it for? Astrology, for Christ's sake!' Gwen, who had been trying to persuade me to visit the astrologer and palmist at the Ashok Hotel, kept quiet. Bruce went on to talk about the primitive craftsmen in the street shops of Agra and Jaipur, turning out 'these trinkets', but you could tell by the way in which he handled a Krishna carved in ivory, a bracelet for a girl friend, a small inlaid box, that his eyes and fingers admired what his brain dismissed.

'You must speak to him,' Gwen urged me privately, about the resident astrologer. 'He knows everything. He told me things about myself that I'd quite forgotten, really private things. He says I'm due for a change in fortune. I can't say more.'

But the astrologer's time was booked, and so was mine. I had an appointment to meet Kapila Vatsyayan at the Department of Education—whose office, piled high with books, files, loose papers and folders, was a model of functioning anarchy. Dr. Vatsyayan is an authority on Indian theatre, a former dancer and the author of a pioneering study, *Traditional Indian Theatre: Multiple Streams*, whose clarity of thought and care with abstractions would have contented even Bruce. Her face was lined with authority, her eyes bright and welcoming, and she sat lightly at her desk, at ease but not desk-bound, as if ready to dart mentally in any direction. She had been called in to help with the Festival of India in London and we talked about the problems of presenting the exhibition on an Indian village at the Museum of Mankind. 'There is no such thing as a typical Indian village,' she said. 'There are many kinds of villages. You can't just photograph a few mud huts and say, "Here is a village".' 'Isn't that the problem,' I asked, 'with the whole Festival?' 'It may be a problem,' she said, 'but the fact that it is insoluble is no excuse for not tackling it.'

She asked me why I had wanted to come to India. 'Let me explain . . .' I began, but found it difficult to do so. There were so many reasons, the sheer lure of the place being one, but also because I had found myself in London taking a condescending attitude towards all those Indian craft products in Kensington Market and Portobello Road, dismissing them (as Bruce had done) as pretty trinkets. Another motive was the thought that over the summer, we would be bombarded by Indian exhibitions in London, Indian dancers and theatre troupes, about whose origins I knew

nothing and yet, as a journalist, would be called upon to describe. Cultures uprooted from their environment and their civilisations quickly become nothing more than decorative *kitsch*, essentially meaningless because they have been separated from that which gives them meaning, the life of the unknown people. Now, of course, my Indian trip could give me nothing more than a slight taste of the reality which infuses Indian art, a tentative chew on a betel nut wrapped in a leaf, but that might be better than no taste at all.

'Let me explain . . . ' I went on. 'I think that many people in the West feel that we have come to the end of our methods of thought. We can't talk about evolution any more. We can't believe in the idea of technological progress. It's too dangerous. We'll either blow ourselves up or squander the earth's resources. We have to find some way of living in harmony with ourselves and with nature. And that is what we can learn, or think we can learn, from you . . . '

It sounded dreadfully unconvincing. In Delhi, there are many signs that India is learning from the West, is absorbing the West, lock, stock and barrel. A strike of civil servants had been called for the following day, the middle-classes protesting against low wages; and Mrs. Gandhi's government, like Mrs. Thatcher's, was determined not to be shaken.

But Kapila Vatsyayan responded not to the banality of my words, but to the groping uncertainty of the thoughts behind them. 'Let me explain . . . ' she said, and went on to talk about Hindu philosophy, rural development, the tribal territories, the mythologies, the practical problems in understanding them, the impact of the West, until the water level in my jug of explanations had risen several inches and was spilling over the sides.

'Please explain . . . ' I said, when I wanted her to go on. 'Let me explain . . . ' I said, when I wanted her to stop. But time soaked up the explanations and grew dry in the heat again.

Gwen, who had gone on to Kashmir from Delhi, phoned Bruce from her hotel. 'It's so beautiful here,' she said. 'You just want to stand and look. You don't want to do anything in India but just look. It's such a *giving* place.' 'She's mad,' said Bruce, in disgust. 'Absolutely, totally mad,' throwing his trinkets, one by one, into his case, ready to return home. 'That's it,' he said at last. 'That's packed up India. If I stayed here any longer, I'd go mad too.'

But I had a few more days left and was already plotting a second visit.

['A Tourist in India', the first of three articles on India by John Elsom, was published in the June 1982 issue (Vol. 240, No. 1397). 'London's India', the third article in the series, will appear in the August number.]

HERBERT SPENCER: THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE

by Betty Abel

BY 1877 Herbert Spencer's book, *The Study of Sociology*, composed of his first set of articles in the *Contemporary Review*, had reached its sixth edition in *The International Scientific Series*.¹² Published in New York by Appletons, at the instigation of Professor Youmans, its London publisher was Henry S. King & Co. The series has several significant aspects, not least as an indicator of Spencer's standing at that time amongst his scientific peers. 1877 is a convenient date at which to assess his relative popularity with the reading public, as well as to estimate the didactic scope of the series as a whole. It then contained twenty volumes, each already reprinted more than once. Only that of Professor Tyndall, on the properties of water, had been re-issued as often as Spencer's *Sociology*. Both were surpassed in selling power by John William Draper's *History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science*, then in its eighth edition. The *Conflict* was the launch-pad for the evolutionary arguments put forth by eminent scientists and political philosophers from Europe and America, in a form designed to be both persuasive and comprehensible. Besides Spencer, the private scholar, all other contributors were professional research workers and some were household names. The list includes:

Walter Bagehot: *Physics and Politics*, or Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of 'Natural Selection' and 'Inheritance' to Political Society. (Third edition.)

Professor Alexander Bain (Aberdeen University): *Mind and Body*. (Fifth edition.)

Henry Maudsley (founder of the Maudsley Hospital): *Responsibility in Mental Disease*. (Second edition.)

Professor Oscar Schmidt (University of Strasburg): *The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism*. (Third edition.)

Professor William Dwight Whitney (Yale College): *The Life and Growth of Language*. (Second edition.)

Why should books like these contain matter of immediate popular concern? One possible reason is surely that the 'religion of Science' implied to mid-Victorian cultivated minds the inviting prospect that all problems arising out of the relation of man to man, and even man to the universe, could ultimately be solved through the methods of physical science. Spencer's social science, whilst chiming with and even leading a 'faith' in society's upward progress, contains a spirit of economic and political compromise that might bring solace to his readers, illogical though that spirit may be. For he possessed a sturdy political expertise which moved him to temper the wind to the shorn lamb in matters concerning the social order. In his final essay in the sociological series in the

Contemporary Review (Vol. 22, October 1873) he finds it possible to say:

Just as injurious as it would be to an amphibian to cut off its branchiae before its lungs were well developed; so injurious must it be to destroy all [a community's] old institutions before the new have become organised enough to take their place . . .

Again, coming nearer to basic concerns:

. . . In the speeches and writings of those who advocate various political and social changes, there is so continuous a presentation of injustices, and abuses, and mischiefs, and corruptions, as to leave the impression that for securing a wholesome state of things there needs nothing but to set aside present arrangements.

And further,

. . . Though the process of social evolution is in its general character so far pre-determined, that its successive stages cannot be ante-dated, and hence no teaching or policy can advance it beyond a certain normal rate, which is limited by the organic modification in human beings; yet it is quite possible to perturb, to retard, or to disorder the process. The analogy of individual development again serves us. . . It is quite easy to adopt a treatment which shall dwarf, or deform, or otherwise injure. . . Similarly with the social organism. Though by maintaining favourable conditions, there cannot be any more good done than that of letting social progress go unhindered, yet an immensity of mischief may be done in the way of disturbing and distorting and repressing, by policies carried out in pursuance of erroneous conceptions.

The notion that distortion and retardation are possible effects of action, but not amelioration or acceleration, is strangely irrational. And how could so strictly pre-determined and programmed a course be deflected at all? But Spencer's inability to entertain challenge to his carefully constructed edifice, composed of rightly-positioned bricks round the cornerstone, made him unwilling, unlike most philosophers, to expect and prepare to counter adverse moves in the building game. Another instance of such unphilosophical behaviour is found in Spencer's preface to a widely-read *Epitome* of his *Synthetic Philosophy* written, with his blessing, by F. Howard Collins, one of his devoted assistants. Here he blandly advises the reader to take each abstract proposition slowly, pausing, in the absence of the author's apt illustrations, to supply his own examples in support of the argument. He does not anticipate objections based on counter-examples.

The edifice of the *Principles of Sociology*¹⁸ is based on a detailed comparison between animal organisms and human societies, worked out in three main systems. In both there are regulative, sustaining and distributing organisations. Animals are regulated by the central nervous system, societies by government: animals are sustained by alimentation, societies by industry: animals distribute their resources through veins and arteries, societies through roads, telegraphs and other means of transport. There are two corollaries, one descriptive, the other prescriptive. The first is that, unlike animals who each have one consciousness relating to the whole organism, society has no collective mind. The second is that society exists for the benefit of its members and not they for its benefit. The second thesis, by no means new, is the part of his theory that increasingly claimed Spencer's attention in his later years. When in the course of their 'unhindered' development people press their own claims at the ex-

pense of others' interests, seeking pleasure or happiness (the hedonistic belief to which Spencer adhered), justice (another of his prime objects) requires some agency to mediate between rival claims. He therefore set bargaining at the centre of his social contract. It is at the heart of his Liberal political scheme and, in the late nineteenth century industrial climate, only the fittest could survive. 'Natural selection' would work in its favour.

It was Spencer's intention of using his curiously unmathematical equation (between individual organic growth and the 'growth' of its aggregates) to bolster strongly naturalistic *laissez-faire* arguments against a rising tide of socialists that led him again, in 1884, to contribute a series of four articles to the *Contemporary Review*, this time as an avowed defender of the existing social order. Sir Percy Bunting, then editing the *Review*, was an influential member of the Liberal Party. The essays consisted of four broadsides, under provocative titles, aimed at the proliferating legislative measures with which Gladstone's administration of 1880-1885 found itself forced to contend. A mixture in Government of old Radicals and new Socialists seemed to Spencer (and others like Joseph Chamberlain) to threaten private enterprise and, instead of protecting the labouring poor, to increase their burden. Some of the measures proposed were responses to the evidence produced by Royal Commissions and Committees of Enquiry. Many of them concerned the housing of workers in London's East End. Examples are the Select Committee on Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings Improvement, 1882, the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes, 1885, as well as the continuous flow of Bills applying to the education and employment of children.¹⁴ Much of the resulting controversy was carried on through books, pamphlets and periodicals such as the *Westminster*, *Fortnightly* and *Contemporary Reviews*. Spencer, then at the peak of his fame, embraced the individualist cause against State encroachments on personal liberty, seeing increasing taxation and other constraints as inimical to both rich and poor. In essays entitled 'The New Toryism', 'The Coming Slavery', 'The Sins of Legislators' and 'The Great Political Superstition' he laid the foundation for a volume, published four months later as *The Man Versus The State*.

The sole reference in the *Autobiography* to the articles occurs in Chapter LXIII, covering the years 1882-1889:

More than six years have passed by since the incidents narrated in the last chapter [i.e. his return in poor health from a three months' stay in America]; and were I to give an account of these years after the same manner as heretofore, several more chapters would be required. Of work, now proceeding very slowly and with long intervals during which nothing was done, certain small results would have to be described. There were four articles in the *Contemporary Review*, . . .

Easily persuaded into hypochondria by sleeplessness and *ennui*, his fighting strength seems, however, unabated as he prepares his attack with all the skill of a modern investigative journalist.

In 'The New Toryism' (Vol. 45, February 1884) he laments the drift of the Liberal Party from individualism and the defence of freedom towards collectivism and coercion. In 'The Coming Slavery' (Vol. 45, April 1884)

he demonstrates the dangers of increasing bureaucracy, regimentation and undue taxation. 'The Sins of Legislators' (Vol. 45, May 1884) contains an impressive array of disasters resulting from the 'meddling and muddling' of confused politicians. Finally, in 'The Great Political Superstition' (Vol. 46, July 1884), he attacks the theory of parliamentary sovereignty, resurrecting the ancient illusion of 'natural rights' and using it as bit and bridle to an all-powerful State. Aware that Gladstone himself had expressed misgivings about 'whole vistas of social quackery', Spencer develops the theme that no-one in their senses would call in a doctor unversed in anatomy to cure a disease. He is sceptical of democratic procedures and, despite a general approval of extending the franchise, he wishes to limit the power of elected representatives. 'Majority' decisions are worse than none. Majestically, he says:

The function of Liberalism in the past was that of putting a limit to the power of kings. The function of true Liberalism in the future will be that of putting a limit to the power of parliaments.

And, in an arresting image,

The great political superstition of the past was the divine right of kings. The great political superstition of the present is the divine right of parliaments. The oil of anointing seems unawares to have dripped from the head of the one on to the heads of the many, and given sacredness to them also and to their decrees.

Spencer's contrast between military and industrial societies is one between Tory and Liberal regimes. 'Natural growth' implies peaceful proliferation of industry in unrestricted enterprise for the profit of all. Why one set of arrangements made by groups of men acting in concert should be more 'natural' than another is mysterious. The determined pursuit by Spencer of the organic growth analogy entails, too, a revival of the principle of 'natural justice'. The miseries of the poor could, therefore, be said to be their own fault and he makes much of their misdeeds:

'They have no work', you say. Say rather that . . . they are simply good-for-nothings, . . . vagrants and sots, criminals and those on the way to crime . . . fellows who share the gains of prostitutes. . . . There is a corresponding class of women. . . . A creature not energetic enough to maintain itself must die.¹⁵

Could this unfeeling diatribe be what the prosperous middle-classes wished to hear? And it is evident that unrestrained vituperation was one of the 'freedoms' in which journalists of those days could indulge with impunity.

Of legislation, Spencer displays particular objection, in 'The New Toryism', to those changes in the law dealing with the transfer of charity funds to public ownership. His uncle and former tutor, a clergyman in the parish of Hinton Charterhouse, is shown as having happily disbursed charitable endowments to villagers, to the satisfaction of all, or rather of that section of the community which now found itself paying increased taxes instead of letting the benevolent vicar dole out the mite. It is an affecting story from the viewpoint of the property-owning and tax-paying classes, and tenants are warned that soon they too will be taxed; for the 1884 Franchise Act, besides giving them the vote, will draw them into the net. Since 'each type of structure tends to propagate itself', the more social measures that are passed the more will have to be paid for, even by the beneficiaries themselves.

Similar evils were seen in plans for housing the poor, for providing free libraries and, horror of horrors, for State appropriation of railway companies, a scheme not to be fully realised for three-quarters of a century. And the scenario Spencer projects would surely have seemed to railway proprietors a nineteenth century Orwell's 1984:

With appropriation must come many attendant changes. For railway-proprietors, at first owners and workers of railways only, have become masters of numerous businesses directly or indirectly connected with railways; and these will have to be purchased by the Government when the railways are purchased. Already exclusive carrier of letters, exclusive transmitter of telegrams, and on the way to become exclusive carrier of parcels, the State will not only become exclusive carrier of passengers, goods and minerals, but will add to its present various trades many other trades. Even now, besides erecting its naval and military establishments and building harbours, docks, breakwaters, etc., it does the work of ship-builder, cannon-founder, small-arms maker, manufacturer of ammunition, army clothier and boot-maker; and when the railways have been appropriated, . . . it will have to become locomotive-engine builder, carriage-maker, tarpaulin and grease manufacturer, passenger-vessel owner, coal-miner, stone-quarrier, omnibus proprietor, etc. Meanwhile, its local lieutenants, the municipal governments, already in many places suppliers of water, gas-makers, owners and makers of tramways, proprietors of baths, will doubtless have undertaken other businesses. . . . There will be good precedents for extending its function to retail distribution. . . . The French Government has long been a retail tobacconist.¹⁶

In thus gauging the strength of the political opposition, Spencer has few peers, and it is easy to see why nationalising railways took so long. But why did he rate one monopoly as superior to another? He was in no sense a trimmer, except to his own especial beliefs. The answer must lie in his preoccupation with his image of harmonious co-operation, for he goes on to say that dictatorship can be defeated only by 'that improvement of character which results from peaceful industry, carried on under the restraints imposed by an orderly social life'. His argument has come full circle.

Still he persists in the growth analogy, except that he does wish to change rather forcibly the educational preparation of the best minds. No amount of linguistic acquirements (by which he means learning 'dead' languages) will help their judgements in the least: the evidence of old civilisations on war, slavery or the subjection of women cannot help them to estimate how acts of parliament will work in great nations of modern types. What is needful is a systematic study of causation 'as displayed among human beings socially aggregated'. For legislation changes causation, and possibly natures, since each is modifiable and modifications are inheritable.¹⁷

Beatrice Webb, *née* Potter, has given in her autobiography, *My Apprenticeship*,¹⁸ an illuminating account of Spencer's influence on her early development as a social worker and Fabian theorist. Described as 'the oldest and most intimate friend of the family' and 'the philosopher on the hearth', he merited her undying gratitude for a stringent training in close and accurate observation of men and animals. He was, too, the ally of all nine Potter daughters in rebellion against restrictions placed by adults on their adventures. Of his well-known aversion to the exercise of author-

ity over growing minds (exemplified in the essays on education in which he advocated scientific pursuits in place of inert rote learning)¹⁹ she recalls an irresistible instance of the bitter bit. Constantly enjoining the children to subvert their governess's instructions, he was bidden by this long-suffering lady to take them for a walk. She reminded them of his preference for 'subversion'. With a will, they led him into a wood, imprisoned him in a hole in the ground and covered him in leaves.

'Your children are r-r-rude children', exclaimed *The Man Versus The State* as he stalked into my mother's boudoir. But for the most part he and we were firm friends: we agreed with his denunciation of the current curriculum. . . . [We scoured] the countryside in his company for fossils, flowers and water-beasties which . . . found their way into aquariums, cabinets and scrapbooks . . . I was never interested in these collections. . . . What fascinated me was watching him collect illustrations for his theories. I do not suggest 'some direct observation of facts' did not precede the formulation of his principles . . . though it appears . . . that only those facts were noted . . . which had some 'general meaning', i.e. directly or indirectly helped towards the building up of 'a coherent and organised theory' of the universe. But, by the time I became his companion these 'First Principles' had ceased to be hypotheses; they had become a highly dogmatic creed with regard to the evolution of life. What remained to be done was to prove by innumerable illustrations how these principles or 'laws' explained the whole of the processes of nature, from the formation of a crystal to the working of the party system within a democratic state. Herbert Spencer was, in fact, engaged in the art of casuistry, and it was in this art that, for a time, I became his apprentice, or was it his accomplice? . . . What he taught me to discern was not the truth, but the relevance of facts; a gift said to be rare in a woman and of untold importance to the social investigator.²⁰

In a conversation with Huxley in 1887, Beatrice Webb records that she put forward the idea that Spencer had welded into one the disjointed evolutionary theories of his time. Not so, replied Huxley:

'Spencer never knew them: he elaborated his theory from his inner consciousness. He is the most original of thinkers, though he has never invented a new thought. He never reads: merely picks up what will help him to illustrate his theories. He is a great constructor: the form he has given to his gigantic system is entirely original: not one of the component factors is new, but he has not borrowed them.' (*My Apprenticeship*, p.24.)

Lacking a family life of his own, Spencer regarded the Potters, and particularly the parents, Richard and Laurencina, as his closest friends. Beatrice, when Spencer was feeling as usual that his life was drawing to a close (although he lived for another sixteen years), reports that in 1887 he asked her to become his literary executor and to write his biography. Rescinding the agreement, however, when in 1892 she became engaged to Sidney Webb, eminent in the Fabian Society, Spencer less than delicately proposed that she should still oversee the material for the biography to be written by F. Howard Collins. 'It would not do for my reputation,' he said, 'that I should be openly connected with an avowed and prominent Socialist—that is impossible'. (*My Apprenticeship*, pp. 28, 29.)

In Beatrice Webb's memoir is exemplified the strong personal affection for Spencer, allied to a growing impatience at his inability to come to terms with the logical inferences of his own theory, which many of his friends experienced. George Eliot and G. H. Lewes could not discuss positivism with him for he would immediately suppose them to be accus-

ing him of plagiarising Auguste Comte's humanistic beliefs. And yet George Eliot affirmed that their enduring friendship was attributable to Spencer's truthfulness, the quality which she most esteemed. She does not appear even to have resented Spencer's rather cruel refutation of persistent rumours that he had wished to marry her during their early close association. Never, he said, had he been in love with her: and in any case her nose was too long for him to kiss her comfortably. And it was Richard Potter who deterred him from publishing, after her death, a denial of the suggestion, made in newspaper obituaries, that Spencer had been 'one of her suitors'. 'My dear Spencer, you will be eternally damned if you do it', said Potter firmly. Beatrice Webb describes him as amiable and affectionate except when he scented some injustice. Then he became a man possessed by fury, eyes flashing fire, face contorted with rage until someone (like herself) stilled the storm by assuring him of a place among the elect. She believed that his pessimism was brought about by 'poisonous food and drugs': he used morphia, as did many other writers and artists, in large quantities as a sleeping draught. To Beatrice he is 'the dear old man' and his care for her in childhood provided a lasting bond, even though her later total rejection of *laissez-faire* Liberalism and scientific agnosticism meant a painful overthrow of his training. 'My case . . .', she writes, 'is typical of the rise and fall of Herbert Spencer's influence over the men and women of my generation.' (*My Apprenticeship*, p.33.) In 1884 she was reading with sympathy *The Man Versus the State*, accepting its diatribes against social experiments and repressive laws, but already seeing flaws in his deduction of social laws from the laws of another science.

Spencer's visit to America in 1882 was a purely recreative project. Despite the success of his books there, he could not be tempted by offers from lecture-bureaux of \$250 or even \$300 per lecture. Public dinners he likewise refused, saying 'I absolutely decline to make myself a show.' Delighted to have just missed a British Association gathering, he complied only with his friend Youmans's request to attend the Montreal Committee of Science Teaching, a project dear to Youmans's heart. For the rest he enjoyed the scenery, met privately Oliver Wendell Holmes and Professor Fiske of Harvard, visited the widow of the admired Emerson, made one speech at the Boston Saturday Club, and felt sure that his health would improve once he reached home. And yet he greatly approved American ideas and institutions. Duty done, he settled happily back into his taxing work routine, whilst complaining that his failing health would never stand the pace. (*An Autobiography*, pp.383-409.) By 1889 he was still referring to 'an invalid life like mine, due to chronic disorder unaccompanied by organic disease'.

For a writer eloquent in the cause of the amity of nations, Spencer's record of foreign travel displays an extraordinary lack of confidence. A trip to Egypt in 1880 had resulted in a similar 'breakdown', indeed, so severe that he had left the rest of his party in mid-stream on the River Nile. However, on the way home he had felt strong enough to stop in

Paris to arrange for a special edition of his book *Education* to be printed omitting, at the French Minister of Education's request, the famous essay, 'What Knowledge is of Most Worth?'. The Minister feared that its principal recommendation, to replace classics in the curriculum by science, would cause a student revolt against Latin and Greek. Agreeing to the truncation, Spencer insisted on a preface specifying 'the extent and nature of the part omitted', thereby effectively blocking the Minister's earnest intention. (*An Autobiography*, Vol. 2, p.347.)

Hugh Elliot, in his biography of Herbert Spencer published in 1917, accords his subject true greatness on no fewer than nine counts. The achievements listed include the writing of perhaps the most important textbook on psychology of his century and the establishment of sociology in England. But Spencer's political and journalistic gifts have gone largely unnoticed under the weight of his controversial theories. His vivid, forceful prose is impressive and readable, whatever bizarre views of literary composition he seems to have held. Sometimes referring to poetry or the epic mode, he dismissed both—the first for the reason that nobody should write poetry if he could help it, 'but if it burst from him it might be very good', and the second because he disliked the monotony of blank verse. He thought Homer 'absurd' for his description of the shield of Achilles and for his detailed genealogy of a horse. This is one of his strangest misapprehensions, for Spencer's whole theoretical system consists of an analogy so far extended as to become a metaphor and to possess an organic life of its own. His dream of an ideal, anarchic, mutually supportive and harmonious society is one of epic proportions. It outstrips his imaginative capacity, so that he deems it to be a literal rather than a poetic truth. The laws of science hold him in their grip; he wishes to tidy up the universe in their light; but he fails to recognise the point at which his extensive knowledge becomes a stranglehold on a vision that is revelatory, not quantifiable or verifiable.

NOTES

¹² List in frontispiece of *The Study of Sociology* by Herbert Spencer, Henry S. King & Co. (Sixth edition, 1877).

¹³ Volume 2 of this work was completed in 1876.

¹⁴ A useful source of reference to educational legislation and provision is *The Silent Social Revolution 1895-1965* by G. A. N. Lowndes. OUP 1969.

¹⁵ 'The Coming Slavery', *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 45, June 1884.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.478.

¹⁷ 'The Sins of Legislators', *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 45, June 1884.

¹⁸ *My Apprenticeship* by Beatrice Webb. Longman's, Green & Co. 1926.

¹⁹ *Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical* by Herbert Spencer. Williams & Norgate, 1861. In a footnote to his lecture, 'Herbert Spencer and the Scientific Movement' (*Pioneers of English Education*, ed. A. V. Judges, Faber 1952), J. A. Lauwerys records. 'Between 1878 and 1900, 42,000 copies of the cheap edition (at 2s. 6d.) had been sold . . . , 7,000 of the ordinary edition at 6s. This apart from the American editions.' p.161.

²⁰ *My Apprenticeship*, p.22-24.

[Betty Abel's first article on the life and work of Herbert Spencer appeared in the May 1982 (Vol. 240, No. 1396) issue of *Contemporary Review*.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Before She Met Me. Julian Barnes. Cape. £6.50. *A Loss of Heart*. Robert McCrum. Hamish Hamilton. £7.95. *Blind Understanding*. Stanley Middleton. Hutchinson. £7.50. *Getting it Right*. Elizabeth Jane Howard. Hamish Hamilton. £7.95. *Unsolicited Gift*. Jacqueline Simms. Chatto and Windus. £6.95. *The Private World of St. John Terrapin*. Chapman Pincher. Sidgwick and Jackson. £7.95. *Flashpoint*. Madelaine Duke. Michael Joseph. £7.95. *The Diary of a Country Doctor*. Alex Duncan. W. H. Allen. £6.95.

A curiously grey atmosphere seems to pervade the late Spring fiction. Despite the turbulent times in which we live, a significant number of novelists are concerned with the activities of inadequate and often tedious individuals. This is not to suggest that the writers in question are anything but extremely skilful in presenting ordinary, humble people. It is rather that their characters lack the doughty qualities of Hardy or Dickens creations. Those men and women believed in themselves, despite limited opportunities and achievement, while today's nonentity is obsessed by a sense of failure.

So at any rate seems to be the case in *Before She Met Me*, successor to Julian Barnes' brilliantly successful first novel, *Metroland*. The central character, Graham, is a university lecturer who must have seemed far from engrossing to his captive audience. For some years Graham had been unhappily married to a boring termagant bent on demolishing his self-esteem while at the same time furthering her own cause. In a moment of uncharacteristic decision he leaves her and the pleasantly maturing daughter, Alice, who progresses rapidly from cuddlesome child to self-possessed young adult.

The ostensible reason for the 'break' is Ann, poised and efficient as a business woman, following a brief career on the stage. That such a dynamic personality should have thrown in her lot with the tepid Graham is puzzling and not satisfactorily explained; yet there is an end of term atmosphere about the relationship. All seems set for a successful second marriage until his ex-wife manoeuvres him into taking Alice to see her step-mother acting in a tawdry film. This apparently minor incident sets in motion a catastrophic course of events.

The spectacle of Ann in intimate proximity to the male star reminds Graham of her pre-marital affairs, which she has never sought to conceal. From then on, he develops an obsessive jealousy of her past and, as the months go by, devotes his leisure hours to searching her private papers for 'clues', watching her performances in other, even older and more inept films and even to identifying passages in a friend's novels which might relate to a sexual relationship between them. Inevitably, as his paranoia deepens, their pleasant comradeship atrophies into indifference. Although alarmed by his growing eccentricity, Ann ignores the danger signals: gives parties, arranges holidays and generally pursues a course of business-as-usual. Yet a violent conclusion is soon seen to be inevitable, and much space is devoted to preparing the ground for it. Julian Barnes manages to avoid the obvious outcome, yet surprise is vitiated because it all takes so long to come about. Even the double blood-

letting does little to revive the reader's interest. The situation of retrospective sexual jealousy is by no means incredible and Julian Barnes outlines its problems and dangers with admirable objectivity. It is just such a pity that the narrative runs out of steam long before the ultimate tragedy.

Another self-pitying university lecturer is at the centre of Robert McCrum's new novel, *A Loss of Heart*, one even less likely to capture the wavering attention of the under-graduates. Victim of a broken marriage and father of a still-born child, with an alienated brother and hostile father, Philip Taylor does not seem to have very much going for him. The run-down marital home is not an attractive place in which to spend the Christmas vacation and Philip is soon heading for his father's house in Buckinghamshire. He is even less likely than usual to feel at peace with the world for he has recently undergone a shattering experience. A mysterious telephone call from the long-lost brother's girl-friend requests a meeting in a Leicester Square café. At the conclusion of their conversation police officers descend upon them, and hold them both for questioning on a charge of terrorism. True, they are soon released, but the incident leaves a scar, not erased by a chilly reception at the parental home. Nor is this sufficient chastisement for an already bruised spirit. The missing brother, Daniel, is found dead, and Philip is obliged to return to London to identify the body. And here the novel takes off in a new direction and uncovers its true purpose—which is Philip's determination to investigate the reason for Daniel's untimely death. An outsize skeleton emerges from the family cupboard. The Taylor family were engaged in marketing untested drugs to the Third World and Daniel had, in the course of a journalistic assignment disclosed the scandal. Philip's enquiries eventually lead him to a house in Islington, once owned by Daniel, where the girl-friend, Stevie, now resides in company with Greg, a drop-out with outsize chips on his shoulder. Stevie and Philip are held as hostages by Greg in a re-run of events all too familiar in the contemporary world. Once again, violence has the last word. It would be unfair to disclose what form this takes, but with such a colourless, expendable character as Philip it does not seem to matter too much.

As an account of the agonies of spiritual isolation *A Loss of Heart* is extremely moving, even if the interesting ingredients never quite come to the boil. It is more rewarding to concentrate on Robert McCrum's brilliant observation of the minor items which make up a scene or a portrait, and of the casual and often seemingly unimportant incidents which chart a life's course.

Ordinariness of a very different kind conditions *Blind Understanding*, in which Stanley Middleton once again channels his particular talent into close contemplation of some very unexceptional people. John Brainbridge, a retired solicitor, and his family are what is known as 'provincials'; that is to say they live and work far from the metropolis and, being affluent and well-established, inhabit a world bounded by local concerns.

John Brainbridge is only 70 years old and in these days of longevity the general acceptance of him as an 'old' man seems rather strange. His general decrepitude must be attributed to too little worthwhile activity in his retirement years. His attractive and comparatively youthful wife, Diana, finds him fatiguing, although she herself is not much less so, despite her enthusiasm for music appreciation and bridge. What heightens the interest is that Diana's sister, Betty, once enjoyed a brief love affair with John, who might even be the father of her only child, thus setting in motion some dark undercurrents of sisterly jealousy. However, those fraught moments have long since been happily forgotten and Betty now lives *a trolis* with the Brainbridges, joining

in the social round. The long-past tensions are explored through an extensive use of the flashback, a narrative device which Stanley Middleton thoroughly understands, although occasionally the rapid switch in time becomes confusing. The effect is to highlight the ultimate triviality of events which were once thought to be of paramount importance; and the marriages of John and Diana and widowed sister Betty seem to add up to an almost total debit. Stanley Middleton does not fall over backwards to demonstrate the inner failure of many outwardly successful unions. He simply presents the facts and leaves the point to be taken.

In Elizabeth Jane Howard's long awaited novel, *Getting it Right*, we are back with the cult of self-denigration. Her young hero, thirty year old Gavin, recognises that there are few advantages in having him as a friend, let alone a lover. A hairdresser in a West End salon, he suffers from chronic blushing, septic acne and a repressive home life with his intolerant Mum and lethargic Dad. Elizabeth Jane Howard marshals her powerful resources to observe the social differentials and many of the descriptions of Gavin's family life—the appalling taste in furnishings, stodgy meals and myopic view of politics and international affairs—are extremely funny. This pointed send-up extends to some of Gavin's colleagues and the account of a visit to the home of one of them is hilarious, although the newly-married couple who plan meals to tone in with the house decor are farcical rather than comedy characters; while the hour-by-hour account of life in the salon is reminiscent of a Joyce Grenfell monologue.

What makes Gavin a suitable subject for an Elizabeth Jane Howard novel is his private appreciation of music, literature and art and some of his observations are a pleasure to read. However, the main purpose of *Getting it Right* is to find Gavin a mate. In the time honoured tradition of romantic stories there are three candidates; Joan, a wealthy middle-aged woman who in a single night releases his inhibitions, thus ridding him of his despised virginity; Lady Minerva, a poor little rich girl determined to acquire him as a husband by shock tactics, and Jenny, mother of an illegitimate child, an unsophisticated 'junior' in the salon overlooked by Gavin until he chances to see her feeding ducks in St. James' Park. Long before the final decision it is obvious that his choice will be for a cosy, no-nonsense kind of life, allowing plenty of time for educating Jenny in cultural matters. It is all skilful and well-blended but the question remains, why did this supremely talented novelist elect to concern herself with such a group of non-persons.

It is a relief to turn to a novel in which the characters are all exceptional, even if unbelievably so. *Unsolicited Gifts* has a cast of only three, which makes possible degree of concentration, remarkable in a first novel. Jacqueline Simms has chosen an unusual theme; a double incest which begins with Michael and his sister, Fleur, who go through a form of marriage while still at school, and consummate the unpropitious union on the floor of a disused laboratory. It is a cruel stroke of Fate that Fleur dies in an accidental explosion in that same laboratory, and not surprising that the memory of her haunts Michael in his adult life, while he veers between careers in music and physics. After many vicissitudes he marries a Japanese musician and writer, Kiyoko. Their daughter, Sumi, also musical, becomes a child prodigy. She knows all about Fleur, having read a long forgotten diary in which the childhood 'marriage' is disclosed, and offers her own body to Michael in place of the deceased Fleur. He yields, is discovered by Kiyoko, and thus ends all hope of the spiritual peace he so urgently requires, and instead is from then on destined to go through life alienated from the two people he loves best. This curious

story, presented through a cascade of highly polished prose with brittle dialogue, numerous extracts from journals and written confessions is altogether in a class of its own and makes no attempt to discuss in realistic terms a situation repugnant to most people.

The characters in Chapman Pincher's new novel are also far from ordinary. In *The Private World of St. John Terrapin*, the author of *Dirty Tricks* and *Their Trade is Treachery*, has a most original theme. William Barnes, alias Terrapin, was afflicted by sudden deafness while quite a young man. To compensate, he developed to perfection the art of lip-reading, so that he could follow the private conversations of people not within normal hearing distance. As a habitu   of the once famous Domino Room at the Caf   Royal in Regent Street, he had the opportunity to observe such fellow-patrons as the Prince of Wales, Oscar Wilde and D. H. Lawrence. Each evening, in his lonely bed-sitter, St. John Terrapin made transcripts of the confidential exchanges and it is on these records, which came into Chapman Pincher's possession in 1951, that the present novel is based. Considerable space is devoted to the trial and imprisonment of Oscar Wilde. Distilled through the sympathetic observations of Terrapin, much that has remained obscure becomes understandable; yet most likely to excite interest is his account of the Jack the Ripper crimes, presenting quite convincingly as the ultimate solution the Royal connection, often dismissed or overlooked in preference for more well-ventilated theories.

And finally, two very different novels. Over the years Madelaine Duke has specialised in the documented suspense thriller, long before the *genre* became the popular success vehicle it is today. In her latest novel she has moved into a more serious stance, for *Flashpoint* concerns the matter which lies at the very heart of contemporary debate, the deliberate or even accidental use of the nuclear deterrent. Through an elaborate and often complex plot the progress of one young man provides a rallying point for the many relevant points Madelaine Duke wishes to place on record. The result is compulsive, if salutary reading.

As Alex Duncan in *The Diary of a Country Doctor* a totally different side of this prolific writer is revealed. The *Diary* is the third in a series of 'medical' stories set in the Sussex countryside. Fortuitously, Dr Jack Mason comes upon a day-to-day account by his predecessor and father which placed on record some illuminating facts about the patients, many of whom are still alive and well. This provides a convenient peg for an unambitious yet very engaging story.

Also Received:

And the Walls Came Tumbling Down. Jack Fishman. Souvenir Press. £8.95.

The investigative journalist and novelist, Jack Fishman, is likely to enjoy a considerable success with *And the Walls Came Tumbling Down*, which explores a little-publicised episode in World War II, the saturation bombing in 1944 of a gaol in Northern France. The attack resulted in an escape of the inmates on a massive scale among whom was one man considered to be of supreme importance to the war effort.

Manriisa Man. Peter van Greenaway. Gollancz. £6.95.

The theme of the robot and what happens when this machine-man takes over has long been popular with suspense and thriller writers for film and novel. In *Manriisa Man*, Peter van Greenaway gives a new twist to the debate by inventing a kind of humanoid ape who can be trained to accept statistics in

the manner of a computer. The drama comes when the half human actually acquires the skill of speech, and a new kind of being is unloaded on an already trouble-torn and bitterly divided world.

Against the Stream. James Hanley. Andre Deutsch. £6.95.

It is good to have an opportunity to re-read *The House in the Valley*, now issued as *Against the Stream*. Submitted and published under a pseudonym, James Hanley took a calculated risk in submitting the book to Cape without disclosing his true identity. That it was immediately accepted must have been an immense consolation of a kind valued by any creative writer who has somehow failed to achieve the success he knows very well that he deserves. This simple story of a young child's upbringing in sad and often confusing surroundings is the kind of theme which shows James Hanley's unusual talents to the greatest advantage.

Among the winners of literary prizes announced at the Society of Authors Annual Awards Party on June 16th, 1982 were: Hawthornden Prize: *St. Kilda's Parliament* by Douglas Dunn (Faber & Faber). Somerset Maugham Awards: *A Good Man in Africa* by William Boyd (Hamish Hamilton); and *Lantern Lecture* by Adam Mara-Jones (Faber & Faber).

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

AN EMINENT HISTORIAN

G. P. Gooch: a Study in History and Politics. Frank Eyck. Macmillan. £8.95.

In a scholarly biography of Dr. G. P. Gooch, Professor Frank Eyck has admirably depicted his subject as a leading historian of our times who reconciled academic life with a strong desire to be in the political arena. Outstandingly successful in three main spheres,—in writing history, in active parliamentary work and in editorial and journalistic writing,—Gooch did not seek 'success' but rather, throughout his 95 years of life, to serve his fellow men. His considerable gifts were exercised in interpreting and recording European diplomatic history (and this, he constantly maintained, was not a creative art but 'a matter of conscience'), and in providing, in the *Contemporary Review* which he edited for 49 years, a forum for the views of other serious commentators on home and international affairs. As a young man, sitting in Parliament as joint Liberal Member for Bath with Donald Maclean, under the Prime Ministership first of Campbell-Bannerman and later of Asquith, Gooch brought his deep knowledge of history to bear on the problems of the Boer War and, together with Lord Pethick-Lawrence, a close friend from Eton and Cambridge, he continually strove for the ideals of common humanity as against the subjugation of so-called 'inferior' races, whom he saw as essentially part of the extended family of man. To this extent, Eyck says, his ideas on social reform were 'rather advanced for that day and age'. Much of Gooch's time and money was spent on philanthropic projects on behalf of the poor and neglected as well as in giving generous opportunity to other writers, artists and scholars of many nationalities. Professor Eyck has achieved the difficult task of doing full justice, through exact and meticulous research as well as personal knowledge, to each of these aspects of the life of a wise, humane and learned man.

An important part of the book is the chapter entitled 'Parliament' in which is given an original, detailed analysis of Gooch's short but significant career as a back-bencher in the Liberal 'landslide' Government of 1906-10. The remarkable range of his interventions reveals his concern for the oppressed, both native and immigrant, peoples in all Commonwealth countries. They include interventions on Ireland, when he served as Parliamentary Private Secretary to James Bryce, Chief Secretary for Ireland; on the iniquity of the treatment of non-whites in South Africa under the High Commissionership of Lord Milner; on his hopes for the equitable government of native Indians under the aegis of John Morley as Secretary of State for India. And they extend to the support of political participation by the local populations of Egypt, Persia and the Balkans. His disgust at severe oppression in the Russia of the Tsar Nicholas II and his Chief Minister, Stolypin, caused Gooch to join a parliamentary Russia Committee whose aim was to try to persuade the Tsar to improve his country's internal conditions. An historian's understanding of the danger in which Christendom stood from the Ottoman Empire led him to see Russia as the only bulwark in the defence of Macedonia and Armenia. As an original member of the Balkan Committee, Gooch belonged to 'one of the most interesting groups in Britain at that time': it included, besides James Bryce as President, Noel Buxton, C. P. and G. M. Trevelyan, C. F. C. Masterman; the 'rising star of the Labour movement', Ramsay MacDonald, and distinguished journalists such as A. G. Gardiner and H. N. Brailsford. There were many questions, too, on domestic affairs related to Old Age Pensions, which he supported 'for the deserving', and on the welfare of children in elementary schools and work-houses. Gooch's Liberalism, then and later, reflected the dilemma of many of his party, that of feeling fundamentally in sympathy with many Socialist proposals for reform. In a speech at Huddersfield Liberal Club, in November 1907, on "Socialism and Liberty", Gooch defined his views on the desirable balance between the power of the state and the rights of the individual', says Eyck. 'While he sympathised with many of the ideals of Socialism, such as fellowship, mutual aid and solidarity, he was opposed to its advocacy of collectivism . . . Gooch believed that initiative would disappear in a collective state.' The nationalisation of certain assets such as coal, gas and water was desirable: the state's limited role as an entrepreneur could be justified only on the ground of social justice. In Eyck's judgement, this philosophy included a stern Protestant work ethic, for Gooch felt strongly the obligation on every member of the community to prove his worth by hard work and temperate habit.

The loss of his parliamentary seat, in 1910, 'restored him to his books'. Except that he was convinced that England and Germany should not be enemies, Gooch might well have been returned to Parliament in 1913, but the time was inauspicious for the expression of his love for Germany, fostered by study and by personal association. In 1911 began his long editorship of the *Contemporary Review*. His outstanding book, *History and Historians of the Nineteenth Century*, published in 1913, established his authority in the front rank of historians. His balanced stand, in writing and in Parliament, was rewarded by the co-editorship of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*. Eyck's chapters on these three enterprises are illuminating and valuable, for he assesses Gooch's achievements in a way not previously attempted. Of the *History and Historians*, he records the astonished admiration expressed by contemporary writers of European history, ranging from H. A. L. Fisher, Maitland, Hearnshaw and Trevelyan in England, to Eduard Meyer in Germany and Paul Fredericq in Belgium. In evaluating the difference between Gooch's

comprehensive historical sweep and the increased specialisation by present-day scholars, Eyck shows that today 'the task would be beyond the capacity of a single author, and would have to be a co-operative venture. Gooch worked on his own, without assistants, which is really an astonishing feat. . . . Like Trevelyan, Gooch helped to develop further and in many ways to perfect the writing of popular history of the best kind, capable at the same time of satisfying the specialist and often fascinating the educated layman. Gooch was helped in his task by his mastery of style, which owed much to an intense musicality'. Of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, Eyck tells the story graphically of the invitation by Ramsay MacDonald to edit the archives containing communications between governments. In association with Professor Harold Temperley, the somewhat difficult collaborator of Gooch's own choice, the volumes continued to be produced for the next 15 years, despite the vicissitudes of inter-departmental rivalry in Government as to the admissibility of some secret documents. The work did, however, when completed, place all future historians in their debt by the 'high standard of editing and the wealth of material provided'.

On the death of Sir Percy Bunting in 1911, Gooch and the Rev. Dr. Scott Lidgett were appointed co-editors of the *Contemporary Review*. Gradually, Gooch took the lead but worked for two decades 'in unbroken harmony' with his colleague, then and later enhancing the prestige of the journal through two world wars and beyond. Assisted by his many scholarly and political contacts at home and abroad, Gooch endeavoured to present all points of view on pressing diplomatic and political questions, occasionally, however, running into censorship problems. In 1915, the journal received a warning from the Press Bureau against discussing the delicate matter of tension in the Balkans. Distinguished contributors such as Noel Buxton and Seton-Watson took this in their stride; but Dr. E. J. Dillon, the eminent regular commentator on international affairs, insisted on disapproving in print of censors who forced him to be silent on countries of which he had expert inside knowledge. Eyck pays tribute to the 'remarkable independence' which the editors left to Professor J. E. G. de Montmorency in his editorship of the literary supplement and to his reviewers, so that a wide range of opinion could be expressed in its pages. Foreign affairs were authoritatively covered by Hugh and Harold Spender, Sir Edwin Pears, H. N. Brailsford; by statesmen such as Bryce and by Archbishop William Temple. Despite his love of Germany, Gooch laid down firm lines against contributions sympathetic to Nazism, well before the second war. Professor Eyck has performed an inestimable service in so clearly depicting a man who received many honours but whose whole work has not until now been adequately evaluated. And he is as readable as Gooch himself.

BETTY ABEL

NEW ASSESSMENTS OF THOMAS HARDY

Thomas Hardy: a biography. Michael Millgate. Oxford U.P. £15.00.

The Countryman's Ear. Evelyn Hardy, with a Foreword by Robert Gittings. Tabb House. £6.70.

Coming close on the heels of Robert Gittings's two volumes, *Young Thomas Hardy* and *The Older Hardy*, this new biography by Michael Millgate may be said to round off conclusively and with impressive authority more than a decade

of intensive research and revaluation. It is, to put it mildly, unlikely that any significant material has been overlooked and could survive to provide the surprise of a later discovery. The third-person autobiography that Hardy prepared for his second wife to publish after his death was evidently intended to discourage biographers by forestalling them. In the event its omissions and distortions came to be seen as a challenge: the only stones left unturned by now must be very small pebbles indeed.

Professor Millgate comes to his task with formidable qualifications. Fortified by his earlier research in *Thomas Hardy: His career as a novelist* he is currently engaged, with R. L. Purdy, in the joint editorship of *The Collected Letters of Thomas Hardy*. He has had access to a great body of documentary source material—much of it not previously available—and he can therefore offer the illumination of fresh details as his narrative unfolds. Perhaps the most immediately striking novelty is the emergence from total obscurity of two sisters, Eliza and Jane Nicholls, who engaged Hardy's emotions in the years of his early manhood when he worked in London. They were the daughters of a coastguard whose duties took him to Kimmeridge on the Dorset coast for several years. Eliza worked in domestic service in London, near Hardy's lodgings: she was, in Professor Millgate's view, 'the most important figure in Hardy's early emotional life.' On the evidence of a niece of Eliza's, recalling a family tradition ninety years after the event, there was something like an engagement between Hardy and Eliza during the years 1863–67, which foundered on the rival attractions of the younger sister, Jane. 'Neutral Tones' and the 'She to Him' poems may spring from the relationship with Eliza.

In a note on his twenty-fifth birthday, in 1865, Hardy wrote 'wondered what woman, if any, I should be thinking about in five years' time'. The words 'if any' suggest a doubt which we now know to be groundless. There can never have been a time in his long life when Hardy was not 'thinking about' one woman or another. The earlier ones, who preceded Emma, were numerous, in their varying degrees of significance, but they have in common the sad fact that they remain mute, unacknowledged by Hardy except in oblique and cryptic ways, and unrecorded in their own terms. 'Not a line of her writing have I' wrote Hardy in 'Thoughts of Phena'. It is a line that must echo dolefully in the minds of his biographers.

For the measure of Professor Millgate's achievement we must look beyond the additions he has been able to make to what has become a generally familiar story. His strength lies in his ability to digest such a mass of detail, covering 88 years, into a beautifully proportioned and supple narrative which always stays close to the central figure and is constantly probing and assaying each new stroke as it is added to the final portrait. His individual judgments are incisive and humane. The tribalism of the Hardys, the dourness of the matriarchal Jemima and the inner dramas of a seemingly uneventful life are conveyed with precision, sympathy and an unwaveringly sure touch. This will be a standard work of reference for many years; and for that reason one or two minor inaccuracies need correction. The Pitt-Rivers 'handicraft' museum was not in the Larmer Tree Gardens but at Farnham. Mrs. Pitt-Rivers (the General's wife) was not the niece but the sister of Lady Jeune's first husband, and the Stinsford heiress whom George Pitt married was Lora, not Lorna.

In his foreword to *The Countryman's Ear*, Robert Gittings pays a deserved tribute to one of Hardy's earlier biographers, Evelyn Hardy. This latest collection of her essays on various themes shows that her knowledge and love of Hardy's writings can offer us fresh insights in many directions.

DESMOND HAWKINS

THE POLITICAL CONSULTANT

Larry J. Sabato. *The Rise of Political Consultants: new ways of winning elections*. Basic Books, N.Y. \$20.95.

Dr. Larry Sabato of the University of Virginia has written what can only be called an alarming study of a new political species, the consultant. Ever since the animal first appeared 50 years ago in California, the consultant stands in the shadow of the candidate (or is it the other way round?), advising and warning, preparing mail drops and media presentations, bringing to the politician a P.R. man's showy and extrovert expertise. Sabato surveys 'the consultant corps', naming names and indeed giving vivid examples: Reagan, it is clear, was a good candidate primarily because he could, as could any trained actor, 'learn his lines' and absorb his index cards. Most consultants, of course, serve as professionals, and in theory do not interfere on issues, but in practice they usually run campaigns in their own fashion. Indeed, few candidates fully appreciate the skills and the 'technology' they buy. One consultant refused to serve a client because of his 'character flaw'. Sometimes a highly successful consultant will simply confess on occasion—'I did basically the same things in that campaign that I had done in every other campaign, and we lost'. And now and then, although his candidate loses, his managers are held to have 'won' because of the skill with which they 'sold' their candidate, as did Joe Napolitan in his role as consultant to Hubert Humphrey in 1968. On the whole, however, as in all elections everywhere, it is victory, however obtained, that counts. 'When I win I'm a genius, a hero, and when I lose I'm a jerk'.

The main core of this book, however, is the analysis of polls—with its admirable and detailed analysis of the major organisations behind political campaigns—of media presentation—with its brilliant description of Ike's campaigns in 1952 and 1956, which were transformed from amateur to skilled almost entirely by the advice of his consultants—and of direct mailing. On these Sabato's book must become a handbook on 'how to win elections with or without issues', or on what Napolitan calls 'The Election game and how to win it'. The book ends with a masterly conclusion, revealing among other things the financial extent of this development and listing the consultants by name. American politics is now a game for billionaires, and in it moral as well as political issues can easily be blurred. But Sabato is sensible. Consultants, he finds, 'are hard-working professionals, very bright and capable, politically shrewd and calculating, and impressively articulate'. But they have helped to produce a political climate in which the ethics are 'flexible', they are prone to choose candidates who are better campaigners than office-holders; and the press, often involved in symbiotic relations with consultants, have generally served as promoters rather than critics.

Is there an answer? Sabato believes that the work of the consultants should be better understood—and his book is a splendid contribution to that end—and made more accountable. Political parties should regain their primacy in the conduct of campaigns and bring the consultancy services 'in-house', as the Republican Congressional, senatorial and national Committees have begun to do in recent years. This is a piece of massive research (with a very valuable bibliographical essay) that is at once readable, entertaining, useful—and ethically disturbing.

EDMOND WRIGHT



ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

The Arab-Israeli Wars (War and Peace in the Middle East). Chaim Herzog. Arms and Armour Press. £11.95.

Chaim Herzog (Hon. K.B.E.) is unique in his long link with every Israeli war since the War of Independence, either as a soldier or Director of Military Intelligence. The book is illustrated with a wealth of maps and pictures. It is convenient for the student to have in one book the Sinai Campaign of 1956; the Six-Day War of 1967; the less known War of Attrition ending in 1970; the surprise attack by Egypt which nearly succeeded in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and finally the war against terrorism at Entebbe. President Nasser was armed by the Soviet Union; the United States has been a permanent help to Israel but also has made frequent attempts to bridge the gap based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.

I can never forget the scene in the Sinai desert after the Six-Day War, seeing hundreds of modern Russian tanks lying in ruins at every corner and the superb bravery of the Israelis on the Golan Heights. Now, alas, an entirely new manifestation of the Middle East War is taking place in Lebanon. In the early days I can remember the most peaceful relations between Lebanon and Israel. It is too easy to attribute these wars to Israeli aggression or to the pertinacity of the P.L.O. The tramp of marching armies through Palestine across the coastal plain which links Asia Minor with the Continent of Africa has been as long as history. The history of the Return of Jews from the Diaspora is the latest episode and the struggles of the last sixty years have never been more meticulously studied and recorded than in General Herzog's masterly survey.

To most of us, the Jewish people have always been associated with finance and with music and the arts. The revelations of their brilliance in modern warfare needs closer examination. The Israelis will exclaim that it was survival or extinction. This is much the theme of this quietly-spoken Israeli, with his Irish and Cambridge background and son of a Chief Rabbi. It would seem that some further explanation is needed to account for the superb planning and split-second heroism of Entebbe.

General Herzog, apart from his military career, has always been associated in some way with Government and for some years was Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations. Even now he is a Member of Parliament. In a word, he is the nearest thing to a member of the Israeli establishment. It is this combination of activities which gives this carefully written book an authoritative stamp and a most useful reminder for the student of war or of Israeli affairs.

KENNETH LINDSAY

MALE MIDWIVES

Male Midwives: A Report of Two Studies. Mary Speak and Jean Aitken-Swan. Dept. of Health & Social Security 1982. £2.55.

In November 1981 the Professor of Nursing Studies in Edinburgh University, lecturing under the auspices of our Centre for Human Ecology, addressed a packed house under the title of "Nurses in Ferment". She covered many topics including the remuneration of nurses, the related roles of the service, administrative and academic components within nursing and the general thrust of advance to which nursing is currently exposed.

This important little book is associated with one of the changes in nursing practice. It describes in a clear and detailed manner two studies in which the role of men in the practice of midwifery is considered. As might have been

anticipated, early reactions to this proposal were inimical and in 1975 the Royal College of Midwifery obtained support from a number of bodies determined to prevent the admission of men to this profession. However, one is now glad to report that both surveys, the first conducted in the Islington School of Midwifery in England and the second in the Forth Valley School in Scotland, provided definite and equally favourable results. It was found that male midwives were generally accepted by mothers, husbands, midwifery staff and general medical staff. The question of chaperoning has provided some difficulties but these do not appear to be insurmountable. Careful selection of candidates for midwifery training was stressed and good educational background was seen to be valuable.

A change of this type can only be regarded as for the better. The practice of midwifery will assuredly be improved and the number of trained people correspondingly increased. The authors of this pamphlet are to be congratulated on their clear exposition and I wish the whole project all success for the future.

JOHN A. LORADNE

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Impact of English Towns 1700-1800 (Oxford University Press. Hardback £9.95; Paperback £3.95). Penelope J. Corfield, History Lecturer at Bedford College, London University, has produced a concise but comprehensive account of the 'gradual but distinctive process of urbanisation in eighteenth century England'. She takes as a town a settlement of at least 2,500 inhabitants. 'By the end of the eighteenth century over two and a half million people, or about 30% of the country's population, lived in towns of 2,500 inhabitants or more. A century earlier the towns had accounted for fewer than one million people, less than 20% of the total.' Her study includes the relation between rural England and the urban areas, the impact of the growing industry and commerce, the towns and the economy, urban demography, society, politics and the environment. There is a separate chapter on London: and other growing urban centres of particular or exemplary relevance are briefly treated. She has brought together a great deal of material, but well aware that many statistics available are not complete or entirely reliable. She is basically concerned

with general trends and developments. She has included chapter references and a bibliography. It is a very useful introductory study of a vast and important subject in our history.

Everyman's Good English Guide (Dent. £7.95). Harry Fieldhouse is a distinguished journalist with a long career as editor, writer and rewriter who for many years has taken an intense interest in the use of the English language. In this useful and sometimes provocative volume, he has provided his comprehensive guide to the use of both spoken and written English. It is not, and cannot be, a definitive study on usage. On the other hand, Mr. Fieldhouse can point out crude errors and discuss choices. 'Conservation is among the tests. So the established sense is preferred to the upstart, the native term to the trendy import, the informed pronunciation to the latest guess.' He points out that there is 'no future in challenging individual usages that are already part of the language'. He means by this, presumably, standard English. His views will not always be accepted. For example, his attitude to the use of the colon and semi-colon is

controversial; furthermore, he does not deal with the abuse and misuse of the paragraph, particularly in the press. In general, this book is well worth in itself usage by those who need to improve their standard of English.

Tales of Hoffman (Penguin Books £2.25). Hoffman, who, as R. J. Hollingdale points out in the introduction, was a minor public official with Jekyll and Hyde characteristics, is best remembered as the eponymous hero of Offenbach's opera. This latest fruit to flow from Penguin Classic's cornucopia should go some way to restoring Hoffman in his own right. Two of the tales, *The Sandman* and *Councillor Krespel*, are the basis of the Doll and Venetian scenes of the opera. The others are a mixture of nightmare, invention and darkness. Hoffman's own split personality manifests itself in the characters of these tales of insanity and death. (J.M.)

The New Pelican Guide to English Literature (Penguin Books). In the nineteen-fifties, the volumes of the Pelican Guide to English Literature were published with great success. Now a revised and expanded edition is being published under the general editorship of Boris Ford. The series consists of nine volumes. In his General Introduction, Mr. Ford describes the work as 'a guide to the history and traditions of English literature, a contour map of the literary scene. It attempts, that is, to draw up an ordered account of literature as a direct encouragement to people to read widely in an informed way.' The volumes are related to particular periods, with the first two devoted to Medieval Literature. To hand are Medieval Literature, Part 1, Chaucer and the Alliterative Tradition (£2.95; USA \$5.95); The Age of Shakespeare (£2.95; USA \$5.95); From Donne to Marvell (£1.95; USA \$4.95) and From Dryden to Johnson (£2.50; USA

\$5.95). Each volume contains a 'survey of the social context of literature', a 'literary survey', 'detailed studies of some of the chief writers and works in the period' and 'an appendix of essential facts for reference purposes' including a bibliography. There are numerous contributors dealing with particular subject matters. This new Guide should be widely welcomed.

The Psychic Power of Hypnosis. (The Aquarian Press. £2.75. Paperback). The late and much missed Simeon Edmunds published in 1961 his classic and serious study, *Hypnotism and the Supernormal*. In 1968 the Aquarian Press issued an abbreviated and simplified version of his findings, with particular emphasis on that section of his work which dealt with the various ways in which hypnosis can be used to develop and foster latent psychic gifts. The present volume is a second edition, revised and enlarged, of that more circumscribed study, which, although it cannot in the nature of things do full justice to the author's gifts of research and expression, does at least keep his name before the public. Never duped, but always open to new experience, he saw hypnosis as a useful tool to shape and bring into play such paranormal abilities as extra-sensory perception, clairvoyance and precognition. This is a sound and useful introduction to a fascinating borderland, still largely unmapped. (R.W.E.)

England: A Traveller's Guide to History (G. W. and A. Heaketh, Ormakirk. Paperback). Travellers on holiday should find this second revised edition of Christopher A. Leeds' excellent book very useful. It contains brief notes on nearly three hundred places of historic interest. They are enough to whet the visitor's appetite and to encourage him to further enquiry. Bibliographies would have been of great advantage to him.

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
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Self-Determination & the African-American People



by James R. Forman

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The origins and development of the term self-determination are described, revealing aspects of the suppressed history of the February, 1917 Russian Revolution and the inner secrets of what happened to the former Third International.

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This book maintains the oppressed African-American nation and its national minority areas are entitled now to autonomy under the existing socio-economic arrangements in the U.S.

About the author:

Formerly the executive secretary of the Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC), James R. Forman is currently the chairman of the Unemployed and Poverty Action Council (UPAC), a civil and human rights organisation working on the passage of the 1965 Civil Rights Act, the Equal Rights Amendment, and improved human rights in El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa and elsewhere.

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THE POPE IN BRITAIN
Sir John Bliggs-Davison,
M.P.

**KEEPING EURO-LEFT:
THE ITALIAN
COMMUNIST PARTY
AND THE EUROPEAN
'THIRD WAY'**

Alan Hick

**DEBATING WITH
TIGERS: THE
MORALITY OF
UNILATERAL
DISARMAMENT:
NOTES ON THE
RECENT DEBATE**

W. J. Stankiewicz

**CINEMA: A
QUARTERLY REVIEW**
David Shipman

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KEEPING EURO-LEFT: THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN 'THIRD WAY'

by Alan Hick

TRY to imagine the scene...

London, just before Christmas. As news comes in about Poland succumbing to Martial Law, Michael Foot goes on television, publicly denouncing the repression and the political system which led to it. (Highly plausible). Tony Benn, joined by Denis Healey and Len Murray, declares that socialism does not exist in Poland. (Plausible). They all insist that détente must be saved, and that a new international initiative and new political conditions are needed, and that the role of Europe—particularly the European Community—is of central importance in all this. (What?) Michael Foot then dashes off to the European Parliament at Strasbourg in order to appeal, in this his first major policy speech since the Polish events, for greater political unity in the European Community integration process, for an end to nationalism of the Left, and for the launching at the Community level of a democratic-socialist European 'third way'. (Is this some kind of sick joke?)

No joke. True, the British Labour Party leadership did not quite react in this way to the Polish coup. There was no real 'European' dimension in Labour's response. But in Italy this, literally, is how the Communist Party (PCI) was led into battle. Flanked by Pietro Ingrao on the Left and by Giorgio Napolitano on the Right, and backed by the PCI trade union leader Luciano Lama, Enrico Berlinguer was in no doubt when he bluntly declared that the Soviet system was no longer a relevant or dynamic force for socialism, and that Western Europe, united, was. He had no hesitation in identifying the European Community as the most appropriate trans-national political apparatus for launching a joint European socialist campaign. He had no qualms in choosing the directly elected European Parliament, rather than OECD, EFTA, the Council of Europe or the UN Economic Commission for Europe—about which we hear so much in Labour's 'alternative' European strategy—as the venue for his historic and much applauded call for a new European 'third way'.

Is it really too late for Labour to heed this call?

Like Labour, the PCI was initially hostile to the Common Market and the 'capitalist' Treaty of Rome. Unlike Labour, however, which clings to the idea of a national independent road to recovery and change, albeit in a spirit of international and inter-governmental co-operation, the PCI

managed to shed its former 'tactical' policy of pursuing diverse national roads to socialism, with only bi-lateral forms of co-ordination, for a more regional or transnational based strategy of 'polycentrism'; and in so doing the PCI also came round to identifying the broader European Community setting as a potential autonomous zone for socialism.¹

Indeed, as early as 1962, senior PCI spokesman, Giorgio Amendola, recognised both the economic advances of the European Community and the new political openings on the Left which could emerge through it; and he therefore called for a workers' European struggle' and for the vital democratisation of the EEC.² Euro-Communist policy in the 1970's subsequently stressed the need for 'united initiatives' by the Left and progressive forces in the Community—and especially in the European Parliament—in order to work for a more 'democratic, peaceful and independent Europe.'³ Berlinguer repeated this 'pan-European' pledge at the Berlin Communist Conference in June 1976.⁴ By the run-up to the European Elections of June 1979 the PCI, despite its strong criticism of the prevailing EEC establishment set up, had, in fact, become the pro-Community party *par excellence*. Amendola enthusiastically argued for a 'constituent' role for the new European Parliament, 'capable of charting a new course for European integration in terms of institutional forms and contents'.⁵ Leading PCI Executive Committee member and current Speaker of the Italian Parliament, Nilde Iotti, went on to call for a 'supra-national' European political authority.⁶ The PCI leadership as a whole explicitly declared: 'The transformation of the Community into a democratic organism, founded on universal suffrage, is imperative. A pluri-national power is necessary to effectively tackle such problems as currency, capital movements, industrial reconversion, energy and scientific research.'⁷ In short, unlike Labour, the PCI judged the European Community to be a relevant and integral factor in the struggle for socialism in the West, and considered the directly elected European Parliament as a positive development in forging democratic power at the European level.

The qualitative progress from a national to a regional detachment from the orbit of Soviet communism clearly played a part in the PCI's 'European choice'. Moreover, as Italy's leading federalist and current vice-chairman of the PCI European Parliamentary group, Altiero Spinelli, has recently pointed out, sitting as an Independent Left/PCI MEP, the PCI, in a way, had no other choice but Europe, in view of Soviet dictatorship in the East and American imperialism in the West, while a purely national road to socialism had too many fascist connotations in Italy itself.⁸ It would be misleading, nonetheless, to represent the PCI's commitment to the European Community as simply a matter of political tactics and expediency. In more fundamental terms, as the European Elections campaign demonstrated, the PCI regards the European Community as a viable and essential transnational *political* grouping, with a democratic Parliament and strong socio-economic ties, which is needed for dealing with planning measures and international problems and dangers the sheer scale of which nowadays evades national independent action and accountable control, let alone

effective influence on the part of individual socialist governments.

This appreciation of the European dimension and potential role of the Community in extending rather than reducing sovereign rights was succinctly explained by Berlinguer at the 1979 PCI Congress as follows:

The development of the process of integration must be seen as a condition of the true independence and the internal economic development of the Community's member states.⁹ The fact that not all parties of the Left—notably the PCF and Labour—shared this view was a source of irritation clearly registered at the same Congress when the PCI Central Committee stated: The difficulties of the European Left stem to a large extent from the lack of a common European prospect. There is vigorous opposition to the construction of a European organism endowed with real powers . . . both in some Communist Parties and in Socialist, Labour and Social Democratic Parties. There is not yet, in the orientation of the European Left movement, sufficient awareness not only of the gravity of the present economic crisis, but above all of the nature of the world crisis, with the problems it raises.¹⁰

Throughout the last three years this crisis on a world scale has indeed been a propelling force in the PCI's increasingly radical European stance. On the economic side, as the active PCI budget and agricultural spokeswoman at Strasbourg, Carla Barbarella MEP, pointed out, in a crisis of global proportions the road to recovery does not lie in 'fragmentation' but in the unity which the EEC can help bring about.¹¹ This is not to say that the PCI has a strictly Euro-centric view discounting the fate of others, but rather a pivotal view of united Europe's role on the international scene as a whole. Indeed, in the wake of general recession, increasing North-South economic disparity, inter-bloc tensions over Afghanistan, Latin America, Poland and the Middle East, and with the haunting threat of nuclear war hanging over all of us, PCI minds have become more concentrated than ever on the need for Europe—specifically the European Community—to act.

A crucial advancement in this sense was achieved in October 1981 when the PCI Central Committee unanimously approved an international policy report submitted by Romano Ledda which called for an effective European third force, autonomous but loyal within the Atlantic Alliance framework, to act as a mediatory agent in order to reduce East-West ideological tensions arising out of expansionary 'Soviet power politics' and cold war 'Reagan adventurism', and to assume decisive responsibility in bridging the North-South poverty gap. Critical of the European Community's 'incapacity' to unite more tightly and to combat 'unrestrained protectionism' and 'nationalistic reflexes', the report went on to appeal for a strong counter-offensive both in the Italian and European Parliaments, and within the European Left, to draw up a new 'concrete platform' and 'political guide' for uniting Europe.¹² This appeal was repeated in the final policy statement issued by the Central Committee in November which, again pointing to the unfortunate divisions of the European Left regarding closer integration, claimed that political unity was in the general interest and that Western Europe—and in particular, once more, the European Community—had a special international role and function which should not be renounced.¹³ In the same context, returning from an important trip to Latin America in the Autumn, Berlinguer announced that there were 'great expectations'

concerning the role of Western Europe, and that the 'European workers' movement' had a crucial part to play in the creation of a radical, democratic and peace-loving 'new international order'.¹⁴

This point was stressed with even more urgency in the wake of nuclear arms escalation, threatening to make Europe the 'theatre' of a nuclear holocaust. Indeed, in a plea the full originality of which has never had much currency in Labour unilateralist circles, Romano Ledda exclaimed in August last year that 'between rearmament and surrender, Europe has a choice', that being in effect to 're-found the Community' along such united political lines assuring it of real 'power and authority' within the Atlantic Alliance, and capable thereby of inducing both the US and the Soviet Union to enter into serious arms limitation talks.¹⁵ The veteran PCI spokesman on International Affairs, Gian Carlo Pajetta, similarly argued in favour of a 'European' rather than an 'isolationary' or 'unilateralist' position as the basis for bringing the two blocs together.¹⁶ It was with this regional, multilateralist view that the PCI supported both the trans-national peace movement and Chancellor Schmidt's astute 'honest broker' diplomacy between the US and USSR; and when the Geneva talks were finally launched, the PCI journal *L'Unità* laid claim to an 'active third role for Europe'.¹⁷ As Ledda again argued, 'Europe must stop now', the European governments had to act in unison in order to assume a 'direct responsibility' in the negotiations.¹⁸ This position was re-stated only recently by the PCI Foreign Affairs spokesman, Paolo Bufalini.¹⁹

In short, in a period of 'international radicalisation', turbulence and crisis, the PCI's European and pro-Community policy came out strengthened, not weakened. As Pajetta publicly stated in early December: 'we give primary consideration to the reinforcement of multilateral co-operation, especially on the part of the European Community. This type of co-operation by Europe . . . can make our continent into a pole for substituting power bloc logic with a policy of co-operation and . . . détente.'²⁰—One week later Poland fell under the grip of Martial Law.

More than any other single event, the Soviet-approved military crack-down in Poland galvanised the PCI leadership into European action both on the geo-political and ideological plane. No longer was a united Western Europe seen only as a valuable political base for promoting détente, a 'new internationalism' and a diverse route towards socialism in the multiple regional 'polycentric' sense. Western Europe was now also seen as the key area for the future development of socialism in ideological contradiction to the Soviet system.

This definitive qualitative break with Moscow, for which the writings of Gramsci and Togliatti were arduously quoted in justification but which the untenable factual experiences of Hungary 1956, Prague 1968 and now Poland 1981 more clearly brought on, has indeed made the European unity process and the role of the European socialist movement the central plank of PCI international policy. For, by tacitly condemning, and in turn being 'excommunicated' by, the 'bankrupt' Soviet system, by bluntly declaring that democratic pluralism rather than the single party-state can be the *only*

basis of socialism, and by concluding that advanced capitalist Western Europe is the chief propelling force for socialism and that the European Left is the new socialist vanguard, the PCI, more urgently than ever before, must now link up with Europe's Socialist and Social Democratic Parties and ensure that the organic political machinery at the European Community level not only remains intact but develops still further.²¹ This is why, in his speech to the European Parliament on December 17, Berlinguer was not satisfied with just repeating calls for more EEC political autonomy in East-West affairs and economic activity in the North-South rapport, but went on to exclaim:

Today, more than ever, we need the maximum of positive and new initiatives, and therefore unity on the part of the European Community. And instead we are faced with an unchained spiral of protectionism and also of nationalism. But does every single state think that it can solve its problems by itself? . . . And why does the economic and political integration so vital to Europe not progress but regresses instead? The main cause is the political short-sightedness of governments and of the dominating economic classes, and their proven organic incapacity to push integration beyond the limits already reached. However, in our opinion, the workers' movement in the West must also bear some responsibility for partly having an outdated purely nationalistic view of its own interests and role.²²

This is why the PCI Executive Committee statement of December 30 called for a democratic-socialist European 'third way', neither following the 'unacceptable' Soviet course nor the insufficient tinkering of social democracy as it has been practised in the West till now.²³ This is why, in his historic speech to the Central Committee on January 11 this year, Berlinguer called out to Europe's Socialist and Social Democratic Parties to join the PCI in the search for new forms of socialism with a European dimension, and why he made a special appeal to Labour and the PCF not to discard the independent, democratic and social potential of the European Community and its international role under a Euro-Left lead.²⁴ Finally, this is why Berlinguer and the PCI leadership as a whole attach so much importance to the radical-structuralist views and European social profile of the Mitterrand regime, and why a loose European pact between the PCI and PSF has been set in motion.²⁵

The PCI, in other words, is set on course to become the European 'mould breaker'. Spurred on by the pace of international events, the break with Moscow, and the incapacity of fragmented and old-fashioned social democracies to effectively tackle the world economic crisis and recession, Berlinguer indeed looks like breathing new air into the role of the European Left. Having effectively shed unacceptable traits of Leninist dogma, though not Marxist doctrine, the PCI is patching up the disastrous split in the European workers' movement brought on by the Russian revolution, and is forging a new 'third phase' unity, in place of the defunct Soviet and social democratic experiences. Left-wing socialists in Italy strongly approve of this line and have even suggested that the PCI be invited to join the 'Socialist International' as observers. Their more right-wing party boss, Bettino Craxi, does not object to this, though there is some reticence in other parties. The PCI leadership itself, officially, does not want to become embroiled in the affair at this stage, despite positive

pronouncements by radical Executive Committee member Achille Occhetto. Organic unity initiatives in the European Community setting, especially in the European Parliament, might, however, materialise more quickly. In fact, already to a major degree, the PCI is working in close harmony with the Socialist Group at Strasbourg, whether this be on policy issues such as reform of the CAP or condemnation of the false elections in El Salvador, or on vital solidarity issues such as the recent election of Dutch Socialist, Pieter Dankert, as Parliamentary President. (On this latter point, it is rumoured that, not the PCI, but some Labour MEPs actually broke ranks and voted for the Italian Radical Party maverick, Marco Panella). At the institutional level, furthermore, the PCI has given a strong federalist lead by sponsoring and in turn by voting en bloc last year in the European Parliament for Altiero Spinelli's European constituent proposals. Indeed, together with Spinelli, the leader of the PCI Europe group, Guido Fanti MEP, is a key member of the institutional committee set up to prepare the constituent proposals in detail. The senior PCI international affairs spokesman, Sergio Segre MEP, has also given his diligent support to the project from the start.²⁶

As we look to the future, the PCI's European policy is thus emerging in force. In contrast with Labour, a socialist strategy is sought within, not outside of, the Community. Trans-national measures are looked to in order to combat the recession in unison and order, and to promote a radical European strategy to reflate the economy, cut unemployment, rationalise the CAP according to regional and qualitative needs, and to achieve the European 'social' profile which Mitterrand and Berlinguer both identify as an integral part of the European 'third way'. In addition, radical institutional reforms, long demanded by the PCI and utterly discounted by Labour, extending accountable democratic political power to the European level, have become the rallying call of the PCI Europe group and leadership as a whole. Finally, in complete contradiction to Labour's stated view that inter-bloc tensions 'will be perpetuated as long as the EEC exists',²⁷ the PCI is adamant in identifying the European Community, especially under the lead of the European Left as a whole, as the major third force of the future, essential for promoting both détente and a 'new internationalism', based around an ever more convincing trans-national example of modern democratic socialism.

It is still too late for Labour to 'keep Euro-Left?'

NOTES:

1. Consult D. SASSOON, *The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party from the Resistance to the Historic Compromise*, (F. Pinter, Ltd., London, 1981), pp. 106-116.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
3. 'Joint Declaration of the French and Italian Communist Parties, 15 November 1975', P. FILO DELLA TORRE, E. MORTIMER, J. STORY, *Euro-Communism Myth or Reality?*, (Penguin, 1979), Appendix Two.
4. E. BERLINGUER, 'For New Roads towards Socialism in Italy and Europe', (Speech to the Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, Berlin 29-30 June, 1976).

5. G. AMENDOLA, 'The Communists and the European Elections', (Interview to the Agnelli Foundation, March 1978).
6. N. JOTTI, 'The Communists in the European Parliament: reflections on experience and prospects', in *Which Europe*, (CESPI, 1978), p. 48.
7. PCI Central Committee, 'Draft Theses for the 15th National Congress of the PCI', (1978).
8. A. SPINELLI, interview with writer.
9. See R. KINDERSLEY (Ed.), *In Search of Euro-Communism*, (MacMillan, 1981), p. 150.
10. PCI Central Committee 'Draft Theses . . . 1978', op. cit.
11. C. BARBARELLA, interview with writer.
12. R. LEDDA, 'PCI Proposals for Peace and World Development: North-South, disarmament, the role of Europe', *l'Unità*, (6 October 1981). For Central Committee debate, see *l'Unità*, (7 October 1981).
13. PCI Central Committee document, 'The Contribution of the PCI to a Plan for Peace and Development', *l'Unità* (8 November 1981).
14. E. BERLINGUER, Press statement, *l'Unità* (24 October 1981). See also his interview in *la Repubblica*, (24 October 1981), and general policy statement, *l'Unità* (9 November 1981).
15. R. LEDDA, editorial, *l'Unità* (30 August 1981).
16. G. C. PAJETTA, editorial, *Rinascita* (28 August 1981). See also his editorial in *Rinascita* (4 December 1981).
17. Editorial, *l'Unità* (29 November 1981).
18. R. LEDDA, editorial, *l'Unità* (22 November 1981).
19. P. BUFALINI, editorial, *Rinascita* (26 March 1982).
20. G. C. PAJETTA, interview, *l'Unità* (5 December 1981).
21. See documents quoted below.
22. E. BERLINGUER, speech to the European Parliament, *l'Unità* (18 December 1981).
23. PCI Executive Committee statement, 'Opening a New Phase in the Struggle for Socialism: reflections on the dramatic facts in Poland', *l'Unità* (30 December 1981).
24. E. BERLINGUER, report to Central Committee, 'The PCI's Role and Initiative for a New Phase in the Struggle for Socialism in Italy and Europe', *l'Unità* (12 January 1982). For Central Committee debate, see *l'Unità* (13-14 January 1982).
25. See articles in *l'Unità* (31 March, 1 April 1982).
26. For survey of PCI's role in the European Parliament, see G. FANTI, interview in *l'Unità* (14 March 1982); S. SEGRE, articles in *Rinascita* (4 December 1981, 29 January 1982); G. BARBARELLA, articles in *Rinascita* (30 October 1981, 19 March 1982); A. SPINELLI and F. IPPOLITO, *Crocodile*, monthly newsletter to MEP's.
27. See *A Socialist Foreign Policy* (Labour Party, 1981), p. 14.

INTERVIEWS:

Guido Fanti MEP (chairman PCI Europe group); Altiero Spinelli MEP (vice-chairman); Carla Barbarella MEP; Gianni Cervetti (PCI Executive Committee). Plus help and advice from PCI European Department; International Policy Research Centre (CESPI); *l'Unità* and *Rinascita* offices.

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SPAIN AND 'EL 23 F' — BEFORE AND AFTER

by Anthony Gooch

ON November 20th, 1975, Francisco Franco Bahamonde breathed his last, having assured the Spanish People that he was leaving everything *atado y bien atado*/'tied up, well and truly tied up', and that his work would be carried on by Don Juan Carlos, the young prince in whose person Spain was once more visibly to become a monarchy.

The universal interpretation of this was the logical one: that Franco had arranged things to ensure *continuismo*/'the continuation of the status quo', and, ever since the reintroduction of democracy, Spaniards have frequently been heard to make remarks such as: 'If Franco could see this country now he would have a fit'. But would he, in fact, be as surprised as all that?

Franco was no fool; even his worst enemies would concur on that score. Unquestionably *cuco*/'canny', 'shrewd', he managed to judge men and circumstances sufficiently well to stay in the saddle through thick and thin for nigh on forty years. This could hardly have been due to sheer good luck and the force of inertia, even if these things did at times play their part.

Did he really believe that, when he was gone, *franquismo*/'Francoism' would nevertheless go on indefinitely? After all, even when he was there, the status quo did not mean the same thing in 1975 as it had meant in 1965, or 1955, or 1945. The changes in Spain had been many and far-reaching, above all after 1953 when, as a result of the Agreement on Bases with the United States, American investment and influence began to stream into the country, while Western European influence made itself felt through tourism and the coming and going of vast numbers of Spanish emigrants. Contact with the United States and Western Europe gave rise to the contradiction of an authoritarian, quasi-fascist state hobnobbing with democratic states. Tierno Galván was to say: 'We import democratic goods and then consume them in totalitarian conditions.' Inevitably the conditions became less totalitarian as democratic concepts came increasingly to circulate in Spanish minds. Industrialisation and the affluence that stemmed from the Economic Miracle of the sixties, while keeping the attention of many Spaniards off things political, caused many others to think about them as never before, especially those thousands who were now able to travel abroad as tourists and who, as a result, suddenly realised just how embarrassingly anachronistic and unacceptable *franquismo* looked in the light of the world beyond Spain's frontiers.

In 1973 Admiral Carrero Blanco was blown sky-high by ETA, and the main human prop of *continuismo* after Franco was gone.

It may well have been about this time that the young prince Juan Carlos is said to have asked Franco for advice on how he should govern when the time came. It is reported that Franco replied more or less in

these terms: 'I have no advice to give you, because the problems you will have to face will be different from mine, and, therefore, the solutions you will have to seek will also be different from mine.'

Did Franco perhaps have some inkling of what those solutions might ultimately be? Did he perhaps have a shrewd idea that behind the bland exterior of Juan Carlos lay something more, possibly a great deal more? We can but conjecture; the Caudillo may well have confided his innermost thoughts to no-one.

During his long years of training under Franco, the Prince had consistently conveyed an uninspiring impression of nothing more than respectful submissiveness and was thought by almost everyone likely to prove a nonentity doomed to an extremely short political existence: he was dubbed *Juan el breve*. Yet, within two years of coming to the throne, he was to stand revealed as *el motor del cambio*/'the driving force behind change'. Franco's ineffectual last premier, Carlos Arias, having been eased from office, the King passed over such imposing candidates as the brilliant and dynamic Manuel Fraga and the urbane and sagacious José María de Areilza, men with an established image, to whose seniority and experience he might have felt constrained to defer; instead he chose the little-known Adolfo Suárez who, although he had come up through the Franco system, was by no means indelibly marked by it, and was young and flexible enough to strike a new course, ambitious and bold enough to outface rivals and opponents.

The spirit of democracy was in the air; a large majority of Spaniards, now freed of the almost mystic presence of Franco, felt weary and, in many cases, ashamed of living under a regime bearing the stigma of fascism, and they wanted change; the days of *inmovilismo* were numbered—movement there had to be. This spirit combined with the King's conviction that the road to democracy was the only one for a Spain whose future he saw as clearly lying in integration with the other nations of Western Europe through membership of the EEC and NATO, and the only one for a fledgling monarchy ultimately dependent for its consolidation not only on Spanish opinion but also on the opinion of the world beyond.

For the King to have attempted an immediate, sharp break with *franquismo* would have been foolhardy in the extreme; it would have been an irrefutable betrayal of his oath of allegiance to Franco and would have precipitated a violent confrontation with large sectors of the Establishment. The answer was to be something far more subtle: Suárez *reformismo*—a process by which the fabric of the Francoist State was to be dismantled piece by piece, using the mechanisms available within the existing political structure, and, hence, technically at least, in accordance with the letter of Francoist legality. The man chosen by the King, working in close collaboration with the King, achieved, in the late seventies, a political miracle far more astonishing than the economic miracle of the sixties: the re-establishment of political parties—even the legalisation of the Communist Party—and the holding of free elections:

in short, two years after the death of Franco, the setting-up in Spain of a parliamentary democracy. This was only possible because it was what the vast majority of Spaniards wanted and what they voted for in the National Referendum on Reform held in December 1976.

We have surmised that Franco, despite his life-long condemnation of the democratic political party system, may have foreseen something of the sort, and perhaps, in his heart of hearts, he condoned it as inevitable: 'the solutions you will have to seek will be different from mine'.

But those who certainly did not condone it, those who would have no truck with *reformismo* and regarded Don Juan Carlos and Suárez as vile traitors and base hatchet-men were the dyed-in-the-wool, hard-core, last-ditch or bunker-mentality 'unreconstructed' Francoists, people like Fuerza Nueva's Blas Piñar, people who continued and continue to live with a black and white, Manichaean, Civil War and anti-communist Crusade mentality, according to which anything other than the right-wing traditionalism and authoritarianism embodied in Franco was and is anathema.

From the point of view of these people what has democracy brought to Spain?—

(1) A decline in the degree and quality of authority and of respect for it, leading to a socio-political climate in which crime and terrorism thrive, and in which many people, especially the young, do not know where they stand and easily fall victims to *desencanto*/'disillusionment' and slide into *pasotismo*/a 'drop-out or you-can-count-me-out attitude'.

(2) The erosion of traditional moral values, the toleration of pornography and the legalisation of divorce, resulting in such evils as drug-taking, sexual permissiveness, family instability and an increase in abortion.

(3) A loss of national character, a feeling that the colour is going out of Spanish life and that stimulating eccentricity is being replaced by dull uniformity—a Spain rapidly becoming less 'different' and thereby suffering a diminution of her 'true essence'.

(4) The danger of a break-up of the country stemming from separatism fostered by a policy of regional autonomy—a Spain no longer '*una, grande y libre*' as she was under Franco, but becoming fragmented into a multiplicity of paltry little Spains.

(5) Industrial disruption and decline resulting from trade union activity.

(6) Economic crisis involving rising prices, inflation and unemployment.

This jaundiced picture of the democratic record in Spain since 1976, although certainly not totally devoid of justification, is simplistic, lop-sided and basically unfair; it is the sort of picture one gets from those for whom political freedom has little significance or value or indeed is seen as positively injurious. It is usually accompanied by an equally simplistic view of Franco, in which frustration and resentment at eroded privilege and diminished prosperity combine with romantic nostalgia for a paternal-

listic, relatively uncomplicated past, a view encapsulated in the phrase *Con Franco vivíamos mejor*/'Life was better with Franco', or, as the wife of a member of *Fuerzo Nueva* recently put it in more graphic terms: 'He made the poor richer without making the rich poor; those were GOLDEN TIMES—a DREAM!'

Not surprisingly, where a hankering for the Franco past survives most noticeably is amongst army officers who fought on the Nationalist side in the Civil War or were trained subsequently by those imbued with the Nationalist ethos. With their essentially authoritarian mentality and instinctive distrust of and contempt for politicians, they have naturally watched the evolution of the democratic process in Spain with a baleful eye, and have been exasperated and infuriated above all by what they regard as government flabbiness and ineffectualness in the sphere of law and order. Justifiably, they see the campaign of terrorism waged by the Marxist Basque independence organisation ETA as a constant threat directed not only, with special venom, at them, but also at the fabric of Spanish society in general and at the country's unity and 'territorial integrity'. Looking upon the Army as the ultimate guarantor of this unity and integrity and as the repository of 'the true essence of the spirit of Spain', a group of these officers—with the classic 'cultural condescension' of those who maintain that the Spanish people are forever politically immature and do not know what is best for them—decided early in 1981 that the country had had quite enough feeble government based on free debate, consultation, compromise, consensus and such-like pluralistic democratic wishy-washiness and shilly-shallying; what Spain clearly needed was a good dose of single-minded *mano dura*/'firm-handedness' or 'strong-arm treatment'. So, on the evening of 23rd February—*El 23 F*, as it was to become known—Civil Guard Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero Molina spearheaded a coup attempt that was to astonish the world as a kind of TV Spectacular Dance of the Three-Cornered Hat performed in the Palacio de las Cortes in Madrid to the accompaniment of rattling sub-machine guns, while in Valencia tanks moved into the streets at the command of Lt. Gen. Jaime Milans del Bosch.

After the near-miraculous smoothness of the Transition, *El 23 F* shook the confidence of Spanish democrats to its foundations. Could it be that Africa did begin in the Pyrenees after all? Could it be that there wasn't all that much difference between Spain and a Latin-American banana republic? Suddenly they saw the 'Turkish solution' as very, very near and Brussels as very, very far away.

Happily the attempt failed, and it did so because it elicited far less support than the ring-leaders had counted on. There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, the number of *golpista* officers—fully committed active supporters of the coup plan, was small, perhaps roughly equivalent to the number of officers fully committed to the ideals of democracy, the vast majority standing in an intermediate, undecided position, tending strongly to sympathise with conservative views but, at the same time, aware of the incongruousness, in a Western European context, of

extreme right-wing attitudes. Secondly, the King, who, from his early years of training in Spain had diligently fostered the closest possible relationship between himself and the Armed Forces, threw his whole weight into the defence of democracy and was instrumental in dissuading many who might otherwise have thrown in their lot with Tejero and Milans.

Yet, at the trial of the *golpistas*, which came to an end in May, Tejero, Milans and other accused officers maintained that they had been given to understand by General Armada Comyn, private secretary to the King, that the latter, in despair over the political crisis following on the resignation of Adolfo Suárez, knew what was afoot and indeed approved the idea of a new government, under Armada, to be set up by putsch. To explain what the King in fact did when the crunch came, they claimed that he had obviously got cold feet at the last minute.

All this was categorically denied by Armada, in cross-examination, and has been dismissed by Don Juan Carlos as despicable slander.

It is apparently the case that, on occasion, Don Juan Carlos has, in private, expressed frustration and impatience with the party politicians, and it seems possible that, through Armada, some of these remarks may have reached *golpista* ears. But that they could have been thought to be a green light for a coup is surely preposterous when we consider that the King not only had a record of unfailing loyalty to democratic principles ever since his accession but, as we have seen, was himself the prime initiator of the democratic process in Spain. All the known facts point to a right-wing conspiracy to discredit the King by showing him as having contemplated the betrayal of democracy—a subtle form of revenge from those who hate him for, as they see it, having betrayed Francoism.

El 23 F brought back into sharp relief the basic conflict running through the whole of modern Spanish history—the clash between two radically opposed interpretations of the concepts of ‘honour’, ‘patriotism’ and ‘service to Spain’. Tejero and Milans did what they did for the honour of the Army and out of a patriotic desire to serve Spain; the King did what he did for precisely the same reasons. But, whereas for Tejero and Milans the Army is an almost mystic entity possessed of sacrosanct omniscience where the good of Spain is concerned and hence above civil authority, for the King the Army, though an institution worthy of the highest respect, is nonetheless no more than the servant of civil authority as established by the Will of the People expressed in the Constitution of 1978.

The results of the trial are now known. The maximum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment for ‘military rebellion’ has been imposed on Tejero and Milans, and, since it is a military tribunal that has pronounced its verdict, this constitutes an extremely important statement to the effect that armed revolt by officers against the democratically elected government is regarded by the Army itself as totally unacceptable.

The very considerable leniency shown to the remainder of the accused, many of those of junior rank having been let off scot-free, called forth

strong protests from the present Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, from the former Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, and from others; such leniency, they argue, can all too easily be construed as a sign of lack of commitment to constitutional legality. Yet these protests may have been a tactical error. It was essential, for the vindication of democracy, that exemplary punishment be visited on the ring-leaders, but, at the same time, it was extremely important not to give the impression that the Army as such was on trial; magnanimity towards subordinate officers who obeyed orders, even though it would certainly be seized upon by some as a sign of weakness and even though it would mean the return to active service of disaffected men, could well pay better dividends in the long run than an attitude lending itself to the charge of vindictiveness.

The main political parties—the ruling Centre Union (UCD), the Socialists (PSOE), the Communists (PCE) and the Conservatives (AP)—in their common anxiety to preserve democracy at all costs, in their common apprehension of another coup attempt, leaned over backwards, after 23rd February 1981, to avoid giving any form of offence to the Army. UCD moved a few steps to the right and gave the anti-terrorist campaign a strong boost, while starting to soft-pedal on regional autonomy; the Socialists and Communists so vied with each other in moderation as scarcely to seem worthy of their names, and only the Conservatives seemed likely to make any gain from the situation. A kind of tacit self-censorship came into effect; debate was inhibited; a general numbness settled on the body politic. Democratic Spain was in the grip of *el síndrome del miedo*/'the syndrome of fear', and the failed or 'soft' coup had thus in fact achieved a degree of success. In a positive sense, it can be said to have brought about subsequently a salutary increase in the sense of responsibility of Spanish politicians.

Shortly before the declaration of the findings of the coup Tribunal in June of this year came the victory of the Socialists in the Andalusian regional elections, reinforcing the widely held view that the PSOE is likely to be the winner in the next general election.

In the background lies a harsh economic situation with high prices and high unemployment and a record of failure on the part of a splintering UCD to give really strong, effective government.

How would the Army react to a PSOE victory? Although it has been said that the military would not stand for a Socialist administration, it is now postulated that, for many army men, a firm moderate Socialist government would, in fact, be more acceptable than a wavering UCD. If Manuel Fraga's Conservative AP, victorious in the Galician regional elections and now advancing steadily, were to come second in the general election, this would certainly be comforting to the officer corps, as would also the probable poor showing of the crisis-ridden PCE.

Also coinciding almost exactly with the trial results came the announcement on 30th May of Spain's formal entry into NATO. This means far greater stimulus and vastly wider horizons for the Spanish Armed Forces and a whole range of fresh military considerations for

them to address themselves to, with consequent diminution in the time available for fretting over the political situation within Spain. Spanish officers will automatically come into ever greater contact with their opposite numbers in countries where democracy is taken for granted and military men think of themselves as essentially subject to the authority of the civil government. Pessimists naturally point ominously to what has happened in Turkey regardless of NATO, but the fact remains that membership of the Western Alliance is clearly an element rendering another coup attempt in Spain less likely, and, in this sense, it is probably more important than her still not totally certain accession to the EEC—a desirable accolade for Spanish democracy rather than any guarantee of it.

It is extremely bad luck and highly embarrassing for Spain that her entry into NATO should have taken place in the midst of the Falklands crisis. As a democracy she condemned the Galtieri invasion, but, as the mother nation of the Hispanic world who once held the islands herself, she has deep sympathy for the Argentine claim to sovereignty. Spanish right-wing extremists hastened to remind everyone that, when Spain was ostracized by the democratic powers after World War II, Argentina was one of her very few friends, and they organised vociferous demonstrations in which cries of *Malvinas argentinas* 'The Malvinas for Argentina' were, not surprisingly, combined with yells of *Gibraltar español* 'Gibraltar for Spain', and Fuerza Nueva phalangists declared that, with a man with guts like Tejero, instead of a lily-livered individual like Calvo Sotelo, Spain could have taken the same glorious path as Argentina and flung the English and their apes off the Rock. This, of course, is something that Franco, in his wisdom, always stopped short of, but then many of those who revere his name are more Francoist than Franco was himself, just as there are still not a few Catholics in Spain who are more Papist than the Pope—to cite one very extreme example, the Spanish priest who, earlier this year, made an attempt on the life of John Paul II at Fatima, thereby drawing another unhappy parallel between Spain and Turkey.

But in the same way as the violent extreme right wing in Spanish politics is now a relatively small minority, so, in religion, the fanatical traditionalists still wedded to attitudes associated with the *nacional-catolicismo* of days long before Vatican II are increasingly offset by Christian democrats and progressives concerned with human rights and social justice.

In the autumn Pope John Paul is to visit Spain, and there, as every where, he will doubtless speak of a world 'disfigured by war and violence' and preach the Gospel of 'Peace and Reconciliation' based on 'fraternal dialogue'. These spiritual words will have a deep political echo in a country which, between 1936 and 1939, suffered the hideous disfigurement of the most bitter kind of war, and in which the two sides, that so terribly lacerated each other in those years, to some extent live on to this day. They are words which are bound to strike a special chord in the heart of Don Juan Carlos, who, as Head of the Army, Champion of

Democracy and King of the whole Spanish people, stands, as he himself has often said, for the reconciliation, through dialogue and debate, of *las dos Españas*/'the two Spains'.

The Pope may well speak also, as he has before, of the need for justice and for mercy—'Justice, yes, but justice filled with mercy', and it seems not beyond the bounds of possibility that the occasion of the Papal visit could be used by the King, mindful that mercy 'becomes the throned monarch better than his crown' and that magnanimity is a sign of strength, to grant a royal pardon to the *golpistas*, who would thus be transformed from martyrs of the Right and figures of resentment into symbols of reconciliation.

The notable sociologist Salvador Giner has said: 'The change in Spain will be final only when Colonel Tejero has become a museum piece'. He might have added 'and when the ghost of Franco is finally allowed to rest'.

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THE POLISH EAGLE CONFRONTS UNCERTAIN WARFARE

by Leonard F. Schwartz

POLAND is a rudderless state. Despite the imposition of martial law, no one in Poland seems to know where it's headed. Prime Minister Jarulzelski, current Head of the Polish Military Council, in a recent and much-anticipated speech, failed to present the bold plan that everyone had been waiting for. 'There would be no return,' Jarulzelski warned, 'to the profligate, corrupt, arrogant rule of the pre-Solidarity days when Party bureaucrats built villas and vacation homes illegally'. But nor would there be any return 'to the wild, anarchistic, dangerous post-Solidarity days.'

Condemning Polish administration of both the pre- and post-Solidarity days, the Polish Prime Minister left Poles feeling muddled and helpless. An old man, caught in the emotion of testifying against a fellow Pole at a trial of a Solidarity official, felt impelled to break off his testimony in mid-stream, turn to the judge and ask plaintively, 'What is going on in this country?'

Captain Gorniski, spokesman for the Polish Military Council, charged with imposing the martial law regime, himself acknowledged, 'Nothing works anymore, not the economy, not anything.' 'A foreman,' he explained, 'would try to give an order to workers, but their response was "go to hell".'

Thus, willy-nilly, Poland has entered a state of uncertain warfare. Polish uniformed soldiers throughout the country have been forcing Solidarity workers to return to their jobs. Those who refused were imprisoned or shot. To Polish Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski, there is no uncertainty about the current situation, only its purpose. 'The state of war,' he explained, 'was intended to put an end to growing anarchy and the destruction of the Polish economy' (and in any event was) 'preferable to Polish civil war.'

But in the Silesian coal mines, in the underground actions of Solidarity as well as in the increasingly frequent statements signed by intellectuals, the Polish brother is opposing his fellow.

The flight of the Polish eagle remains aimless. The Military Council has alternately arrested thousands of intellectuals and Solidarity members only to free some, put others on trial, plead with some, while threatening others with severe punishment; at the same time arranging *mea culpa* trials, hoping thereby to demonstrate that it, too, shared a measure of the blame for the chaotic situation.

In its latest attempt to set things aright, the Military Council agreed to allow two of Solidarity leader Walesa's intellectual advisors (Mazowiecki and Geremek) to join Walesa with the hope of finally getting the long-stalled talks off dead-centre. Within one week, notwithstanding its re-

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cognition of the close dependency between Walesa and his intellectual advisors, the Military Council reversed its stand.

The faltering and uncertain character of the Military's rule has dashed hopes that somehow things will work themselves out. The Polish masses, equally disillusioned by the indecisiveness of the Communist Party and of Solidarity, have retreated into a suffering silence, characteristic of much of Poland's history. In the words of a prominent Polish writer, 'It is the end of a dream and the beginning of a deep sleep.'

Externally, the Soviet Union, despite its role as Head of the Communist block, has not demonstrated any firmer leadership than its ward. Determined not to let even a spectre of reform take hold in its satellite, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev warned that 'The history of our country has shown with abundant clarity the absurdity of independent trade unions.' In other words, the Soviet Union felt it could not permit Solidarity even to appear to be a force in Polish political life.

At the root of the problem lies the belief that to admit even the smallest element of change would bring down the entire structure. Perhaps the Soviets still recall their own bread riots in St. Petersburg followed by the mutiny of the Imperial Guards sent down to quash the riots.

But the internal situation in Poland was not the only thing with which the Soviet Union had to contend. Its chief Cold War antagonist, the United States of America, also made an issue of Poland. Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations put the Soviet Union in no doubt that their actions were being carefully watched and that, quite specifically, any presence of Soviet military forces within Poland would be viewed with concern. Reagan's former Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, has continuously denounced Soviet actions while pressuring the NATO allies to join the US sanctions against the Soviet Union.

After an initially lukewarm beginning, some NATO members, notably Britain have tentatively agreed to join in limited sanctions.

Whether the East-West confrontation over Poland will escalate into something more ominous is difficult to predict, especially since the political skirmishing has become compounded by economic wrangling. Poland owes Western banks and governments a staggering \$28.5 billion dollars. Non-payment of this debt has raised serious questions not only concerning the credit-worthiness of Poland but that of other Eastern European countries who are also in financial debt to the West. Some economists estimate that Poland would require \$1.5 billion in new money every three months simply to keep going.

The precarious world economic situation can ill afford another OPEC-like thrust. Forfeiture of multi-billion dollar debts by Poland and her neighbours could prove devastating to Western economies.

Meanwhile, the Polish eagle drifts aimlessly on the wing.

[Dr. Leonard E. Schwartz is Professor of International Relations at CSUS.]

THE POPE IN BRITAIN

by Sir John Biggs-Davison, M.P.

THE revivalism of the Papal Visit was similar to what Roman Catholics know as a parish mission written enormously large. Cardinal Hume compared Wembley Stadium with a parish church.

Parish missions and their equivalents in other denominations have effects described in the 'Parable of the Sower'. They may win souls and win souls back; but the mass effect is temporary.

Apart from snatches of Latin chant and old Latin hymns loved by at least the older generation of British and Irish faithful, no gesture or concession was made to the adherents of the Tridentine rite and other traditionalists in the liturgy of the Papal Masses. Guitars and charismatics were kept within bounds; but the alienation of those who have never come to terms with 'the changes' that followed, without necessarily carrying the authority of the Second Vatican Council, will not have been lessened by the dignity impressed upon even the banalities of the celebrations by a man of God who, unlike some indigenous goody-goodies, is truly a man.

The moving 'encounter' at Canterbury Cathedral could not have been wholly congenial to traditionalists who will have swallowed with difficulty the likening of Father Maximilian Kolbe, who laid down his life for another at Auschwitz, to Martin Luther King, and were suspicious of the fudging of doctrine by the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission. Another of these proliferating Church Commissions is promised in consequence of the Papal Visit.

Neither ecumenical hopes nor traditionalist fears, nor the apprehensions of Protestants, whether Anglican or Free Church, are, however, likely to be realised. The latest compromises from the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission had already been damned in Rome with faint praise. Indeed the Holy Father's appearance at the heart of the Anglican Communion was seen by some as a bit of *suaviter in modo* after the demonstration by the Holy See of *fortiter in re*. The Pope gave nothing essential away at Canterbury. He gave love. He came in the love of Gregory and Augustine, leader of the Roman mission to those parts. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Runcie, in his address of welcome, mentioned them too. The ecclesiastical unity for which John Paul II stood was unity according to the mind of Jesus Christ, whose Vicar he is.

Anyone, then, who imagines that the Pope would renounce his special teaching authority and sit down in an ecumenical boardroom as *primus inter pares*, when so many of the would-be *pares* occupy no single, certain position on some of the central truths that have come down from Christ through his Apostles, and differ widely on the meaning of the Eucharist, is living not in Christendom but in Cloud-Cuckoo-Land. Schemes of partial Christian reunion have usually, if not always, provoked new

schisms. But these would be nothing in comparison with the schism that would rend the Church of England in the event of reconciliation with Rome or of a Uniate arrangement acceptable to Rome. Would not many Evangelical Anglicans, despite their devotion to the Book of Common Prayer and the Anglican way of things, find that they had more in common with Free Churchmen who also do not accept the body of Catholic dogma on the sacraments, church order or the traditional teaching on marriage, contraception and abortion once largely common to Christians but now maintained almost alone by the Roman Catholics? Now that the Anglican Communion embraces the Church of South India and priestesses have been 'ordained' within important constituent churches, the idea that Anglicanism could build a bridge, or bridges, between all the main denominations stretches the capacity for compromise beyond anything conceived even in England. Pan-Protestantism and Romanising Anglo-Catholicism are mutually repellent.

The Pope made a superbly successful pastoral visitation. It was not an occasion of State. He did not come as a Head of State, although the Holy Father is Sovereign of the diminutive Vatican City and is now properly and worthily represented at the Court of St. James's by an Apostolic Pro-Nuncio, Archbishop Bruno Heim, whose diplomacy and urbanity, not to mention his culinary arts and wide and expert knowledge of heraldry, have endeared him to many and done much for true ecumenism in Great Britain.

Yet the Pope's homilies included statements on peace, disarmament and war. It was reported that when he called on the Queen at Buckingham Palace he sent his blessing to Prince Andrew, then serving with and fully sharing the dangers of the Task Force as a Royal Naval helicopter pilot. Many British and indeed Irish Catholics may have been disappointed that the Pope said nothing in acknowledgment of the cause in which the Task Force was sent to the South Atlantic. If there were ever a just war within the canons, was this not it? The Pope is, however, Supreme Pastor in Argentina and Latin-America in a larger sense than in England, Scotland and Wales, in the first two of which other churches are by law established in special relation with the Crown. Moreover, some Catholic bishops in Britain had shown themselves less patriotic in a good cause than the Argentine hierarchy in a bad, although they had previously displayed little hesitation in condemning Latin-American dictatorships. Cardinal Hume had it right; but the Catholic trumpet was less certain than that of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Doubtless Catholic Chaplains to the Forces were less confused or equivocal, as was the sturdy Monsignor Scroggan in Port Stanley.

Even a bishop has a right to be a pacifist—Monsignor Bruce Kent's preference for CND over work which priests should, and laymen cannot, do is something else—but prudence is one of the cardinal virtues not, alas, conspicuous in all Cardinals. Prudence sometimes requires silence as the price of unity and of the avoidance of scandal. Christian statesmen, for their part, are not entitled to impose pacifism or a neglect of the national defence upon the non-pacifist citizenry for whose safety and

liberties they are trustees and guardians. In one of his homilies the Pope expressed the hope that a way could be found of preserving liberty without the use of force. He also mentioned the right of self-defence.

It should be our prayer that peace with freedom and justice may prevail. As the Pope said at Coventry, which suffered much in war, the peace Christ gave is more than an absence of war. He called for prayers for the UN session on disarmament and we indeed should make intercession for progress, despite Soviet obstruction, towards a complete, balanced and verified disarmament. But the peace of Christ is more than the peace of treaties, just as Christian unity must be found high above the documents of ecumenical bureaucracy and the phrases for formulae that cloak honest differences on faith, order and morals. The union of Christians must be rooted in union with Him who is Truth.

[Sir John Biggs-Davison is Conservative Member of Parliament for Epping Forest.]

The September issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The Finlandisation of Denmark* by John Barnie, *Examining Third World Strategies* by Antoine J. Abraham and Ahmed Abdul Majid, *An Analysis of the Aegean Crisis* by Semih S. Umar and *London's India* by John Elsom, held over from the August issue.

DEBATING WITH TIGERS: THE MORALITY OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT: NOTES ON THE RECENT DEBATE

by W. J. Stankiewicz

PROPOSERS of nuclear disarmament, unilateral or otherwise, usually begin their argument, as Lord Jenkins does in his article 'Avoiding the Nuclear Holocaust', (*Contemporary Review*, September 1981),¹ with a lengthy statement about the horror and immorality of a nuclear war. The implication is that opponents of disarmament somehow disagree or do not care. It may be true that some opponents of disarmament indeed do not care, but the real issues cannot be discussed on this level: we are talking about the future of civilisation. If there is a difference in point of view on the matter, it is basically that opponents of unilateral disarmament deny that 'better red than dead' is a slogan that will save civilisation.

Lord Jenkins' own position with regard to this slogan is by no means clear. He says in a paragraph dealing with the imminence of a nuclear holocaust that 'any talk about preferring to be dead than red is simply failing to deal with the problem' (p. 133). Yet seven paragraphs later he says 'It would be better to be red than dead because we should be a British shade of red and alive to shape our society in our own fashion' (p. 134). The second statement is probably closest to his own commitment, the first representing little more than a refusal to let himself be caught defending an untenable position—the 'Yes, but' inherent in the second statement prevents his opponents from pressing their point home. Adopt a 'Yes, but' attitude and later you can act as if no concession was made—that the real issue follows the 'but' part.

When Lord Jenkins uses this device, the question becomes that of the freedom possible under Communism and the fact that the USSR has never tried to occupy Tonga or some other remote area of the globe. Now, several Communist states do indeed have independence (or a measure of independence) from the Soviet Union either because they have easily defensible borders and support from the West, like Yugoslavia, or because they also have a very large population as well as atomic weapons, like China. But it would be naive to suppose that if the USSR had a completely free hand such independence would continue and that we could count on it in thinking about the future of a disarmed Britain or USA faced by an armed USSR. It seems that Lord Jenkins admitted as much when he first conceded that 'any talk about preferring to be dead than red is simply failing to deal with the problem.' However, he subsequently forgets about it because he has dismissed the point as self-evident. I think it better to keep it in mind.

Lord Jenkins has a preconceived 'solution' to the problem of nuclear war—unilateral disarmament. His position is that 'if Britain does not

opt out of nuclear war, this country and its people will be wiped out' (p. 132). The only ground for such an argument in this context would be that nuclear war would wipe out Britain. This is so because we can agree that Britain (as well as everyone else) would be wiped out in a nuclear war; but it does not follow that 'opting out' is the same as 'not being wiped out.' The evidence is that atomic fall-out does not permit neutrality (a point one might have expected Lord Jenkins to insist on rather than ignore, since he makes so much of the idea that atomic war does not distinguish between civilians and the military).

The gist of Lord Jenkins' argument is rather that a disarmed Britain would be beneath Soviet notice. 'Russia has enough on its hands,' he says, and 'to waste nuclear weapons on a country without them would be the act of madmen' (p. 132). (The latter argument would indeed be more forceful if he had not already argued that there is a surplus of atomic weaponry and that 'logically' such weapons 'must' be used; also his argument for unilateral disarmament would be stronger if he had not previously argued that 'sheer self-protection' demands that 'nuclear weapons be targeted on the other side.')

Lord Jenkins seems to feel that when he is trying to prove that the USSR would ignore a country that poses no threat, he can ignore the 'sheer self-protection' element in the argument and just focus on the fact that if Britain disarmed, the Soviet Union would still have many pressing problems to attend to before paying much attention to a disarmed Britain. Most of us would probably agree that if Britain disarmed, the USSR would be likely to give more attention to the problem of countering the 'threat' from the USA and thus in effect Britain would be spared the threat of immediate attack. What would happen after that, however, would depend on whether the resulting shift in the balance of power gave the Soviet Union such absolute dominance that it could, for instance, compel America to disarm. If this were the case, the argument that a disarmed Britain would be unworthy of the attention of a supreme power would no longer hold.

Lord Jenkins' naiveté can be seen in his speculations why anyone would resist the policy of a campaign organised to prevent nuclear war. As part of the explanation, he suggests that the danger of nuclear war is so great that many of us refuse to face reality. In psychoanalysis this is called 'repression': no doubt there are opponents to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) who so behave. Characteristically, such people deal with personal problems by acting as if they did not exist—refusing to go to a doctor when symptoms of a malady arise because they cannot face the prospect of an illness. Although such people exist there is no evidence that most opponents of CND are neurotics. A much stronger case could be made for the opposite view: it is the members of CND who refuse to be realistic, who suppose that having good intentions is the same as attempting to solve problems and who also suppose that an organisation originating in someone's good intentions necessarily retains its purity of purpose. Many who are realistic enough to recognise the threat to civilisation posed by atomic war are also realistic enough

to see that neither of the propositions held by members of CND are realistic.

In addition to explaining opposition to CND in terms of psychoanalysis, Lord Jenkins puts forward another trendy view: 'nuclear disarmament leads to total disarmament' thus 'weakening the resolution of the people . . . to fight and to pay for arms' (p. 134). In fact nuclear disarmament leads to total surrender.

It is refreshing to turn from a man who supposes that idealism excuses everything, including fatuity, to Dr. Brodin,² who, in her article 'The Nordic Countries and the Prospects of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone' (*Contemporary Review*, July 1981), recognises that debates about nuclear disarmament are debates about 'security,' not about the ethics and prudence of applying the Christian norm 'turn the other cheek' to international relations. Dr. Brodin has a background in political science and hence understands the implications of the concepts of sovereignty and security that are apparently much too mundane to deserve Lord Jenkins' attention. Dr. Brodin keeps firmly to the facts: the issue is security and the question is whether security would be increased by "negative security assurances," i.e. assurances from the nuclear powers that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries' (p. 14). At present, Nordic countries are in the situation Lord Jenkins advocates for Britain: they have neither nuclear weapons nor the capacity to produce such weapons. But instead of supposing, as does Lord Jenkins, that the issue of nuclear war has been settled when such a state is attained, Dr. Brodin raises the question of whether being free of nuclear weapons (disarmed) should become a policy and be formalised by treaty with nations who do have nuclear weapons.

Dr. Brodin warns that formal treaties do not guarantee that they will not be abrogated by a power capable of abrogating them without retaliation: 'Formal guarantees may, if vital interests are at stake, be abrogated, particularly if given on a unilateral basis' (p. 14). Possibly because of her position as adviser to a neutralist nation she does not spell out exactly what in fact she is implying and what may be gathered from her article as a whole: namely that the USSR in guaranteeing not to attack a disarmed country is in fact not making any concessions whatsoever. It is in a position to abrogate the treaty at any time—within minutes of the signing if it is advantageous—whereas a disarmed country that changed its mind would be reduced to (in boxing parlance) 'telegraphing' its punches by adopting the most elementary defensive measures. Furthermore, as she points out, a commitment to being disarmed makes it difficult to reconsider whether to be armed or disarmed. She implies that this is so for domestic reasons, but there is no hint in her article of an even more telling difficulty. If you equate disarmament with 'neutrality' then even considerations of a defensive nature will be interpreted as an abandonment of neutrality and hence as a submission of the national interest to that of a foreign power. Being disarmed is not so generally regarded, though in fact it is the clearest evidence of submission

to some other power: victors always insist on the disarmament of the vanquished.

Dr. Brodin's account does not recognise the fact that the importance of the issue—the Nordic nations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—should be seen within a wider context. The USSR refuses to acknowledge it is a Nordic nation and therefore refuses to make any concessions to the Nordic countries about mutual disarmament. The Soviet Union's argument is that it is a European power and cannot make regional treaties with regard to nuclear disarmament, whereas Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland are Nordic countries and therefore should do so: 'The Soviet Union cannot as a nuclear power be expected to enter into a Nordic nuclear-free zone, nor can Soviet territory be included in any such arrangement.' As Dr. Brodin points out 'The Soviet interest in such a zone has . . . been motivated by a desire to curtail, if possible, the freedom to manoeuvre of the Nordic members of NATO' (p. 10). However, she has not brought out that the problem the Nordic powers face when trying to get a nuclear-free Nordic area (which logically includes the Nordic area of the USSR) is precisely the problem one faces when one talks of 'freeing' Europe of atomic weapons. Talk of Europe as a nuclear-free zone considers freeing all parts of Europe *except the Soviet Union in Europe* from atomic weapons. When the question of including the USSR arises, the latter announces that it is not a 'European' power but a 'world' power and as such must be excused from participation (though it is only 'logical,' the Soviet argument goes, that actual European powers should be nuclear-free or neutral with regard to Russia's relations with the USA).

The gist of the opposition to arguments for nuclear disarmament is that advocates of disarmament are addressing the wrong people. They are, in Air Vice-Marshal Stewart Menaul's words, in his article 'Survival in Nuclear War' (*Contemporary Review*, August 1981), 'preaching to the converted.'³ Statements by the advocates of deterrence clearly show that in the West there is a general conviction that an all-out nuclear war is unthinkable. There is no evidence that there are any military or diplomatic strategists who believe that anyone could 'win' a nuclear war. It is, however, felt that some of us could *survive*. Air Vice-Marshal Menaul argues that acting as if we believed this (as by providing civil defence and building nuclear shelters) is a necessary part of deterrence: 'In providing these deterrent forces [we must] ensure against the possibility that deterrence might fail . . . Passive defence . . . is just as important . . . as active military defence. The Soviet Union long ago recognised this . . . The provision of a civil defence organisation . . . will help to convince the Soviet Union of our determination to resist' (pp. 69-70).

The point being made here is that we are now engaged in a psychological war with the Soviet Union in which we must make clear that we are both prepared and determined to resist. When we speak of 'deterrence' we are not simply talking of the rather absurd fact stressed by advocates of nuclear disarmament that we can wipe out the Soviet Union

several times over and are building up an even greater capacity. It is certainly absurd from a 'purely' military point of view to be able to wipe out someone else an indefinite number of times, but this is not the point. Long ago, in his widely-read book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Henry Kissinger pointed out that 'It is futile to speak of 'purely' military considerations.' To him, 'the crucial problem of strategy . . . is to establish reasonable relationship between power and the willingness to use it.'⁴ Kissinger does not explicitly say so, but the issue is essentially 'psychological'—our apparent willingness to act—and it is precisely this that proponents of unilateral nuclear disarmament do not understand. 'Strategy,' when no one can win, requires 'deterrence' and fundamentally deterrence is not simply a capacity to destroy but a matter of convincing the potential aggressor that yes, if forced to, we will indeed press buttons and, further, that even if only one tenth of them gets pressed or one tenth of the missiles gets through defences, an aggressor still cannot 'win.'

This being the case, our defences are seriously undermined by talk of unilateral disarmament, even if only a small minority take the talk seriously. The very principle of deterrence is undermined, for it rests not just on our capacity to retaliate but also on our willingness to do so. This Kissinger understood well to be our strategy; and if it is our strategy, the advocates of unilateral nuclear disarmament should be seen in a true light: not merely as people with a particular view about the horrors of nuclear war but as being in effect subversives, no matter how well-intentioned, idealistic and non-doctrinaire they may be.

Such a situation, of course, confronts democratic societies with a grave problem. If we do not take a strong stand against advocates of unilateral nuclear disarmament (as, for instance, by vigorous and repeated government statements exposing the fallacy of unilateral disarmament), we give the USSR the impression that we are not serious about our willingness to mount such a war in our defence.

Yet one thing is certain: our strategy is undermined if no action of any kind is taken (even if the unilateral disarmers do not succeed in affecting government policy). It is as important that representatives of the government counter anti-nuclear arguments as that we retain nuclear arms. The emphasis of the counter-arguments needs to be where Air Vice-Marshal Menaul has placed it: proponents of unilateral nuclear disarmament, in addressing their own governments, are 'preaching to the converted' when they emphasise the horrors of an atomic war, but the issue is not there. The issue is 'deterrence'—taking every rational step to ensure that an atomic war does not occur by convincing anyone who considers the use of atomic weapons that he cannot win. Clearly, it is not rational to argue that an incapacity to retaliate in kind will stop the opponent from using atomic weapons. As Kissinger once observed, militarily no other weapon is as efficient—which is the very reason why such weapons will be used if their use cannot be countered. Therefore we must both have the weapons and show a willingness to use them. This calls for a blunt rejection of 'moral' arguments about the monstrosity of killing

the innocent and destroying human civilisation. The problem is indeed monstrous, and as such it is part of the concept of deterrence.

In effect, internationally, we are in the position of mediaeval society, which lacked efficient policing systems for maintaining internal order and therefore had to use *Schrecklichkeit*—an utterly revolting torture of criminals. From a moral point of view, we cannot say who was worse—the criminal or the society that tortured him to death; nor can we argue that we would all be better off today if such ‘immorality’ had never occurred. (Yet this is the position of the ‘better red than dead’ school which castigates the ‘immorality’ of nuclear weapons.)

Western societies have changed their mind about the need for *Schrecklichkeit*, arguing that the forces of law and order must always act in accordance with moral principles, even if criminals do not. (As a result in many countries capital punishment cannot be applied even against professional murderers.) It is this view of law and order that motivates ‘idealists’ with regard to the issue of deterrence. What they are in fact saying is: Given that an atomic war is unthinkable morally and that the West is indeed the major force for law and order internationally, it follows that we must not retaliate even if our opponent employs atomic weapons. Such ‘idealists’ hope no one will use such weapons. (Some even try to reinforce their case by arguing that there would be no need for anyone to use them if only one side actually had them.)

The argument of the ‘idealists’ has not been effectively tackled by Western governments because it is accepted by the latter with regard to domestic law and order. Thus the forces of law and order will not use certain techniques because they are ‘immoral.’ To do so—the justification goes—is to establish that one is as ‘bad’ as those one is trying to control: we will therefore not torture sadists or kill murderers. On the level of international relations, this becomes the ‘better red than dead’ philosophy or the argument that the USSR will not use atomic weapons if it is not threatened by us. It is almost useless to argue against either position as if it were the true basis of the idealist argument. The crux of the matter is shifting the moral considerations in enforcing law and order from the domestic to the international scene. It is conveniently forgotten that international law—which includes the concept of peace—rests on quite different principles to domestic law. It is not possible to argue from what is possible domestically to what is possible internationally. Internationally, issues are decided by the prudential factors the military refer to when talking about ‘deterrence.’ Ethical issues are then irrelevant because the necessary conditions are not present. It is unfortunate that this is so, but no one is being ethical by pretending it is not. One is simply being unrealistic, as the military (and ‘militarists’) keep emphasising.

In this respect the UK Statement on the Defence Estimates for 1981, which includes an analysis of the various aspects of defence policy, is most revealing. In particular, the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. John Nott, makes the important point that adverse criticism of Western security policy rests for the most part on a failure to understand the

meaning of 'deterrence.' He says that 'in essence we seek to ensure that, whatever military aggression or political bullying a future Soviet leader might contemplate, he could not foresee any likely situation in which the West would be left with no realistic alternative to surrender;' he then draws an analogy between deterrence and the strategy of a chess master who 'blocks off in advance a variety of possible moves in an opponent's mind.' The central aim of Western strategy is, as he puts it, '*to influence the calculations of anyone who might consider aggression* [my emphasis]; to influence them decisively; and, crucially, to influence them before aggression is ever launched.'

Now this is what I believe to be the only realistic objective possible and what has been essentially true of the NATO policy. It seems clear, however, from Lord Jenkins' article that he believes neither that such a strategy can avoid nuclear disaster nor that the stated policy is in fact being pursued. If this is the case (and especially if the latter belief is also present in other people's minds), a discussion of nuclear disarmament cannot be limited to seeking ways of outlawing nuclear arms but must first identify the potential aggressor and weigh the factors that are likely to influence his decision whether to use nuclear weapons.

It is the military who are generally more aware of the need to examine the issues surrounding a particular potential aggressor. Thus General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, discusses the increasing threats from the Soviet bloc in relation to their internal problems and their willingness to employ military power as well as in the light of the fact that they have a numerical advantage in men and equipment.⁶ In other words, he directly raises the issue of the potential for aggression from the USSR and does not limit himself to talk of their capacity to attack.

It is precisely the issue of military preparedness which must be tackled first when talking about nuclear disarmament—or any other kind. Underlying much of such talk is the belief apparently held by many on our side that the Soviet Union would not care to challenge the West since it could not win a sustained conflict against our combined forces and since the USSR would be much better off economically and politically if it could devote more of its productive capacity to supplying consumer goods. One feels that proponents of disarmament do not believe their Government when it stresses the need for deterrence. Convinced that any non-socialist government is based on self-interested exploitation, they interpret the foreign policy of such governments as attempts to expand that exploitation and consequently see the armed might of the Soviet bloc as purely defensive. Stop the threat from our side, the argument runs, and peace is secured; it follows, according to this view, that the policy stated by Mr. Nott cannot be right.

This I think is what Lord Jenkins had in mind when, in his letter to *The Daily Telegraph*, he said of Mr. Nott that 'only those whose case is based on a myth are afraid to face reality'⁷—the myth in this case being basically the view that the Soviet Union is a potential aggressor. As critics of democratic foreign policy like to point out, we are remarkably

tolerant of non-democratic regimes provided that they are not bent on territorial expansion. Such critics see this view as evidence of our 'hypocrisy' and regard the different attitude of Communist governments to non-communist regimes as evidence of their 'sincerity' and hence as 'evidence' that Communists can be trusted. (To be sure, this attitude has only been 'selectively' different. Note, for instance, the alliance between the USSR and Nazi Germany.) They are immune to arguments about the necessity of being prepared militarily for aggression from the Communist bloc because they do believe the arguments are not sincere and need not be answered: 'The government,' they say, 'is lying.' They completely ignore the fact that democratic foreign policy and military strategy are based on our opposition to Communism not simply because it is a different system than the democratic but because it is an aggressive ideological system which can maintain and propagate itself only by coercive means.

Now, the issue is: can you change an established, institutionalised policy by a dialogue? Can you debate with a tiger? Has pacifism a future?

Major religions have markedly reduced the amount of aggression in the world by promoting pacifism in the face of threat. It is a psychological truth that 'a soft answer turneth away wrath.' The reason it sometimes works is that anger, as a biological phenomenon having survival value, is threat-behaviour—a non-verbal 'Stop or else' injunction; if the response is submissive, actual aggression becomes unnecessary. Pacifism can sometimes be considered moral because in some situations it reduces aggression.

But when one is faced by a proven aggressor—who intends to use force to gain his ends—pacifism produces no such results. It becomes a submission to and encouragement of what pacifists themselves regard as immoral behaviour. We cannot simply argue that a non-aggressive stance on our part is by nature moral. It is only conditionally moral—the condition being that 'the opponent is non-aggressive.' But when the latter is not the case we must be very careful about our choice of symbols designed to convey peaceful intentions and an unwillingness to harm the innocent. If the choice of symbol—Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament—makes us incapable of responding to an act of aggression, it clearly conveys the impression of hypocrisy and moral cowardice—an unwillingness to oppose aggression even though we profess to consider it wrong—and as such it is much more likely to invite future aggression than any other act we could undertake. It is naive to suppose that symbols convey only what their authors intended.

Apart from being basically immoral, the pacifism promoted by unilateral disarmers reminds one more of Buddhism than of Christianity, especially the lofty form offered by the Living Buddha of Ceylon, who was asked by a traveller what one should do if confronted by a man-eating tiger. 'If after exhausting all the possibilities of expostulation,' said the Buddha, 'the tiger is still determined to attack, you may, my son, enter into a debate with the tiger.'

It would seem from this judgement that the Living Buddha is in agreement with Dr. Freud: debate to the latter was an act of 'aggression.' To a Buddhist it may be the extreme limit allowable. To anyone faced by practical realities, it does not even seem relevant. When there is a tiger loose, one has no time to be a Living Buddha.

Proponents of unilateral nuclear disarmament have repeatedly asserted that both the USA and the USSR have the potential for wiping each other out ten times or a hundred times over. The exact figures do not really matter. No one knows what they are, but we do know that each side admits to having an arsenal of nuclear weapons capable of 'overkill', and obviously intends to enlarge it. According to this argument, military men and some politicians are insane and there is no point in listening to what they have to say about the need for nuclear preparedness. Viewed against this background, Professor John Fremlin's article 'A Strategy for Nuclear Disarmament?' (*Contemporary Review*, December 1981),² which provides an explanation of the strategic importance of 'overkill', is a valuable contribution to the current debate. What is puzzling, however, is that a person so keenly aware of the strategic issue of 'overkill' can let his analysis of technical problems become the dominant issue.

Professor Fremlin points out that we cannot beat nuclear swords into ploughshares: 'In the light of the discussion so far, it might be found that *no* method of destroying plutonium will *ever* be acceptable, in which case effective nuclear disarmament will be impossible in less than a quarter of a million years but, since this conclusion is unacceptable to me, I will put forward an alternative suggestion' (p 297). Most of us lack the expertise to verify whether his proposal is feasible. (Judging from the question mark in the title of his article he himself seems to be doubtful.) What should be pointed out is that his views on disarmament stem from the specific problem he poses: if we try to reduce nuclear arms, the problem of the disposal of plutonium arises. He then says that he has a solution which, however, will not work on a large scale. In other words, not everyone should disarm. Therefore, he concludes, let Britain abandon her nuclear arms and let us see whether his proposal works.

Professor Fremlin reaches his conclusion on the basis of technical feasibility alone, asks no fundamental questions, and provides no real justification for his recommendations. He merely states: this and this can be done; therefore nuclear disarmament should be attempted in the UK. As a scientist, he no doubt wishes to elicit interest in his own method of disposing of plutonium if Britain unilaterally disarmed. Yet one could never have predicted from his introductory paragraph that he would become an advocate of such a policy. Unilateral nuclear disarmament, he says, 'represents a dangerous and unprecedented reversal of the most explicit lessons of history; that the future is to the strong and that if you wish for peace you should prepare for war' (p 295). As a physicist, he can, I am sure, offer good advice about problems in physics (and technology) which may arise once a political decision has been taken; but his very expertise and the self-interest arising from it blind him to

what should be the basis for political decisions—what he himself called 'the most explicit lessons of history'.

NOTES:

1. Lord Jenkins of Putney, 'Avoiding the Nuclear Holocaust,' *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 239, No. 1388 (September 1981).
 2. Katarina Brodin, 'The Nordic Countries and the Prospects for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone,' *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 239, No. 1386 (July 1981).
 3. Air Vice-Marshal Stewart Mennaul, 'Survival in Nuclear War,' *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 239, No. 1387 (August 1981), p. 66.
 4. Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, (Doubleday Anchor, Garden City, New York, 1958), p. 103.
 5. John Nott, 'Nuclear Weapons and Preventing War,' *NATO Review*, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 1981, p. 25. The essay is reprinted from the UK Statement on the Defence Estimates for 1981.
 6. General Bernard W. Rogers, 'Increasing Threats to NATO's Security Call For Sustained Response,' *NATO Review*, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 1981.
 7. Lord Jenkins of Putney, 'Ministry in 'Witch-Hunt' against CND,' Letter to the Editor, *The Daily Telegraph*, 18 August 1981.
 8. John H. Fremlin, 'A Strategy For Nuclear Disarmament?', *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 239, No. 1391 (December 1981).
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Other articles in the series, also available, are 'West Europe's New Anti-nuclear Wave' by Joseph F. Pilat, (Vol. 240, No. 1396). 'The War that Cannot be Won' by Thomas Land, (Vol. 239, No. 1390) and 'Seeds of Attila: an Infantry View', by J. I. H. Owen, (Vol. 238, No. 1385).

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WHICH WAY FOR ARGENTINA?

by Roland Dallas

IT is not easy to be an Argentine: Buenos Aires is said to have the largest number of psycho-analysts per capita of any of the world's great cities except New York.

Endowed with one of the world's richest lands, the Argentines might have become aid-giving members of the rich nations' club, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This literate people of predominantly European origin could easily have produced internationally respected writers, painters and composers as well as academics. Instead, the Argentines have, since 1930, tolerated various forms of dictatorial misrule which have left their society, their economy and their culture in ruins. The Falklands fiasco will only accentuate the Argentines' brooding sense of failure.

The downhill slide began in 1930, when the armed forces ousted the democratically-elected president, Hipolito Irigoyen. It is true that Irigoyen's government was open to a great deal of criticism (which government is not?) but at least he had the merit of representing the middle classes and a considerable part of the working class. He was not a creature of the oligarchy of the time—the landowners from the pampas and the bankers, grain-dealers and shippers of Buenos Aires.

Since the fall of Irigoyen, the Argentines have submitted to a series of 'strongmen' including Juan Domingo Peron over whom they have had no control at all. There has been no really independent judiciary; parliament has mostly been closed down or has served as a rubber stamp; human rights have depended on the whims of the military chiefs; and the media was either controlled or guided by the regime. Argentines have been continuously barraged by propaganda serving the interests of whoever is occupying the presidential palace; objectivity in the media is not even considered. At times of crisis, ordinary Argentines who live in Buenos Aires tune into a small Uruguayan radio station, transmitting from the other side of the River Plate.

With only occasional peeks at partial democracy ever being permitted before the next military coup, democratic political parties have been depressed into mediocrity. It would, of course, be absurd for a young, talented and ambitious Argentine to seek a career in public service, perhaps with the hope of becoming a cabinet minister or president of the republic, by joining a democratic political party. You get a top government job in Argentina by being a general, an admiral or an air force brigadier, or a civilian friend.

Juan Domingo Peron's populist dictatorship gave the working masses a sense of belonging to Argentina, and a sense that they had been recognised by those in power, for the first time. For this reason, the Peron experience was traumatic. But it also bankrupted the country and degraded its institutions; Argentina was set in a fascist, corporatist

mould from which it has not really escaped today. Unlike Germany and Italy, where Hitler was followed by Adenauer and Mussolini by de Gasperi, Peron's first harsh and disastrous dictatorship (1946-1955) was followed by two generals, a civilian president and a series of coups.

Under the ageing Peron's second disastrous government (1973-1974), following his return from exile in Spain, and that of his wildly inept widow, Argentina descended into terrorist-inspired chaos. It was only stopped by the armed forces' notorious 'dirty war' in which some 6,000 people disappeared without trace and without trial. There were few protests that the rule of law was being brutalised. It was dangerous to speak out; Argentines shrugged their shoulders and kept quiet. Many thought that the *desaparecidos* (disappeared ones) 'probably had what was coming to them'.

A spokeswoman for the 'Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo', who parade every Thursday outside the presidential palace because the government refuses to tell them what has happened to their 'disappeared' children, has a theory about what happened to the Argentines. This lady, whose 17-year-old son was grabbed from his bed in her flat at night although (she says) he had nothing to do with politics, believes that the 'dirty war' had the effect of 'de-sensitising' Argentines to the normal western rules of civilised behaviour.

While they watched power being abused by general after general, the Argentines have also suffered as economy minister after economy minister has failed to rescue what ought to be a thriving economy from a shambles. It has reached the point now where Argentines habitually invest half of their monthly salary, as soon as they receive it, for a two-week period: incredibly, it is a hedge against inflation. About 130 banks and finance companies advertise in the financial newspaper in Buenos Aires every day, offering competing interest rates for two-week deposits.

Awareness of the overwhelming failure of their rulers, their country and themselves has not prevented Argentines from being intensely proud. Failure may well have provoked a false, defensive sense of pride. Argentines have taken refuge in their sense of racial superiority over other South Americans, whom they dismiss as blacks, uncultured Indians or half-breeds. This attitude has made Argentines deeply unloved in the rest of Latin America, and the Argentines accept their self-imposed isolation.

But who are they? Although they speak Spanish, they are not all Spaniards—there is an enormous Italian population, the northerners are Indians and there are sizeable colonies of Germans, English, Yugoslavs, Welsh, Jews and other peoples of European origin. This is a nation of immigrants, yet it is unlike that great nation of immigrants, the United States, where the new arrivals tried hard to identify with their new country and become proud of being Americans. In Argentina, there were few traditions to understand and absorb—just the lore of the cattlemen of the pampas, the 'gauchos', which seemed remote from the big city of Buenos Aires. It was impossible to vote, to share in the government and feel associated with decisions affecting people's destinies. It was difficult,

if not impossible, to sympathise with the government, still less to identify with it. Where could one place one's roots? The 'old country' was 5,000 miles or more away. It was, and it still is, very difficult.

There has, however, been one issue on which all Argentines could agree and which gave them a sense, albeit spurious, of national identity—the Falklands and their nation's long-standing claim to the islands.

When General Galtieri's junta grabbed the islands by force, almost all Argentines cheered. It may have seemed strange that this well-educated people should have hailed such an act of brazen illegality, carried out at a time when Argentina and Britain were negotiating the issue. But look back at their history: the Argentines grew up in a society in which power was almost always grabbed, where rights were ignored, and the law depended on the ruler of the moment. The grab of the Falklands was quite acceptable to a people who were 'de-sensitised' to the need for a rule of law. All the complaints about disregard for the rights of the islanders counted for nothing among the people of Buenos Aires. When had anyone had any regard for their rights?

As the conflict with Britain began, another ugly aspect of Argentine society began to predominate: government propaganda, hitherto used to defend the top general of the moment as a hero, began to tell enormous lies about the conflict. In the unreal Argentine world, words seemed to suffice to sink British ships and to rout British troops. In the harshest reality known to man, a war, the government propaganda machine continued to live in its fantasy world, unrestrained by a parliamentary opposition.

In the face of failure, which way will this mixed-up people turn? General Galtieri has gone, quickly. An inquiry has been ordered by the new 'president', General Bignone, who was appointed by the army commander and no one else. Before he fell, Galtieri was laying much of the blame on the Americans, because they supported Britain. 'I feel much bitterness for them,' he said. 'I see this as a betrayal.' These feelings are likely to be shared by many who do not want to accept responsibility. For years, Argentina has suffered from a visceral anti-Americanism bred mostly from a sense of insecurity and failure. (By contrast, Brazil has no such hang-ups; Brazilian attitudes to the United States are cool and unemotional). Anti-Americanism in Argentina is likely to grow.

Since the Falklands conflict brought discredit on the army high command, Argentines are feeling freer in criticising the army. Newspapers have been printing accounts of conditions in the Falklands in which soldiers were poorly supplied and badly commanded, including cases where officers abandoned their men in defensive positions. Some senior generals, trying to avoid the blame, have been claiming that they were not told about the Falklands invasion until after it was over. No amount of excuses, however, will remove this blot on the record of the army, which is thoroughly discredited. The navy, whose ships stayed in port out of fear of being torpedoed by Britain's nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines, fared little better. Only the air force, whose pilots were a real

threat to Britain and would have caused much more damage if their bombs had gone off as intended, has emerged with its reputation intact.

The implications for Argentina's political future of this development are enormous. A succession of army presidents, over six years, is now clearly seen to have failed to resolve Argentina's economic chaos, failed to have returned the country to democracy and failed in their real job of being efficient officers. The army has become isolated, abandoned even by the navy and the air force, who at the outset refused to take part in President Bignone's government.

In such a situation, it would be normal to assume that great pressure would build up for a return to democracy; that a civilian leader would be elected president and the rusty doors of parliament would swing open again. This is what many people want to happen, especially the leaders of the five major parties, who have formed a common front called the 'Multipartidaria'. President Bignone has promised a return to democracy by 1984.

Yet the doubts remain. Discredited though it is, the army continues to hold power. The army commander is the effective boss of the country; the garrison commanders, in La Plata, Cordoba, Mendoza and the other big cities, have the final word on all local issues. Army officers have become used to the perks of civilian offices including directorships in state-owned enterprises. They will give up these privileges unwillingly.

The major question mark is over the ability of the Argentines to sustain a viable democracy, in which the rule of law is honoured. The first pre-requisite is that new life has to be breathed into the old democratic political parties, especially the Radicals and the Intransigents. These powerless parties, mostly run by well-intentioned but tired old men and their hangers-on, have little organisation. Some local party clubs exist but for decades they have had no momentum, no encouragement to spread and prosper. Some of the smaller parties are little more than pressure groups. While the army has been wielding power, they have been officially regarded as illegal. They have little support among the working class.

For this situation to change, talented and ambitious men and women, probably from the middle class, will have to invest some time, money and perhaps their careers in democratic party politics. For decades, these people have seen no point in wasting their time on such an idle enterprise. They are, however, the bedrock of their country's future political stability. If these political parties are injected with youthful energy and receive a surge of support from Argentines who feel they must make a commitment to democracy, then there may be a chance for stable political development. They must seek out, and organise, mass support. If they do not, the way is clear—once again—for the Peronists.

Incredibly, despite the appalling record of the two Peron governments, Peronism remains Argentina's most cohesive movement. It has kept its support through fairly well-organised Peronist trade unions and the perception of working people that Peronism is the only real alternative to military rule. Peronism has been weakened by deep splits between far-

leftists, many of whom became terrorists in the 1970s, and old-fashioned unionists more concerned with wages, conditions and protecting Argentine industry against cheap imports. The party is also weakened by its lack of a charismatic leader, a hero on horseback, as a successor to Peron. As a result, rivalries are building up in the movement and it is said to be becoming less authoritarian in its internal organisation. Despite these weaknesses, however, Peronism could easily win a general election.

What the armed forces' reaction would be to such a result remains to be seen. They have removed the Peronists from power twice in coups. They have also prevented the Peronists from taking part in two presidential elections. It cannot be entirely excluded, however, that the army might try to work out some sort of power-sharing deal with the Peronists, if the party's new leaders show themselves to be pragmatists. Neither the army nor the Peronists have a strong commitment to parliamentary democracy. An alliance between the two would have an odd sort of logic.

What a strange country this is! No visitor to Buenos Aires can fail to be struck by the generally high standard of living and the fact that the people obviously dress and eat well. The Argentines often appear to be sophisticated, charming, easy-going and hospitable. (Their tolerance was demonstrated during the Falklands conflict by the way in which British television crews and newspaper reporters were allowed to work freely in Buenos Aires). The Argentines ought to have everything going their way; yet they do not.

They now have an opportunity to emerge from a dark period in their history, when many were indeed 'de-sensitised' to traditional western democratic values, and play their full role in developing a free, prosperous and generous country. Much will depend on the willingness of businessmen, professional people, academics and scientists and other leaders of civilian society to plunge into politics. With the armed forces discredited, the opportunity is there.

[Roland Dallas writes on Latin American affairs for *The Economist*.]

POEM

GROWTH OF UNCERTAINTY

A cat is dulcet,
stepping among the geraniums,
while an Arab
in his shabby workclothes
leans on a plough
behind a camel's spongy tracks.
His Ugliness . . . ropey tail
and thick coiled neck
that swivels the dull-lidded eye casually . . .
. . . yet is persuaded
of some indolent dignity—
the furry-humped bag
that lasts for unhurried days?

And these two build a garden,
with the red geraniums, the marigolds,
and the bright unripe dates still orange
in their clusters among the palms.
And the harnessed beast is convinced,
but ignorant of his use,
and the man strains
and is unsure of his labour.

The sea remains out there,
a platform.
The sand is white
and tractable,
where the wind would nudge or flatten it.
The cat steps among the green bushes,
where the birds twitter,
and are bright as medallions.

The camel plods on
under his harnessed assumption
and the Arab looks tired,
then stops for water
and a cigarette.
He stares quietly at the camel
and the sand
and the garden that they are cultivating . . .
. . . cultivating.

W. BONNELL

ROOSEVELT'S NEW DEAL PROGRAMME FOR UNEMPLOYED YOUTH—A MODEL FOR TODAY

by Ann Thedford Lanier

THE Great Depression of the 1930s, like the two wars which bracketed it, was a world-wide phenomenon. Its effects had a dreary sameness everywhere — unemployment, hunger, dislocation, demoralisation, official helplessness. In response, Germany tried Hitler, England the dole, and the United States the 'New Deal'. One of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal programmes, a work-relief programme for unemployed youths, was called the Civilian Conservation Corps and it was a distinct success. This success is worthy of study, particularly in a time of music to riot by:

The clubs come down around your head,
It's war on the streets, and they're running red . . .
The police are running, facing defeat,
The cities are burning in the summer heat.

In the modern world, disaffected, unemployed youths, like death and taxes, seem always to be with us, and one must wonder whether the costs of repression are really less than the costs of compassion.

Roosevelt was elected in November 1932 and took office on March 4, 1933. Twenty-seven days later, his bill creating the Civilian Conservation Corps passed Congress. Although the CCC was harmonious with Keynesian demand-side economics, upon which Roosevelt was to base his policies, its origin was from motives other than economic theory. Roosevelt had a genuine interest in forestry, and he was convinced that America lagged behind other industrial nations in carrying out a coherent national conservation policy. He was also genuinely concerned about the fate of those he called 'the wild boys of the road', the masses of unemployed young men who wandered the land in search of work. The CCC was designed to send an 'army' of unemployed youths into the forests to carry out long-neglected conservation tasks and to heal the nation of environmental abuse and over-exploitation.

The CCC was disbanded in 1942 during mobilisation for World War II. Its achievement was never properly summed up for public appreciation and it was forgotten after the war. But it was a success, measured by its achievements in conservation and development, by its benefits for those who served, and by its secondary benefits for communities and the nation. Analysis of the success of the CCC provides lessons for modern governments, be they liberal or conservative. The CCC proved to be a design capable of dealing with the normal by-products of 'doing business' in modern industrial societies—unemployment and pollution.

The CCC carried out a conservation programme rivalled in scale and effectiveness in modern times only by the programme in Maoist China. The CCC fought Dust Bowl conditions on the Great Plains and helped restore 'the breadbasket of the world' to fertility. It planted 2 billion

trees, half the number ever planted in the U.S., in ambitious reforestation and shelter belt projects; and it built or improved federal, state and municipal parks, including such familiar landmarks at Central Park in New York City, Yellowstone, Yosemite, the Petrified Forest and Grand Canyon.

As the Depression wore on, it taxed the ingenuity of the government to keep the CCC boys busy. Ultimately, the Corps became an all-purpose work force working under some 25 different federal agencies and carrying out a wide range of tasks, fighting forest fires, providing flood relief, restoring old forts in the Carolinas, gathering ticks for scientists studying Rocky Mountain spotted fever—anything in the public interest which the profits-and-wages sector of the economy could not or would not provide for.

A regimen of good food, hard work and regular hours quickly restored boys who had suffered the ill-effects of poverty and the Depression. The work was obviously worth doing and the boys' handiwork provided them with immediate gratification as a rock wall or mountain roadway or park building took form and neared completion. The boys worked and played together and a cameraderie quickly developed. Each boy sent \$25 of his monthly \$30 earnings home and helped support an average of four other people, and the \$300 they sent home during a year was no inconsiderable sum at a time when per capita income was less than \$400 per annum. Being able to send money home provided motivation to put up with a bit of hardship, homesickness and danger (47 boys died fighting forest fires).

The boys learned skills on the job and had many educational and social opportunities during off hours; it was common for 40% or more of the boys at a camp to be enrolled in evening classes at nearby high schools or colleges. Communities received such an economic and morale boost from the camps that the boys were often invited to dinner in private homes and were easily drawn into community activities on a voluntary basis.

In 1977, 35 years after the CCC was disbanded, ex-enrollees formed an alumni association, the National Association of Civilian Conservation Corps Alumni (NACCCA), and by 1981 the organisation had grown to 48 chapters and 7,000 members nationwide. Every researcher who has studied the CCC has found that those who served remember the Cs with affection and pride. For many of them it was the highlight of their life. One alumnus expressed his feelings about his service in the CCC by saying: 'I'm having trouble deciding whether to be buried in my old CCC uniform or my Marine dress blues.' Sentimental, yes, but typical. The NACCCA took as its motto, 'The CCC will always be close to the hearts of those helped by it.' In all, 2.5 million boys were helped by the CCC—many would say that they had been saved by the Corps.

In later life, an unusually high percentage of ex-CCC alumni and their children worked in public service jobs, at every point on the spectrum from the Army to the Peace Corps.

Immediate cash benefits went, of course, to the 2.5 million enrollees

and the 10 million relatives to whom they sent money. Another one million people held military and civilian jobs with the CCC and helped support their families on their earnings. Thus, nearly one out of every eight Americans alive during the Great Depression received a small cash boost from the CCC.

Communities near the hundreds of camps received a significant economic benefit. Supplies and food were purchased locally and the boys spent their pocket money in neighbourhood shops. A few local boys filled out the ranks of nearby camps and local people were hired for a variety of jobs at the camps. On an unmeasurable level, the CCC boys replaced the local profits-and-wages economy, shattered by the Depression, with an economy of co-operation and mutual support. Completion of a municipal park or swimming pool boosted local pride and morale and made life seem better. Youthful energies demanded athletics and dances and celebrations, and communities were lifted up by these renewed activities. And the effect of the CCC needing everything from toothbrushes to uniforms rippled through the entire nation; a cotton mill town might be revived without ever quite knowing where the demand for cloth came from.

The greatest need of the nation in the early '30s was to get moving again rather than to suffer passively. Within four or five months of its creation there were 1,300 CCC camps built and 300,000 young men enrolled. The economic Depression was not over, but the psychological depression was greatly relieved.

Several interlocking factors in the Corps's development and organisation contributed to its success; in outline, these were:-

1. *Hasty mobilisation and scant pre-planning.* The CCC was scarcely planned at all, and it was mobilised more quickly than had been the Army for World War I. As a result, the CCC took its form from its constituent elements and its needs and goals. Since the Army was the only organisation in the country experienced in housing, feeding, paying and moving masses of men, the Army became paymaster for the Corps and ran the camps. The Forest Service, the Park Service, the Soil Conservation Service and other federal agencies knew what work needed to be done and how to do it, so they were put in charge of designing and supervising projects. Within three years of the creation of the CCC, Forest Service people were already saying that the Corps had put the cause of conservation in America ahead by 20 years; agencies which had long known of the conservation needs under their jurisdiction were very quickly in the position of seeing the essential and necessary completed and the desirable and ideal underway. Finally, the CCC took its form from the unemployed youths who served.

The public expects a level of success and a degree of accountability of government programmes which it would not expect of private or personal enterprise. The hasty, unplanned creation of the CCC permitted a normal latitude for failure and experiment. The Corps, organised like roadhouse

stew, poked about like a sciliated amoeba until it found its 'natural' niche and then, wonder of wonders, it worked!

2. *The camps were small and on the human scale.* The camps were nominally set up for 300 enrollees plus support personnel. As is well established by now, genuine human community, in which individuals share daily life familiarly with one another, can flourish in communities of up to 400 or 500 souls, but not more. Beyond that number, bureaucracy and hierarchical organisation take over and produce facelessness and impersonality. The small CCC camps were conducive to the development of genuine community and camaraderie, and CCC alumni fondly recall their service with 'a great bunch of guys.'

Furthermore, the camps were small enough to be easily struck or moved. When there was internal trouble or conflict with a nearby community, when projects were complete, or when, for any reason, it was desirable to disband or move a camp, it could be done quickly. Denver, Colorado, dragged its feet over administrative preparations for its CCC camp and, when nearby Boulder made a strong bid to get the camp, the Denver camp was struck and on its way to Boulder within two days. Obviously, the small, semi-permanent camps permitted the government great flexibility in management of the CCC.

3. *The CCC focused on getting work completed.* The modern focus, at least for government programmes in the U.S., has been on skill training and education. Skill training in the CCC took place on the job and was in areas that were immediately useful. Educational opportunities were made available, but only during off-duty hours and on a voluntary basis. The evidence shows that the boys profited most from restored health and development of good, regular work habits. By the time they left the camps they felt stronger, more confident and more competent than when they had joined. Each had known the gratification of seeing his own contribution help make the work and the camp life a success.

4. *Each camp featured a fruitful mix of people.* In addition to Army and federal agency personnel at the camps, there were civilian workers, local boys enrolled to fill out the camp roster, and LEMs—local experienced men, stonemasons, carpenters, and other skilled men to train the boys and supervise daily work. The effect of the mix was to bring local people and out-of-towner CCC boys together and lessen the mystery of town and camp to each other; to bring old and young together to increase overall maturity.

Eleanor Roosevelt campaigned for CCC camps for women, and a handful were established. In keeping with the customs of the times, there were all-Black and American Indian camps; an all-Black company completed most of the work at the Petrified Forest in Arizona, and the CCC is said to have been the most successful programme for Indians ever, the communal, co-operative nature of the Corps being harmonious with their cultural traditions. And camps were also established for unemployed veterans of World War I. So, in sum, the CCC became something of a

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social experiment, and the design of the CCC was successfully adapted to accommodate other groups than those for which it had originally been designed.

The CCC became both a flexible instrument of government and a popular people's programme. Camps could be created, disbanded, moved and put at the disposal of many federal agencies to complete a wide variety of public interest tasks. It could be adapted for different kinds of enrollees, including women, Blacks, American Indians, older people, and so forth.

From a people's perspective, the CCC functioned on a human scale even though it was a 'Big Government' programme. The camps were operated on the human scale rather than as a faceless, impersonal bureaucracy. The work was useful and gratifying, a source of pride. The boys wanted adventure, so they turned hardship and challenge to this end. They had, many of them, left their families and not been able to start new families, so they made the CCC their family. They had lost their youth and their time of growth and education to the Depression, so the CCC became their university, and they used it both for brotherhood and high jinks. They wanted to be a part of their community and a part of worthy enterprise, so they worked hard and accomplished works that the nation recognised as beneficial.

Ironically, private enterprise profited enormously from the CCC. Tractor manufacturers were spared the social (unemployment) and environmental (Dust Bowl) costs of doing business. The soil conservation and reforestation work of the Cs was of extensive value to agricultural and ranching interests. Each park became a focal point of human activity, and thus an opportunity for food service and assorted tourist businesses. Even some publishing ventures such as McGraw-Hill kept themselves afloat during the Depression by selling yearbooks and textbooks to CCC boys.

If, as some of us believe, unemployment and environmental degradation are the inevitable fallout of normal business activities in modern industrial nations and if, as seems to be the case, we are unable to figure out a way to have business pay the social and environmental costs of doing business, then understanding the success of a programme like the Civilian Conservation Corps may be, not merely useful, but the equivalent of a fire drill.

[Ann Thedford Lanier, a research assistant for the Bureau of Sociological Research, Center for Action Research, University of Colorado at Boulder, is also a Teaching Assistant. She recently received a grant to carry out research into the Civilian Conservation Corps. There is at present a movement in Congress to try to establish '3C2'. Legislation will be proposed in 1982. It faces uncertain response: the Reagan administration, whilst favouring 'workfare' such as 3C2 would be, seems hostile to conservation. Ann Lanier's research provides valuable background for the pressure to establish 3C2.]

KNOWLEDGE: 1066 AND ALL THAT*

by Edward Grist

*What have you the faintest recollection of?*¹

KNOWLEDGE is a dynamic, not a static. It is continually modified and adapted, relearned and rediscovered. It is inter-related, not divided. It should enrich and enhance a person's view of the world, not blinker his vision. It has a function beyond that of the schoolroom, that of use in the business of life.

When it is passed on from generation to generation, it loses that freshness of discovery and immediacy. In any given learning process, some systemisation and organisation will come in. A given body of knowledge becomes the norm. This could be termed conventional wisdom, or be known as a syllabus. It has to be cut up, given headings, require a certain formality in answers given to questions. Both teachers and students become adept in giving the right answer.

It is the rightness of these answers to questions which start to bring a disservice to knowledge. What may be the right answer today, will be the wrong one tomorrow for many reasons. It may even be only partially right today, hedged in with ifs and buts, doubts and reservations. But few teachers will admit to this, few students will want to know. The former has to get through the syllabus, the latter has to pass his exam. At all levels of education, this has a most undesirable side effect. Unless the student has been taught to study on his own, has the ability to assemble and utilise information, he will dismiss his education as an irrelevance. The acquired knowledge was useful to pass an exam., which may gain him a job. The painfully acquired knowledge can now be safely discarded as he goes about the business of life. Sellars and Yeatman are too serious to be taken humorously.

Symbolic of discarding academic life is the rush to sell old textbooks at University and College level; and the fact that at school the textbooks are issued at the beginning of a year and collected at the end, to be speedily forgotten. They are not part of the fabric of real life. Windows on the world are closed at the end of each year. For many they were never really opened. This is an incredible waste of resources. It is a waste of valuable human resources, of the country's collective brain, imagination and mind. The years between, say, five and twenty have gone without trace. It is a waste of educational investment in teaching skills, training and equipment. It is an insult to our painfully acquired heritage in all its forms. It is depriving thousands of access to a better life, let alone an economic loss to the country.

Everything we learn at school, college and university should be of use during the rest of our lives at some time. It should enable us to evaluate

* *1066 and All That* by W. C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman. Methuen 1930, reprinted 1981.

other subjects, to cross reference, to find out the latest development, to rediscover that which was forgotten, to illuminate problems at home and abroad, to enrich existence. The windows should remain open. By closing down these windows, it leaves people prey to trivialisation of issues. The assumption is made by the purveyors of information that unless anything is presented in its simplest form, it will not be read, it will not be interesting, it will not sell. It assumes people are stupid. But present the material in a lively and informative manner, without necessarily making any concessions to the complexity of a matter and people generally respond. There is a latent ability for people to understand and evaluate complex issues. It can be accompanied by the recognition of the lost years of their schooldays. Attempts are made to rediscover those years through night classes, extra-mural classes or the Open University. Despite the joys of discovery, the satisfaction of learning, of taking a fresh view of the world that was lost, the very real question remains as to what happened during school/college/university days?

What happened, to my mind, is the negatives of the opening paragraph. Knowledge is presented as a static, it is divided into packages—subjects, and its presentation blinkers vision. It appears to have no function beyond the schoolroom. In sorting out knowledge into gobbets for exams, our teachers have become arrogant. It is as if they had taken on the mantle of those 19th century scientists who felt they had discovered all there was to know about the laws of physics, and apart from tidying up the loose ends, there was very little else to do. To say that Einstein was just around the corner, is something of an understatement.

There is little or no real argument brooked from the student or pupil. He takes down the notes and reproduces the answers, blissfully unaware that someone has already or is currently undermining all that he is writing. The student may be given a collection of alternative views, but small attention is given to how these views or the initial view was reached. Nor is the student enabled to see how one subject might illuminate another; how a set of conclusions in one field might affect those of another. The economist rarely knows any economic history and vice versa. The consequences for both subjects are dire. The economist never talks to the engineer and vice versa. The consequences for the country are dire. Conclusions and thought process from various fields can illuminate each other in unexpected ways.

An engineer might build a bridge, a nuclear power station may be proposed, there is a technological revolution in communications. All these developments will have a social and economic impact. Yet very rarely at an academic level do the disciplines of, say, engineering and economics meet.

When I was a student, having freshly completed my degree course in Economics and Economic History, I met a student of Engineering. In his course he had had to carry out a study of the impact of building a bridge in such and such a place. He had done intuitively a cost benefit analysis without the tools with which I as a student economist had been equipped. How adequate these tools may have been, since I had no know-

ledge of engineering, would have been interesting, and may cause me to rethink cost benefit analysis. The point is that no one in the engineering department had thought to enlist the aid of the economics department, and no one in the economics department had gone to the engineering department to see if cost benefit analysis was applicable.

Having already stated that the economist never talks to the economic historian and vice versa (and in my university the former was a floor or two above the latter), this may come as no surprise, but it is nonetheless worrying. As a consequence of the seeming irrelevance of knowledge, people forget their country's history and that of other nations. They are then surprised at riots in this country, or the seeming paranoia of the USSR or South Africa. Knowledge of both are vital in our relations with each other and the outside world. They forget their geography, their foreign languages, their maths, their sciences, which are only rediscovered through, for instance, a good television programme or newspaper article. Then their interest is rekindled with a vengeance.

Our education system is breeding a nation proud of its ignorance. This is not to say that people are generally stupid, but rather that there has been a large scale failure to demonstrate to people the usefulness and validity of what they are being taught in their most formative years. There have to be ways of stimulating that interest, so that pupils and students will be prepared to work hard to acquire that knowledge for which our parents and their parents strove. Otherwise we are depriving them of their rightful heritage and the waste will continue. And that will be as scandalous as the current wave of educational cutbacks that the country is presently enjoying. Neither can be afforded.

NOTE

¹ *1066 and All That*, Test Paper 1, Question 9, 'Up to the End of 1066', p. 24.


[Edward Grist has had a number of articles published on the Economics of the Arts and the Arts in general. He has had a varied career in Arts Administration including fringe and community theatre, repertory theatre and ballet. He was until recently administrator of the CV One Theatre Company, a small scale touring company which promotes new writing.]

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

THESE past few months I have found myself having to defend *Reds*, and much about it is indefensible. The dog, for instance—that dog owned by Jack Reed and Louise Bryant, which whines outside their door while they're making love. As a Great Love Story *Reds* is mediocre; as an extended comment on American communism it is brave and sometimes illuminating. As it happened I saw it a few days after the BBC televised *The Trials of Alger Hiss*, and there is little doubt that Warren Beatty (who produced, directed and co-wrote the screenplay with Trevor Griffiths) regarded Reed as the Hiss of the day, American enemy to the American state. After celebrating the Ten Days That Shook the World in his bestseller Reed was militant in helping to found the American communist party; when he then disappeared inside the USSR the State Department seized the opportunity to dismiss him as a non-person. The first half is the best, with its portraits of a pseudo-intellectual New York set and a literary set in Cape Cod—with Jack Nicholson, as Eugene O'Neill, taking every scene in which he appears; but the second half has its moments, if only in giving expression to the official view that Reed's political beliefs constituted subversion. This, like Bryant's spirited defence of her agnosticism and the triumphant playing of the Internationale, is something one never expected to find in an American movie. In the end the film hedges its bets, though it remains ambiguous as to whether Reed became disillusioned with Soviet communism or was, in the circumstances, again the opportunist. The more romantic aspects of the plot are offset by those contemporaries of Reed who interrupt the action to offer sometimes irrelevant recollections; and in the same manner one's feelings about Beatty's overly boyish Reed are offset by his clear dedication to this project. Diane Keaton's Bryant fails to sustain the three-hour running time and is a libel on a lady who was much sharper than the script makes her.

But, all in all, this is one of the most stimulating and important films seen in London in years; and as much may be said of *Aus einem Deutschen Leben*, though cinemagoers showed scant interest. Perhaps they didn't want to see a film about Auschwitz—and perhaps Contemporary (the distributor) was unwise to call it *Death is My Trade*, though that is a literal translation of the title of Robert Merle's novel on which it is based. *Death is My Trade* sounds like a horror movie, and this is anything but—except by implication and, of course, in the cause of historical truth. Theodor Kotulla, writing and directing, takes the early events out of chronological order in order to stress the irony in the situation of an averagely-intelligent German becoming a non-fanatical Nazi functionary. It is because he is of minor importance that he is appointed commander of Auschwitz; it is because he regards himself as a disciplinarian that he accepts the institution of the Final Solution. His



wife's acceptance of this, done as a marital tiff, is the one crass moment; otherwise the film is an expression of Germanness—via its hero, with his love of the countryside, of uniforms, of obedience and beer. He may seem admirable—the film has become required viewing in German schools—until the final moments, when an American officer puts history's verdict with a lack of emotion which is nevertheless eloquent.

A German view of the War is also available in *The Boat*, or *Das Boot* as it was rechristened after an English version had failed to impress. Since we have always shown an aversion to dubbing it was absurd for the distributor (Columbia-EMI-Warner) to bring in this version, especially as American audiences had welcomed the film in its original language—inexplicably as it turns out. The director, Wolfgang Petersen, previously known for a soppy homosexual love story, *The Consequence*, brings slickness but little insight into this tale of a U-Boat and its crew. Its popularity on its home territory (it has made a profit on a budget which was the highest for any German film yet made) is doubtless due to its view of the nation at a crucial point in its history—courageous, desperate, defeated, pro-British to a degree (the crew sings 'Tipperary' in English) and no longer under any illusions about Nazi leadership. I'm afraid that I believe that this merely conforms to what Germans want to believe about themselves then; but of course the same thing might have been said about us when we flocked to *The Cruel Sea*, which was equally meretricious.

Volker Schlöndorff, who did have something to say about that war in his version of *The Tin Drum*, fails in *Die Fälschung (Circle of Deceit)* to say much of relevance about the current Middle East crisis. A journalist, reporting on the Civil War in Lebanon, becomes confused and then dismayed at the prospect of communicating its stupidity, cruelty and futility. What plot there is is adapted from a novel—by a reporter who had studied the war—and it retains, presumably, the journalist's emotional problems, consisting of a failing marriage and an unsatisfactory affair with the German widow (Hanna Schygulla) of an Arab. Unfortunately, analogies are drawn between these problems and the conflict—and the unworthiness of this ploy are conceded in a foreword which claims that what follows is a work of the imagination. Alternatively, that is Schlöndorff's way of advising us that, like his protagonist, he feels inadequate to the events he has to portray. The introduction further states that the film is not a documentary, but in that case is self-defenceless for no good reason: at least forty per cent of the film consists of footage of the fighting in Beirut, and the compassion inherent in the selection is reason enough to see this deeply flawed film.

The West German cinema has been well represented lately; a few years ago Spain was making inroads into our movie consciousness and its recent neglect caused the Electric Cinema Club in London to offer a week of new Spanish films not seen in this country. *A un Dios Desconocido (To an Unknown God)* apparently failed to turn up at the 1977 London Film Festival, but any relevance it had has already gone. As written by its director, Jaime Chavarri, and its distinguished producer,

Elias Querejeta, it purports to examine the dilemmas confronting a middle-aged homosexual in contemporary Spain. Hector Altiero won a Best Actor award at San Sebastian for his performance, but in truth it consists of little but allowing a singularly glum expression to break into an occasional smile. It is difficult to sympathise with him, and that is also because the film is less interested in him than in being 'clever' and allusory. It begins with the death of Lorca, but an obsession with Lorca, a promising theme, is hardly developed; at the same time the piece only works in those sequences where the past impinges on the present.

That is a concept which has often interested Carlos Saura, but he does little with it in *Mama Cumple 100 Anos* (*Mama's Hundredth Birthday*). The star is his wife, Geraldine Chaplin, who had recently appeared in *A Wedding*—of which this is a rehash, plus the inevitable borrowings from Buñuel and Berlanga. Family gatherings, if they can't be original, should at least contain likeable or amusing participants. Saura's subsequent *Deprisa, Deprisa* (*Faster, Faster*) is a return to the milieu of his first feature, *Los Golfos*, and his best film in a long while. It charts the progress of some young thugs from stealing cars to robbing banks, including Angela, who in Franco's Spain would have been a virgin and attended church daily: now she embraces drugs, guns and the accompanying thrills—and I would like the film better did it not imply that such appurtenances were essential to youngsters today who want to break the monotony of daily life. It is one thing to be objective, but I cannot think of a single great film-maker, including Saura's idol, Buñuel, who was not also a moralist.

The particular quality of this film is due partly to its locations, the suburbs of Madrid and the scrubby countryside around Segovia. The brilliant photographer concerned is Teo Escamilla, and his contribution to *El Corazón del Bosque* (*The Heart of the Forest*) is also paramount. The film has a dreamlike quality, but it would be better, yet again, if the style was keyed to the essentially simple plot, which concerns a hunt for a guerilla leader who has been hiding in the mountains of Asturias since the end of the Civil War. The screenplay is by the director, Manuel Gutiérrez-Aragon, and his producer, Luis Megino, whose subsequent collaboration, *Maravillas*, is a black comedy about an adolescent girl in present-day Madrid. Once again the piece consists of quirkish behaviour, constant allusion—often to the Civil War—and borrowings from Buñuel and Berlanga. It marks a further decline for Aragon, whose brilliant *Camada Negra* (*Black Brood*) established him in the forefront of Spanish directors. His collaborator then, as with *The Poachers*—they swopped as writer and director—was José-Luis Borau, and it was a second wholly original film, concerning in this case the relationship between crime and right-wing terrorism. It demanded audience revaluation from scene to scene, which is something his more recent films fail to do.

I cannot understand why it failed to get British distribution, but then I do not understand the neglect accorded the Sri Lankan director Lester James Peries, whose dozen features have hardly been seen outside the National Film Theatre. He started making films at the same time as

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

A BIOGRAPHY OF GRAHAM SUTHERLAND

Graham Sutherland. Roger Berthoud. Faber & Faber. £12.50.

Douglas Cooper, most difficult of experts to please, at one time wrote of Sutherland that he was 'the only major artist who had emerged in Great Britain since the death of Turner'. Those of us who have visited the Sutherland exhibition will be ready to accept the plausibility of that verdict. Everyone will have their own favourite portrait. Doctor Adenauer was mine.

Graham Sutherland bewitched my wife with his modest charm when she met him, as indeed did his beautiful wife. Let us welcome this biography as the revealing portrait of a genius. But few men of genius can ever have become involved in more sensational quarrels. Sir John Rothenstein was a victim of a persecution in which Graham Sutherland, for no apparent reason, played a prominent part. Sir John has already reviewed this book in dignified fashion, but made little attempt to conceal his understandable bitterness.

Sir John publicly turned at bay and struck Cooper, who must have weighed twice as much as himself, to the boards with a right hook. But Cooper and Sutherland later fell out. On the account given here, Graham Sutherland and his wife seem like the aggressors. I never met Douglas Cooper, but having read many of his scathing articles, I am ready to believe that the aggression was not all on one side. The row with Sir Basil Spence seems entirely in character, Sutherland's not Spence's.

We are given a blow by blow description of the most famous dispute of all—that over the Churchill portrait. Unless the account is corrected by the Churchill family, it presumably must be accepted as accurate. Opinions, insofar as it has been possible to form them, must always differ about the portrait itself. My wife and I attended the ceremony at which it was displayed and were reasonably satisfied, as the audience appeared to be. But one must admit that Churchill was portrayed as a very old man. It was, after all, an eightieth birthday present. He certainly looked very tired. But then, so he was. A year later he had retired from office and made little or no contribution to public life thereafter. The portrait was obviously very depressing to Churchill and to those who were close to him and loved him. Hence its inevitable destruction.

The comparison with the Beaverbrook portrait, well brought out here, is revealing. 'Well, Kathy', said Beaverbrook to Kathleen Sutherland, 'it's an outrage, but it's a masterpiece.' No doubt Churchill felt the picture of himself was an outrage, but not a masterpiece. It is difficult to feel that he was wrong on the latter point.

Sutherland, according to Roger Berthoud, felt an underlying urge to seek drama throughout the latter part of his life. This is one explanation of the series of unhappy relationships with those who had originally regarded him with affection and admiration. Sir John Rothenstein does not seem to dispute this estimate, but to find in it an explanation of why Sutherland's later work declined. By the highest artistic standards, that may be a just estimate. But the layman who has visited the Sutherland exhibition will feel enormous gratitude to the artist and forget the quarrelsome disposition that went along with his wonderful talent.

FRANK LONGFORD

ROMAN LONDON

Londinium: London in the Roman Empire. John Morris. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, £15.

The appearance of this book serves as a vivid reminder of its author, a long-time lecturer at University College, London, who died five years ago. He had completed the manuscript some years earlier and had put it aside to work on his text of *Domesday* and to serve as a joint editor of the *Prosopography* (a Who's Who, or even a Namierisation) of the *Later Roman Empire* of which two volumes have appeared. For John Morris was a man of many parts. His central academic interest was always the transition from Roman to medieval society in Britain, as his *The Age of Arthur* attested (published in 1973). He wrote on the army and the politics of the early Roman Empire, and on early British and Irish Christianity. All he wrote was based on evidence scrupulously assembled. But he was also an imaginative teacher not afraid to move into the present—in 1952 he founded *Past and Present*, and he edited it for its first eight years—and in 1935 he fought unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate. For him—to use an old adage—history was past politics and politics was present history.

This—his last—book is a remarkable memorial. He probes an area all but unexplored, and of which the remaining survivals that were revealed when the Barbican site was being prepared, are tantalisingly few. This archaeological evidence was carefully assessed 15 years ago by Ralph Merrifield in his *Roman City of London*, but the broader setting and the wider context remained for Morris to analyse and describe. What he does in this book, and does uniquely, is to explain the world in which London was set, and to trace the story for the first 600 years of the city's existence, from pre-Roman to Saxon times.

London is, of course, a Roman city, founded at the time of the second invasion of 43 A.D., not to be a garrison or a fortress, but to be a centre of Government. It was built on a specially-chosen site in the middle of an untamed and uninhabited forest, but on a fordable river (the level of the Thames was then some fourteen feet lower than today) and within reach of the open sea, which was the Roman line of communications. It was, in other words, as virginal a city in its founding as Washington on the Potomac, and set to perform a similar function. It began with a bridge at the lowest crossing place of a major river, and Morris places the first bridge close to the present London bridge, though he wisely says that 'attempts to determine its exact site are not likely to succeed'. The city grew up around two low hills, Cornhill and Ludgate Hill, and along the banks of the Walbrook, nowadays covered by Finsbury Circus. And the first Romans in London lived, he thinks, 'between the Bank and Cannon Street'. It did not last: the 'first Londoners' were wiped out in Boudicca's wave of attacks (c. 60 A.D.) and the 'first London' was totally obliterated. The British were ruthless to their invaders.

The years that followed were marked by Agricola's campaign in the north—in his account of which Morris shows a proper respect, and admits that it was to be another 1,700 years before southern rulers effectively subdued the moors and mountains of the north country. For the Romans, with half-a-million men (only a few of them Roman) spread along a 3,000 mile frontier from the Solway to the Danube, it was cheaper and easier to contain the north than to conquer and hold it. But all this made a great city necessary at London. It grew around Government House in Cannon Street and a second fort at Cripplegate, and Morris—drawing on Merrifield—gives a graphic account of the life and society of this flourishing provincial capital. In the third century

it was densely populated and may have numbered 100,000; the province itself may have had in all as many as two million people. It was a province of laws, and thus of lawyers; the Roman peace was broken from time to time by rebellion but, by and large, the peace held; and Rome even managed to efface the memory of pre-Roman Britain, which remains now all-but-impossible to penetrate.

The Roman villas in the London region attest to its comfort and affluence. But the fall of Rome in 410 and the recall of the legions left Britain to its own devices, and—it seems—to a twenty-year period in the mid-fifth century, in which the names that emerge from an all-but-empty landscape are those of near-mythical leaders like Ambrosius Aurelianus, described as a 'gentleman, last of the Roman nation', and Arthur. As before 43, so after 410, the mists gather. The Romans at least did keep records and names and, as a result, they have left their own unique and splendid mark on history.

And so has John Morris in this fascinating piece of reconstruction. The publishers help with charts and maps, even if in chapter 14 the typography is occasionally peculiar. But this is a fine piece of research, a readable tale, and a scholar's memorial.

EDMOND WRIGHT

THE INTERNATIONAL FILM ENCYCLOPEDIA

The International Film Encyclopedia. Ephraim Katz. Macmillan. £7.95 (paperback).

Courtesy of the film critic of *The Observer*, the paperback edition of Macmillan's *Film Encyclopedia* comes in 1,266 pages, jacketed with the claim that it is far superior to Halliwell's *Film Companion*, a fact which can please neither Mr. Halliwell nor his publisher. In the movie specialist bookshops Katz's tome in hardback immediately floored *The Filmgoer's Companion*, and it was a knock-out blow.

I have always admired Halliwell, if only because he is one of the few writers on film with a sense of humour, but the truth is that his listings don't go very far: for most entries one line of description ('Virile British leading man') is followed merely by a filmography, not always complete. Katz's filmographies are complete, at least for most directors and all the important stars, but most importantly he gives details of careers. Do you want to know what Edward Everett Horton or Raoul Coutard did before they entered films, or what happened to Eisenstein and Ginger Rogers after films left them? Or that Van Heflin married a former leading lady of B movies? Or that Isabel Jewell, second lead of the 30s, once went to jail for drunken driving? Or do you wish to follow the peregrinations of those directors exiled by the Nazis?

There are sound, and extensive, articles on individual studios and national industries; and sensibly brief entries on technical terms. Katz only falters when his sources left him down—including one of my own books, in which I credited the French actress Arletty with a film she then didn't do after I'd sent the manuscript to press. He has Laurence Olivier appearing in 'Guys and Dolls' for the National Theatre, which was cancelled in mid-production, and just very occasionally with foreign language films he confuses alternative titles or thinks the translated English title a further credit. But for what is confessedly a 'one man project' to have so very few mistakes is virtually miraculous—there are probably over 100,000 titles listed among his 7,000 entries. Unfortunately in extended pieces on such major figures as Welles, Ford and Griffith an opinion is inevitably expressed, and equally inevitably it is both banal and banally expressed. But for the most part Katz is content to convey

information, and with one bound he has put himself in the forefront of film studies. He has given us the facts—more of them than anyone else has ever done, and since that's the next best thing to seeing the films themselves, who wants theories?

DAVID SHIPMAN

MORAL PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS

Moral Thinking. R. M. Hare. Oxford University Press. £11. Paperback £3.95.

Professor R. M. Hare has, in his book *Moral Thinking*, continued to explicate the system of ethics which he began with *The Language of Morals* (1952) and *Freedom and Reason* (1963). In all three works Hare subscribes firmly to the belief that we cannot argue from premisses about matters of fact to conclusions about matters of value. In his recent work, however, Hare makes a new move: he describes Utilitarian theories of moral thought as the only rational ones. This surprising development is fully explained in the author's introduction where he advances the view that moral thinking, concerned mainly with the moral words 'ought' and 'must', require not only a logical understanding of the concepts they denote but also of 'the preferences of the people whom our actions will affect; and it is an empirical question what these are.' We can, he thinks, 'get a long way by logic alone—further than many people have thought; but that, in the selection of principles for use in this world of ours, facts about the world and the people in it are relevant. So a complete moral system will depend on logical and empirical theses—which makes it all the more important to be clear which are which.' Listeners to Bryan Magee's interviews on BBC television, in 1978, with *Men of Ideas*, will recognise that Professor Hare then declared a belief in Utilitarian doctrine. The detailed statement of his position is completed in his new book. Hare shows here that there is an intimate relation between Bentham's dictum, 'Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one', and Kant's deductive prescription, 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.'

Hare's connecting link consists in imagining ourselves in the position of everyone who will be affected by our actions, thereby creating a body of principle which, if properly followed through, will inevitably result in prescriptions such as a Utilitarian would make. He accepts, at the same time, that only an Archangel could so thoroughly envisage all possible people and consequences. Human as we are, we have to be guided most of the time by such traditionally-recommended principles as 'never torture people' or 'do not kill the innocent'. Only the Archangel in each of us could tell when it might be appropriate to run counter to these intuitive prohibitions in the cause of the greater good of a greater number. 'Moral thinking', he concludes, 'is thus revealed as something that we have to do in concert, though each individual has to play his own part.' A reader will naturally wonder, then, how he is to know when it might be right for him to rise to the level of Archangel and dare to contravene the norms by which his behaviour is habitually governed. This, says Hare, is not a philosophical but an empirical question, depending for its answer on something like an assessment of the state of grace in which each of us believes himself to be at the relevant time. We are bound to doubt our own capacity for so daunting an enterprise and to wonder whether, like Tom Stoppard's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the play *Jumpers*, we should fail to notice the bodies lying on the floor.

Professor Hare, the doyen of contemporary English systematic moral philo-

sophers, undertakes to square Utilitarian thought (a doctrine attractive to many) with the analytical distinction, first noticed by Hume and strictly upheld by G. E. Moore, between conclusions based on matters of fact and prescriptive notions of how they ought to be. To Moore, failure to recognise the distinction was to commit something which he designated the 'naturalistic fallacy': a mistake that led the critical judgment astray. For there is no means of bridging the gap between what 'is' and what 'ought' to be, save through an act of moral evaluation and of decision about preferred ends. To many philosophers the Utilitarian argument appears to be a prime example of 'naturalistic' conclusion where, in any given course of action, the test of its rightness is seen in its consequences.

The lucidity and honesty of Hare's reasoning makes the book a highly intelligible and therefore accessible account of systematic moral argument. He clearly distinguishes two different levels of moral thinking, showing how Utilitarian argument at the critical level, bringing into consideration impartial sympathy for others' dilemmas, allows the use of moral principles which chime in with our common acceptance of what, for instance, justice entails in action. The logic of this and other concepts makes a firm base for his reasoning and shows why 'situation-ethics' and relativist thinking should be ruled out. A single moral dilemma requires for its resolution some assumed, if not stated, general principles: a consideration of the normally observed prohibition against killing another human being does operate in most people's emotional make-up, even when they do not logically analyse the concepts involved. 'Reason', says Hare, 'leaves us with our freedom but constrains us to respect the freedom of others, and to combine with them in exercising it.' To have worked out a system rather than to see each puzzling moral problem in isolation from other partially similar situations, seems to him to provide at least a starting point in deciding when to follow and when to discard general prescriptions for action. Otherwise, the whole work of evaluation has repeatedly to be performed, at any level of decision-making. No one is absolved, in either case, from the truly difficult answers to the question of what is to be done.

BETTY ABEL

THE MYSTERY OF APPARITIONS

Hauntings and Apparitions. Andrew MacKenzie. Heinemann. £8.50.

Explaining the Unexplained: Mysteries of the Paranormal. Hans J. Eysenck and Carl Sargent. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £9.95.

When Andrew MacKenzie, distinguished member of the Society for Psychical Research, first studied the subject of apparitions, he thought that the evidence pointed to their being, in the main, subjective experiences, but gradually his view changed, so that he now accepts that some apparitions might be what Professor H. H. Price, Emeritus Professor of Logic at Oxford University, called 'real objects'—neither mental nor physical, but something intermediate between the two, 'a complex system of "cognita", but not quite complex enough to count as a complete material object.' In the light of this, and other theories, in his absorbing, serious, well-researched and original study, published on behalf of the Society for Psychical Research in its centenary year, Mr. MacKenzie considers both old cases documented in its annals, and modern cases of particular interest.

Dr. D. J. West, Mr. MacKenzie tells us, believes that few cases in the S.P.R. collection are sufficiently well corroborated to be convincing, but Mr. MacKenzie's position is not so extreme. His conclusion is 'after studying a great

many cases of haunting, that what is in operation is a subtle interaction between a person, or family, and a house or area.' He does not shun difficult regions of philosophical or scientific speculation, and reminds us that the founders of the S.P.R.—Myers, Gurney, Sidgwick—were extremely astute and fastidious in their theories and classifications. He is always most interesting when discussing the likelihood of the occurrence of happenings when the percipient is in an altered state of consciousness: alertness to the possibility of a paranormal experience is usually a deterrent. Thus, a characteristic prodromal is to be 'lost in a book'.

Mr. MacKenzie's examination of the Versailles Adventure, with its emphasis on the experiences of persons other than Moberly and Jourdain, is full of new thoughts. He is well up to date on the latest scientific work in the field, and is in touch with Dr. Karlis Osis, Chester F. Carlson, Research Fellow at the American Society for Psychical Research, who has developed a research model which elucidates four basic kinds of apparitions, and enables the researcher to seek out the roots of these phenomena. 'Near-death' research is a promising field of enquiry. Finally, he touches on the way in which some cases of haunting suggest the possibility of the interposition of fragments of life from an overlapping world, and relates this idea to quantum theory.

In contrast, I must confess to a reaction of disappointment over the compilation of Drs. Eysenck and Sargent. Because Professor Eysenck is so eminent, so dynamic, and, above all, so searching, one comes to a book to which he has lent his name hot for some new revelations of certainty. That cannot be, of course, and the mixture is as before, except for a chapter on the physics of psi. For psi, the authors are perfectly happy to allow, is a legitimate area for scientific research. The lay-out has the look of a coffee-table book, with absurd pictures, showing, for instance, an extrovert in expansive party mood compared with an introvert in solitary perambulation. It seems to me that the book falls between two stools; if the reader has the intellect to stay with the physics material, he does not need childish illustrations. Moreover, one is considerably startled to discover traces of partial reporting, as if the authors wish more to stress than to disprove the paranormal. Let us take their treatment of D. D. Home, the medium, by whom, indeed, Dr. Eric Dingwall told me he was more puzzled than by any other psychic. Even so, there are different ways of angling the known facts about Home. The statement that Home never received payment for séances is not valid without the corollary that he was only too content to receive gifts of clothing and jewellery. He blazed like a Christmas tree with rubies and emeralds! And he married splendidly. Nor is it correct to state unconditionally that he preferred to work in a full light. Often he chose to do so, but, often, as for instance on the occasion of his famous 'levitation' in Victoria, he preferred *no* light. Lord Adare's value as an observer was substantially eroded by the work of Mr. Trevor Hall, and Sir William Crookes' evidence on psychic matters is thoroughly discredited by that same writer. The illustrated panel on Esther Cox and the Amherst disturbances is not accurate. Esther's *own* beau tried to rape her, not her sister's. The home conditions were not those of poverty. Only one box moved in the girl's bedroom. It did not 'fly around'. The way in which she swelled up was the main feature of her personal symptoms, but it is not mentioned here. Esther was 'about nineteen years' not eighteen. Walter Hubbell did not merely visit the house several times: he *lodged* there for a period to observe, and perhaps to encourage, the phenomena.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

THIRD WORLD ENCYCLOPAEDIA

Encyclopaedia of the Third World. George Thomas Kurian (Editor). Mansell. £67.50.

Most books of reference have a natural, if unfortunate, bias towards the industrially developed countries of the North (as they have become known after the report of the Brandt Commission). Mr. Kurian is to be congratulated, therefore, for thinking of a separate reference work devoted entirely to the Third World.

So, if you want to know about these, Mr. Kurian's *Encyclopaedia* will give you succinct information on the Council of the Entente and the human rights situation in Afghanistan, on the economy of Surinam as well as agriculture in Uruguay. The bulk of the volume is devoted to an alphabetical, country by country compilation of the type of material that might be expected (basic facts, constitution, economics, culture, and so on). The *Encyclopaedia* also has a brief glossary, a chronology of events in the country from 1945, a bibliography of works published after 1960 and a brief list of official publications. It provides information on some thirty international organisations, and lists agricultural, cultural, development, educational, political, legal, economic and financial organisations, media associations and development banks.

There is an imaginative collection of appendices, including those comparing Third World countries with each other, those providing global indicators on economics, industry, energy, agriculture, health and nutrition, and those examining economic aid, multinationals, commodity cartels, producers' associations, and women in the Third World. A marvellously detailed index to the whole work, and a basic bibliography of the Third World (from 1970) conclude the *Encyclopaedia*, which will be an essential addition to all libraries interested in any aspect of the Third World. My only query is whether Mr. Kurian's fixation with up to date information (e.g. lists of cabinet ministers) is worth the space it demands since such material is ephemeral in any case, but perhaps especially so in the countries to which Mr. Kurian has devoted so much work.

PRAEHU S GUPTARA

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Knesset (Associated University Presses. £14.50). This is a valuable study of 'parliament in the Israeli political system' by Gregory S. Mahler, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont. It contains a detailed analysis of the working of the 'sovereign' Knesset and the background and attitudes of its 120 members, based upon interviews and other data gained by the author during ten months in Israel in 1974-75. There is a final chapter bringing his assessment up to 1981, before the

General Election last year. Professor Mahler likes to describe the Israeli political system as 'essentially a British-model parliamentary political system' with 'some significant deviations'. These deviations are, however, so fundamental as to make the two constitutions basically different both in law and practice. There are no separate electoral constituencies. The elector has no choice except to vote for a party with an electoral list. Any party which receives at least 1% of the national vote is entitled to representation in the Knesset. There-

after representation is based upon percentage votes gained by a party. The latter's list of candidates in order of priority is determined by the party caucus. Thus the position of the candidate on the list is vital, subject to number of votes polled. In the result, the member so elected is utterly dependent, as Professor Mahler accepts, upon his party leadership as to his voting, speaking and conduct in the Knesset. There is no room for deviation if the member looks to re-election in the next parliament, unless already a party leader. There is a movement for electoral reform on the basis of district constituencies. As the author points out, this is strongly opposed by the major parties and is most unlikely to succeed. Probably the saving grace of the system is the inevitable growth of numerous small parties. There has never been an overall majority for a single party: Professor Mahler has a useful chapter on the history of coalition government in Israel, which on the whole has been successful in combining the sovereignty of the Knesset with strong government. The Begin administration is an example, although of course strong government is not the same as good government.

Everyman's Book of Victorian Verse (Dent. £9.50). In less than 350 pages of text, Professor J. R. Watson has endeavoured, so far as possible in such limited space, to 'select the most interesting poems written during the reign of Queen Victoria, giving space to the lesser poets as well as the greater ones, and attempting to show something of the dense, plankton-like activity of the age of poetry'. He has arranged his selection chronologically in four sections, 'the four ages of Victorian poetry as it develops through the century in parallel with the unfolding of the reign', namely 1837-1851, 1851-1867, 1867-1885, and 1885-1901. The anthology starts with

Tennyson's *The Poet's Song* and ends with Hardy's *The Darkling Thrush*. Professor Watson's Introduction on Victorian poetry is penetrating and somewhat defensive. He defends sentiment as against sentimentality with which much Victorian poetry has been too frequently associated. 'What Benson called the "wealth of idealised sentiment" is a common, almost universal, feature of Victorian verse: events, places, encounters, failures, are used to explore the feelings with a carefully cultivated sensitivity. If the Victorians did not feel their thought, they certainly thought about their feelings' . . . 'the sentiment of Victorian poetry is central to its proper functioning'. Professor Watson regards his selection as a test of nerve in an ironic age and a declaration of faith in the verse reprinted here. Anthologies are almost by definition subjective, and some readers will regret omissions. No doubt, however, this volume will be widely appreciated for its selection and as representative of Victorian poetry as a whole. There are brief, but useful, biographical and explanatory notes.

Livy: Rome and Italy (Penguin Books. £2.95 UK: \$5.95 USA). This is the last and concluding volume in the Penguin Classics series of translations of Livy's History of Rome. The first volume, *The Early History of Rome*, covers Books I-V of Livy's history. The second volume now published is a translation by Betty Radice, with annotations, of Books VI-X. It covers the period from after the defeat of the Romans by the Gauls in 386 BC to the victory at Aquilonia in the Third Samnite War, in 293. The volume contains a valuable short Introduction by the late R. M. Ogilvie. Books XI-XX being lost, the other volumes in this series cover *The War with Hannibal* being Books XXI-XXX and *Rome and the Mediterranean* (Books XXXI-XLV).



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**EXAMINING THIRD
WORLD STRATEGIES**

Antoine J. Abraham and
Ahmed Abdul Majid

**JORDAN, PALESTINE
AND ISRAEL**

Kamel S. Abu Jaber

**THE MILITANT
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
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EXAMINING THIRD WORLD STRATEGIES

by Antoine J. Abraham and Ahmed Abdul Majid

THE conflict between the rich and poor nations of the world has intensified in recent months with the United States and the Western World (the First World) being placed on the defensive since the World Food Conference held in Rome in November 1974 and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Originally called the group of 77, but now consisting of 120 nations, the Third World (composed of the nations of Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East) have joined together to threaten the First World in what has been recently referred to at the United Nations as the 'tyranny of the minority.' Former US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger's academic approach at the WFC, and former US Ambassador to the UN, presently US Senator (NY), Daniel P. Moynihan's flamboyant outbursts only seem to antagonise dialogue and indirectly imply responsibility for some of the conditions of hunger, despair and underdevelopment in the Third World. However, a sociological review of the problem of rich nations versus poor nations tends to indicate that the First World should accept very little blame for conditions in the Third World.

With an almost mechanical precision, leaders of the Third World at the WFC and at the UN blamed the Western World and particularly the United States for the continuing problem of world hunger, disease and underdevelopment. In effect, they have applied the concept of an 'external conspiracy' created by the West to deflect any blame from themselves for a condition for which they are partly responsible and which they continue to sustain. They hope to placate their peoples by blaming the West for the ills of their society.

The Third World demands a greater share of the wealth of the First World to offset the urgent problems of hunger, malnutrition, overpopulation and underdevelopment. The rich nations were accused of colonial exploitation, insufficient foreign aid, forced economic dependency to supply the industrial world's raw materials and markets, limited technological assistance in the area of agricultural development, inadequate fertiliser supplies, outdated methods of agricultural reform, reductions in available cereal output and, finally, insufficient humanitarian concern.

To remedy these conditions, the Third World nations have asked for an international stockpile of food as well as emergency food aid. In addi-



tion, they suggested food reserve planning, a speed-up in the process of technological transfer, a revised system of export-import finances to benefit them as well as additional funds from the World Bank and Special Drawing Rights. They have also asked for a special 'poor tax' to be mandated from the First World along with additional funds for foreign aid.

In return, the Third World nations pledged to stress agricultural development by assigning it top priority, to encourage foreign investment and business, to discourage prestige projects and to improve and expand technological education.

The suggestions of the Third World's leaders indicate that little has changed in their self-view or their opinion of the First World since World War II. While 'new' grandiose plans were offered, the rich nations were expected to remain burdened by the poor nations for many decades. No revolutionary ideas or even new approaches were suggested to 'put the Third World on its own feet.' The donor-acceptor attitude continues to dominate thought on the Third World problem.

The nations of the Third World share a common destiny to the same extent that the nations of the First World have had a common past. To a great extent, what the future holds for the Third World will grow out of its capacity to foster changes in its culture. The Western World did not become rich and powerful by accident or as a result of colonial exploitation. Colonialism came after both the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Thus, with slight variations, present-day rich nations were already prosperous and powerful prior to their colonial ventures, but colonialism enhanced their wealth astronomically. The nature of Western wealth and power resulted from changes in its culture. Hence, at the nucleus of the conflict between rich and poor nations is a conflict of cultures and values.

The majority of the nations of the First World evolved from an eighteenth century enlightenment which freed the Western World from the shackles of tradition, worn out institutions, inflexible value systems and discredited time-honoured myths. In their place, a new world view was created extolling the power of the rational mind in all fields of human endeavour. Europe's Classical heritage lost its pre-eminence and in its place a new culture emerged emphasising innovation, science, secularism and nationalism. These developments enabled the Western World to develop their human resources and, consequently, to achieve an agrarian and industrial revolution which launched the Western World upon a path to wealth and power. For the Second World (the Communist World) a similar process began in the nineteenth century under capitalist auspices and continued to develop under the materialistic view of Marx, Lenin and Mao.

In the Third World no true enlightenment has occurred so far. For the most part, the leaders of the Third World have sustained their power by relying upon traditional institutions and cultural patterns. Often, they are supported by political parties dominated by conservative elements and by a local clergy which sees the West as 'decadent, materialistic, pleasure-seeking, immoral and non-spiritual.' Consequently, the tradi-

tional structures are reinforced and human misery abounds. To remedy conditions in the Third World, its leaders import Western technology and fix it upon a traditional base. They see the strength of the First World in technical achievements while, in reality, the First World's potency is derived from its values and institutions. Clearly, a traditional base cannot sustain a modern superstructure and, therefore, little progress takes place in the Third World.

All too often when individuals in the Third World rise to challenge their own social systems and traditions, they find themselves facing inflexible opposition and are forced to seek external aid. Usually, they find support in the Communist World and proceed to establish local Communist parties to challenge the traditional social, political and economic order. Consequently, a problem in modernisation becomes politicised, resulting in an East-West conflict with the United States on the traditional (legitimist) side of the struggle, e.g. such was the case in Viet Nam.

The recent situation in Iran provides us with another example of a nation struggling to modernise and trapped between two 'alien' cultures—Western and Marxist. Disenchanted with the emotional and cultural dislocation modernisation creates, the Iranian clergy sought an alternate solution to the problem of modernisation. While both the United States and the Soviet Union eyed each other suspiciously over Iranian interests, the Iranian clergy seized the moment, creating an unexpected Revolution in Reverse. (At a later stage, Moslem Marxists joined the revolution in the hope of weakening American influence in the region, but their role remains adjunct.)

Like many other Third World nations, Iran is a multi-cultural nation. A small western-educated elite lives a modern life-style while the overwhelming majority of the population exists as it did for centuries, impervious to change. Thus the clergy has a substantial alliance with the majority of the inhabitants. For some of the clergy and traditionalists, modernisation is desirable only if it is scientific, technological, or bureaucratic, but not if it is social or cultural, affecting the life-style of the masses and thereby eroding the clergy's prestige and power. Without insight into the benefits of cultural modernisation, the traditional elite and its followers condemn modern life-styles as foreign imports that 'corrupt' youth. The western-educated elite is depicted as a tool of foreign imperialists enabling the clergy to lead the masses in a campaign to purge the society of the 'transgressions' of modernisation.

Yet, within the multi-cultural milieu, the struggle continues over the future orientation of Iran. The youth of Iran, as in other Third World nations, demand the benefits, wealth, and power that modernisation brings, but they ask whether it can be achieved within their own cultural tradition.

To answer this query, at least in part, we must distil the cultural factors of modernisation as they evolved in the Western World's struggle for social liberalism and justice. These factors include:

1. Humanitarianism based on the fatherhood of God, brotherhood of man, and equality of life.

2. Secular law which can be interpreted to change with the times, adjusted to make the punishment fit the crime and to provide equality before the law regardless of sex, race, or creed.

3. Separation of church and state to enable new ideas and institutions to be adapted without the interference of the clergy, whose views tend to conform with the past. The secular state tends to create greater loyalty among its constituents, for it allows all citizens to participate fully and freely in the future of their nation as equals.

4. Individual liberty in the society is guaranteed by a constitution without distinction of race, religion, or sex.

5. Women's rights are of special concern since they represent half of the nation's human resources. Equality of the sexes provides for greater dignity and stronger feelings of worth for women as they learn to be more independent and gain control over their environment.

6. Modern education in the social sciences and liberal arts enables the state to be pragmatic, utilitarian, and capable of initiating creative change.

7. A geographic basis of nationalism enables the state to cut across tribal, ethnic, and religious lines for the betterment of the nation as a whole.

8. Population control to enhance the quality of life in over-populated regions.

9. Freedom of religion is an inalienable right of the citizens of the modern world. It is based on the individual relationship between God and man, and the mutual respect for the beliefs of all people. This idea is based on the fundamental view that for each person his or her faith is true and valid. It implies freedom of worship, the right to change one's religion and to marry outside one's faith with the blessing of the clergies involved. No compulsion in religion and freedom from alienation or punishment in conversion is fundamental to the idea of freedom of thought and religious belief.

10. Majority rule with protection and respect for the society's minorities is a cardinal principle of modern social life. This allows the minority liberty of action and freedom to express their opinion without fear or conflict with the majority.

It appears that the ideas and values inherent in modern societies run directly against the cherished values of traditional cultures and societies. Perhaps all we can be sure of at this time is that the Third World will suffer a painful emotional adjustment in its search for wealth, power, and prestige.

Technological and economic aid has done little to resolve the problems of the Third World while the current programmes and projects will continue to burden the First World with no end in sight. Of course, current aid should not be discontinued and technological assistance to the Third World should increase wherever possible. However, if the United States

is to take an active role in eliminating the problems of the underdeveloped nations and, at the same time, limit the effects of local Communism there, it must embark on a bold and pragmatic policy that will accommodate the socio-political ambitions of the Third World nations within the spectrum of modern values.

Modernisation begins with the mind which affects human relations and values. No amount of technological assistance, foreign aid or military hardware can modernise a nation if it is not accompanied by a change in the nation's life-style. For the First World modernisation began with the enlightenment which sustained secular nationalism enabling the West to industrialise. The current strategy has reversed the historical process placing the 'cart before the horse.' We seek to change life-styles in the Third World by exporting industry and arms into the region. In Iran that process resulted in an unexpected or unperceived revolution.

Perhaps one method to achieve greater success in modernising the Third World would be to establish a wide-ranging educational assistance programme by telecommunication satellite which would influence its children and young adults at a formative age. Within one or two generations enlightened self-interest could emerge and, thus, a transformation from tradition-bound life-styles to more modern American-European life-styles would be possible. In the meantime, American economic and military aid packages should be coupled to social, economic and political reform programmes; and measures should be taken to protect foreigners in the Third World from non-western law codes, through negotiations between the respective governments or at the UN.

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JORDAN, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL

by Kamel S. Abu Jaber

THE Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a young country covering a part of the world's oldest inhabited area. As it exists today, it is a twentieth century development, coming into being following the termination of the First World War. It was included in the zone of influence allotted to Britain under the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. From 1516, and for the next four hundred years, it formed part of the Ottoman province of Syria. During these four hundred years it stagnated to such a degree that by the advent of the twentieth century its inhabitants virtually reverted to a state of pastoral nomadism.

Prince, later King Abdullah, grandfather of the present monarch, King Hussein, was recognized by Britain in April of 1921 as the ruler of Jordan. In September 1922 and in accordance with the provisions of Article 25 of the Mandate, Jordan was expressly exempted by Britain from the provisions of the Balfour Declaration calling for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This last statement needs to be further emphasized in light of Zionist and Israeli attempts at creating the illusion that Jordan was part of the Palestine Mandate.

Two points need to be elucidated: first that from approximately the last exit of the Crusaders at the end of the thirteenth century and the establishment by the Mamlukes of the Kingdom of Kerak, including most of present Jordan, East Jordan and Palestine have been two separate administrative and often political entities. Second, even had Britain briefly considered Jordan as part of the Palestine Mandate, contrary to her earlier pledges to the Arabs, what historical sanctity does such a consideration carry? In the first instance, Britain promised to give what it did not own to a people who did not belong and, later, took away what it should not have given in the first place. For, in her pledges to the Arabs, as expressed in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, no mention of a national home for the Jewish people nor of a Mandate over Palestine was made. Mentioned though, was the pledge that, should the Arabs help in the war effort against the Ottomans, Britain would recognize Arab sovereignty and independence. At the end of that letter in which Mr. McMahon reaffirms British pledges he states, '...I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab people . . .'¹ Within less than six months of the writing of this commitment, Britain broke its pledges by secretly signing the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, the text by which the Arab lands promised to Sherif Hussein were divided into mandated territories between the British and the French only became known to

the Arabs through its publication by the newly established Bolshevik government in Russia.

Bitterness against the British 'betrayal' penetrated deep into the Arab psyche and persists until the present day. Though now, overshadowed by more dramatic and wider losses sustained by the Arabs, that feeling of bitterness floats to the surface with each realization that it underlies all the tragedies that have hit the Middle East since then. Not only was independence denied and Palestine promised to people residing anywhere else in the world except Palestine, but the British and the French instituted a system of colonial administrations over the area that was given the civilized euphemism of the 'Mandate System'.

It was thus that Prince Abdullah commenced his rule over Jordan. He was faced with two immediate challenges, challenges that still plague his present successor and grandson, King Hussein. Internal development was related to the events taking place in Palestine. Zionist colonization of that country aided materially and, facilitated by the British administrators, continued to create a great deal of agitation and frustration in neighbouring Jordan. In his characteristically pragmatic, patient, and evolutionary approach, King Abdullah slowly, but ever so surely, began to forge a nation out of the tribal society that Jordan then was. A task made the more difficult by the paucity of natural resources, lack of skilled administrators and technocrats as well as constant disturbances caused by the Palestine Problem—to which problem a great deal of attention and resources had to be diverted.

The decade of the 1930's saw an intensification of Zionist immigration into Palestine. The newly arrived Jewish immigrants, escapees from Hitler's Nazi horrors in Germany, were at the root of riots, disturbances and rebellions in Palestine. The revolt of 1936-1939 by the Palestinians, the last Palestinian revolt on Palestinian soil, caused turmoil in Jordan. Though still under British tutelage in both army and administration, Jordan began to play an active role in Arab affairs, especially in Palestine. Its first appearance on the international political scene was in 1939 when it sent delegates to the London Round Table Conference on Palestine. King Abdullah was urging the British to pursue an even-handed policy in Palestine. He was, throughout his life, continuously reminding the British that they have a moral obligation not only to the Jews, however much they suffered, but also the Arabs, their allies in the two major conflicts of this century. Abdullah emphasized time and again that Western atrocities against our cousins, the semetic Jews, must not be paid for solely by the Arabs. Lacking the coin of twentieth century diplomacy, namely power, his wise exhortations went unheeded and a chauvinistic, belligerent and bitter Jewish state came into being.

Israel saw itself, as it still does as an *avant garde* of western influence and civilization in the Middle East, and not a country that belongs to the millieu, to the region, for better or for worse.

May 15, 1948 is the date usually given by the Zionists as the 'independence' day of Israel. Independence from whom one wonders: the hapless

Palestinians who were progressively pushed out of their land and country, or the British, who were the actual facilitators and midwife for the birth of the new state. The Palestinians, mostly residents of rural areas, peasants, and landlords, were forced to watch helplessly while their country was being taken-over by Russians, Poles, Hungarians, Germans, Britain '... shall be responsible for placing the country under such and perhaps more accurate date for the establishment of Israel would be July 24, 1922 when the Council of the League of Nations passed the Mandate for Palestine. Article 2 of the Mandate declares that Britain '... shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home'. Article 4 states that an '... appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating,' with the mandatory power in matters that will facilitate Zionist aims. Later in the same article the Zionist organisation was recognised as the said Jewish agency. Article 66 exhorts the British Administration in Palestine to '... facilitate Jewish immigration...' The Zionist Jewish Agency, in effect, became a 'government' for the Jewish community in Palestine administering both its internal and external affairs in co-operation with Britain. The Agency became the official spokesman and representative of world Jewry especially with regard to Jewish settlement in Palestine. It was also granted the unusual power of selecting candidates for immigration into Palestine. Only those who had received the Agency's 'certificates' could apply for visas to Palestine at the British consulates. By 1948 this 'public body' assembled a 65,000-man modern army, complete with tanks, artillery, a navy and an airforce; all in the small area of Palestine and somehow without the British authority's notice! An army even numerically larger and more efficient than all of the Arab armies combined.

Jordan participated in the 'war' effort to prevent the creation of Israel. In fact, it was the small Jordanian army alone that succeeded in defending an enclave in eastern Palestine including East Jerusalem and which later came to be known as the West Bank. In 1950, and following parliamentary elections, deputies from Jordan proper and from the West Bank formalised an act of union between the two banks of the Jordan. Palestinian refugees who flew into Jordan and Palestinian residents of the West Bank were given Jordanian citizenship. The task of rebuilding, indeed the building of a nation was made the more difficult with the advent of destitute Palestinian refugees.

The Palestinians played and continue to play a very major role indeed in the politics of Jordan society. Understandably, many were embittered, having to look at their close-by homes and farms being occupied by others. In turn, they exerted great pressure not only on Jordan but on all Arab governments to effect a solution to their problem. A solution made the more difficult by Israeli intransigence; for Israel, in her violent birth, far exceeded the area allotted to it by the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947. Israel also adamantly refused to repatriate even some of

the refugees following the cessation of hostilities. And, under one pretext or another, Israel often unleashes its highly efficient military machine to punish, often raze whole Arab villages along the 1949 Armistice Line.

The attack on the village of al Samu in late 1966 was perhaps the beginning of the so-called Six-Day War of June, 1967. The six day war was a swift blitzkrieg preceded by tens, indeed hundreds of smaller aggressions and incursions by Israel into Jordan's West Bank, indeed all of Jordan. Fifteen years have passed, and in June of 1982 under yet another pretext, Israel is in virtual occupation of all Lebanon. The latest 'War' named by Israel the 'peace for Galilee' operation was ostensibly begun to protect Israeli citizens, residents of upper Galilee, from Palestinian Commando attacks emanating from southern Lebanon. Since the operation began, 'southern' Lebanon has turned out to be virtually the whole country, with Israel trying to impose its will on Lebanon while effectively liquidating the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Meanwhile the 'civilised world' watches, even condones, while the Arab regimes lies prostrate. Even the usual whimperings of protest to the United Nations, or an Arab foreign ministers' meeting are hardly attempted.

Israel, the 'peaceful' little country, 'model of democracy', beleaguered by hordes of 'hostile' Arabs, continues to convince the western world, against all evidence to the contrary, of its righteous acts of 'self-defence'. A nation steeped in the mythology of the past with Prime Minister Menachem Begin as its latter-day saint and prophet continues to draw the sympathy of the western world; indeed its unlimited backing and support.

Mr. Ariel Sharon, the efficient military leader and Defence Minister of Israel, states that Jordan was Palestine and that it should become the Palestine state. His reasoning goes that, since many Palestinians reside in Jordan, it should be their home. Surely it ought to be asked whether Mr. Sharon has any right to distribute states or to create new states for stateless people. Should one problem be solved by creating another?

The solution to the Palestine Problem, should there be any serious consideration of a long-lasting solution, must take into account the several and various United Nations resolutions, from 1948 to the present time. Jordan has come to recognise that the Palestinians, a highly gifted and versatile people, must be granted the right to have their own identity on their own land, or at least a portion of it. Israel, as Jordan's King Hussein stated on several occasions, cannot hold on to the land and have peace at the same time. Israel continues to speak of peace while acting otherwise, and to get away with it. Yet realistic options that can bring peace to the area to exist, ranging from an adherence to the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 to the Saudi Arabian Fahd Plan of 1982. Underlying all these plans, however, is the theme that the Palestinians must be allowed to have their own national identity.

One final issue remains to be emphasised, that an Israeli withdrawal from the Arab sector of Jerusalem and the recognition of Arab sovereignty over at least that section is an absolute precondition for any lasting peace. Jerusalem, recognisably holy to all the three monotheistic religions, must be restored to Arab sovereignty. Any solution that fails to take this issue into account will fall short of the desired peace. In fact, Israel must understand the Arab longing for Jerusalem and recognise that while she may continue her occupation and even conclude peace under duress, such a peace will be merely a truce until the next battle or until the next generation.

Peace should be the natural status between the Arabs and the Jews, the last two great scions of the semitic race. The Jews in Bagdad or Spain prospered when the Arabs prospered and that future co-operation built upon mutual respect and just considerations will cause the whole area to advance and prosper.

It is also important that the Israelis contemplate the following points: that should Israel continue on her belligerent and intransigent course, hatreds that may now be overlooked will become a formidable psychological barrier and the temporary animosity become 'traditional'. That while contemporary Israel with western, principally American backing, may continue to win the next two or three battles; that western backing is bound to weaken as it has already begun to do. That the Arabs, presently directionless and effectively leaderless are bound to become better organised. With each successive battle they learn more. The nuclear deterrent that Israel may rely upon in the future is a weapon that is double-edged and can be played both ways. Israel is already a very heavy political, economic and military burden on the west, even on America. American diplomats and policy-makers privately, and some publicly, are complaining of the rising world-wide embarrassment and cost of Israel. For how long can the present citadel maintain itself?

Though at present technologically retarded and militarily inept, the Arabs are bound to catch-up and close the gap. This, coupled with the logic of population statistics, must give the Israelis food for thought. It is well established that the Arab population of Palestine and Jordan is increasing at the very high rate of over 4% per annum. Wherever Israel may try to push the Arabs, it will always be surrounded by them.

NOTES:

1. See the letter from Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Cairo to Sherif Hussein of Mecca dated October 24, 1915.
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THE FINLANDICISATION OF DENMARK

by John Barnie

A COMMON saying among the Danes is *Danmark er et lille land*—Denmark is a little country—a saying which suggests a shrug of the shoulders, a feeling that, as a small nation, the Danes are often at the mercy of forces beyond their control. Since the late 1960s, however, a resurgence of left-wing politics has insisted that at least as far as Danish foreign policy is concerned, there is an alternative to the course steered by successive governments since the Second World War. The Danish left is fragmented into a considerable disarray of parties and factions—*Venstresocialister*, *Socialistisk Folkeparti*, *Kommunistisk Arbejderparti*, *Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti*, etc.—some with representation in the *Folketing* and others not. But while much of their energy is spent in mutual recrimination, these groupings tend to unite on certain fundamental principles of foreign policy, especially as far as Denmark's relations with the United States of America and Western Europe are concerned.

Many of the points in the foreign policy of the left are, of course, familiar and common to other left wing movements in Europe: opposition to nuclear power and weapons, for instance, although in Denmark this takes the specific form of agitation for a Scandinavian nuclear-free zone and, as a consequence, Danish withdrawal from NATO. This in turn merges with an anti-Americanism which has grown more vocal in recent years, ranging from ultra-left accusations of imperialism to a more general distrust of American designs in Europe and the rest of the world, which is pervasive in Danish society as a whole.

This wider distrust is understandable. American culture has made significant inroads in Denmark in the past twenty years. Because, for example, *Danmarks Radio*, the state-owned radio and television network, cannot afford to produce sufficient programmes of its own, it buys many series from abroad, a high proportion of the most successful—and frequently controversial—soap operas and crime series coming from the United States, and expressing values which many Danes find obnoxious and unacceptable in their own society. Likewise, American pop music and teenage fashions have been pressed very strongly on Danish youth in recent years; while in the cities, MacDonald, Burger King and other fast food chains are a brassy intrusion in the streets which would have been unthinkable a decade ago. The quite widespread reaction against all this should cause no surprise. Small nations like Denmark are at risk from the cultural influence of dominant powers like the United States, who frequently have little understanding of or sympathy with the needs, feelings and aspirations of their less powerful allies. The homogeneity of Danish society, which could be taken for granted as late as the 1960s, was steadily eroded in the 70s, and while American cultural influence is certainly not the only reason for this, it has played a rôle in what many

Danes see as a regrettable trend in their culture.

Hostility towards America is reinforced by a tradition of pacifism and anti-militarism which, although closely associated with the left, in fact transcends political boundaries and has widespread popular support. During the Falkland Islands crisis, a letter from a G.P. to the liberal Copenhagen daily *Politiken*, condemned Britain's action on the ground that small wars of this kind could easily erupt into a major Russian-American confrontation and a nuclear *débâcle*. His conclusion was that armed force even in defence of one's own rights was unacceptable in the modern world, and that instead we should settle for *fred for enhver pris*—peace at any price. Mogens Glistrup, leader of the ultra-conservative *Fremskridts Part* (Progress Party), once said jokingly that in the event of war, the government should merely play a tape repeating endlessly: 'We surrender, we surrender.' Behind the joke is a sentiment shared by many Danes.

In fact, Denmark has not fought a war since the disastrous conflict over Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, when it lost considerable territory. Since then, successive governments have opted for a policy of neutrality, and when this has proved impossible, as in the Second World War, for one of submission. The Danish military, acting on instructions from the government, hardly offered even token resistance to the Germans in 1940. The country was given special status as a result, and although a resistance movement put up an honourable fight in the last years of the war, the majority settled down to a more or less acceptable *modus vivendi* with the Nazis.

The pacifist, anti-nuclear, and anti-American trends in the country merge with opposition to the EEC. Denmark's entry into the Community was decided by a referendum which, in the event, was carried by a significant majority in which the agricultural community played a key rôle. In the cities, however, the opposition still flourishes, with a lobby in the *Folketing*, and members of *Folkebevægelsen mod EF* (the Popular Movement Against the EEC) sitting in the Community parliament, where they are supported by left-wing parties such as *Socialistisk Folkeparti*.

There is no doubt that, so far, Denmark has gained economically from membership, but the dispute over fishing quotas has soured many people, and should the Market's agricultural policy be changed from its present favourable terms for Denmark, then the strong support of the farming community might well swing in favour of the anti-EEC lobby.

In these circumstances, many people have turned once again to the old idea of a Nordic Union, between Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Cultural, historical and geographical ties make such a union attractive. But although examples of Scandinavian co-operation exist (SAS—the Scandinavian Airlines System—is one), the three countries have, in fact, pulled away from each other in recent years. The discovery of oil, and the decision against joining the EEC, have caused Norway to adopt an independent stance similar in some ways to Sweden; while Sweden, economically and politically the key to such a union, has shown little inclination

this century for closer ties with its weaker neighbours. Meanwhile, Denmark's membership of the Common Market has increased the nation's dependence on its stronger neighbours to the south. Under present conditions, a Nordic Union can be little more than a romantic dream.

Indeed, Anker Jørgensen's ruling Social Democrat party is committed both to membership of NATO and the EEC, despite closet opposition from some members of the party's own left wing; while any change in government is likely to lead to a shift towards a liberal-conservative coalition which would be just as committed to present foreign policy.

Yet doubt remains about Denmark's whole-hearted involvement in either NATO or the EEC. Denmark is still a remarkably homogeneous nation, and one feature of this is a notable lack of diversity in, for example, intellectual circles. Danish intellectuals throughout the late 1960s and 70s espoused a nominal Marxism which demanded conformity to the principles of pacifism, withdrawal from NATO, and opposition to the EEC, with anti-Americanism and Danish neutrality as concomitants. Teachers, university lecturers, students, writers and artists, the left-wing press, and (in an equivocal fashion) liberal newspapers, seemed to speak with one voice. Outside the conservative press, few voices were raised in opposition. Most of those who disagreed preferred to keep silent, for the left had managed to insinuate into society at large the idea that moral right was somehow in its charge.

One result of this was an almost total capitulation of the teaching profession to the demands of left-wing educational theorists. From kindergarten to university, the system was 'radicalised' in the early 70s with the active support of successive Social Democrat ministers of education—most notably the controversial left-winger Ritt Bjerregaard—and by default of any serious opposition from those within the profession who thought otherwise.

In the schools this has meant education in 'social awareness', that is to say, the inculcation to a greater or lesser extent of pseudo-Marxist principles in the minds of pupils, and participatory democracy on a scale quite unknown in England. It also means that the tendency to think in pacifist and isolationist terms, which has long existed at a popular level in Danish society, was, throughout the 70s, strengthened by left-wing dogmatism in the schools and universities.

Among younger people, even those who would consider themselves Social Democrats or liberals, there is often, as a result, an instinctive tendency to think in terms of a neutral and pacifist rôle as the one best suited to Denmark's needs and situation. In any future war in Europe, it is argued, Denmark would be caught between the super powers, and the stationing of NATO forces and missiles on Danish territory would only make the country a target for a Russian nuclear attack, with disastrous consequences.

As I have suggested, the present government and any likely government in the near future, is, and would be, committed to Denmark's continued membership of NATO. But in greater Copenhagen and the con-

urbation of north-east Zealand, together with the larger towns and cities like Aarhus, Aalborg and Odense, there is a younger generation which is radically opposed to what it sees as an irresponsible and outdated political programme. It is difficult to predict what shifts in government and especially in foreign policy might occur in the future as a result of this trend.

It seems certain, however, that any shift in policy towards pacifism and neutrality could only have adverse consequences for the Danish nation in the long-term. In an ideal world, neutrality would indeed be the most attractive position for such a small country. But Denmark's geopolitical situation makes this quite impossible. Unlike Sweden, Denmark is poor in the natural resources which might give it a degree of economic independence, and which would enable it to maintain an efficient modern army on the Swedish model. Even if it could do so, Denmark's geography—a conglomerate of low-lying islands facing the approaches to the Baltic and the flat Jutland peninsula—would make the country quite indefensible outside the penumbra of NATO.

For good or ill, Denmark is dependent on the countries that surround it for its existence. At the moment, economically and financially, it is tied to the EEC, especially West Germany; while militarily it depends on the NATO alliance. Under these conditions, Denmark cannot be neutral, in the sense of pursuing a policy of healthy independence and non-alignment—it can only be *neutralised*; and that would mean (if it happened) *de facto* acceptance of a position similar to Finland in respect of the USSR. For Russia is clearly not disinterested in Denmark's key position at the entrance to the Baltic.

Earlier this year, the mayor of a town on Bornholm, the Danish island in the southern Baltic, invited a US military band to play at a festival there. The invitation was countermanded by the Ministry of Defence, on the grounds that Denmark had an unwritten agreement with Russia that no foreign troops would be stationed on the island, which had been wrested from the Germans by Russian troops at the end of the war. The incident is reminiscent of successful government pressure in the 1930s on the press not to report negatively on Nazi Germany for fear of future repercussions.

Whether it likes it or not, Denmark is caught between the two competing super powers. For the reasons I have suggested, it seems to me that it cannot pursue a policy of neutrality, but must choose—either a firm alliance with NATO and the West, or, like Finland, neutralisation under Russian pressure if it attempts a policy of pacifism and non-alignment.

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THE MILITANT ANACHRONISM

by Paul Rose

H EADLINES mirroring the current war of words and convoluted procedures created by the relative success of so-called militants in the Labour Party conceal one basic fact. These groups have been around for half a century. They formed, disbanded, regrouped, split and reformed. Living on the fringes of the Labour movement they often fed like parasites on the idealism and innocence of Young Socialists and Communists disillusioned by the pace or direction of their Party's policies. Sometimes their hyper-activity and their familiarity with theory was of value. For it provoked in a rather Philistine Party some semblance of debate in an essentially pragmatic movement with little theoretical background—the word intellectual was always pejorative.

Tawney, the Webbs, Laski, Crosland and others spring to mind as one looks for thinkers among the left. Shaw left indelible marks on attitudes. Cole reinterpreted Marx for lesser mortals by telling us what he really meant. Meanwhile old-fashioned prophets of freedom, like John Stuart Mill and modern prophets of absolute totalitarianism, were pushed on one side. In the wake of Stalin's bureaucratic and brutal counter-revolution in which the old Bolsheviks perished in an orgy of bloodletting the exiled Trotsky became the new prophet.

A brilliant analysis of the degeneration of the Bolshevik revolution provided a pretext for what went wrong. What few paused to consider is how different the one Party State could have been even with their hero at the helm. Few remembered Kronstadt where revolutionary sailors were ruthlessly put down with the same energy devoted by latter-day Polish Communism to the destruction of Solidarity.

That the roots of totalitarianism may exist in the Bolshevik theory of the Vanguard Party in a one-Party state was at least partly appreciated by one revolutionary faction—the International Socialists, now succeeded by the Socialist Workers Party. Their figure head was Rosa Luxemburg, as much as Trotsky. She met an untimely fate at the hands of Hitler's predecessors, but she had at least challenged the Vanguard concept. For them, the Soviet Union represents State Capitalism.

The roots of the Militant Tendency and the more militant Revolutionary Workers Party, formerly the entryist Socialist Labour League (or the League of Militant psychopaths to its critics) lie in the dissensions within the Communist Movement as successive groups were eliminated by Stalin.

They were in effect the external dissidents. Supporters of the Revolution, they blamed the failure to export it to the advanced Western nations as the cause of the internal decay. Here was a valid theoretical explanation, for the aberrations of the new tyranny which they termed a 'degenerated workers' state' to be defended against Capitalism but to be transformed from within.

For romantic revolutionaries, embittered outcasts and others genuinely hostile to the ethic of 'bourgeois democracy' there was always a refuge in the tightly sealed world of these messianic groups. Theology was a hobby for militants clashing with revolutionaries over such matters as support for the FLN or MLA in Algeria. One wondered whether it concealed personal incompatibility between the leaders of the various groups, who seemed to treat them as their own private property.

'Entryism', the tactic of joining the Labour Party, was always a key debating point and divided the more recently formed International Marxist Group from the Militant Tendency. Now the Labour Party has the dubious honour of Tariq Ali abandoning his former stance in favour of membership—an indication of the change within the Labour Party itself.

Each group has its mentor, usually equipped with a printing press as his main weapon; Tony Cliff, for the SWP and veterans Gerry Healey and Ted Grant for the RWP and the Militant Tendency or Revolutionary Socialists. I witnessed a confrontation between two of the little Lenins in the days when Ted Knight was organising his group allied to Denis Healey. The world shook for ten feet around as accusation and counter-accusation of poaching reached a crescendo. Violence occurred on occasions and if some called them Red Fascists it was not without good cause in certain cases.

However, the genial Pat Wall, now at the centre of controversy, was one of a group of Militants based in Merseyside. At least they had a sense of humour unknown amongst most of these intense and almost paranoid personalities. They vied with the others in attracting the allegiance of young people with unsullied visions of Utopia and the 1956 events in Hungary brought new recruits from disillusioned Communists into the ranks of the left in a ferment of debate. Many of the divisions within the Trotsky fourth international were a little abstruse to those concerned with the cost of living, health and education. They were forecasting the imminent collapse of Capitalism and their turn-over reflected the burned out enthusiasm of many an idealist devoting his or her whole being to the cause with no impact upon the working class they idealised.

The mystery for me is how no development in society affects their analysis rooted in the thirties and based on a Marxist view of nineteenth century capitalism with little relevance to a fast approaching twenty-first century technological society. Closed minds of religious zealots with evangelical fervour entered into the political fray with manic vigour. Small groups concentrated in particular areas are capable of taking control and frequently driving out opposition. Their influence can be out of all proportion to their numbers. The fact is that there has been a steep decline in working class participation in the Labour Party. Equally, there has been a general decline in active membership as indeed there has in voting support for the major parties of the post-war era.

The roots lie in the increasing numbers of socially mobile people not committed to confrontation politics; a sharp decrease in blue collar

workers as against those working in advanced technology, service industries and employment that does not delineate them as the producers of wealth snatched from them by rapacious bosses. The post 1945 revolution in education and the advances in welfare; the increasing complexity of a modern technological society blurring differences has created a far more subtle structure than the Marxist model. The forecast of increasing absolute impoverishment has proved unfounded except in the sense of International North-South rift.

The Marxist forecast of revolutions in advanced industrial states with increasing proletarianisation has been equally shattered. Indeed it is frequently the product of the Universities and Polytechnics, rather than industrial workers, who form the core of militant group. One may ponder upon the fact that 'intellectuals' have almost invariably led revolutions whether in 1919 or since in the name of the workers.

As activity declines in the inner cities with increasingly moribund Labour Parties, they become a prey to neglect and dereliction. It is not difficult for a small dedicated group in Lambeth, Islington, Bermondsey, Brent, or Bradford to emulate the example of Merseyside—which now has five Alliance MPs as the other side of the coin. Any tightly knit caucus can gain control of diminishing and ageing Party machines. It is less likely in the more settled areas especially, where MPs have not encouraged grass roots activity in a short-sighted attempt to retain primacy.

In many areas the traditional—sometimes termed the legitimate—left know little of the Parties within the Parties which have burrowed away and are now dislodging MPs and Councillors. They naively see them as allies against an uninspiring and sometimes reactionary right, not recognising the Salami tactics which have transformed yesterday's left wingers into enemies of Socialism.

By the same token the new analysis of Society by genuine radical social democrats has not only created the SDP but relatively strengthened the Militants. Thus the old pragmatic right and centre personified by the folksy Jim Callaghan and the tricky Harold Wilson is ill-equipped to formulate an alternative strategy. The latter devalued the currency of politics with his kitchen Cabinets, Common Market somersaults and patronage. The former stood for nothing save the traditional Trade Union approach devoid of any real ideology or radicalism. Among all this ferment with charismatic figures like Shirley Williams and Roy Jenkins turning away from the old politics, a vacuum has occurred into which another personality has stepped into the limelight, not averse to accepting the adulation of genuine followers and the groups for whom he is the trojan horse. I refer to Tony Benn, once known as Anthony Wedgewood Benn, or Viscount Stansgate.

Charming, dedicated; and with vision, Benn championed the Clydeside sit-in, joined the Right to Work March, stumps the country to speak at humble meetings and large rallies. He denounces the Common Market with apocalyptic zeal. He rounds on former colleagues with whom he

shared collective responsibility for good and bad policies alike. His democracy is based on participation but in reality it is the participation of the activist elite.

The vacuum which gave Benn the limelight was increased by Limehouse and the formation of the SDP. The advocates of mandatory selection could no longer share the same pews in what was once a broad Church with the advocates of universal Party suffrage. Phantom block votes and small caucuses were not for David Owen. However, careerist politicians caught in the cross fire ran helter-skelter for cover—some to the dubious safety of Tribunate Silkin and others into the embrace of Benn. The majority opted for the comforting solidarity group—not to be confused with the Polish Trade Union. Arch-survivor Roy Hattersley and the earnest and able Peter Shore would rescue Michael Foot from his own weakness for tolerance, and Deputy Leader Denis Healey, with a fraction of one per cent saving his position, seems to be overshadowed by the other combatants. Their motives vary from honest conviction to naked opportunism.

The same may be said of latter day converts swelling the ranks of the SDP benches. However, the Labour Party is held together partly by an instinct for survival and mutual self-interest, and partly by sentiment. It had a great history and had ushered in the great reforms of the late forties. The crusade that started from Taff Vale via Jarrow foundered in the winter of discontent when unfilled graves and a 5% norm undermined the very vehicle which the Trade Union Movement had chosen to ride. It ushered in the age of monetarism and unemployment unprecedented since the thirties.

The polarisation in turn fed the flames of militancy and between the two extremes emerged a greater space for the growth of the new Alliance. Whether Labour will decline into an ideological rump or regain its credibility remains to be seen. I believe, however, that we may well be entering the era of the three-party system trapped in the present electoral system, and with Parliament still geared to two-party confrontation.

One curious feature of the whole argument about Trotskyism and Militancy puzzles me. There was one Bolshevik leader—perhaps the most popular in the wake of Lenin—who began to seek a Soviet version of Socialism with a human face forty years before Dubcek and the Euro-Communists. He was one of Stalin's least well-known victims. He was the ideologist who for a generation read his 'A B C of Communism'. He went to his death as a Communist with a real concern for the peasantry and workers whom the revolution was intended to benefit. His name was Bukharin.

No left-wing faction ever built up a caucus around his ideological stance. There was no Cliff, Healey, Grant or Ali to inspire a group of idealists with the concept of Marxism divorced from the brutality of Stalin and the failed prophet Trotsky. That was left to others who have forgotten his name. Perhaps in the twilight world inhabited by militants


and other revolutionary tendencies his execution, like that of Imre Nagy, may teach a bitter lesson.

It is a shared contempt for compassion and tolerance, for a democracy in which all participate rather than the people's democracy of an elitist Vanguard with a mystical belief in their own rectitude and Marxist purity. Old-fashioned Liberals and new-fashioned Social Democrats now have the task of marrying secret ballots and open government with a genuine radicalism in a coherent ideology that can challenge and defeat the ideas of the militants. In a previous article in *Contemporary Review* and in my book, *Backbenchers' Dilemma*, I argued that ideas can only be defeated by better ideas.

I believe that the so-called left is highly conservative and their self-righteousness and narrowness on social issues is part of an anachronism in tune with an era that has passed them by. I do not impugn their motives but reject their methods and fear the results of the ideology they espouse.

Unwittingly, or intentionally, they are fragmenting the Labour movement. For many supporters the allegiance is still similar to that which one has for a football team through thick and thin. It is not based on reason but even for them, the hooliganism among their own militant supporters is driving more of them off the terraces and some may find the SDP style of play more sophisticated and effective as it fights its way into the First Division.

The October issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The Warsaw Pact* by David Childs, *The European Parliament: in Search of Relevance* by Juliet Lodge, *Australia's Conversation Piece* by Keith D. Suter and *The Contradictions of George Orwell* by A. L. Rowse.



FALKLANDS—THE ITALIAN SLANT

by Tim Parks

TOWARDS the beginning of the war in the Falklands, a public opinion poll carried out by RAI (Italy's public broadcasting service) indicated that only 12% of those questioned supported Britain in the crisis, while 14% would have preferred Argentina to win the war. All the rest didn't care and considered the whole affair ridiculous. Hence, when Italy pulled out of the EEC sanctions effort, ostensibly because its trade links with Argentina were more extensive and significant than anybody else's, perhaps the more telling reason was that there was simply no public support for the sanctions policy, rather the opposite, in fact. No one felt in any way moved to make sacrifice on behalf of the British. Why? During the war, many bitter complaints were made in the British press about the rather grudging support we felt we were getting from some of our allies, America's fudging at the UN; the EEC raising agricultural prices when our backs were turned; Ireland pulling out of the sanctions, etc. However, now that the worst of the affair is over, it might be salutary for us to examine, without too much prejudice or suspicion of malice, the attitudes of those who were so cautious in coming to our aid. Because, in the event of a more grave international crisis in which Britain certainly wouldn't be able to 'go it alone', the opinion of the peoples of Western Europe would obviously be critical.

There are, of course, many thousands of Italian immigrants in Argentina and these 'cultural ties' were used to explain the lack of support coming to Britain from Italy. Unfortunately, this was a typical example of explaining away, rather than coming to terms with a real problem. Judging from the nature of the Italian press coverage of the Falklands, plus the results of opinion polls (which were more anti-British and anti-war in general than pro-Argentinian) there is little reason to suppose that support for Britain would have been any greater if the crisis had occurred elsewhere in the world, in Belize, for example, or Gibraltar.

Most significantly, perhaps, the media in Italy provided almost no clear information on the background to the crisis. Newspapers, television and radio concentrated exclusively on the day-to-day events of the war without any in-depth consideration of the claims of the two sides. Commentators gave the impression of being simply bewildered by the folly of a war being fought over a few god-forsaken islands in the South Atlantic: no possible claim by either side, nor any principle, it seemed, could justify it. RAI's newscaster invariably introduced Falklands coverage with the remark, 'this absurd war'. Casualties tended to be played up to stress this aspect. When the *General Belgrano* went down we heard that a thousand men had lost their lives, and this number was never rectified. Likewise, when the Argentine attack on *Sir Galahad* was carried out, casualty numbers were quoted at 450 dead. When the *Sheffield* went down, *Corriere Della Sera* announced that the dead already exceeded the number

of inhabitants on the island, a wild over-estimation. The following day they would be announcing: 'Negotiations renewed, but British keep firing.' Verona's *Arena*, typical of many aspirant local papers, spoke of the narrow vision of the English who, 'could see no further than the fact that the islands had been illegally occupied and must be re-taken and British prestige restored at any expense of life, equipment and international stability.' After promising an extremely bloody end to events in Port Stanley, RAI then made no mention of the very low casualties in that final attack.

And all this without any comment on the precise nature of the historical quarrel between the two countries or any consideration of the people who live on the islands. Ironically, RAI's one current affairs programme dedicated to the crisis, a ten-minute analysis of their own public opinion poll, only served to indicate how badly they had informed the public about events. More than seventy per cent felt that the obvious solution was that the islands should become independent and couldn't understand why the British hadn't made them so ages ago. More than sixty per cent felt that the war was being fought entirely for commercial ends on both sides.

What seems to emerge from all this is not so much any malice toward Britain or support for Argentina, but a totally different attitude toward what it means to go to war, an attitude which acts perhaps as a kind of subliminal editing mechanism on information available. Historically, it's not difficult to see why this should be. While Britain has been involved on the winning side of two world wars and feels itself to be the upholder of liberty, Italy shares no such experience, her involvement in the Second War having been a confused affair provoked by Mussolini's colonial aberrations. With the end of fascism, colonialism naturally came in for extremely violent criticism, and likewise any military meddling in other countries' affairs. Hence the act of participating in any way that isn't purely national self-defence (and that doesn't mean defence of territories eight thousand miles away) seems, at least in the public eye, to be an act of gross pride and aggression. Remarks made to me from colleagues at work and business contacts, all professional people, ranged from, 'You just don't want to lose your last colonies', to, 'Why don't you English concentrate on Europe and stop harking back to the past', and even, 'Thatcher would jump at any excuse to start a war, you can see that'. The notion that a real question of principle had provoked British intervention in the Falklands was almost universally disbelieved.

What conclusions can be drawn? Clearly it would be futile to think that Britain could alter this kind of attitude by any effort of its own. Extending World Service foreign language broadcasting is certainly not the answer in a country which, having a free, entertaining and fairly vigorous press is bound to listen to that rather than any other. (The British Government was perfectly correct in calling an end to broadcasts to Italy.) More reasonably, perhaps, more effort might be made internationally among the press to exchange editorials and broad analyses of

world events and to do so quickly and effectively and with good translations so that the public of all countries might have a clearer idea of how events are perceived elsewhere. This would give us in Britain a better picture of the extent to which we can expect support or opposition in international crises, while at the same time hopefully serving to make us more aware of our own narrowness and prejudices in various areas—which most certainly exist!

[Tim Parks is a freelance journalist at present living and working in Italy.]

FINAL ACT?

Following the outcome of the Falklands conflict, it may be of interest to consider one of the last editorials written by James Neilson, editor of the *Buenos Aires Herald*, published in Argentina on March 3rd, 1982. For an interview with James Neilson by Jamie McKinnon, see *Contemporary Review* No. 1397 (Vol. 240)—Editor.

AS expected, the Argentine negotiating team adopted a rather tougher posture in the latest talks with the British government about the Falkland/Malvinas Islands than has been noted in the past and the official foreign ministry statement after they were over contained a veiled threat: should the series of talks projected fail to bring about the desired results, Argentina 'maintains the right to put an end to this mechanism and freely choose whatever means best suit its interests.' And there can be no doubt whatsoever about the results the Argentine government wants, full and unquestioned sovereignty over the archipelago and other island groups in the South Atlantic.

Negotiations about these territories have been going on for so long that that British might be inclined to shrug off this declaration of purposefulness, consoling themselves with the thought that Argentina has acted tough before, as when Isabel Perón's government, at a time of great political stress, withdrew the Argentine ambassador from London, and that all governments habitually grant themselves the 'right' to do anything they think may help them achieve their international objectives. On this occasion they would probably be mistaken. The present Argentine régime seems to regard the establishment of sovereignty over the islands as one of its principal aims and is determined to show that in this area, at least, it means business.

Great Britain has always argued that the interests of the islanders must come first and that until they can be persuaded to accept Argentine rule there is not much that can be done. The present Argentine negotiating team seems to understand that this is a genuine problem and is prepared to make commitments taking the islanders' economic, political, and religious characteristics into account. The economic and religious obstacles should

not be hard to overcome: generous financial compensation can be given those who would prefer leaving to rule from Buenos Aires and, by and large, Protestants, agnostics and atheists do not find Argentina intolerable. The islanders' political objections to Argentine rule may be harder to satisfy: people of British origin usually take democracy for granted and have a deeply ingrained—and thoroughly justifiable—detestation for anything that smacks of dictatorship. So if the military régime were to make its dedication to democracy more plausible than it is at present the position of the negotiators would no doubt be strengthened.

The worst possible solution to the ancient dispute would be an Argentine invasion of the islands. While this might attract those who think there is military glory to be won by overpowering a force of less than fifty armed men, it would do considerable harm to Argentina's reputation in the Western world, encouraging the always latest belief that Argentina is a turbulent power with aggressive designs on its neighbours. Such an outcome can best be avoided by the British government accepting the inevitable. It is plainly not prepared to do anything to defend the islands. Its best possible course is therefore to hand them over with good grace even before Argentina has used up its preliminary options, most of which would do more damage to Argentina than to Great Britain.

James Neilson

LONDON'S INDIA

by John Elsom

FIRST picture the actual scene—and then dream of the true setting. You will need the last throb of the imagination.

Start by locating in the mind the Queen Elizabeth Hall. Walk across Hungerford Bridge from Charing Cross to Waterloo, with the trains shunting in and out of the stations on one hand and, on the other, the Thames drifting and glittering towards St. Paul's Cathedral in the distance. You will in this short journey have travelled from a city built at the height of the Raj to one which was all too eager to erase the vestiges of British imperialism.

The contrast between the two architectures is sudden, indeed polemical, as if the old world and the new were glaring at each other across the river. Whitehall Court, on the north bank, is all pomp and circumstance, with turrets, towers and marble statues, drawing the eye around to the gothic splendours of the Palaces of Westminster.

The south bank eschews such grandiloquence. It was planned in the years after the war, when India was given its independence and the vogue-word was common-sense. The smooth stone-and-glass of the Festival Hall proclaims that in 1951, neatness was all, a modest sufficiency; but by the 1960s, such buildings were regarded as tame. The greater ruggedness, but equal anonymity, of timber-patterned concrete came into fashion, encompassing the grey, towering cliffs of the National Theatre and the walkways on stilts around the Hayward Gallery. There is much untenanted space. The terraces of the South Bank were supposed to have been inspired by Italian piazzas, but even on a warm July evening, they evoke nothing more mediterranean than the architects' department at County Hall.

The Queen Elizabeth Hall is situated physically and aesthetically between the Festival Hall and the National Theatre, about halfway between tidiness and the new brutalism. In July, its programmes offered evenings of Classical Music and Dance presented by Sanskritik for the Festival Committee of India. The artists appearing included Yamini Krishnamurti, a noted exponent of Bharatnatyam, Malavika Sarukkai, a young Odissi dancer, and a troupe of singers, dancers and drummers from Manipur. The sarod, a stringed instrument carved from a single piece of teak with the belly covered by goatskin, was played by the young maestro, Ustad Amjad Ali Khan.

At approximately 9.00, the Manipuri dancers were expected to evoke a mood of 'devotion and deep yearning, symbolising the pangs of separation from the godhead and the joys of the anticipated reunion.'

You cannot exactly say that the GLC has stretched itself for this occasion. Somebody has thoughtfully placed two boxes of potted plants, mainly daisies, on either side of the stage—to relieve the brown monotony of the curtains, which were intended evidently to blend in with the

brown woodwork of the stage, the brown acoustic panels which flank the auditorium. There are two ways of climbing on to the stage—up little steps to the left or, if you want to be different, up little steps to the right.

(At the Rambagh Palace in Jaipur, the dancers whirled onto the lawns from all angles, using their spiralling movements to whisk them towards the centre, the blues, golds and purples of their costumes catching the sparkle of the lamps which hung from the white colonnades.)

More than the Thames and eighty years of history separates the architects of the South Bank halls from their Edwardian ancestors on the north bank. Theatre builders at the turn of the century had dreadful problems with their curtain designers. They would ask for something plush but simple, which would not clash with their elaborately decorated proscenium arches with rococo plasterwork and the twin masks of Comedy and Tragedy suspended above; and along would come these truly alarming curtains in mauve and royal blue, slashed with tassels and gold braid, which far from discreetly asserted the supremacy of the tapestry maker over the mere builder.

Such competitiveness has been eliminated from the Queen Elizabeth Hall. It would be out of place. The curtains are simply a barrier to prevent the public from seeing what it should not see. There is no proscenium arch. The stage picture is a dignified brown without a frame and, despite the acoustic panels, the Indian musicians are still confronted by a tangle of microphones which rise up before them as they sit cross-legged on the floor, like a nest of black cobras.

(As we mounted the hillside above Jaipur, carried by camels and elephants, a boy serenaded us by singing and playing on what looked like a toy sarod. His voice could be heard echoing down the valley, more than a mile away, mingling with the bleating of goats and the cries of the traders.)

Over the past eighty years in London, we have changed from being imperialists and cavaliers, to being puritans and roundheads, to being roughnecks. This transformation is fully expressed in our architecture, not least of theatres and concert halls; and throughout the concerts, exhibitions and dramas of the Festival of India, I persistently felt that the main events were being staged in the wrong places—at the Queen Elizabeth Hall, the Barbican, the Hayward Gallery and the Commonwealth Institute, where our modern civic architecture exudes a puritan restraint, born of our scientific faiths and our social virtues. But such buildings have so little in common with the colour and flamboyance of Indian art. It is as if the Indian artists were crying out to the brown walls, 'Be dazzled by this beauty! Surrender to it! Absorb it with all your senses!'—and the brown walls reply thoughtfully, 'I see what you mean', without sounding the least convinced.

And yet there are other buildings in London, such as Leighton House or the Victoria and Albert Museum where one of the most successful exhibitions was staged, on Mughal art, which have been influenced by

India art and artists, where decoration and voluptuousness are not regarded as immodest and where the Festival of India would fit as snugly as a glove. Why did we not use the Festival of India more imaginatively—to reveal the glories of our Victorian and Edwardian buildings? Why should we pretend that our imperial history never happened? Indian art has much more in common with the showmanship of the Raj than with the decent simplicities of the governments which gave India its independence.

The answer is, I suppose, that we could not. It would have required too great a wrench to our prejudices. Indeed, half way through this extraordinary festival, with its multitude of events, I began sadly to feel that its impact was almost exactly the reverse of what it should have been. Instead of exciting our love and admiration for India, the festival was discreetly putting India in its place, along with other ethnic arts, as sideshows in bland buildings designed to embrace all tastes, however odd they may seem to our administrators.

The Festival, in short, amounted, wittingly or unwittingly, to a discreet cold-shoulder, receiving less press coverage than it was due and drifting on throughout the summer, hiccuping through little local difficulties (such as insufficient finance and administrative inefficiency) until only the devotees remained—while London as a whole shrugged off the munificence of the gifts offered to it.

This lack of impact cannot be attributed to poor publicity. I suspect that there is an innate wariness in Britain to Indian art, a combination of ignorance, uncertainty and that sixth sense which tells us that behind Indian art there lies a philosophy which challenges our assumptions. Let us take, for example, that moment when Yamini Krishnamurti, the Bharatnatyam dancer, climbed up the little steps to the Queen Elizabeth Hall stage and after a brief obeisance to the musicians and the audience, began to dance.

Miss Krishnamurti is strikingly pretty, and every detail of her costume, from the richly coloured fabric (linen? silk?) of her dress to the gold bangles on her wrist, is designed to enhance that beauty. Her eyes, naturally wide and lustrous, are heightened with black eyelines, just as her full lips have been shaped with lipstick to the perfect bow. In Sanskrit plays, you always read of beauties with breasts and buttocks like melons, and Miss Krishnamurti's figure, voluptuous but thin-waisted, could provide a perfect illustration for them all. In the West, dancers tend to have small breasts: they emphasise their asexual athleticism at the expense of their femininity.

A Western feminist would instinctively protest that Miss Krishnamurti has transformed herself into a sex object, and a particular kind of sex object too, one not intended for common mortals but for emperors and the gods. Indeed, a part of her art is directed towards that end; and when in an erotic mood, one of several encompassed by Bharatnatyam, she smiles at lucky members of the front rows, her lips and eyes promise an infinity of sensual pleasure. It is not just

feminists who would be taken aback by that smile. The instinct of a red-blooded Englishman would surely be to summon the police, for no Soho stripper has such an inviting smile, so devoid of the guilt, bargaining and suspiciousness which usually season Western delights.

Such a whole-hearted embracement of sexuality seems to us a snare and a temptation; and I do not think that our rejection of such eroticism, which persists particularly perhaps when we think that we are most abandoning ourselves to erotic joys, when we are at our most kinky and fantastic, stems solely from our Christian backgrounds. It can also be found in Aristotle, who talks of the *purgation* of feeling, as if love needed to be released through an emetic; and in a host of other assumptions. We have this habit of regarding emotions, whether they be of sexual love, anger, pity or fear, as but means to various ends. We make love in order to have children. We are angry because of some outrage. We fear some threat.

We treat our emotions mechanistically, as part of a pattern of cause and effect; and it goes against our grain to consider them as things-in-themselves—to contemplate 'fear', 'pity', 'sexual love' and the other feelings described in Bharata's *Natyasastra* as if they could be detached from the motives which bring them into being. Why should we feel angry, if there is nothing to be angry about? Let us, for the moment, reverse this line of argument. If we do not know what anger is like, as a thing-in-itself, then we are at the mercy of whatever happens to be its trigger. There exists in the soul a passion called anger whose force can be tapped by minor as well as major grudges. If we do not know what is meant by anger, then there is the risk that it will take us by surprise—and will be shaken by fury when some shopkeeper overcharges us for bread. If we do not know the power of eroticism, then a casual invitation to dance may lead to overwhelming longings, fantasies, frustrations, jealousies or other mixtures of joy and torment. Because we do not know the emotion, the trigger which releases it either fails to set off the gunpower or blows us to pieces.

Miss Krishnamurti's art is devoted to realising the purity of such emotional states; and it relates to a vision of the world in which all such feelings are various expressions of what the Edwardians would have called in their mystical scientism 'the life force'. Just as emotions are not interpreted mechanistically, neither is the body itself. Western dancers not only look unlike Indian dancers, of whatever style or region, but they also move differently. The limbs of Western dancers are always being stretched, either in vast leaps, in point work, in the splits or in their opposite, crouches, the buds before they unfold, the compactness of body about to uncurl and extend itself. Relaxation is the space between two sudden expansions of physical energy.

Indian dancing very rarely indulges in such extremes. The legs are bent. When Miss Krishnamurti rises up on her toes, she does not prolong the point-work to become an athletic anguish which leaves the smile strained and the audience gasping; she uses point-work simply to vary

her height and to achieve a rhythmic slap on the floor when her heels return to contact the boards. In Western dancing, the spectators are enthralled by the sheer dimensions of the body. In Indian dancing, we are absorbed by the suppleness and the expressiveness of the gestures, the variety of bends and curves in the body, the balancing of the parts in relationship to the whole. To develop linear bodies with small breasts and boyish buttocks in the Western style would severely limit the Indian dancer.

Indeed, without indulging in any fanciful metaphors, the shape of the body itself expresses the difference between the cultures. In Western art schools, as in academies of dance, we start with the skeleton, conceived as a system of levers, rods and clamps in bone. The skeleton is a machine, on which we then lay the muscles, the gristle and the flesh. The text-book sketches by Leonardo da Vinci remind us that not the least of his preoccupations was the scientific one, to examine objectively how the body as a machine works.

Indian art, while no less meticulous, starts from a different philosophical premise. The body is conceived as a film of skin containing air—the air itself being the breath of life. The bones give shape to that skin and lends it different capacities, such as movement; but what fills this sack is the fluidity of life. Hence, whereas in Western art, anything extraneous to muscular movement is regarded as fat, Indian art is not ashamed to be curvaceous and full of bloom, to have fully rounded breasts or the stomach of a seated Buddha.

Hence, without starting to describe the details of Miss Krishnamurti's dancing, or those of the Manipuri dancers, of Miss Sarukkai, we have arrived at a clash of cultures, whose origins can be traced back, if we want to do so, to that opposition of views described in my previous article—between Aristotle and purgation and Bharata and emotional fulfilment. The purpose of the Festival of India, in my view, should have been to reveal to Western minds the gulf which exists between our worlds, a separation which needs to be understood before other political and economic decisions can be taken.

In fact, the Festival of India was thwarted by the lack of imagination in the part of its British organisers, which is why the sites were, for the most part, badly chosen, the press remained for the most part unalerted and even the advertisements portrayed a dull, kitsch view of India and the festival harped on clichés, instead of using the range of colour and design which belongs to the art forms.

Now summon up the imagination to visualise the true settings—the palaces, the landscapes with its dust, mud and violent flowers, the dusk, the temples—particularly perhaps the Hindu temple in Delhi built in the 1930s with its stone elephants over which the children can climb, the rich ornamentation, the saris, the smell of curries, the sparkle of jewels, the birds, the snakes, the tiger and the camel. You will not need any words of mine to summon these visions, for they exist in our literature from Shakespeare to Kipling, in our architecture which has gone through

so many stages of longing for India, in those little Indian objects in antique shops brought back during the days of the Raj, inlaid cabinets, delicately carved Krishnas, and, above all, in longings which cannot be directly attributed to an Indian experience but which attach themselves to India, as a moslem looks towards Mecca.

That fabled place of our imagination exists. It is called India. But the festival of that name no more lived up to the living myth than a textbook of sexual positions describes love. It was as if the Western mind were determined not to learn from India but to slot India into its terms of reference. It cannot be done.

[The first and second in the series of three articles on India by John Elsom are *A Tourist in India* (No. 1379, Vol. 240) and *Explaining India* (No. 1398, Vol. 241) of *Contemporary Review*.]

AN ANALYSIS OF THE AEGEAN CRISIS

by Semih S. Umar

IT is with deep concern that the free world has been watching the deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean and the Cyprus problems. This is, and has always been, one of the most sensitive parts of the world because it is through this area that Europe is linked with the Middle East and the great Asian and African Continents and also it is across the blue waters of the Aegean that Russia, once extricated from the Black Sea by the Turkish Straits, can have access to the Mediterranean and the wide seas beyond. Those old enough to remember the Second World War would need no further reminder of the conditions which make the Eastern Mediterranean basin a vital crossing point of strategic, military and economic interests between any rival powers in Europe, particularly if one of these happens to be Russia with her age-old ambitions of expansion into warm waters and the Middle East for world-wide domination.

Knowing this super-power involvement in their area and being fully conscious, as they should, of their fundamental interests as members of the free world, Greece and Turkey might be expected to sit down together and settle their differences over any rights of sovereignty or economic potential between them. As a matter of fact, that was exactly what they had been doing, albeit somewhat reluctantly, until Mr. Andreas Papandreu became Premier of Greece as a result of the General Election in October 1981.

As soon as Mr. Papandreu took office, he started to engage in a series of bewildering manoeuvres with short- or long-term objectives, aimed cumulatively at establishing Greek hegemony over the whole of the Aegean region, including the international air-traffic control mechanisms, continental shelf rights, territorial waters, air space, etc. In order to make the whole puzzle intelligible to the British public, it is necessary to explain some aspects of it and give certain background information, so that they may know how this seemingly remote, complex situation could end up in a conflagration that would probably cause the collapse of the free world's defences in this highly volatile area.

As soon as Greece achieved independence in 1821 against the Ottoman Empire at the end of an arduous struggle in which the great romantic Philhellene, Lord Byron, took a prominent part, Greece started to work for the acquisition of all territories under the Empire that were part of the Hellenic world in classical times about twenty centuries ago; that is, the Aegean islands and parts of Western Anatolia. European powers were working for the destruction and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and it fitted their plans nicely to encourage this Greek *Megali Idea* (Grand Ideal) of territorial aggrandisement which was supported also by the romantic intelligentsia and statesmen of all the major European countries at the time. The island of Crete was added to Greece in 1913 through devious international manoeuvring backed by uprisings instigated locally through subversive

methods in which thousands of Turks were killed in one night, although Turkish armed forces had practically reached Athens in a previous advance that was stopped by the friendly intervention of Britain and others. Later still the island of Cyprus was also detached from the Turkish Empire and placed temporarily under British rule as part of a programme of co-operation between the Ottoman Empire and Britain against Russia, aimed at curbing the latter country's overt and covert moves to gain access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The implementation of the *Megali Idea* continued more or less successfully until the end of the First World War when a chance presented itself to Greece, through the blessings of Britain, France and the USA, to build a Greek empire straddling across the Aegean, irrespective of the fact that after so many centuries, only insignificant Greek communities now remained in the coveted regions of Western Anatolia. It was Greece's misfortune and her downfall that a statesman like Elephtherios Venizelos, the victor of Crete, with a lively imagination that could mistake dreams for reality, was at the helm in Athens at the time and also that a military and political mastermind of the calibre of Kemal Atatürk was working feverishly amongst his beleaguered people in Anatolia, organising one of the most spectacular national revival and rejuvenation movements in history, with repercussions that would ring throughout the world for ages to come. Greek armies progressed as far as the environs of Ankara in the heartland of the Anatolian steppe, but were then forced to roll back ignominiously and quit Anatolia altogether.

It was through one of the most statesmanlike bargaining practices in diplomacy at Lausanne in Switzerland that the two countries finally achieved a durable *modus vivendi* in 1923, and clasped hands to create a strong bond of friendship and a delicate balance of political and military factors in the Aegean area. Turkey agreed to let Greece have all the islands and islets off her Western shores as a gesture of good-will and friendship (except the two that dominated the entrance to the Dardanelles, and the Dodecanese that were under Italian rule) and there was a period of genuine rapprochement between the leaders and the peoples of the two countries with cultural and social exchanges flourishing and even a great deal of talk about a federation between them.

In the meantime the Greeks of Cyprus continued to struggle surreptitiously for Enosis (union with Greece) under the British colonial rule, partly because they remained out of reach of the new atmosphere of friendship between Greece and Turkey and therefore continued to be under the spell of the *Megali Idea* that was nourished most invidiously (with surreptitious support from Athens) by the autocephalous Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church (which, incidentally, was given a free hand by the Sublime Porte in Istanbul in 1571 to act as political leadership for the Greek Cypriot community) and partly because the British encouraged the rift for their own colonial purposes at the time. When the late Archbishop Makarios III started the anti-British EOKA terrorist campaign in 1955, the object was not independence for Cyprus but the annexation of the island to Greece which

would have been anathema to the Turkish Cypriot people as it would mean the replacement of a relatively just and fair colonial rule by one that would amount to the total destruction of all human rights and liberties.

What was really significant in all this was that Greece was now fully behind the EOKA campaign for Enosis (actually supplying arms and military leadership for it) and this meant that for the first time since her Anatolian adventure and defeat she was openly engaging in activities that amounted to a full revival of the *Megali Idea* and were therefore diametrically opposed to the spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne, since Enosis in Cyprus would destroy the delicate balance established under it, as well as exposing Turkey to serious threat through her 'soft underbelly', if Cyprus ever fell into hostile hands, as it well might considering the powerful Greek communist element in the island. At first, Turkey kept an incredulous watch over the situation (believing that Britain would not easily relinquish her rights of sovereignty and that if she did she would not do so without obtaining Turkey's consent) but when the Turkish people of Cyprus started to come under organised EOKA fire, designed to intimidate and suppress them, she needed little prodding to realise that, unless she acted in time, the mess being created by Greece would be too big to clear up through peaceful negotiation. Consequently, she deployed her full weight and the Zurich and London agreements were signed to create the Republic of Cyprus for a functional federation between the two peoples of the island, under Anglo-Turco-Greek guarantees. The harm was already done, however, and Greece, hand in glove with Archbishop Makarios, was soon working for the alteration of the basic elements of the new Constitution towards the creation of conditions that would re-open the way to Enosis, and Turkey gradually came to realise that decisive action was needed if the Turks of Cyprus were to be safeguarded and the friendship between the two countries, as well as the South-East wing of NATO, were to be rescued from total destruction.

It is interesting to recall that the Government in Athens was headed by the late Yorgos Papandreou (the father of the present Greek Premier, Andreas Papandreou) when the Zurich principles were thus being thrown into the dustbin after 1964, and that the military regime which had come to power later had no concern other than achieving Enosis through a *fait accompli* based on a collusive *coup d'état* in Cyprus. That is how Turkey came to intervene militarily in Cyprus in 1974 and, as a consequence of this, the junta in Athens was overthrown when Mr. Karamanlis, who had been living in exile in Paris, came to head a new government in Athens.

It should be quite clear to everyone by now that under no circumstances is Turkey likely to agree to any major changes in the status quo as regards her entire network of relations with Greece. Consequently it is totally futile for Mr. Papandreou to fish in troubled waters by creating an artificial crisis and clamorously demanding protection against Turkey. Since her war of independence at the end of the First World War, Turkey has been a peaceful country (fighting only in Korea with the UN) and intervening recently in Cyprus to protect her vital interests.

It is in the light of all this that we have to consider Mr. Papandreou's

recent accusations against Turkey as regards the situation in the Aegean, which is a puzzling complex of problems within problems. What Turkey agreed to let Greece have at the end of their Anatolian confrontation, as a gesture of good-will that formed the basis of their honeymoon period from early 1920s to the beginning of EOKA in Cyprus in 1955, turned out to be the focal point of a new crisis in their relations. Having little respect for international agreements and obligations, Greece used the pretext of NATO requirements to arm the Aegean islands in flagrant violation of the Treaty of Lausanne. She built large airports ('for touristic purposes') and, beginning in 1964, sent all types of armaments and men to the major islands within easy reach of Turkey's Aegean hinterland. It was when Turkey objected to this that she started to talk about the so-called 'Turkish threat'. Almost simultaneously with this arming of the islands, Greece issued licenses to multi-national concerns to search for oil in the international waters of the Aegean and claimed the right to extend her territorial waters to 12 miles (from 6), and to have full continental shelf rights for all her islands, islets and rocks (365 of them altogether) irrespective of the fact that most of these islands and islets were either within Turkish mainland's territorial waters or within her continental shelf areas.

With huge oil prospects lurking in the background, Turkey stated openly that she would consider it 'an act of war' if Greece extended her territorial waters to 12 miles, and suggested that the two countries should discuss the whole situation. The Greek Government under Mr. Karamanlis agreed to this and discussions continued sporadically with a provisional agreement reached in 1976 that both sides should avoid searching for oil in the international waters of the Aegean. (Mr. Papandreou recently violated this agreement and drew a strong protest from Turkey, who began getting her deep water oil prospecting ship, *Hora*, ready for action, in retaliation.)

If Greece were to increase her territorial waters to 12 miles, the whole Turkish sub-continent would practically be suffocated, as she would have to have permission from Greece every time one of her ships or aircraft had to leave Turkey's air space, as Greece is also claiming the right to increase her air space from 6 to 10 miles, and all this irrespective of the fact that Turkey's Western coastline serves a hinterland of about 20 million people in the western provinces of the country against a few hundred thousand Greeks living on the islands. (The population of Mitilini, which is one of the biggest Aegean islands, for instance, is only 104,000 and of Chios, 49,000.)

Greece's most important claim, however, is her demand that each one of her islands and rocks dotting the Turkish coastline should have full continental shelf rights extending about 200 miles in all directions, disregarding the fact that all these islands are well within Turkey's continental shelf, geologically as well as politically. The basis of Greece's claim in this respect (as well as for her territorial waters claim) is a draft Article in the Law of the Sea which is being worked out in international conferences, to the effect that islands should also have continental shelf rights. She refuses to negotiate for a compromise solution, although another Article in the draft convention lays down that under 'special circumstances' and with regard to 'closed seas',

problems should be settled through peaceful discussion in line with 'principles of right and justice' and not according to 'general principles'. As a matter of fact, the situation in the Aegean is so 'special' that a similar situation scarcely exists anywhere else in the world, except perhaps the Aland islands off Finland's South-West coast which are populated entirely by Swedes and which actually belong to Finland.

To make the problem still clearer, let us suppose, for instance, that a series of islands belonging to Cuba, and with a total population of no more than a few hundred thousand people, extended all along the Atlantic coastline of the US, many of them within US's territorial waters. And let us also suppose that Cuba claimed full continental shelf rights, 200 miles wide, for each and every one of these islands and rocks so that all these overlapping continental shelf areas left the US and her millions of people living on the Atlantic seaboard and its hinterland nothing in the way of a continental shelf and economic rights, with the result that US inhabitants were actually imprisoned within her coasts, with Cuba trying to enforce the right to inspect every movement of military or civilian aircraft, or shipping, even before they left the US air space or the territorial water limits. Let us suppose again that further south on the US coastline there was another and bigger island which was independent under US and Cuban guarantees and which was inhabited by 450,000 Cubans and 150,000 Americans, with Cuba doing everything possible to destroy American existence on this island, leaving the latter no free port or naval base and bringing half of the US within easy reach of the planes of this hostile country or her more powerful allies.

How all the Aegean islands came to belong to Greece and constitute a threat to Turkey's vital interests is, as we have seen, a long story of Turkish naivety. Now, both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot people demand actual proof of reciprocal sincerity before they show their generosity once again, and an end to clamorous protestations of a Turkish threat which are obviously a pretext for (a) claiming everything in and under the Aegean Sea and (b) arming the Aegean islands.

All this is an ominous reminder of Mussolini's *Mare Nostrum* claim for the Mediterranean. The Greek Prime Minister is openly stating that the Aegean belongs to Greece, that 'Cyprus is an extension of Greece' and that her 'frontiers' and 'rights of sovereignty' are being threatened by Turkey. He has claimed the protection of NATO but what NATO should do is to demand a clear-cut explanation as to what is meant by 'frontiers' and 'rights of sovereignty', for surely NATO could not guarantee one member's territory against that of another member.

Mr. Papandreou and the leaders of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus would do well to realise that it is no longer desirable or feasible to stake claims on any territory on the basis of racial affinity or classical relationship or to disregard the fundamental rights of others. If that were to be a measure for a redistribution of the continents, large parts of Northern Iran, for instance, and of the Soviet Union, all the way from the Caspian Sea to the Wall of China and beyond, would have to be turned over to

Turkey, as no less than 60 million Turkish-speaking peoples live on these territories.

How this crisis will develop and whether it will continue to constitute a threat to the security arrangements of the Western world or be settled peacefully must depend to a great extent on the attitude of the Western powers towards Mr. Papandreou's activities. For instance, he is exercising considerable pressure on Mr. Brandt to get the Socialist International involved in organising an influence group with regard to internationalising the Cyprus problem. If Germany, France and the Scandinavian countries in particular (Britain, with her more intimate knowledge of the area, has already shown a correct assessment of the situation) confuse the issue of the Aegean and Cyprus with the efforts of the military in Turkey to re-organise the country's democratic system on a more functional basis, and make the mistake of supporting one of the two countries against the other, they would probably create a situation that would cause greater harm to the free world than anything Russia would ever hope to do. Greece and Turkey have always managed to settle their problems peacefully so long as external forces do not attempt to intervene, and no doubt will do so again! It is important, for in Europe today there is no such thing as 'mine' and 'yours', but the purpose of our joint civilisation.

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THE OCEAN

by Howard Atkinson

ENTERPRISE is the capacity to turn all things to account. Although not of the Prime Minister's party, I share her respect for the quality. For two months I have been moving through unemployment into poverty, and the time has come to turn this rich experience to account and, the NUJ permitting, make a little business of my unemployment of my own and take my place among the many who, with more remuneration, are engaged in this industry.

From 11 July I have drawn £19.20 unemployment benefit weekly and, living with a friend, managed comfortably upon it. I had no savings, having not only shared in producing wealth, but consumed as fully as I could to keep production going. It was a condition of my stay that I should leave without argument on the last day of August, and I did, moving into a hostel in Lambeth. The hostel is a Christian establishment, but not a charity. It has three part-time employees and provides a bed, clean comfort and two meals a day for twenty-eight pounds a week. I suspect that it runs more economically than some charity hostels. However, the charge is £8.80 more than my benefit each week.

I arrived Bank Holiday Monday, and on the Tuesday set off early to report my change of address to the Employment Office. This necessitated first a visit to the Job Centre—half an hour's walk. They were speedy and friendly, though with no job for me. Then to the Benefit Office: more walking. It is here that one moves into the atmosphere of frustration that characterises the unemployment industry and its service establishments behind the facade of optimism. Here that carpets are replaced by worn linoleum, ashtrays no longer provided, and the cigarette stubs and spent match-sticks pattern the floor. Here too that one becomes conscious of the grill, though glass has replaced bars. The employees are separated from the workless by wooden counters topped by glass which I assume to be unbreakable. Never is the barrier between the two crossed. It is a frontier.

There are queues, and much waiting. Announcements are made stridently and a little petulantly from one side, and answered by habituated indignation and unsurprised dismay on the other. A big man, neatly, if casually, dressed is clawing the grill in one enclosure, arguing loudly with the employee opposite who is trying wearily to explain that she cannot take his word for something, and remain helpful. The regulations require no statement by the workless to be believed unless confirmed by prescribed evidence. Despite the misfortune and ostentatious frustration my side of the grill, I pity, really pity, those on the other side working here five days every week. That they stick it, if they do, is but proof how close they are to exchanging roles.

After forty minutes I am called to a space between partitions at the grill. My interrogator is young and prepared to be polite, if not to smile.

I explain that I have recently changed my address, that I am registered in Bromley, that I have completed a course to re-enter teaching and that I shall not know for ten days whether I shall have full-time or part-time teaching or none. I do not explain that my *curriculum vitae* indicates a career which does not inspire the eager expenditure of public money on interview expenses, nor that this career was caused by the determination to teach thinking, at its outset, in an establishment devoted to teaching thought—a difference to me, that is, that between life and death.

I do explain that, at least for a limited time, I need to draw supplementary benefit. I am given a letter to the Social Security office. The young woman does not wave goodbye.

The Social Security office is adjacent to a park, and I interrupt my progress for a cigarette and a paper cup of tea there. The cigarette is my first that day. Poverty is imposing a novel self-discipline on me, for which I am not ungrateful.

It is 12.15 when I enter the ministry building. The porter's lodge is unoccupied but a sign indicates that I should go to the first floor. There are some thirty men, women and children lounging dismally in well-worn chairs and the floor has the same carpetting of cigarette stubs and spent matches; also pellets of chewing gum. Again the segregation of the grill. This time there is only one employee visible behind the grill, a slight young man with a moustache who is talking to a woman of his own age with a little girl. I wonder to whom I have to present my letter. The clerk disappears and for five minutes no one is visible behind the grill. There is a door at one side of the room and above it a notice reads: 'If you have an appointment, wait here until your name is called.' I suppose I had better make an appointment. I go through the door and find a further grill with partitions dividing it on my side into eight booths. Only one is occupied. There is, again, only one employee visible. I hover near the occupied booth. I do not want to presume, but if I could just ask somebody, and there is only you, one question—eight words. After five minutes there is a lull in the talk.

'Where do I go to make an appointment?'

'Round there.'

I return to the outer room, go to the grill and pause behind the young woman with the girl. It is only three minutes before she gets up to go and apologetically, I ask:

'Where do I make an appointment?'

'Get a ticket from downstairs—on the wall, and take a seat and wait for your number.'

My number is 30. There is, I see now, a box above the centre of the grill with numbers like a digital clock. It is at number 1.

It is remarkable how little need shows itself in dress. I look in vain for a frayed trouser bottom, a patch. There are couples, and singles, and children. There is a pregnant woman with long, beautiful chestnut hair curling naturally down over her shoulders; I should like to draw her. I

have a sketchpad in the document wallet I carry with me but am too shy to draw in public. There are pensioners, most with a certain dignity, one thin woman with white hair looking bitter. There are two couples, well-dressed seeming uncertain how they came to be here.

After an hour, I take out the pad and start to sketch quickly. The thin, bitter woman gets up and goes about the room selecting cigarette butts from the floor. I observe her limbs, which her scant dress makes clearly visible. They remind me of photographs of Belsen. She is the only person in the room who looks starved.

At 1.45 a second employee appears at the grill. The box shows number 12.

When it is the thin woman's turn to be interviewed, there is a scene before the grill. The woman demands loudly to be told what she will get to eat today, how she will eat. She leaves without satisfaction but with commotion.

At 3.30 the box has clocked 25. It moves to 26 and there is no movement towards the grill. 27, 28 and 29 have all given up. Perhaps that was intended. 30. I move swiftly and take my place before the interviewer. It is the young fellow with the moustache. He takes the envelope but is more immediately concerned to have my numbered ticket. He books me an appointment for 1.30 next day, explaining that I must bring proof of my attendance on the training course which preceeded my becoming unemployed. I leave. It has taken three and a quarter hours to book an appointment—arranged in situations where pauperisation is not being enforced within a minute. My interviewer has been polite, impersonal. It is not his fault that the staff has been reduced to such a minimum that its clients' embarrassment to the economy is brutally demonstrated to them. It is not humility that has enabled me to preserve the appearance of docility, but the prospect of reproducing the experience on paper. Virtue has almost always an ulterior motive.

I go to Penge in the morning, to collect proof that I have attended my training course. I also pick up the girocheque of my unemployment benefit. It is for a fortnight. With it I can pay my first week's board.

My friend offers me an early lunch. I have not looked up the trains but reckon I can safely get back to Lambeth in an hour and a quarter.

I am mistaken. At the Elephant and Castle I realise I shall be some minutes late for my appointment. I ring the Ministry. I get through and listen to the ringing tone for four minutes before putting down the receiver. I waste pence I can't afford on a bus. I am exactly five minutes late. Again there is no member of staff to speak to. I can only hope my name has not been called. After yesterday it does not seem likely. I wait. A name is pronounced through a loudspeaker. It is not mine. I think she was waiting before I came in.

The thin woman is there again. From time to time she gets up and hunts for cigarette ends. 'Hunts' is not quite right. She finds. She has the movements of a bird, quick, premeditated.

Another name is called. And another. After forty minutes no more names are called. After an hour I leave. There is no one I can approach, but outside I can try again to phone.

There is a post office over the road. Both booths are occupied. After a few minutes one is free. This time I get the signal 'number engaged'—good! at least it's being answered; or is it? Is it simply off the hook? On the fourth try it rings and is answered. I recognise the voice of my interviewer of the day before. I explain that I was late—apologise—explain I rang to explain and was not answered. Yes, he will book another appointment. He will get the book. He's afraid it's impossible this week. He will get next week's book. Nothing free till Wednesday. I think: 'I have unpardonably failed to keep my obligation—precisely to keep appointments—and am to be trained in docility thus'. Aloud I say, 'What time?' and cannot keep a little sharpness from my voice.

'Eleven-thirty'.

His blandness offends me. Yet it is probable they really do not have a booking until then.

After paying for my first week's board I shall have ten pounds left. Good! By the weekend I shall have given up smoking. Just now, though, I need a cigarette. I do some calculations in my head and realise that in three months I have spent £80 in stamps and stationery trying to get a job. It has brought me one contact in further education which may lead to a few hours part-time work. I am by now discounting the chances of a job in a comprehensive for which I once hoped. The medical history I had to complete—which I did with candour—will have passed through the hands of the ILEA interviewer's secretary. I fear he may have been tempted to be discreet.

An application form came this morning for part-time teaching in Brixton. 'Communication skills'. If I can find out what is wrapped up in the words I'll offer to teach it. I move off towards the public library.

There is a cafe just before it. It is empty but the door is open, and I enter. After a minute a thin, pensive woman comes in by the street door followed by a child. She asks what she can give me and I ask for a cup of tea.

'Anything else?' she asks hopefully.

I'd like to provide her with more custom, but answer no. 'This cafe used to be Greek.'

'It still is; half-and-half English,' she replies, 'I'm the English half.'

I put a cigarette in the holder and light it. The holder has a filter and I bought it to reduce the tar. Since then, it has become for me a symbol of defiance of the cult of the ordinary. The woman I don't remember, but her husband comes in and though he doesn't remember me, I see he is the same. They embrace quietly. It is affecting. I drink up and go.

At the library I present the envelope in which this morning's application form came as proof of residence, complete a card and become a member.

The librarian says, 'How many books do you want to take out—you can take out up to six?'

Because I need to ventilate frustration I reply: 'In that case—ten!'

She giggles and repeats what has been said to a slightly older and plainer woman librarian who has been pronouncing to a bystander on the council's policy of not replacing employees who have left and whose jobs fell vacant. She is being mildly militant. Employment in public service is seen by such people as an opportunity to translate the work of a servant into the role of an official, an excuse to patronise. I regard the older librarian cautiously.

'Also,' I add, 'I want to obtain a book you almost certainly haven't got.' This time amusement is conditional—I am probably going to be awkward! I give the title of the book. It's French. I have to translate. I have to pay 14p. I have it in change exactly? Good, then I can put it in the money-box myself!

I pick four books and return to the counter and ask if there is a subject index. Apparently there is not, but what is it that I want? I tell the older librarian, who has by now the expression of a shop-steward discovering a grievance, that I want a book, a chapter, or even a paragraph on communication as it relates to education—nothing against shop-stewards except it seems to me they have produced a situation where only the underpaid may expect to continue in employment!

After some minutes she returns with a book, the index of which has three page numbers against 'communication'. She is grimly courteous. I agree to be satisfied and go.

Repassing the cafe I see two people drinking coffee and decide I will join them. I go in and take a seat. The others leave. The nice woman comes in again from the street, this time followed by three children. Seeing me she recognises 12p.

'I'm closing now. I've my family to cook supper for,' she admonishes mildly, so I leave, taking no offence, but wondering if my unemployment already has an identifiable smell.

Down the street who do I see at a bus stop but Winnie! She was a waitress in the staff restaurant of a firm I worked for near here, four years ago. She says she thinks she remembers me, with a timid smile. Asks who I work for now. I can't invoke her disappointment and her pity.

'I'm going to teach in a comprehensive,' I lie. 'The pay's terrific.'

A friend of mine lived two years out of dustbins for his faith. I am now older than he was then. Also, I have much less faith. I wonder if the ocean has a bottom.

GO OUT INTO THE COUNTRY

Graham Sutherland's Paintings and Drawings at the Tate Gallery and the Imperial War Museum

by Simon Passmore

IS the sun striking palely on the rooftops or on the south side of the street? It will be flooding the fields. Go out and find it.' This text, a scrap from the *Daily Express* seemingly pinned to Graham Sutherland's lithograph 'Go out into the Country', represents the commonest sense of the relationship existing between the worlds of man and nature, a sentimental romanticism which is the special prerogative of travel advertising. In the body of Sutherland's poster, designed and produced for London Transport, this simple antithesis is developed with more subtlety: a typewriter, chair and window frame make a formal composition with its own attractions, though very different in style and atmosphere from the river scene floating seductively above it, with a dinghy sail and thick foliage reflected in the water. But this is the dream of a typewriter, or a typist: when Sutherland himself went out into the country, it was to confront a very different nature.

A picture like 'Green Tree Form: Interior of Woods', painted two years later in 1940, is more representative both of Sutherland's talent and of the view of nature which runs through his work. Looming out of a darkish green background suggesting the depths of a forest, a sinuous form, irregular and in places truncated, twists out at the spectator. It is curiously highlighted from one side as though spotlit, picked out unexpectedly in the secrecy of its own world, and suggests discomfort and even pain. Root or branch, it is difficult to classify; but beyond doubt it is a living thing, organic, and its appeal is much more urgent than the poster's.

The lorry bills which Sutherland produced for Shell in the 1930s show the same relationship with nature. While sticking to his brief and producing images to attract the touring motorist, Sutherland also conveys something of the strangeness of the countryside, which in Britain is so often presented as snug and familiar. By contrast his picture of Brimham Rock is full of a sense of natural forces, untrammelled and vaguely threatening. The rock itself is described by Sutherland in an article ('An English Stone Landmark' in *The Painter's Object*, edited by Myfanwy Evans, 1937):

It is round in plan and divided into three distinct sections. The lowest and largest is shaped like a flattened sphere, rather broader than it is long, and the middle section is attended by much corrugation and eruption, which, extended to the section above, almost attains to an efflorescent character. The whole mass is poised, like an acrobat's ball on his stick, on a small inverted cone of stone.

This static object is, for the artist, the focus of a whole range of forces:

flattened, corrugated, erupting and efflorescent, the stone balances precariously between earth and sky like a massive plaything. The energy of the surroundings is brought out in the poster, with grass shimmering in the breeze and clouds whipped into strange pointed shapes.

Some of Sutherland's earliest pictures exhibit the same complex attitude to the world of nature, acknowledging both its beauty and its power. A group of etchings dating from the artist's student days at Goldsmith's College share a sense of mysterious quiet in the style of Samuel Palmer, whose engravings Sutherland first encountered in 1924. The tone of these early productions is subdued, with nature dominant and human figures, often dwarfed by trees, bowed and with heads averted. Working in such a precise medium, Sutherland had to rely largely on mood and composition to establish his characteristic sense of nature impinging on man; an etching in the manner of Paul Nash, 'The Garden' of 1931, is an unhappy mixture of crisp execution and awkward forms, and stylised curlicues sticking out of a flower bed suggest the scrolls of a buried string quartet.

It was shortly afterwards that Sutherland's output became more varied, as different styles and media were tested. Tureens, teasetts, postage stamps, fruit bowls and Christmas cards afforded the artist opportunities to experiment and develop; and at the same time the travel posters and first studies of Welsh landscapes indicated the path which later took him to the animate heart of the country. Oil on canvas began to supplant the etchings, gouaches and lithographs, and in this new medium Sutherland found new ways of approaching natural forms.

In these paintings of the late 1930s the artist makes contact with his subject. For his student etchings, Sutherland had drawn from nature but transformed his sketches into allegorical scenes, sometimes including a Latin inscription to bring home the *gravitas*; 'Cray Fields' (1925) is related to a specific tract of country, but the etching is more concerned with the apparatus of mysticism, setting sun and evening star. One feels that the experience presented was encountered by the artist not sketching in the open but later, or earlier: it is an indoors conception. Compare this with 'Western Hills' (1938/1941): again the sun hangs over a landscape, transforming it, but this time the experience and the landscape belong together, as parts of the same vision. The distance travelled between these two pictures is great; it represents the span between a day trip to replenish stocks of pastoral scenery and going out into the country, to find what before had been overlooked.

'This was perhaps his difficulty—that his graphic skill was not allied to a particular set of beliefs or passions. It's as though he had nothing to say beyond the aesthetic.' A common misreading of art in general, Sarah Kent's judgement of Sutherland highlights the difference between an illustrator and an artist. Sutherland began, like so many, as the former: illustrating received ideas of a pastoral mysticism (the Samuel Palmer etchings) or royalty (the postage stamp designs) efficiently but without imaginative fire. It was his ability to see his surroundings, unmediated by

a 'set of beliefs', which made him an artist. A set of beliefs is like a set of golf clubs: there is always one to cope with any awkward situation, so it is unnecessary to improvise, to create. An artist's game of golf would involve rewriting the rules a hundred times between first and last hole, as each position of the ball demanded a unique response. Even the most basic set of artistic notions, such as how space and depth can be represented, are challenged and redefined by every successful work. By what set of beliefs did Leonardo paint? Or Degas? The great example of art executed according to principles and rules is that of Nazi Germany, interesting mainly to those other theorists, art historians. It is exactly because art is a living thing, or it is nothing, that no artist can paint by numbers.

One might argue that, in Sutherland's case, religion provided such a framework. He became a Roman Catholic in 1926 and perhaps his conversion contributed to the element of mysticism which dominates the etchings of that period. But religion for an artist is not so much a set of beliefs as an imaginative position—an act of faith rather than a rule-book. Its effect was to bring Sutherland closer to the natural world, not to separate him from it by predetermined convictions. Nowhere is this clearer than in the 'Crucifixion' and 'The Deposition' of 1946, where art traditions (the crucifixions of Grünewald) and actuality (the victims of German concentration camps) meet in the central Christian image. What Sutherland chose to emphasise was the physicality of pain: a spiritual occasion, certainly, but one achieved through the organic world of growth and decay, expressed by the almost bestial appearance of the figures. In this transfiguration without beauty, the most familiar theme in western art is interpreted, as it must be again and again, in the light of the artist's own time.

Another vital difference between Sutherland's early pastoral etchings and the natural forms which succeeded them is the developing idea of an environment. The Palmeresque villages were homes for ideas, not people—the ideas of a young art student trying his hand at illustrating. 'Western Hills', 'Black Landscape' and 'Entrance to a Lane' all constitute something more solid, a series of habitats, and paintings like 'Gorse on a Sea Wall' and 'Green Tree Form' suggest the organisms which might live there. The anthropomorphism often applied to such forms, based on roots and pieces of wood, obscures their true nature. They are organic; whether animal or vegetable (or both) is immaterial.

A whole range of such forms were painted by Sutherland, living (or dying) matter within a succession of mineral environments: 'Red Monolith', 'Estuary with Rocks', 'Folded Hills'. All vegetable and animal life continues to move, through both growth and decay, and to change; while these rocky backdrops alter their form through erosion and attrition, but rarely change fundamentally. Metamorphosis, not anthropomorphism, is the principle beneath many of Sutherland's mature works: a root becoming an animal, thorn trees adopting the sentient cruelty inherent in their form, a living god turned to a dead man. In contrast to the fixed, lifeless



arrangements of the etchings, Sutherland began late in the 1930s to note and respond to the dynamic relationships of the surrounding natural world.

The Second World War prompted some variations on this theme. As an Official War Artist, Sutherland was commissioned to record bomb damage in cities and Cornish tin-mining, among other things. Wrecked buildings became, under his attention, another sort of natural decay—the city reclaimed by nature. In the series of pictures called 'Devastation', ruins of factories and houses bloom in wreaths of twisted girders. Wrecked machinery in a mantle factory, burnt rolls of paper from a warehouse, a twisted ventilator shaft: all take on an eerie beauty. Wyndham Lewis once described beauty as 'a universe for one organism', and Sutherland's ruins belong in the same way to his sequence of environments, obeying the same principles of life and death, decay and growth.

The organisms from these particular environments are noticeably absent. Writing to the Secretary of the War Artists' Advisory Committee, Sutherland remarked that 'it is difficult to draw in some places without rousing a sense of resentment in the people.' It is scarcely surprising that the inhabitants of the blitzed East End, in which the artist became 'tremendously interested', should resent his sketching, dependent as they were on their smashed habitat, and temporarily out of sympathy with the natural cycle of change. But Sutherland does not in any case seem to have been interested in the bombed out householders, on an artistic level. Only rarely does the human figure appear in his work, and then it is often in terms of the environment: in 'Miners Emerging from Two Stopes' the men seemed formed by the small space in which they half lie, half squat, forced down by the weight of rock on all sides. Later the artist noted that 'It was as if they were a kind of different species . . . my feeling was that in spite of the hardness of their work in this nether world, this place held for them—subconsciously perhaps—an element of daily enthrallment.' He is interested here neither in the miners alone, nor in the mines, but both together—the complete dynamic. To complain, as Sarah Kent does, that 'the drawings of miners and quarrymen seem more concerned with the aesthetic than with their subjects' is to miss the point; the aesthetic *is* the subject, and for Sutherland the aesthetic is a dynamic one.

The portraits with which Sutherland is often associated seem almost irrelevant to his best work. They share no single style, but in each case adopt that of the sitter: Somerset Maugham is elegant and mannered, Helena Rubinstein richly exotic, Max Egon merely a beautifully arranged pair of trousers. Sutherland not only could go out into the country familiar to most people, but also visited the 'extraordinarily beautiful' landscape of the Blitz, and the 'world of such beauty and such mystery' which the tin-miners inhabited. Men and women on their own, however, provided an insufficient terrain for this wide-ranging painter.

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

by David Fingleton

- BELLINI. *La Sonnambula*. National Philharmonic Orchestra/Bonyngé. (3 Records). DECCA D230D 3.
 BERLIOZ. *La Damnation de Faust*. Chicago Symphony Orchestra & Chorus/Solti. (3 Records). DECCA D259D 3.
 BERLIOZ. *Les Nuits D'Été/La Mort de Cléopâtre*. Te Kanawa/Norman/L'Orchestre de Paris/Barenboim. DEUTSCHE GRAMMOPHON 2532 047.
 RAVEL. *L'Enfance et les Sortilèges*. London Symphony Orchestra/Previn. EMI ASD 4167.
 JANACEK. *Glagolitic Mass*. City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra & Chorus/Rattle. EMI ASD 4066.
 BRAHMS. Violin Concerto. Mutter/Berlin Philharmonic/Karajan. DEUTSCHE GRAMMOPHON. 2532 032.
 ELGAR. Violin Concerto. Perlman/Chicago Symphony Orchestra/Barenboim. DEUTSCHE GRAMMOPHON 2532 035.
 MOUSSORGSKY. *Pictures at an Exhibition*/RAVEL. *Gaspard de la Nuit*. Cecile Ousset (Piano). EMI ASD 4281.

THE recent, rather tatty, revival of Bellini's lovable opera *La Sonnambula* at Covent Garden was of a production that had first been staged to display the Royal Opera's latest star, Joan Sutherland, in the title role way back in 1960. Not long after these performances, in 1962, Decca recorded the opera with Sutherland as Amina and her husband, Richard Bonyngé, conducting. Now, twenty years later, comes a further complete *Sonnambula* from Decca, again with Sutherland, now in her fifties, in the title role, and again with Bonyngé conducting. The rest of the principals are, of course, different: instead of Nicola Monti we now have, almost inevitably, Luciano Pavarotti in the tenor role of Elvino, and as Count Rodolfo the fine Bulgarian bass Nicolai Ghiaurov is a marked improvement on the rather nondescript Fernando Corena. The rest of the cast is predominantly British, and very good too. Especially Isobel Buchanan, whose Lisa is of star quality, and she is admirably supported by Della Jones as Teresa and John Tomlinson's sturdy Alessio. Decca have provided a fine clear digital recording, and the National Philharmonic respond with considerable polish to Bonyngé, who, as always, is entirely in his element in this music, extracting all Bellini's mastery of sentiment and humour, as well the apogee of *bel canto* style, from this score.

Pavarotti's Elvino, sadly, is pedestrian and perfunctory: why does he so pack his schedule that we almost never hear him at his very considerable best any more? But naturally the focus of interest on this recording must be Dame Joan's second stab at the opera. 'Age cannot wither . . .' is the answer to any doubts that had struck me before putting on the first record. Her voice retains almost all its former glory—only rarely does she sound under any pressure—and her coloratura technique must still be the envy of any young soprano aspiring to a *bel canto* style. Moreover this later Amina is even more convincing than the earlier one in that it is better projected, more carefully enunciated, and thus more secure in recitative. In sum the character is more fully developed, and

thus more credible. Do get this set: apart from Pavarotti's contribution, it's an object-lesson in how this kind of opera ought to be performed, and a worthy tribute to Dame Joan's mastery of the genre over quarter of a century.

Another, totally different but equally successful, operatic recording from Decca is of Berlioz' elusive masterpiece *La Damnation de Faust*. Different and elusive because, unlike *Sonnambula*, it's a work that is almost impossible to stage: it is immensely dramatic, but one cannot avoid the feeling that Berlioz' original intention to write it as a 'Concert-opera' was the soundest one. It is nonetheless a work of genius, and makes for wonderfully concentrated gramophone listening, particularly with as superbly engineered a digital recording as this one. It was made in Medina Temple, Chicago, with Sir Georg Solti conducting his magnificent Chicago Symphony, and such orchestral set-pieces as the Hungarian March and The Ride to the Abyss made for supremely exciting listening on good quality equipment—with the volume up and the neighbours out! Kenneth Riegel is a correct, if slightly dry, Faust—he lacks the ardour of a Gedda—Frederica von Stade provides a beautifully modulated, often touching Marguerite, and the fine Belgian bass José van Dam is an almost incomparable Mephistopheles—gloriously sung and intensely dramatic and convincing. The orchestra play with great élan as well as sensitivity—the delicacy of their Dance of the Sylphs is much to be admired—and the Chicago Symphony Chorus under the direction of Margaret Hillis sound laudably idiomatic in this French work. I had never previously associated Solti with Berlioz: this fine recording shows just how wrong I was.

Another, also satisfying, Berlioz recording comes from Deutsche Grammophon and offers two of the very greatest of the younger generation of sopranos: Kiri Te Kanawa and Jessye Norman. The former sings the beautiful collection of poems by Théophile Gautier, which Berlioz himself entitled *Les Nuits d'Été*, and Miss Norman, whose mastery of Berlioz' style was much in evidence when she sang Dido in *The Trojans* so superbly at the opening of this year's BBC Proms season at the Albert Hall, offers the great lyric scene entitled *La mort de Cléopâtre*. Both sopranos are in thrilling form, with Kiri Te Kanawa singing the Gautier songs with gloriously creamy tone, consummate musicianship and remarkably convincing projection of the words. One feels the need to play *Le spectre de la rose* and *Absence* repeatedly for the sheer joy and beauty they offer. Jessye Norman is in likewise magnificent form in the scene of Cleopatra's death, her strong, yet lustrous, voice soaring out with passion and drama. Both ladies are accompanied by Daniel Barenboim conducting his Orchestre de Paris, who are to be heard here at their considerable best—some of the woodwind solos in *Les Nuits D'Été* are exquisitely taken—and Barenboim's feeling for these two fine works is evident. Anybody who loves French music, the soprano voice, or both, should on no account be without this marvellous record.

More French vocal music comes from EMI with their new recording

of Ravel's enormously engaging one-act opera *L'Enfant et les Sortilèges*, conducted by André Previn. This work has a libretto by Colette, who herself chose Ravel as composer, remembering him from Mme. de Marceaux' salon before the First World War, and it was first performed in Monte Carlo in 1925. Colette's text is a splendidly witty story of a naughty six-year-old boy, left alone by his parents, in disgrace for not doing his homework, in a country house in Normandy. The child takes it out on the pets and furniture, and they take their revenge on him. Characters in the piece range from Chinese Cup to Armchair, Teapot, Grandfather Clock, Black Cat and Frog, and some twenty roles are here shared between eight singers. Ravel's music is a gloriously eclectic selection of styles, which he himself admitted to include Massenet, Jazz, Puccini, and Monteverdi, and is responded to with great enthusiasm and panache by Previn and the LSO. The American soprano Susan Davenny Wyner is thoroughly convincing as the spoiled child, and the rest of the strong team of singers includes such French specialists as Jocelyne Taillon, Jules Bastin, Jane Berbié and Arleen Augér, with predictably impressive results, and there is strong choral contribution from the Ambrosian Singers. This is a highly enjoyable recording: something quite different and eminently worth hearing.

The young British conductor Simon Rattle, still in his twenties, has just completed his second season in charge of South Bank Summer Music, and is Chief Conductor of the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra. He has also started a highly successful recording career, of which this new issue with his Birmingham orchestra is a conspicuous example. Janacek wrote his Glagolitic Mass to be sung in Czech by people anywhere—indoors or out, but without any particular church association. It is a marvellously exuberant and exhilarating piece of choral music which perhaps slightly defeats its composer's intentions by requiring a performance of considerable virtuosity if it is to succeed. This it most emphatically receives here, with Rattle drawing a splendidly assured and idiomatic performance from his Birmingham orchestra and choir, the latter singing in Czech, who both sound like top international ensembles. The soloists are also British, Felicity Palmer, Ameral Gunson, John Mitchinson, and Malcolm King, and sing with much conviction, and the virtuoso organ passages, the final one being possibly the Mass's most dramatic feature, are superlatively played by the young British organist Jane Parker-Smith, for whom the technical demands clearly hold no terrors. This is a record which has given me considerable pleasure, and I strongly recommend it.

For lovers of virtuoso violin playing I can offer two prize examples in great violin concertos this quarter. The German violinist Anne-Sophie Mutter is still, incredibly, in her teens, was a Herbert von Karajan 'discovery' at the age of fifteen, and has been making records and giving top level performances ever since. This latest recording, by her and Karajan, of the great Brahms concerto takes one's breath away, not merely for its technical assurance, which is astounding, but by its remarkably mature

musicianship. There is no question here of the conductor 'leading' his soloist. Karajan and the Berlin Philharmonic provide a wonderfully warm and committed accompaniment, but one is left in no doubt that Miss Mutter is in charge. And what magnificent charge it is: her love of Brahms's score is manifest, her preparation of and approach to it carefully considered, and her performance both astonishingly mature and totally convincing. I cannot think of any recent performance of this concerto that has given me greater pleasure, and I am only left wondering where young Miss Mutter can possibly go as she advances into adult life. Another great, and slightly older, though still in his thirties, violinist is the Israeli Itzhak Perlman. He has just produced a stunningly beautiful performance of Elgar's violin concerto which places this work firmly in the great European tradition, and though holding true to Elgar's British feeling for melody, makes much more of the concerto than a merely an English composition. It is indeed a highly international recording, with Perlman's great friend Daniel Barenboim conducting the Chicago Symphony Orchestra who offer immaculate and highly committed playing. Both concerto records have the benefit of Deutsche Grammophon's best digital recording, offering enormous clarity and presence: truly as if one were sitting in the best seat in the hall. Any violin enthusiast should acquire both recordings forthwith.

Finally for some virtuoso piano playing. I heard the French pianist Cécile Ousset give an unforgettable performance of the Brahms 2nd concerto at the Festival Hall in the spring, and at the second night of this summer's Proms she played Saint-Saëns' 2nd Piano Concerto with enormous panache and assurance. She has just started a recording contract with EMI, which is very good news, particularly as her first issue with them offers such pleasure and satisfaction. It is of Moussorgsky's *Pictures at an Exhibition*, which personally I always find much more persuasive and enjoyable in the composer's original solo piano version than in Ravel's later orchestration, and Ravel himself is featured on the other side with his three immensely evocative, and immensely demanding, impressionist pieces, jointly entitled *Gaspard de la Nuit*. Just listen to Mlle Ousset's playing of the Ballet of the Unhatched Chicks, or the final Great Gate at Kiev in 'Pictures'; or of the remarkable *Le Gibet* in 'Gaspard' to get the flavour of her remarkable playing. This recording offers very considerable pleasure and is, I would suggest, but the first in a long line of highly successful issues from Cécile Ousset.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

THE QUALITY OF TONY CROSLAND

Tony Crosland. Susan Crosland. Jonathan Cape. £10.95.

No one has everything required for reaching the very top in politics and earning the title of statesman. Tony Crosland had it nearly all. He had a mental brilliance comparable with that of Enoch Powell and Dick Crossman, and much more power of sustained thought as demonstrated by his classic work *The Future of Socialism*. He had the dazzling looks and, when he chose to use it, the charm of a Ouida hero. His second marriage brought him a highly gifted wife as attractive as himself who has now written a frank and absorbing narrative. Franker probably than would be an official biography which may follow in due course. She does not hesitate to quote a letter written by his brother-in-law A. J. P. Taylor which warned him, 'Attlee won't give you an appointment' (these were early days in the House) 'because he has seen you drunk too often in the Smoking Room.'

Later when they married: 'He was 45 and hadn't tried to convince either of us that his promiscuity had altogether run its course. Escape hatches were constructed in advance'. But she is able to add happily: 'It's hard to say which of us was more surprised when it turned out that the hatches weren't used'. His rivalry with Roy Jenkins is not told in a fashion which is in any way flattering to Tony.

Tony Crosland died of a stroke when he was 58 following several years of high blood pressure. He was the same age as F. E. Smith, the hero of my undergraduate days, with whom Tony Crosland could in many ways be compared and who also overtaxed a strong constitution. He was Foreign Secretary at the time. The leadership of the Party would soon fall vacant. One cannot rule out the possibility that he would have become its leader. Externally his career was as dazzling as his personality. For myself, however, I think of him as unfulfilled.

I feel I understand him better since reading this book and the curious, inhibited relationships between us. I knew him first just before the war as an arresting undergraduate. Of this period he said to me much later, 'You would have had more influence on my generation if you had not been so arrogant towards the waiters in The George'. From Tony of all men this came as a surprising comment, but I think he probably detected a class arrogance in my attitude and throughout his life he was anti-class.

I sat next to him for a long time in the Cabinet. When he was Secretary of State for Education I showed him the draft of a speech I was proposing to make on his subject in the House of Lords. He asked me, 'Do you really think that you are entitled to say that ours is a predominantly Christian Cabinet?' I did a quick round the table and reported: 'I make it 11 Christians; six non- or anti-Christians, and 4 don't knows.' He did not dissent but went on to ask me, 'Where do you put me?' I replied: 'Among the don't knows'. He remarked: 'That's about right, I should think'.

But now I learn that about the same time he said to his wife that he was having lunch the next day with me, referring to me as 'your friend Lord Pakenham'. He surmised that by the time the lunch was over, 'All verve may have been drained from me by Christianity. . .'. I see him now as someone who did not wish to be disturbed by that side of thought.

It is not difficult to find at any rate a partial explanation. He was brought up, as Susan Crosland brings out vividly, 'in the intense, austere, narrow Christianity of the Plymouth Brethren whose pleasure lay in the word of God and endless discussion of it.' Indeed Tony's parents belonged to the *Exclusive Brethren*. To put it crudely he seems to have been put off doctrinal religion for life. When he was 16 he became an ardent and life-long Socialist. His dedication to equality and liberty in this world was to be as earnest as that of his parents to their form of spirituality. It could be derived from that source.

Always, so it seemed to me, this peculiar background put a stopper on his full mental and moral development. I called attention to this in a very favourable review of *The Future of Socialism* and twenty years later, at the time of his death, it would still seem to me a fair comment. But who can say where he would have found himself before the end as he proceeded in so beautiful a partnership?

The Future of Socialism is no doubt dated by now. In Mrs. Crosland's summary it announced that the economy was growing at a rapid pace and there seemed every prospect of its continuing to do so. Tony 'was over optimistic of economic growth as he readily admitted a few years later'. But the relegation of nationalisation to a subsidiary place in Socialist thinking was a lasting service. So was his insistence on the balance that must be struck between equality and liberty. The permissive revolution was to be carried through in the 'sixties in a manner that fitted in with his own passion for 'grace and gaiety' in private life and his own mode of living up to 1956 when the book appeared. But there came a moment near the end of his life when we find him saying to Susan: 'If we're not careful we will end up like Darby and Joan'. She asked who they were and was told. 'They lived only for each other until they were 90 years old.' So here again who can say what would have been his final view of conventional morals.

FRANK LONGFORD

JOHN MACKINTOSH—A TRAGIC LOSS TO DEMOCRACY

Parliament and Social Democracy. John P. Mackintosh. *Scotland.* John P. Mackintosh. Longman. £7.95 each.

The last time I was with John Mackintosh he made a delightfully witty speech to our Greek hosts in Salonika. Six weeks before, he had been given up for ever on the surgeon's operating table, only to make a remarkable recovery. Alas, the tumour that had been removed was malignant and we lost a man whose potential contribution to political thought must surely have blossomed in the fertile soil of post-Limehouse politics. No less malignant were his enemies—the pedestrian ex-Councillors and Trade Union hacks who in 1966 composed the majority of Scots Labour MPs. For John was too clever and such rare ability brought out the anti-intellectual and jealous streak that typifies a large section of the Labour Party.

I will not eulogise John Mackintosh. Professor David Marquand does that in moving, perceptive and very relevant prose in introducing *Parliament and Social Democracy*. His Scottish tradition and his remarkable achievements are contained in a similar introduction by Henry Drucker to John Mackintosh's writings and speeches in *Scotland*, the twin publication by Longmans.

John Mackintosh had clarity, passion, a remarkable ability to look ahead and the gift of self-expression rare among his peers. I for one did not appreciate his talents in a Parliament where the Scottish Grand Committee

and my own interests rarely brought us together. We shared with Michael Barnes a new-found advocacy of the European Idea, which at a Parliamentary Labour Party meeting caused Douglas Houghton to comment that it sounded like a Revivalist meeting.

A quotation from David Steel sums up Mackintosh's political weakness: 'the loner, the unorthodox, and openly impatient at other people's slowness and stupidity as he saw it'. One could not easily put labels on him and in this sense he was one of a few outstanding talents wasted by a Parliament that puts a premium on pressure groups and Party loyalties. He did not serve on the front bench in a temporary minor role even in opposition, as David Marquand and I did. I have little doubt that had he lived he would by now be making an enormous contribution to the debate on political institutions opened up by his work on the Select Committee on procedure and his writing on Cabinet Government. No one can speak for him but in our feelings on Rhodesia, Europe or Devolution I am sure he would have been more at home in David Marquand's present political company, than with Jim Callaghan or Tony Benn, as a radical social democrat.

All of us felt that the Wilson era debased the currency of politics, elevated mediocrity to a virtue and compromise or expediency to a principle. Wilson's heirs in the Labour Party are hardly inspiring with their talented 'little Englander', Peter Shore, and his competent rivals, the Wilsonian opportunists currently being undermined by that would-be prophet of egalitarianism, Tony Benn, looking increasingly like a mirror-image of Enoch Powell. Indeed, the classic debate on Europe between Mackintosh and Shore at the Special Conference was a magnificent draw in terms of passion and oratory. It was, however, a walk-over for Mackintosh in terms of vision and courage.

That vision and courage is placed on display in these two volumes of well-chosen thoughts of lecturer John—for that above all is what he was. Nevertheless, his was one of two votes that denied in practical politics a Bill that Labour tabled to accommodate the TGWU. As a commentator, he could not remain detached and became a powerful participant in the political process.

Mackintosh is not a profound philosopher but a shrewd observer with a gift for communicating ideas, receptive to changes in society and unafraid to cast down idols long worshipped by conventional labourites whether of left or right. His zest for life and propensity to be discouraged, dismayed and yet come back fighting is the mark of a sensitive man deeply offended by injustice and unfairness.

I do not seek to paraphrase his contributions to contemporary thought since these books should be read by anyone concerned to understand the post-war generation of the Social Democratic Left. His work on Scotland may have a more limited appeal but for those who recognise our over-centralised form of government and the hotch-potch of local authorities recently exposed in an SDP policy document, there is a wider relevance.

I find myself at one with his fear of a drift towards centralised power and a weakening of representative government and the peripheral role of the MP which led me to vacate my seat rather than be a tool of Party or Whips. John Mackintosh was made of sterner stuff and battled to the tragic end. His example and that of others currently challenging the established two-party system and his posthumous influence have been among those that have revived my passion for politics. It brought me out of my corner to throw and receive a few more blows in the bruising battle that alone safeguards Parliamentary

democracy. To do otherwise would be a betrayal of the ideas set out so readably in a pair of books that have given me more pleasure than anything I have read for a considerable time. In particular I commend his essay 'What is Wrong with British Parliamentary Democracy?', written as long ago as 1968.

PAUL ROSE

ANGLO-IRISH LITERATURE

Short History of Anglo-Irish Literature. Roger McHugh and Maurice Harmon. Wolfhound Press. £12.50.

All the grand company are here to be sure—Yeats, Wilde, Joyce, Shaw and Synge . . . O'Brien, O'Connor, O'Casey, O'Faoláin and O'Flaherty, Stephens, Beckett and Behan. And stumbling up out of the remote past, my own forebear Sir Jonah Barrington and James Clarence Mangan: vanishing into the sunlight of tomorrow, Seamus Heaney, Thomas Kinsella, Patrick Kavanagh and John Hewitt. How one could go on. But so many people have. Suffice it to say that this splendid and useful book, written by two leading scholars in Anglo-Irish studies, serves well on all the expected, and indeed required, writers, but it is in the pre-Irish Revival, pre-twilit zone, that it provides that little bit extra. A vital portion, for the old Irish system and its literature supplies to this day a strong element in the imaginative resources of the Irish writer—poet, dramatist, novelist. It stemmed, this Part One of the Irish Literary Syllabus, from the Celtic Goidels or Gaels. Gaelic civilisation was tribal in structure and endowed with a rigid pecking order—the king, the warrior-class of aristocratic lineage, then, next step down the hierarchical ladder, the *aes dána* or men of art, that is judges, doctors, skilled craftsmen and poets.

The poet bore the title *file*, which means 'seer', and was thus clothed from the start in becoming druidical robes. The mystic aura still clung four hundred years after immigrant Christian feet had flattened the indigenous pagan ophidians, and the *filí* were revered and honoured for, among other attributes, their power of divination. Custodians and reciters of traditional tales, recorders of genealogies, composers of music, and public orators of the virtues of those kings and nobles under whose patronage they were permitted to flourish, some, inevitably, degenerated into mere bardic eulogisers—poets laureate you could say. Most, however, remained upon their elevated plane, memorising—for there was as yet no recording in writing, although ogham was known—the traditional learning, creative and historical, and transmitting it orally to their successors. With the advent of Christianity came, gradually, the writing down of the old tales. This book discusses the part played by Christianity in bringing to an end Irish cultural isolation, demonstrates how the early missionaries imported a Graeco-Roman culture, which then spread with the monastic centres, and extended literary learning beyond the ranks of the official literary caste, the *filí*. Between them, monks and *filí* gave Ireland a literary tradition older than that of any European country except Greece and Rome.

The second part of the syllabus traces the process by which that culture was broken up, and by which English replaced Irish as the spoken language. It is a story of cultural conflict and transition, the rape of Joyce's beautiful temptress by invaders Scandinavian, Anglo-Norman, Elizabethan, Cromwellian and Williamite. She finally absorbs their strength and assimilates them into her family. A new literary tradition in English struggles to life with the writings of Jonathan Swift, gathering strength throughout the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries to come to its full Anglo-Irish flowering under the horticultural expertise of the cultivators of the Celtic Twilight.

Nicely illustrated, clearly written, amazingly comprehensive, wearing its erudition as inoffensively as a shamrock, this short history manages to tell a long tale without breathlessness in commendably short compass.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

MORAL CONFLICT AND RATIONAL CHOICE

Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Bernard Williams. Cambridge University Press. Hardback £16.50, paperback £5.95.

In his new volume of philosophical essays Professor Bernard Williams writes 'Moral philosophy certainly needs the benefits of theory, but of theory in other parts of philosophy. I am more than ever convinced that what it does not need is a theory of its own. There cannot be any very interesting, tidy or self-contained theory of what morality is.' In his previous book, *Problems of the Self* (CUP 1973), he dealt with pressing philosophical questions of personal identity: his new book goes further into the matter of discovering the rational basis of all moral action. His stimulating though difficult argument, against the supposed necessity of accepting or rejecting whole a system of moral philosophy, makes it possible for the reader to see his own moral experience in a new light.

The rational basis for action which he proposes does not, however, entail an all-out rejection of systems as such. To reject wholesale the long historical build-up of what it means to have a conscience about one's moral choices would clearly be absurd. In giving due consideration to the personality of the chooser, Bernard Williams is not in any way supposing that an idiosyncratic perception of a given situation will justify a decision about what is to be done. Rather, he is concerned to show that no entirely 'objective' view of it is even possible, let alone obligatory. Indeed, no such perspective on knowledge itself can exist in the real world. In the essay on 'Persons, character and morality', the author tackles the problem of making moral choices where love and friendship are engaged in the situation: for, he says 'somewhere . . . one reaches the necessity that such things as deep attachments to other persons will express themselves in the world in ways which cannot at the same time embody the impartial view, and that they also run the risk of offending against it.' Emotional involvement is a necessary part of the substance of life and may itself include allegiance to an impartial system of moral belief: conflicts of conscience arise as a direct consequence of the two loyalties: therefore supremacy cannot be awarded to the impartial system. 'It follows,' he concludes, 'that moral philosophy's habit, particularly in its Kantian forms, of treating persons in abstraction from character is not so much a device for dealing with one aspect of thought, but is rather a misrepresentation, since it leaves out what both limits and helps to define that aspect of thought.'

The essay from which the book takes its title, *Moral Luck*, faces a peculiarly intractable problem of moral philosophy. Through examples of luck in life-chances, the author shows how reflection on one's own experience, and opportunities to be 'wicked', can illumine whole areas of ethical thought and can reveal its basic elements. 'Not to have been born in Nazi Germany', a matter of chance, whilst it cannot remove responsibility for his actions from the agent, is certainly a substantive feature of his case. Success in decision-making cannot depend on luck in its ordinary sense for this would entail an

infinite regress of 'if only' arguments. An inevitable characteristic of moral thinking is that we judge our actions in retrospect to have been right or wrong, and not only in terms of the success or failure of the hoped-for outcome. The outcome colours our retrospective assessment of our own rightness or error in much the same way as it determines our judgment of the correctness of any other sort of conclusion. Painful as it may be to accept the fact that justification partly depends on our right or wrong decision at the time, an act of judgment not only has to be but is, in real life, made by normal human beings. The judgment has to be made from a standpoint in time as well as by a person, and no one can possibly remove himself from the centre of the picture, either now or at the earlier stage. Bernard Williams, whilst setting his arguments in the context of the dilemmas that actually face us, provides no comforting solutions. It requires the strongest nerves to confront the issues as he sets them out. There could be no higher accolade offered to the author than this.

BETTY ABEL

CHRISTIANITY AND THE FAMILY

The Subversive Family: An Alternative History of Love and Marriage.
Ferdinand Mount. Jonathan Cape. £9.50.

Ferdinand Mount (my nephew, I acknowledge proudly) should bring new encouragement to lovers of the family in this brilliant tour de force. 'Marriage and the family', he sums up, 'make other experiences, both pleasant and unpleasant, seem a little tame and bloodless. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that a way of living that is both so intense and so enduring must somehow come naturally to us, that it is part of being human.' The enemies of the family are well and truly taken apart, as he proceeds majestically through two thousand years of history.

But my praise cannot be unqualified. He dogmatically rejects the idea that the concept of the family owes anything to the inspiration of Jesus Christ or the Christian gospels. 'The sermon on the mount is a wonderful intoxicating sermon. But it is a sermon for bachelors.' And the family, which he defends so staunchly, is based on what he calls the popular, rather than the Christian model.

Christian marriage is 'a life-long, divinely ordered indissoluble relationship, within which *all* sexual activity and all childbearing must take place'. Ferdinand Mount announces that this 'unrealised, unrealisable ideal is certainly fading'. After fifty years of married life along those lines, I cannot be expected to agree with him. 'Popular marriage is designed for two of the same objects as Christian marriage, namely, the procreation and protection of children and the mutual help and affection of the couple, but it does not realistically expect to monopolise procreation or affection.' A distinctly lower ideal.

Mount's proposition that Christ contributed nothing to the family is based on a supposed contrast between love of family and love of God. He seems to have forgotten the second commandment that we should love our neighbours as ourselves. Later on we are told to love them, 'as Christ has loved us.' Mount does not deny that Jesus intended marriage to be a life-long association. No one who has reflected at all carefully on the gospels can doubt that, in the eyes of Christ, the mutual love of the two persons involved in this indissoluble partnership should represent the apex of human devotion.

Ferdinand Mount gives many valuable figures related to marriage and divorce. From his point of view the enormous increase in divorce in recent years is by no means a reason for alarm and despondency. On the contrary, it is a welcome sign of liberation and entirely beneficial to his conception of the family. He entirely rejects the title of a leading article in *The Times* of 11 May 1981, which was headed 'The continuing decline of marriage'. He prefers the view expressed by Mr. Ronald Fletcher in 'The Family and Marriage in Britain'.

'There is simply no evidence', says Mr. Fletcher, 'which would permit us to speak of the breakdown of the family, or the growing instability of family life.' Ferdinand Mount heartily agrees with him. Has he no inkling of the amount of agony and distress which arises in the case of so many broken marriages? I know him to be thoroughly humane, so I must conclude that he has not yet dwelt on this aspect of popular marriage.

To write this is in no way to belittle the marvellous selection of quotations to be found here, from Augustine to Chaucer, from Marx to C. S. Lewis, nor to diminish our gratitude that the family, however conceived, should have attracted so doughty a champion.

FRANK LONGFORD

SHORTER REVIEWS

Gulliver's Travels (Penguin Books. UK £1.25; USA \$2.25). Jonathan Swift's classic was first published in the Penguin English Library in 1967, edited by Peter Dixon and John Chalker. It is now reprinted together with Michael Foot's Introduction. The latter is, of course, an authority on Swift, as well as being the Leader of the Labour Party and M.P. He describes the immediate success of the book in 1726, the subsequent opprobrium vented both on the author and the book in subsequent years, and the more recent rehabilitation. Swift may well have died from G.P.I., but Mr. Foot discounts his madness, particularly when *Gulliver's Travels* was written. In his view, '*Gulliver's Travels* is not the work of some indefinable demon operating in the decaying carcass of the famous Dean of St. Patrick's but the deliberate contrivance of his intense, luminous, compassionate mind.' The Editors have provided a brief biblio-

graphy and useful annotations to the text.

On War (Penguin Books. UK £2.95; USA \$4.95). This abridged version of General Carl von Clausewitz's classic, which was first published in full in 1832 shortly after his death, follows the text of Col. J. J. Graham's translation which first appeared in 1908. It is now reprinted in the Penguin Classics, having been first published in this series in 1968. It concentrates on the 'philosophical, social, psychological and political aspects of war'. In his long Introduction, Anatol Rapaport writes: 'The legitimacy of war as an instrument of national policy, and its efficacy as a means of winning prestige and the respect of other states, is an essential feature of the Clausewitzian philosophy'. Mr. Rapaport discusses controversially this philosophy in relation to post-war national policies.

Collected Poems: Edith Sitwell. (Macmillan. Papermac. £5.95). A compact and satisfying volume, the first publication in paperback of the collected poems, first issued in 1957, containing all the published verse, the complete texts of *Façade* and *Sleeping Beauty*, and many previously uncollected poems. Edith Sitwell's own prefatory 'Notes' are, of course, preserved, and still provide an excellent and telling apologia for the early experiments in rhythmic patterning and in prosody generally, and a statement of the darkening and the feeling of the poetry after Hiroshima. Here for all to see *in toto* is a progression from spiky talent to a power still not fully appreciated. (R.W.E.)

Henry James: Selected Tales. (Dent. £2.75). In this Everyman paperback, Peter Messent and Tom Paulin have selected eight of James' short stories, namely *The Private Life* (1892), *The Real Thing* (1892), *The Altar of the Dead* (1895), *In the Cage* (1898), *The Beast in the Jungle*, (1903), *The Birthplace* (1903), *The Jolly Corner* (1908), and *The Bench of Desolation* (1910). These stories, writes Peter Messent in his Introduction, 'show how certain themes remain constant in James' work: how in the tales, art and life, imagination and reality, are seen to be at odds. James sets consciousness in the context of a world which seems to promise only gross materialism and spiritual emptiness'. There is a useful and brief bibliography relative to these stories.

Arvon Foundation Poetry Competition 1980 Anthology. (Kilnurst Publishing Co. £3.00 Paperback). A thoroughly enjoyable collection of prize and commended poetry edited and introduced by Ted Hughes and Seamus Heaney, arranged not in order of merit but alphabetically by title, so that the reader may indulge himself with some practical criticism before turning to the index. The

poems vary greatly in type, from powerful extended outpourings, like an amazing poem set in William Burroughs' land, called *The Baboon in the Night Club*, to a few gnomic lines like *Soil* or *The Unknown*. There is plenty that is 'modern' in form, although nothing that could be only of the 'eighties, and also plenty that is traditional. The adjudicators have always selected for the highest praise the poem that appears to convey a 'genuine' and deeply-felt insight or emotion, and in this way, the mainstream of English poetry continues its course. R.W.E.

Writers at Work: The Paris Review Interviews: Third Series. (Penguin Books £2.95). A re-issue of the substantial third series, edited by George Plimpton and introduced most acutely by Alfred Kazin, which uncannily spans the century with its interviews with William Carlos Williams, Jean Cocteau, Lillian Hellman. . . There is the famous encounter with Evelyn Waugh—'He re-entered, wearing a pair of white pyjamas and metal-rimmed spectacles. He took a cigar, lit it, and got into bed.' Saul Bellow delivers a characteristically profound dissertation on the novel, and Harold Pinter indicates that he writes by the instinctual, inspirational mode. Perhaps more exotic, because less familiar, territory is covered by vivid biographical data in the interviews with Louis-Ferdinand Céline and Blaise Cendrars. R.W.E.

Historical Abstracts (European Bibliographical Centre at Clio Press Ltd., Oxford). The Annual Index for 1981 of The American Bibliographical Center is contained in Vol. 32 in two separate Parts. Part A covers Modern History Abstracts (1450-1914) and Part B Twentieth Century Abstracts (1914-1981). Bibliographical entries on United States and Canadian history are set out in *America: History and Life*.

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FRANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

by Aleksandar Prlija

LITTLE more than a year after the change-over of political power in France, the foreign policy orientation of Mitterand's new government is causing considerable confusion among those whose judgements are based on classical criteria. They consider certain moves of the government—in which Communist ministers are comfortably seated—to be totally misplaced. How has it come to pass, for instance, that France under a left wing government is today the strongest pillar of US policy in the European continent, especially in relation to the USSR? Why is Mitterand now stressing 'historical allegiance' to NATO and doing so even more emphatically than his de Gaullist predecessors? How can one explain Mitterand's readiness to keep the door more widely open to a new understanding with Israel, and to adopt an attitude (positive) to the Camp David agreements, which is actually in contrast with the more cautious positions of West European diplomacies and to his whole-hearted backing of sanctions against Argentina?

These and many other questions should be viewed in the light of the manifest differences in the domain of foreign policy between the two strongest parties in the coalition, i.e., the Communists and Socialists. Whereas the views of the Communist Party of France are still very close to the foreign policy positions of the Soviet Union, those of their partners in the government, and of the government as a whole, differ diametrically from the USSR's approach to the international situation. In fact, this difference is even more marked than that which exists between Europe, or more precisely, Western Europe, and the USSR. The CPF, for example, basically justifies and supports Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea. French Communists uphold and encourage all protest actions against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe (envisaged, as will be recalled, by decision of the NATO Council held in Brussels on December 13, 1979), while President Mitterand firmly supports the deployment of these missiles—even more firmly than West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, not to mention former Chancellor and President of the SPD, Willy Brandt.

There are also similar and profound differences between the partners



in the coalition with regard to the Polish crisis, and to the crises in the whole of the Middle East region. True enough, French Communists at their Twenty-fourth Congress held in February 1982 declared and confirmed their position to the effect that the Poles should be allowed to solve their own problems without any external interference. They urged 'indispensable democratic reforms in the interest of socialism in Poland', but at the same time, held the 'excesses' of the Solidarity trade union to be among the principal causes of the present situation in that country. Accordingly, the CPF considers martial law in Poland to be inevitable, but notes that this state of affairs cannot last indefinitely, that reforms should be undertaken and that there 'must never again be a reversal to the situation of the seventies', (the allusion here being to Gomulka's and Gierek's defeated and rejected policies). It is, however, very difficult to reconcile all this with the positions of the Socialist Party and with those of President Mitterand himself. The latter call for the re-establishment of a normal situation in Poland and hold the USSR to be partly responsible for the present state of affairs which they consider to be a 'violation of the basic premises of the Helsinki Final Act'. In their view the Soviet Union's build-up of SS-20 medium range missile and its present references to the 'Yalta division' of Europe, only strain relations further and aggravate the general atmosphere, so that the Soviet Union and its ambitions cannot be ruled out as a cause of the present tense situation in Europe.

All these issues and differences evidently influence the shaping of France's present-day foreign policy. In point of fact, though in somewhat simplified terms, it may be said that this policy is today mainly 'in the hands' of President Mitterand, which is actually in the de Gaullist tradition established during the entire period of the Fifth Republic. This makes it easier for the Communist to accept the explanation that the present government coalition, being of so broad a nature, primarily aims at effecting the internal transformation of French society, leaving foreign policy to the President of the Republic. The Communist Party is thus relieved of part of its obligations as a partner in the coalition. And so a *modus vivendi* has for the present been found, although there is little doubt that the further deterioration of the international situation and a reversal to 'cold war' practices would expose the present co-operation between the Communists and Socialists in the government to a very serious trial. However, and we may add fortunately, this has a 'feedback' effect, 'softening' Mitterand's attitude to certain aspects of France's relations with the USSR, as well as to some other international issues. Thus, the most essential prerequisites have been created for the functioning of what, for the moment, is the most unusual government coalition in the world.

The observations set out here are necessary to elucidate the options and most important practical goals of France's foreign policy, for without mentioning some of the circumstances and elements that influence the positions of President Mitterand and of the new French government with regard to outstanding problems and current crises, that policy would indeed seem devoid of any stable concept.

Although it is true that these different elements bring pressure to bear upon Mitterand's foreign policy, it is a fact that the government in its first year in office has displayed many inconsistencies in its approach to the international situation. When dealing with deviations from the proclaimed principles and programme on the basis of which the Socialists won last year's election, the serious economic difficulties and crises which the entire industrial world is experiencing must be kept in mind. The present economic crisis, unprecedented since the Great Depression of the thirties, and since the time of Roosevelt and his New Deal, has a limiting effect on the implementation of some of the proclaimed principles to which the French Socialists and President Mitterand are otherwise sincerely committed. Confronted with these economic difficulties, France continues to sell arms to the conflict-ridden areas of the Middle East. It has not broken off trade, nor put an end to peacetime nuclear co-operation with the racist regime of the South African Republic, nor even with the regime in Chile, although in the latter case certain changes may be perceived as no new agreements on arms deliveries have been signed with the Junta; while some of the agreements concluded by the former government are not being implemented. Thus, economic problems compel Mitterand and the Socialists to resort to measures which are not in keeping with the proclaimed principles of their policy, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the efforts they are making to stem the rise of unemployment, a matter to which the new French government attaches great importance. Economic factors and crises have a similar effect on France's long-standing relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe as a whole. The view prevails that the Polish crisis as well as France's intransigent attitude to Soviet deployment of modern medium range missiles would have cut back France's volume of trade with the USSR had France not been faced with serious economic problems.

Once the elements described here are taken into consideration it will be easier to get a clearer idea of the principal directions of Mitterand's approach to the current and more lasting problems of international relations.

One of the first strategic pivotal points of Mitterand's foreign policy is no doubt the emphasis on the 'new type' of France's allegiance to NATO. It is quite certain that the ostensibly 'consistent Atlantic' component of France's new policy shocked the less informed observers of the French left. There is also no doubt that this meant a significant, it may even be said, a basic departure from de Gaulle's concept of the international position of France as an independent nuclear power, not 'between' the East and West, but 'beyond and above' these major world military and ideological blocs. De Gaulle was equally against the monopoly of either of these blocs. Mitterand, too, is against the monopoly of the superpowers, but he believes that France is capable of ensuring its position 'between' the East and West by keeping out of the strictly military side of NATO, while at the same time benefiting by the renewal of its political and historical loyalty to NATO. This may be explained by

Mitterrand's endeavours to establish 'such a correlation between socialism and freedom as has yet not been witnessed in history.'

The proclaimed desire and endeavour to build an 'alternative socialist society' (as opposed to 'real' socialism, which term at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPF was replaced by the term 'existing' socialism, this being by no means incidental) forms part of a grandiose plan on the future of Europe. Mitterrand's Socialists, like Berlinguer's Communists, consider that the great revolutionary potential of transformation brought into being by the October Revolution has today been 'practically exhausted'. ('One thing the Communists will never forgive me'—Mitterrand stated in February 1981—'is that I have become a French Berlinguer.')

In other words, everything possible should be done for 'the tradition of Jaurés and Leon Blum' (the latter, founder of the Front Populaire of 1936, is the type of socialist leader closest to Mitterrand's historical model) to be reinstated in transforming society into a socialist one 'without the impairment of freedom', which freedom, in the view of the French Socialists, was actually repressed by Stalin's practice and the USSR. This attitude brings them closer to certain values of the Western Alliance which, naturally enough, are devoid of all military attributes, but which are applied in a broad social and historical context. Hence, Mitterrand's 'Atlantism' may seem to be a mere repetition of the 'Atlantism' of Guy Mollet and his other predecessors, but such a mechanical analogy would nonetheless be incorrect as proved by the far-reaching and profound socialist changes carried out in France under the left wing government. These changes have little in common with classic social-democratic reformism; they are, on the contrary, the target of vitriolic accusations by domestic and foreign right wing circles.

And so, the ties with NATO should not be regarded as something which narrows France's manoeuvring space between the East and West merely because it increases opposition to the practice and policy of the Eastern bloc in comparison with de Gaulle's former policy and that of his followers. This process will no doubt continue in the future, but current political reasons and pragmatic needs will moderate France's policy towards the East, and especially towards the Soviet Union.

In this context it would be well to recall Mitterrand's opposition to the division of the world, and of Europe in particular, between the super-powers. Referring to the Yalta divisions at his first press conference as President of the Republic, Francois Mitterrand summed this up very clearly in the following way:

All that leads to the transcendence and rejection of the Yalta formulas is a good thing, but we must gradually transcend this division, carefully bearing in mind the slow pace at which history moves.

This was evidently said in view of the inevitable, if only temporary, need to accept the reality of the Yalta agreements in the case of Poland and of the crisis created by the proclamation of martial law in that country. This may also explain the tolerant attitude adopted by Reagan's Administration to Mitterrand's decisions to bring Communist ministers

into the government. What the US vigorously opposed in the case of Berlinguer's far less orthodox Italian Communists, was accepted almost without commotion in the case of France, even though the French Communist Party is far closer to the USSR and to 'existing' socialism than is one CPL. This was accepted because the long-term strategic goal of building an 'alternative socialist society coupled with freedom' provides more space for closer co-operation with Mitterand in Europe (once again, in opposition to the USSR).

All of this should be kept in mind when attempting to provide a proper interpretation of Mitterand's 'alternative socialist policy' and his 'anti-Soviet' and ostensible 'pro-American' policy in Europe, in the Middle East and particularly in relation to Israel.

Another important strategic goal of Mitterand's new policy is his ambition to change or at least to initiate a change in the relations between the developed and developing countries. The improvement of North-South relations forms part of the programme documents of the Socialist Party and of the entire new left. In his speech on the position of the least developed countries delivered at the session of the United Nations held on September 1, 1980, at UNESCO in Paris, President Mitterand undertook the obligation to double France's contribution to the developing countries up to the year 1988. For the first time in twenty-five years, what France invests in the development of its overseas territories and holdings has not been entered in the statistics now compiled by the Ministry for Co-operation headed by Minister Jean-Pierre Cot. At the conference of the heads of state or government of 22 countries held in Cancun in October 1981, France was the most ardent advocate of global negotiations between the developed and developing countries.

In line with the decisions of the special session of the UN General Assembly, France more resolutely than any of the other developed countries of both the East and the West, urged the speedier solution, in terms of policies and programmes, of the present adverse position of the developing world. Among other things it sees here the opportunity to strengthen its role and improve the unfavourable position of its own economy by engaging in trade with some of the highly industrialised nations (Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and the USA). This, however, should not cloud the significance of its commitment which is objectively in line with the requests of the Group of 77, reflecting desire for joint action by all developing countries.

Yet another important strategic goal of France's foreign political ambitions is linked with the struggle for human rights and democratic freedoms, which in turn is directly related to the crisis in relations between the USA and France over Central America, since France supports movements which express the historical aspiration of peoples to emancipate themselves. At the same time this is also seen as France's attempt to uphold the policy of the Socialist International to which it is, to some extent, tied. This coincident of views may also be discerned in France's European policy, but it finds particular expression in the policy *vis-à-vis*

Latin America and the liberation movements. The best illustration of this is Paris' attitude towards Salvador. Only those who do not realise how strong is the strategic orientation of the new French policy could have been surprised at the French and Mexican Declaration about Salvador made public on August 30, 1981. In that Declaration, Mitterand's France and Mexico recognise the Farabundo Marti Front of national liberation (FMLN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) as 'representative political forces, ready and capable of assuming obligations which arise therefrom.'

There is hardly any need to point out that this Declaration was frowned upon by Reagan's Administration. The fact that no great clamour was raised over it, as was the case at the time of de Gaulle's opposition to the great Atlantic ally, may be explained by the irreplaceability of Mitterand's France as America's partner in Europe, helping to curb the spread of Soviet influence and prevent a change in the balance of power in favour of the USSR, especially at a time when, even in the USA, pacifist movements are proliferating.

These three basic features, i.e., the specific Atlantic loyalty along with France's special place in East-West relations, support to the speedier resolution of problems involving North-South relations and full support to all peoples fighting for their right to self-determination, represent the basic directions of France's new foreign policy. Evidently enough, that policy will for a long time bear the brunt not only of the heritage of Giscard's former administration, but also of the relations with the super-powers dating back to a more remote period of contemporary history. Time and persevering efforts will certainly be required to translate certain idealistic principles into practice, while the present political and international crises, such as those over Poland, Salvador and the Middle East, as well as the need—imposed by the economic crisis—to sell arms and nuclear equipment, will continue to shape Mitterand's foreign policy which will appear to many to be following a zig-zag path. This view, as we have here endeavoured to show, is nonetheless basically erroneous, one-sided and certainly incomplete.

[Aleksandar Prija is Paris Correspondent of the daily newspaper *Politika*.]

THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR THE WAR OF MISCALCULATIONS

by Khalid Kishtainy

THE Iraq-Iran conflict has its old historic dimensions as well as its contemporary causes. For thousands of years, the defenceless but rich cultivable valley of Mesopotamia presented a tempting prize for the poorer inhabitants of the rugged and mostly barren Zagros mountains to the east. Over the centuries, their hordes moved into Mesopotamia as immigrants in peace-time and as conquerors in time of war. Under Shi'ite Islam, the holy cities of Najaf, Karbala', Kadhimia and Samarra' added further attraction to the Iranians who wanted to live and die within the Mu'azzin call of the sacred shrines. In our lifetime, Iraqis became familiar with the sights of buses and lorries taking illegal Iranian residents and pilgrims to the border under police escorts, both before and after the 1958 Revolution. The repeated Iranian invasions of Iraq since Babylonian times, filled the annals of Iraqi propagandists and inflamed the imagination of the people with the stories of Persian brutalities. Thus was created the usual psychological framework of suspicion and fear.

Commentators have rarely dealt with the present war without bringing in the sectarian issue, so much so that the war has almost taken on the quality of a religious war. Iran was converted in the sixteenth century to Shi'ism—the faith of the oppressed, the persecuted and the fanatical, whereas Iraq remained basically Sunni, although the present demographic composition may give the Shi'ite a fractional majority (there are no official statistics on the subject). As the old centre of the Abbassid Caliphate and later on the jewel province of the Ottoman Empire, Baghdad remained strongly entrenched in Sunni thoughts, jurisprudence and administration. Despite the British attempt to give the Shi'ites a fairer deal, the force of tradition and determination of the Sunnis maintained the old bias.

It was natural for the Shi'ites to feel disadvantaged and even persecuted. The Iranians tried to exploit this feeling during their various invasions of Iraq by posing as the defenders of the persecuted believers. This has added a religious dimension to the conflict which prompted many observers to view the present war as one of religion. It is doubtful, however, that the conflict would vanish by the conversion of the whole of Iraq to Shi'ism. Indeed, it may be even assumed that the original conversion of Iran to this faith was simply a confirmation of her separate identity and an ideological resultant of the economic and geophysical conflict.

The British withdrawal east of Suez created a sudden vacuum in the Gulf, just when the Gulf was acquiring a strategic importance as the main supplier of oil and accumulator of wealth. The Shah signalled his intention of replacing Britain and carried it through by capturing the three Arab islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb at the

mouth of the Gulf. The only Arab power which could challenge this Iranian design was Iraq, and the trial of strength began in earnest between the two countries. President Saddam Hussein reacted sharply to the occupation of the islands and expressed the determination to restore them to Arab hands.

With the flow of oil money, both countries started to arm heavily. The Shah demanded a better share of Shatt Al-Arab Waterway, and went on to pressurise the Iraqis by using the Kurds, who were then in revolt against Baghdad. Saddam Hussein could not bring the costly fighting to an end without neutralising the Iranians first. This was finally done in Algiers when both leaders signed the 1975 Agreement which gave the Shah what he wanted in the Waterway and installed him as the effective master in the Gulf area. Like most other imposed settlements, the Algiers Agreement was only a brief act in a long drawn play, and carried with it the seeds of a greater problem. The contest with the Shah made Iraq a natural haven for the Iranian opposition. Among those who sought refuge in this country and used it as an anti-Shah base was Khomeini who stayed for thirteen years in the holy city of Najaf agitating against the Throne of the Peacock. With the new agreement between the two countries and swift collapse of the Kurdish Revolt, Iraq had no further use of Khomeini and his presence became an embarrassment. After some consultations with the Shah, Khomeini was sent out of the country unceremoniously. Many stories were woven around the undignified manner with which he was hustled across the border. This, and perhaps other personal experiences, created in Khomeini's mind a strong feeling against Saddam Hussein and his regime. Iraq tried to pacify this feeling after his triumphant return to Teheran, but the Ayatollah was not impressed and did not forget. As he embarked on exporting his Islamic Revolution, Iran's propagandists launched an anti-Iraq campaign calling for the overthrow of the secular Ba'th Party. The campaign was accompanied by a series of violent operations, one of which injured the Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz.

Iran had thus touched on the Ba'thists' most sensitive nerve: security. Iraq has a turbulent history which has been punctuated in our era with a series of violent coups. The natives and foreigners alike recognise that the stability enjoyed by the country for the last fourteen years is probably Saddam Hussein's greatest achievement, regardless of its effects on the question of human rights. Khomeini's subversive campaign was sabotaging this prime achievement and putting the very life of the Ba'thists in mortal danger. Their antidote has remained the same: a resort to force. They reckoned that what worked internally should work externally, which is a gross miscalculation. Indeed, if there is any appropriate name for this war it should be called The War of Miscalculations. The Iraqis assumed that the Iranians would behave like the Iraqis in responding to events with rationality rather than mysticism, and thus cut their losses soon enough and sue for peace. From the days of Babylon, the Mesopotamians have believed that their lot is here on this earth and have never

taken religion, let alone martyrdom, as seriously as other peoples have done in the Middle East. With the high fiscal rewards showered by the Government on the martyrs' families in this war, the Iraqis have obviously turned even martyrdom into an earthly calculable commodity. They never expected the Iranians to be so willing to have their cities, oil industry and economic installations destroyed and to endure long hardships over the insignificant, disputed demands. Nor did they expect the Iranians actually to enjoy and relish the orgy of death. This readiness to die so baffled some Iraqis that they attributed it to drugs administered by the Mullahs! The Iraqis also miscalculated in expecting Iran to disintegrate and the Arabs of the South to rise and join their Arab brothers from Iraq. There was indeed a great deal of internal trouble, but as far as the war was concerned, the Iranians were generally united in their resistance and determination. Certain mistakes in Iraq's internal policies seem to have persuaded the Arabs of Arabistan (Khusistan) not to change horses.

Iran, on the other hand, has had its own miscalculations in expecting the Iraqis, or at least the Shi'ite Iraqis, to behave like the Iranians and react from the standpoint of religion. Khomeini looked on the ruling Ba'th Party as atheistic, oppressive to the faithful and discriminatory against the Shi'ites. During the war, Iranian politicians spoke of liberating the Holy City of Najaf from the forces of Satan. It was therefore their expectation to see the Iraqi Moslems avail themselves of the opportunity of the war to overthrow what they called the 'Saddamis'. Neither this nor the smaller ambition of seeing the Shi'ite soldiery mutiny or defect, has materialised. True, Iraqi morale showed cracks during the spring and the battles for Muhammara (Khormshahr) and the Ahwaz; but since the withdrawal from all Iranian territory, the Iraqi Armed Forces have acquitted themselves commendably in defending their frontier and inflicting defeat on the invaders. Khomeini's appeal to the people and Armed Forces of Iraq to rebel has fallen on deaf ears.

Notwithstanding the armed clashes in the Kurdish regions of both countries, the two nations appear to have acted with responsibility towards the foreign danger and in defending their territory. Optimists have drawn the lesson that the national unity of both comparatively newly formed states have stood up to the test—at least so far. Like the Iraqis who were baffled by the fighting spirit of their adversaries, the Iranians had to explain the Iraqi determination to fight back, not by reference to any drug, but to the ruthless security measures of the Ba'th.

It is a war of miscalculations, but what caused these misunderstandings? There are those who put Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States behind it all. They had their fears of a strong Iran and a strong Iraq and a conflagration turning both States to ashes would suit them very well. It was thus reported that Saddam Hussein visited Saudi Arabia shortly before the war and received a number of assurances underwriting Iraq's risks. It is a question of the beneficial party fanning the conflict and creating the miscalculations. Also, we have here the United States, who managed to secure the release of the hostages as a result of Iran's war needs for

cash and spare parts; and Israel, who benefited from the occupying Iraqi Army, draining Iraq's resources and deepening the Middle East divisions and disunities. It was thus suggested that the military press reports downgrading Iran's capabilities before the war, were inspired by Israeli intelligence. Indeed, with the present oil glut and industrial recession, all the Western Powers have benefited from this war. In pursuing and even professing a narrow self-interest and aggressive non-alignment coupled with much criticised security measures and operations, Iraq has not endeared itself to the major powers, nor did Iran with its hostage-taking, civil rights violations and anti-Western fundamentalism and Islamic militancy. This War of Miscalculations was therefore received with secret rejoicing in many quarters. Yet, over and above these issues, there remains what almost look like a Shavian life force, or more appropriately a death force in the present context, inching the two countries irresistibly towards collision. One way or another, the vacuum in this astronomically rich region must be filled and its mastery must be secured in some powerful hands. The time of religious and nationalist euphoria is the best (or, for that matter, the worst) time for settling such a question.

The war has resulted in incalculable losses to both countries. Many towns and villages in Iran, including the important port of Muhammara and the oil centre of Abadan, are devastated. Iraqi oil, power and industrial installations were also wrecked, as is the new harbour of Mina Bakr. The oil production of two years dropped, for both countries, roughly to about a quarter of its normal annual rate. Iran had to sell its gold and much of its treasures to meet the military requirements as its national income fell by thirteen per cent according to the Central Bank of Iran. The casualty figures of the opponents are contradictory, but the total fatality figures may soon come to two hundred thousand.

To the clergy of Iran, nothing is too much for God, i.e. their supremacy, as they set out to cleanse the land from Satan and his Western inventions and material luxuries, but it is a different story for the Iraqis who were promised just that sort of thing, i.e. better standard of living and more of everything. Even in the war zone, the Iraqi trenches were described as five-star trenches for their fridges, videos and other luxuries. Until the last few months, the authorities behaved as if there was no war. Business remained as usual and the shops were supplied with even more and better goods. Obviously this could not go on indefinitely and the Syrian closure of the pipeline to the Mediterranean on 8th April hastened the depletion of the Treasury. Belts must be tightened, development slowed down and many contracts suspended.

The Iraqi desire to bring the fighting to an end has become more urgent than ever. This is Iraq's Achilles heel and Iranians know where it is. The more Saddam Hussein calls for peace the more intransigent the Ayatollahs become. They wanted first the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Iran. They later demanded the right for the Iranian forces to cross Iraq to Syria. Now they want to liberate the holy cities. Their demand for war reparations of \$50,000m is topped up to \$150,000m. Over and

above, they want Saddam Hussein overthrown and put on trial.

The Teheran leaders are gradually slipping into a new miscalculation. Part of the Iraqi Government's accusations against Iran is her interference in the internal affairs of Iraq and her ambitions to dominate the Gulf. The demands to change the Ba'thist Government, install a clerical administration under a man of their choice, namely Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim, conduct an election in which undesirable forces are excluded—as urged by Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Parliament—enjoy a special position at the Holy Cities of Iraq and extract impossible reparations which will impoverish the Iraqis for years to come, will only confirm those accusations and heighten the fears of the Arabs of the Gulf. After Iraq, whose turn will it be?

This is not the spirit of Islam which may appeal to fellow Moslems. This is the greed of an aggressive nationalism which may only result in cementing an opposing nationalism. Far from isolating the Iraqi leadership, it will rally the people around it as an answer to the challenge. Far from causing a general defection in the Army it will help to close its ranks, and to fight with even more determination than has already been shown in the defence of Basrah.

It is very difficult to forecast what is going to happen next as the power of logical calculation seems always to evaporate under the Middle East sun. But of the various possibilities in this field, the worst is most probably an Iranian in-depth invasion of Iraq. That is why there was some considerable hesitation even among the Iranian leadership in reaching the decision to invade. Apart from the terrible losses in human life and habitation, the invaders may really have to go all the way to Baghdad to bring about the overthrow of the Government. How will they control their undisciplined troops? What backlashes may follow? How will they control the towns and ensure the survival of the protégé government, or do they mean to stay and turn Iraq into a protectorate, pumping oil for the reconstruction of Iran by way of war compensation? Whatever happens, a fully fledged invasion will unleash forces bent on vendetta, hungry for positions and fanatical in belief. They may well turn the country into an inferno far worse than anything experienced in Lebanon recently.

Iraq is a conglomeration of sects and nationalities, with the usual centuries-old grievances and suspicions whose remedies are more than overdue. The attempt to effect the necessary re-adjustments under an Iranian occupation is bound to be brutal and bloody, so much so that a civil war and total disintegration of the country cannot be ruled out. Yet a military stalemate along the one thousand kilometres frontier is going to be a very costly arrangement. The latest Iraqi attempt to end the war is to bring all shipping to and from Iranian ports to a standstill until the Iranians come to the negotiating table. The Kharg Island oil terminal and two merchant vessels were recent casualties, to which Teheran responded by threatening to close the entire Gulf to all shipping.

This is a war of miscalculations and the best way to resolve it is through a proper and brave search into mistakes and failings on both

sides. The first thing they will discover is that the war was a result of a 'peace' of miscalculation. Interference into other people's internal affairs has never benefited any country in the Middle East and Nasser's Egypt was a good example; the export of one's own revolution and style of government to others is another fruitless effort, and the Iranians may well take a leaf from the history of the British, the Americans and the Soviets in that region. It has been said that the Islamic Revolution is already deformed and distorted in Iran. What will be the result when it is handled by the cynical Iraqis?

A more adequate sharing of power, genuine participation by all sectors of the people in running the affairs of the country, more freedom of expression to help the authorities in spotting and treating mistakes and injustices, would all help to create a psychological atmosphere which will make the path to peace a worthwhile option and remove the interest of any disgruntled sect or ethnic nationality in investing in the war.

Iraq's difficulties in dealing with Teheran have been compounded by the existence of some hundred thousand deportees in Iran. Their return to Iraq has become another bone of contention between the two parties. It may be assumed that many of these deportees have been wrongfully expelled. The Iraqis will make their quest for peace easier if they allow such people to apply and establish their *bona fide* nationality. It will be a generous gesture which will not go amiss.

As already mentioned, Iraq and Iran have a long record of feud and unhappy relations whose memories have been revived by the war with its terrible blood-letting, massive destruction and human dispersal. Every new day in the calendar of this war will strengthen the ill-feeling between the two nations in this traditional vendetta land. It is most important for the future generations of both countries that this war is ended. The two nations have to learn to live together, forget what their politicians have said and develop a happier community out of the religion, history, tradition and economic interests which they have in common. We have become accustomed to the cry that this or that war is threatening world peace. The Iraq/Iran war is not going to do that, but it is already threatening the interests of the world. The Iranian government served notice that if the Gulf States continue to help Iraq it would close the Straits of Hermuz and actually despatched its fleet to the area. The industrial nations are, of course, making good money out of this war, but the arms industry is not going to salvage the West out of its recession. Apart from the human considerations, the major powers must respond to the danger signals and use their experience, influence and political levers to narrow the gap between the two sides.

[Dr. Khalid Kishtainy's publications in Arabic and English on the Arab Israeli conflict include *Verdict in Absentia*, *Palestine in Retrospective*, *Whither Israel*, *The New Statesman and the Middle East*. *The Prostitute of Progressive Literature* (Allison and Busby) will be published in October 1982.]

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: IN SEARCH OF RELEVANCE

by Juliet Lodge

ONE of the commonest charges levelled against the European Parliament (EP) is that it is irrelevant: irrelevant to European Community (EC) decision-making; irrelevant to the EC's publics; and irrelevant to the EC's national parliaments. Indeed, so engrained has this suggestion become that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), with their eyes on the 1984 direct election of the EP, have begun scrutinising the need for and scope of any information programmes to arouse sufficient public interest in the EP to prompt a high turnout at the polls. Inevitably, one of the things that should interest potential voters is MEPs' record in office. Even if people are generally ignorant of MEPs' activities and are disinclined to seek out details about some of the more esoteric items of EC legislation, they may be still persuaded that the EP is an irrelevant institution unworthy of support by virtue of the sometimes unfavourable press that it receives. Indeed, except when potentially scandalous or emotive issues erupt, like the recent furore over the payment of MEPs' travel expenses or the seal cull, the media tend to overlook the EP's activities. Small wonder that the EP's image is somewhat tarnished. But is it fair to castigate it and by implication its work as irrelevant? Since their election in 1979, have MEPs really neglected matters salient and important to the voters?

A glance at the EP's record reveals that as part of an attempt to both improve its image and to enable it to accord topical political matters more plenary time than discussion of often technical issues already scrutinised in committee, pressing international issues have featured prominently in its work. Not only have there been numerous EP fact-finding missions to areas all over the world, but the EP has assiduously and successfully agitated for action by the EC's member governments when they have appeared unsure or unwilling to proceed.

Important as the EP's work and debates on international affairs have been, and media coverage for certain of its resolutions, few among the EC's publics would claim that those resolutions or MEP's work in international affairs have been directly relevant to the average person's needs. Cognisant of this, both EP President Piet Dankert and the Belgian President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers for the first half of this year have repeatedly stressed the need for the EC to demonstrate its relevance to the lives of ordinary people. Moreover, as the EC-wide *Eurobarometer* opinion polls revealed shortly before the first direct elections in June 1979, not only is awareness of the EC and MEPs' work among non-elites low, but when prompted, EC publics feel the EC should be engaged in a range of policies. It is thought that either for want of adequate funds or Treaty provisions, MEPs are unable to pursue these policies, thus failing to make an impact on the minds of ordinary people.

One of the exceptions to this might, of course, be the EC aid disbursed to the steel industry in the wake of the steel crisis and the EC Commission's decision of October 1980 to impose strict quotas on EC steel production. While member governments are now committed to ending subsidies by 1985, and while areas in the United Kingdom benefit under aid schemes financed from the non-quota section of the regional aid fund, unless the redundant steel workers acquire new employment, and unless MEPs' pressure on Washington in June 1982 to avert the recurring threat of trade war in steel yields results, they are likely to feel that any representations made to the EC and to their MEPs have been in vain.¹

Given the electoral importance of basic socio-economic and welfare policies to voters, is there any evidence to show that MEPs have tried to pursue what might loosely be termed politically and electorally relevant activities successfully? It is true that MEPs have agitated for the EC to devote greater resources to combating rising unemployment and have had some success in getting member governments to endorse meagre programmes (partly EC-financed) to assist the under-25s, be it by way of youth opportunities or training schemes. Indeed, discussions on the draft 1983 budget emphasise the need for more funds to be diverted to combating unemployment, and in April the Commission presented its action programme on combating unemployment. This dealt with a number of matters—notably the protection of temporary workers and the need to prevent the misuse of temporary labour—that MEPs in September 1981 had identified as problems requiring EC action.²

The Council of Ministers' Standing Committee on Employment responded to the Commission's action programme by asking it to prepare a detailed package of proposals relating to the scale of the problems and planned EC action.³ However, as MEPs themselves are not seen as the source of such programmes and as the EC has such limited funds to disburse, it often appears that MEPs make vacuous but well-meaning speeches having no operational effect; and that even MEPs' value as an institutionalised ginger group is doubtful.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suggest that MEPs have not seriously confronted pressing and controversial matters relevant to EC publics, and especially the unemployed. On the contrary, over the past few months, they have attempted both to remind member governments of their obligations under the Rome Treaty *vis-à-vis* sectors of the EC's workers, and to encourage them to act constructively to combat unemployment.

Some MEPs, notably women members, have campaigned for women to be represented on the Commission (without success), and within the EP for greater attention to be accorded women's issues—particularly those affecting employment—and for the establishment of a permanent committee on women. By early this year, the EP's Ad Hoc Committee on Women had become institutionalised and some headway was being made in securing recognition of the fact of high unemployment among women, many of whom, because they work part-time, are not included

in national unemployment figures calculated largely on the basis of the figures of people (predominantly men) able to claim unemployment benefit. Women make up one-third of the EC's workforce and half the *registered* unemployed. In February 1981, MEPs passed a resolution on the situation of women, but not until 1982 was action forthcoming in the shape of Commission proposals.

In May, the EP passed a resolution endorsing the Commission's somewhat belated action programme on women, but also calling on member governments and the Commission to draft clear rather than vague programmes that can be implemented. Interestingly, the new initiative coincides with the publication of the results of a study into the EC's pilot anti-poverty programme of 1975-80 which uncovered gross poverty among women, and their dependent children in unsupported one-parent families and, like the Commission's initiative, highlighted inequality between men and women in earnings, access to training, social security, and family law matters.⁴ In effect, what MEPs have pointed out is the failure of the EC to enact legislation in accordance with the Treaty obligations on equal pay under Article 119. Indeed, concern over the fact that 80 per cent of all cases on equal pay brought before the EC Court of Justice emanate from the United Kingdom, led one MEP to call on the Commission to analyse the reasons for this. It is widely doubted that the high proportion of British cases can be explained by the suggestion that British women are more vigilant of their interests than their EC sisters. It was, therefore, not surprising when recently the Court ruled British legislation in the equal pay area discriminatory and biased against women achieving equal remuneration with men.

Since 1958, only three directives to improve women's lot have been enacted, and that despite the attempt to use a portion of the minute resources of the EC's Social Fund to aid women seeking re-employment. However, women MEPs have also campaigned for a change in public attitudes towards shaping occupational, family and social responsibilities and are pressing for a higher and more equal proportion of women to be represented throughout the higher levels of industrial, socio-economic and political life.

The EC has also tried to promote the cause of industrial democracy, with limited success. Socialist and Communist MEPs favouring measures to oblige the member states to legislate for worker participation at board level were defeated in May when a resolution designed to encourage the EC's member states to adopt their own systems of worker participation was adopted by 158 votes to 109 votes, with nine abstentions. Even so, and in spite of the opposition of Labour MEPs, there is pressure for systems in the Ten to approximate one another. In practice, this would mean the introduction of a system modelled on the practices of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands where all companies with more than 500 employees must ensure workers' participation in forming the supervisory board.

The Commission, which has initiated several directives on the harmon-

isation of company law, has in fact proposed a fifth directive on worker participation, making for a two-tier board structure. It would either consist of a supervisory management board, one-third of whose members would be employees, or it would embrace shareholders, employees and co-opted management representatives. MEPs favour employees appointing 33-50 per cent of the board. Even so, the Commission has had difficulty advancing co-determination. It first submitted a directive on worker participation in 1972. Amended proposals were produced at the EP's behest in 1978 and adopted in 1979 by the non-elected predecessor to the present EP. Following direct elections, the new MEPs referred the proposal back to their Legal Affairs Committee where it was largely re-written in view of over a hundred amendments to it tabled by MEPs.

As the debate by MEPs on the issue this May revealed, worker participation in management remains a highly sensitive and controversial subject, notably in the United Kingdom. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the most vociferous British support for worker participation emanated from the European Democrat (Conservative) MEPs. Sir Fred Catherwood (Cambridgeshire and Wellingborough), taking issue with Labour's opposition to the form of co-determination mooted, pointed out that even if—as had been suggested—co-determination were to apply only to firms with over 1,000 employees, alienation could be reduced dramatically by proper consultation afforded by the system. He noted also that while 2.5 million British jobs depend on the EC, this fact is not communicated to the workers for political reasons.⁵ Progress on co-determination now awaits Council action.

From the debates held and questions tabled in the EP, it is clear that MEPs respond with alacrity to international crises and advance both their own national and constituency issues and matters pertinent to the EC's overall development. They are vigilant also of infringements of the Rome Treaty by other member states. For instance, to note but two recent examples, Joyce Quin (South Tyne and Wear: Socialist) questioned the Commission over the obstructiveness of Italian authorities in paying out unemployment benefit in accordance with EC rules permitting the unemployed to seek work in and draw unemployment benefit from another EC member state. She hopes that the Commission will pressurise member states to comply with their Treaty obligations. Alan Tyrrell (London East: European Democrat) has taken up the case of French railways restricting work for civil engineers to French nationals, and so discriminating against other EC nationals. The Belgian government has been taken to the European Court of Justice for similar discriminatory practices.

Relevant as such issues are to the public, action and debate on them by MEPs do little to counteract increasing frustration with the EC's apparent unresponsiveness to pressing domestic, predominantly socio-economic, problems. Mindful of this and of the need to dispel the appearance and reality of inertia, in July, MEPs passed a resolution approving wide-ranging changes. The aims of these would be not only to make the

EC's institutions more capable of responding to and acting promptly on issues requiring immediate attention but to delimit the scope of the EC's responsibilities over a range of policies.

Accordingly, MEPs want the EP to draft a set of modifications to the EC's existing acts and treaties defining the tasks and powers of the European Union. They argue that the Union must be able to ensure that member states' policies converge and are compatible with each other; that common policies can be formulated and implemented; and that new initiatives can be taken, notably in the areas of socio-economic, security and international policies. MEPs clearly envisage the EP being granted co-legislative authority with the Council of Ministers, a reform of Council decision-making practices (that is, more action on the basis of majority voting rather than action only when unanimity has been achieved); greater autonomy for the Commission and restoring it to its pivotal position regarding the initiation of legislation as envisaged by the Rome Treaty; and rationalisation of the EC's decision-making practices and linked bodies, such as the European Council (or summit) and European Political Co-operation involving EC Foreign Ministers.

Whereas, in the past, proposals on 'European Union'—such as the 1975 Tindemans Report and the subsequent 'Three Wise Men's Report',⁶ as well as the suggestions contained in the election manifestos of the European People's Party and the Federation of European Liberals and Democrats—failed to get off the ground, MEPs hope that the new initiative on European Union will make a contribution both to building the EC and to stimulating public support for the EC. Indeed, the 'Crocodile Club' sees the new proposals on European Union not just as a kind of constitution but hopes that their ratification will arouse public interest in and support for the EC at the time of the 1984 direct elections to the EP.⁷ Clearly, if MEPs seeking re-election find it difficult to campaign on their records, as many members of the public find them largely obscure, they will probably hope to inspire them with a vision of the EC worthy of support.

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NOTES

¹ See the Resolution on relations between the European Community and the United States in the steel sector, *European Parliament Working Documents*, 1-316/80, 11 July, 1980; and *Agence Europe*, 1 October, 1980.

² *Official Journal*, C260, 12 October, 1981; and *Bull. EC*, 9-1981, point 2.3.6.

³ *Bull. EC*, 4-1982, point 2.1.27.

⁴ See J. Dennett, E. James, G. Room and P. Watson, *Europe Against Poverty: The European Poverty Programme, 1973-80*, London, Bedford Square Press, 1982.

⁵ *The Week*, May 1982, p. 12.

⁶ See the Report on European Institutions presented by the Committee of Three to the European Council, Brussels, October 1979 ('Three Wise Men's Report').

⁷ *Crocodile*, No. 9, June 1982.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF GEORGE ORWELL

by A. L. Rowse

GEORGE Orwell was born Eric Blair, of a Scottish father, and a French mother named Limouzin; so he was really a Franco-Scot. These things are both obvious and important, though people ordinarily have not the imagination, or even the intelligence, to appreciate them. It is an important clue to Lloyd George that he was Welsh, to Winston Churchill that he was Anglo-American; to Joyce and Cyril Connolly that they were Irish. To his Scottish inheritance Eric Blair owed his moralism—he was above all things a moralist; and on the French side, the French have always had a *penchant* for laying down the law intellectually. Eric Blair was then a moralistic intellectual; his greatest achievement to make himself over as an Englishman as George Orwell, and get himself accepted as such.

People will of course believe anything—they have no real critical faculties; but I was surprised at the British Council selecting him to write their book during the war, to present *The English People* to the world. It was sent to me to vet; I don't know whether that held up its publication, for it was not published till 1947 in the popular series, *Britain in Pictures*.

When the book came out I saw that no notice had been taken of the criticism I had made. He said, 'for perhaps a hundred and fifty years, organised religion, or conscious religious belief of any kind, have had very little hold on the mass of the English people.' That may be true today, but it is quite untrue of the 19th century; indeed, in the Victorian age organised religion and religious belief had an immense hold, as every historian knows. Ignorance of history is the besetting sin of the intellectual, particularly of the Left intellectual—which he was then—and made nonsense of much of what he had to say. He thought that 'the distinguishing mark of English life was its *brutality*'. Really! What about the Germans or Russians, or even his own relations, the French? Historians know that—partly owing to geographical insularity—the English record as a whole has been much less brutal than others.

He repeats the old *canard* that England is more class-ridden than any other country—more so than his own France, for example? He was obviously unfamiliar with French history, or even with French literature—Balzac and Proust were not favourite authors (Charles Reade was!). His Paris relatives could have told him something about the fantastic snobbery of the Faubourg St. Germain. He thought that 'at this moment the mass of the English people are probably mildly republican'—he should have lived to see the apotheosis of the Queen Mother. Then there is the old nonsense about British imperialism and the wickedness of the British Empire. The idea of trusteeship of native races was what inspired it latterly; it was a great deal more humane than other empires known to history. Handing over to the peoples concerned—or, rather, to their

ruling classes—has not much improved the lot of the masses at the bottom; and, with the restraining influence removed, they have killed each other, in India and Africa, in hundreds of thousands. Orwell admitted grudgingly that 'the outstanding and highly original quality of the English is their habit of *not killing one another*' (italics his). Very well, he should have drawn the conclusions from this rather obvious insight; the fact is that there was little consistency in what he thought: he had *not thought things out* (my italics).

He admitted that his main motive in 'Why I write' is 'because there is some lie I want to expose, some fact to which I want to draw attention, and my initial concern is to get a hearing'. We may observe, (1) that not all are lies, that in regard to (2) one should then get the facts right, and (3) that he got far more of a hearing than what emerges from his work deserved. He tells us that his motivation was almost wholly political—and most of his work is political pamphleteering. Very well: for that to have any value it needs a proper understanding of politics—such as a Burke or a de Tocqueville had; and that requires in turn a proper psychology, a thorough and sane understanding of human nature.

Neither Eric Blair, nor the writer George Orwell—the persona into which he made himself over—ever had that instinctive knowledge. He tells us that while at school he had 'no notion that the working class were human beings . . . I could agonise over their sufferings, but I still hated and despised them when I came anywhere near them . . . To the shock-absorbers of the bourgeoisie, such as myself, "common people" still appeared brutal and repulsive'. Even if exaggerated, this is a very abnormal attitude. Working people, like myself, would not thank him for agonising over our 'sufferings'—there is a sick and patronising sentimentality in the phrase; nor do I think normal people regard the working class as 'brutal and repulsive'.

So this Daniel come to judgment—on returning from administering the job in Burma he 'hated' (were the Burmese any better off for the end of British rule?)—went to live in the East End of London to acquaint himself with the working class. Thence he graduated to Wigan and wrote *The Road to Wigan Pier*. His admirer, Tom Hopkinson, describes it *tout court* as 'Orwell's worst book'; and a local reporter who had lived in Wigan for years wrote:

he tried to get into the manual working-class and into a very special section of it—the miners. He chose, moreover, a sub-section of the miners—those out of work; and he chose a sub-section of the unemployed: those who lived in the worst slums.

He had gone slumming, like any District Visitor from on high. Neither D. H. Lawrence nor I needed to go slumming: we knew what the working-class was from belonging to it. The Wigan man made the point that if Orwell had made a more reasonable choice—his judgment was very erratic—he would have learned something from the inside of the worker's enormous zest for life, the richness of his humour and the simple philosophy which sustains him. . . . There was no expiation to be found along this easy path.' Hopkinson concludes that 'the guilt Orwell ex-

presses over his expensive education and middle-class background serves to embarrass the reader rather than win his sympathy for those whose life Orwell is describing.' In any case, guilt is a characteristically middle-class emotion: neither aristocrats nor working people give way to this form of sentimentality. Can one see Ernest Bevin indulging in the luxury of a guilt-complex?

What was wrong with little Eric going to Eton? He had won a scholarship there, for which his prep-school had done its duty and conscientiously prepared him. He was disgracefully unfair to the school which had done its best for him, as his schoolmate Cyril Connolly admits. Connolly had the decency later to apologise for the caricature of it he himself had written; he learned of the immense trouble the proprietors had taken to help them to win their scholarships:

The Wilkoes were true friends, and I had caricatured their mannerisms, and I had read mercenary motives into much that was just enthusiasm. What they would have made of Orwell's more severe strictures, I have no idea. I hope they never saw them.

What Orwell wrote was:

the schoolmasters with their canes, the millionaires with their Scottish castles, the athletes with their curly hair, these were the army of unalterable law. And according to that law I was damned. I had no money. I was weak. I was ugly. I was unpopular. I had a chronic cough. I was cowardly. I smelt. I was an unattractive boy. St. Cyprian's soon made me so, even if I had not been so before.

We hardly need La Rochefoucauld to tell us that to depreciate oneself is a way of recommending oneself to others—Connolly knew that ploy well. And it works—people are so simple.

I find this kind of attitude undignified; but what is more important to the historian is that it is untrue. Family friends of the Blairs, and school-friends, did not find him repulsive or unpopular. He was sensitive, like other clever boys, and rather reserved; but his portrait of himself in 'Such, Such Were the Joys' they found unrecognisable. Precious little caning at school, even fewer the millionaires with Scottish castles. As for Eton, 'as a King's Scholar he was only one among seventy, many of whom would have come from equivalent financial and social backgrounds'. As for, 'I was unpopular'; the old family friend comments, 'a fat lot the self-sufficient, self-contained, supercilious Eric would have cared whether he was *popular* or not. What he thought, he thought; what he did, he did. . . . It would be really more accurate to say that the other people were unpopular with *him*.'

We see from this that, for all his insistence on facts, he was not trustworthy in regard to the facts about himself. What this early girlfriend remembered was that Eric was even then going to write; but not simply write, it was always 'when I am a FAMOUS AUTHOR, in capitals.' To become a famous anything, one needs a strong dash of egoism—that is where the extra spurt necessary comes from; those who venerate the later George Orwell as a secular saint tend to overlook that. Orwell himself was more honest; among the motives for writing he placed first,

'Sheer egoism. Desire to seem clever, to be talked about, to be remembered after death, to get your own back on grown-ups who snubbed you in childhood, etc.' I find the catalogue insufficient. As the Duc d'Aumale said, after the betrayal of Metz, '*Mais, il y'avait la France*', so I should say there is the compulsion of the artist: there is always Art. But Orwell, the moralist, denied Art; and that I detest in him.

Women are more observant, and a later girl-friend came to the conclusion that he did not really understand people, women in particular, that he could not give himself. There clearly was a quality of apartness and abstraction about him, a short-circuiting of the emotions, a failure to connect. I used to bring up the women who I thought were good writers and he would occasionally praise their writing, but he used to say that it stuck in his throat to have to do it.

True enough: when one looks through his *Collected Works* there is little about women writers. Fancy going through life without really appreciating Jane Austen or the Brontës or Colette! He gives himself away in a sentence about Conrad: 'one of the surest signs of his genius is that women disliked his books.' How silly; but perhaps revealing that Eric conformed more to a public school type than he realised. For, in general, his position was made up of negatives: he was anti-prep. school, anti-public school; then anti-Empire; anti-women; anti-the structure of society; as we have seen, he began by being anti-working-class, then tried to identify with it; anti-the upper classes, but no less anti-the intellectuals, the Left intelligentsia.

After his flirtation with Leftism in politics, the Independent Labour Party—the sensible Labour Party of Attlee, Bevin and Morrison he despised—he became virulently anti-Communist. It is ironical that, when at length he did become a FAMOUS AUTHOR, it was as anti-Communist weapon, made immense and profitable use of by the world's reactionaries. I am afraid that the truth is that, a sick man—not at all the simple straightforward Englishman of his persona—he was anti-*la condition humaine*, in revolt against the human condition, the inescapable facts and conditions of life.

Understandable as this may be, it specifically precludes him from a real understanding of politics, or from any reliable political judgment. Orwell is always given credit for his honesty and courage, and rightly. But nearly all writers are honest; if some are disingenuous, I find that more among the group of Leftists who lent themselves to the purposes of a Beaverbrook—Muggeridge, Michael Foot, A. J. P. Taylor, Tom Driberg. Orwell had very little use for them, and I agree with him. As for Kingsley Martin and *The New Statesman*, he loathed both; but even Kingsley Martin was not dishonest: he was merely inside-out.

Innumerable examples of Orwell's bad political judgment occur. For Hitler he felt 'the attraction of his own personality, which one can feel even in the clumsy writing of *Mein Kampf*, and which is no doubt overwhelming when one hears his speeches. I should like to put it on record that I have never been able to dislike Hitler. The fact is that there is

something deeply appealing about him.' So there it is on record. Anyone of any sense should have known what Hitler intended to do, for there it is all laid out in *Mein Kampf*, *planmässig* as any German could be. This is as bad as Dick Crossman, who thought that Hitler would introduce Socialism in Germany, and 'anyway he is at least sincere.' The fact that there were few people who estimated him rightly and saw where he was going is the less surprising when one considers that, for politics, few people have any sense. (Attlee knew this, and expressed it of Stafford Cripps: 'he is no judge of politics'.)

The idiocy of Orwell's joining the ILP—the Independent Labour Party—when it had degenerated under the irresponsible leadership of a Maxton into a lunatic fringe: 'Tell me, as your leader, what I am to do, and I will do it!' when the Labour Party was the only practical means of advancing the interests of the working-class. As late as 1938 and Munich the ILP were taking a pacifist line, when Hitler's Germany was working all hours (Trade Unions having been eliminated) at re-arming for war. Even in 1939 Orwell was writing, 'I believe it is vitally necessary for those of us who intend to oppose the coming war to start organising for illegal anti-war activities.' Only a first-class fool could take such a line in 1939, when Hitler was ready to pounce, and had already done so in Austria and Czechoslovakia.

When war came, Orwell behaved patriotically enough; but that only showed up what nonsense he had written on the subject beforehand. He himself despaired of the Left intelligentsia, but he was one of them. When one considers the mountains of trash they wrote on these issues, one respects all the more the people who said and wrote nothing, but shut up and acted—like Ernest Bevin. Of course, he had the same sort of trouble to put up with as Foreign Secretary under the Labour government, when he managed to save Greece from Communism against their vehement opposition, in *The New Statesman* and *Tribune*. But Bevin pronounced the epitaph on Kingsley Martin in 1945: 'ullo oogly, and 'ow long before you'll be stabbin' us in the back?' It was about three weeks.

So, though Orwell regarded politics as his main impulse and theme for writing, we may fairly say that he was no guide for politics whatever.

What, then, were his positive values, what did he believe in? We may sum these up justly as freedom, equality, and truth. Well, we all believe in freedom: nothing to write home about in that. He made a great song and dance about equality, and the deprivation the masses supposedly feel on the subject. We have seen that Orwell was no good guide about the masses or what they feel about anything: his was a middle-class view and a very restricted one at that, a solitary, ungregarious individual, as his friends testify. He did not know what people are really like. It is obvious that what the people at large want are gadgets and a good time. Even in holy Russia we learn that the Communist leadership is greatly exercised by the 'consumer-mindedness' of the masses. But of course. It is understandable that they should want better standards of living and housing

than freedom or equality: defence of these latter ideals is the preoccupation of a small number of dissident, middle-class intellectuals.

The whole question of equality is much more complex than Orwell takes it quite simply to be. The truth is that there is a far wider spectrum of differences in capacity, aptitudes, make-up in man than in any other animal, far greater variety from the potentialities of genius—a Beethoven or a Newton—to what abysmal depths. It is simply a falsification of the facts to deny it. Even the poet Auden, who shared Orwell's illusions about Spain and the Spanish Civil War, came to see what is obvious all round one, and has been obvious to me since my schooldays. I am 'progressive' enough to wish to see some of the consequences of natural inequality alleviated; but to aim at a restrictive equality as the main objective for society is highly questionable. What about the loss to incentive, to initiative, which all Communist countries suffer from, and complain bitterly about? What about the loss to *quality*, in every sphere, which is what I chiefly value? What about the evident losses to culture, to civilisation, art? Orwell does not seem to have considered that—he was no aesthete, he seems to have had no care for music or paintings, the marvellous works of men's genius, or even of their hands, in the monuments of the past. He had little sense of history, and was no use with his hands—like Bertrand Russell, who couldn't even make a cup of tea. As for equality, I suppose there is equality of a sort in a lunatic asylum.

As an historian I attach far more importance to truth. Orwell always tried, with some evidence of strain, to tell the truth as he saw it. But he tells us that, from his early years, he lived in a fantasy world with himself as hero; his struggle was largely an attempt to get closer to the facts of life and describe them as he saw them, but this always gave him difficulty, one sees the strain in all he wrote—not much joy or humour or kindness in any of it—and the result was lopsided, often perverse, contrary to commonsense, elements of fantasy invariably remained. It is significant that his best work, *Animal Farm*, was pure fantasy. Perhaps, like other men of genius—a far greater genius, Kipling, whom he half-admired (he had not much generosity)—he never grew up. In that case he should not have written about politics, which is wholly for the adult. (Again Attlee would agree: he dismissed G. D. H. Cole as the perpetual undergraduate—so Cole could never bear Attlee in consequence.)

Truth is, to the historian, the touchstone. The deliberate manipulation and falsification of truth under Communism, particularly in Soviet Russia, is what shocks me even more than the barbarism. After all, some societies are centuries behind others in civilisation and the Russians have hardly a worse record in killing than the Germans, supposedly a higher educated and civilised society in the centre of Europe; not on the outer fringes. The Russians have always had that Byzantine attitude towards truth, the systematisation of lying, as Custine diagnosed so well in his classic book on Russia, which annoyed them so much.

In 1984 Orwell made this a main theme of his portrait of Stalinism, exposed it brilliantly, and his exposure is corroborated by all that

Solzhenytsin and Shostakovich have told us. We remember for ourselves how Trotsky's immense contribution to the Revolution, second only to Lenin's, was written out of the record: Trotsky had hardly existed, became almost a non-person (a Communist invention); all was re-written to the greater glory of Stalin. When Stalin fell from grace with Krushchev's exposure, Stalin was then downgraded, while a number of those whom he had murdered were rehabilitated, for what good that was to them *post mortem*. What an infantile way of carrying on, what a society!

But ordinary people are not capable of telling what is true, in the abstract, or no: they cannot tell a good egg from a bad egg intellectually (neither can intellectuals very often). So, when Communist North Korea made its aggressive attack on South Korea, Communist propaganda easily made its faithful believe it was the opposite way round. Today we have made a little progress: we have been told that the West stirred up the trouble in Afghanistan, we have not yet been told that Afghanistan attacked Soviet Russia.

Orwell's 1984 held good for Stalin's Russia, on the plane of both physical torture and mental terror. His slogans and inventions are right on target: WAR IS PEACE, IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH; the techniques of Doubletalk, Doublethink, Newspeak, etc. There remains the psychological truth: 'the world-view of the Party imposed itself most successfully on people incapable of understanding it', i.e. on the masses in general. 'They could be made to accept the most flagrant violations of reality, because they never fully grasped the enormity, and were not sufficiently interested in public events to notice what was happening. By lack of understanding they remained sane. They simply swallowed everything.' Here as elsewhere we see what Orwell's view of the people, after his early idealistic illusions, had come to be. One notices too the trace of his old view of women in the book's heroine: 'often she was ready to accept the official mythology, simply because the difference between truth and falsehood did not seem important to her.' It meant everything to Orwell, as it does to me.

At the end of the book she disappears: she simply becomes a non-person. And the Party succeeds in breaking the hero's spirit. He really comes to believe that $2+2=5$.

Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O, stubborn self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother. Drink has always been the anodyne for all ills in Russia.

One sees the nihilism Orwell had arrived at, the complete negation of all his earlier Leftist hopes. And justice compels us to admit that his prognostications were falsified, the event showed him wrong-headed as usual. For, though Soviet Russia remains a police-state, it cannot be denied that things have improved since the horrors of Stalinism. One has to admit that Orwell's view, as usual, was too extreme, unbalanced. Some form of autocracy is indispensable in such a congeries of different peoples

and nationalities: without it Russia would fall to pieces. And the fundamental question of human nature remains: if humans are such kids, why such expectations of them? By the end of his course Orwell ceased to entertain them: he had come round full circle.

What remains, then, of him as a writer, to whom political writing was all in all?

His friendly critic, Tom Hopkinson, sums up:

Orwell's reputation as a writer rests largely on his novels, but his gifts are not those of a novelist. Orwell had little imagination, little understanding of human relationships, little sympathy with individual human beings—though much with humanity in general . . .

That is the usual case with the doctrinaire: love for humanity in general, little for the individual man. (A Shakespeare or a Dr. Johnson reverses that.) Hopkinson particularises:

. . . first, his novels are all alike. They are all tales of solitary characters, each in one way or another an expression of Orwell himself, seen against backgrounds which are sections of his own experience. These solitary characters seek to make contact with others, but are usually rebuffed, alighted, or betrayed. The essence of the novels is that they are unforgiving. Secondly, Orwell's concentration on himself leads him to see the outside world as an enlarged projection of his own personal problems.

We have already seen that this applies to all his political writing and negates its value.

Orwell's strength and weakness relate to a single source: he was without historical perspective. He saw the world of his day with peculiar intensity because he saw extremely little of its past, and he regarded the future as simply a continuation and extension of the particular present which he knew.

The historian knows that any prognostication as to the future must be deeply rooted in a knowledge of the past.

What, then, of his literary criticism?

Take the crucial case of Kipling. Orwell starts from the Leftist position: 'Kipling is in the peculiar position of having been a by-word for fifty years. During five literary generations every enlightened person has despised him. It is no use pretending that Kipling's view of life, as a whole, can be accepted or even forgiven by any civilised person.' Ludicrous, but such was the attitude of the silly Left, as supercilious as intellectually inferior, as usual. 'He *is* morally insensitive and aesthetically disgusting,' Orwell goes on, 'he had grown up with a brilliant mind in mainly philistine surroundings.' Actually, Kipling's early surroundings were Pre-Raphaelite, with uncles and close relations Burne-Jones and Sir Edward Poynter, his father a considerable artist; and Kipling's minutely detailed and jewelled technique owed much to the Pre-Raphaelites. Orwell's intention was to explain Kipling, from the background of his own Anglo-Indian experience. 'The 19th century Anglo-Indians, to name the least sympathetic of his idols, were at any rate people who did things. It may be that all that they did was evil . . . ' What nonsense this is too; but Orwell at least had the sense to see that 'they could have achieved nothing if the normal Anglo-Indian outlook had been that of, say, E. M. Forster.' Well, of course.

Orwell had the honesty to admit that 'the British Empire was demilitarised to a degree which Continental observers find almost incredible'; and then goes on to impute to Kipling 'a hunger for cruelty.' A disgraceful phrase: he was the most vulnerable of men, hiding his wounded sensitiveness beneath the old Public School boy stoicism, the stiff upper lip, etc. One might criticise Kipling on those lines; one would not have him defended on Orwell's. The plain fact was that, as a critic, Orwell was just hit-or-miss. With so much doctrinaire dogmatism, so many shots all round the target, some of his insights are penetrating enough: he could hardly help getting some of them right, for all his congenital perverseness and wrong-headedness. But I do not detect any effort at reconciling his contradictions, achieving a consistent outlook, justice of mind—the one necessity for a critic.

He has been held up to admiration for his style, in which he took a deliberate and conscious line; he had a distinctive interest in words and the technique of their handling. He was all for a plain prose style, in keeping with his bleak Puritan outlook on life. 'Good prose is like a window pane. And looking back through my work, I see that it is invariably where I lacked a *political* purpose that I wrote lifeless books and was betrayed into purple passages, sentences without meaning, decorative adjectives and humbug generally.' He should know. But one might point out that not all window panes are the same: some are of coloured or tinted glass. And what of the miracles of man's art in the stained glass of Chartres or Canterbury, all the varieties of beauty and expression from century to century, even to today?

The sense of beauty is what marks man off from the animals and the achievements of art, more than anything, are what redeem man from the slime—of politics among other things (look at the world around you!). Thus the restrictive Puritanism of Orwell may be regarded as not only a restriction upon, but a deformation of, the spirit of man.

[Among Dr. Rowse's latest publications are *A Life: Collected Poems* (Blackwood) and *Memories of Men and Women* (Eyre Methuen). *A Cornish Childhood* has recently been re-issued by The Cornish Library.]

REDDER GLOWS THE SUNSET— THE SOVIET ADVANCE

by Louis FitzGibbon

IT took the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to focus again the public mind onto that forgotten part of Africa called The Horn, but even so the attention paid to it was muddled by conflicting reports and, in any case, the comings and goings of Mr. Philip Habib (the name, in Arabic, means 'darling' or 'beloved') caught the main headlines. These were interrupted by the triumphant homecomings of the various ships which echoed the Falklands conflict, and it all happened in the summer when, anyway, the English have their eyes glued to beaches abroad or to sport at home. In the middle of all that there was a momentary and rather perplexing revolt in normally reliable Kenya—but it soon vanished and the pulses of ex-colonials settled down once more. And so August passed in the traditional British way, albeit that some recall that in both 1914 and in 1939 World Wars broke out in the 'summer recess'. Those years were the then sunsets of peace.

Almost unnoticed, the Soviets are advancing on many fronts; not for them a holiday in August, nor for their partners in Havana. The war-machine grinds remorselessly on, not always visibly, but on nevertheless. To understand it we must, as it were, place ourselves on some revolving space-ship and look down upon the world from a sufficient height to see large parts of it at once. No picture can be formed by standing on the ground and looking about, for the field of vision is too restricted.

The area to be examined is that which stretches from the Atlantic coast of Africa in the West to far-off Bangladesh in the east. In depth it covers the southern shores of the Mediterranean down to the Cape of Good Hope, and includes large parts of the Indian Ocean. A massive canvas, but only by seeing it as a whole can its meaning be clear, for it is in this area that Soviet hegemony is making its stealthy advance. It is here that the Kremlin chess-masters are moving from square to square; it is here that the West is losing pawn after pawn. Such news as is still reported from Afghanistan continues to dwell upon the details of the peasants' struggle against the Soviets and their dwindling Afghan army: nothing is said about the vast military infrastructure being prepared so that the country is fast becoming a fortress. And a fortress for what? A stronghold whence to launch the southern and south-western thrust of the battle to come—the battle for oil in Iran and in Saudi Arabia; a battle which, if won by the Soviets; will enable them simply to say: 'Check-mate'. Many readers of *Contemporary Review* will have enjoyed Eric Newby's *A short walk through the Hindu Kush*. It was not for such a pleasurable stroll that the Soviets overrode all international norms and forcibly took that barren country—they needed it as a vital square in their game, and they knew that despite the international outcry, no vast effort would be mounted to deprive them of it. True, there were protest

notes (and the waste-paper baskets in the Kremlin are full of them) and there was some talk of sanctions, that blunt blade with which the West pretends to cut at aggressors. But in reality nothing happened, and so the Russians got on with their job of building airfields, both close to the Chinese and the Iranian borders.

In August 1981, the Soviets also spawned a monster-child—the Tripartite Pact of Aden: an unholy alliance between Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen (PDRY). Its stated objects were the usual banal phrases about co-operation, resistance to Zionism and the like, but there were secret protocols, and it was for these that the pact was formed. They underlined the purpose of destabilising or even destroying pro-West countries in the region and even mentioned an outright attack upon Saudi Arabia. Hence it is easy to see that this alliance is the mirror of the Afghanistan consolidation in that it forms a southern flank for the attack. Here it is necessary to look more closely at this unlikely grouping. It is not African in that it includes South Yemen; it is not Arab or Muslim in that it counts 'Christian' Ethiopia within it. So who could bring these three together? Only Soviet Russia. At the time of its inception, Libya was actually helping Eritrea withstand the Ethiopian onslaught. So the Russians instructed their satellite, South Yemen to mediate between the two, and they did so at a time when Ethiopia was very short of oil for its war-machine. Now Libya has oil in plenty, and the success of the bargaining was that Qaddafi's oil flowed into the tanks of Colonel Mengistu—tanks supplied by the godfather: the USSR. But none of this was appreciated in Britain until, on 19 April, 1982, Lord Avebury asked the Government what it thought of the Aden Pact as 'an influence for peace in the region'. I sat below the bar in the Lords and was astonished to hear Lord Belstead say that whereas neighbouring countries did not like the Pact, that was no reason to suppose that the Soviets had anything to do with it. It was as if someone had said: 'Don't be silly: black is not black; black is white'. On 7 June, 1982, the matter was taken further by the Marquess of Ailsa who bluntly asked our Government whether they would kindly reconsider their attitude. Again I was below the bar of the House when, once more, Lord Belstead said there was no evidence of Soviet involvement. So what was to be done? Only one thing—produce that evidence, and produce it in a form so hard as to be almost painful.

Upon invitation, I proceeded to Khartoum on 9 July and within hours I found corroboration for every suspicion: the top Sudanese ministers all confirmed that the Tripartite Pact of Aden was begotten by Russia. On 17 July I went to Cairo and there, again, ministers told me the same thing. In both countries (and together they cover a large part of North-East Africa) I was told that there is grave danger—a danger they said the West was overlooking, or seemed to wish to ignore. They (and I) found that extraordinary. Previously to going I had also spoken to other Arab country ambassadors in London and they, too, had confirmed that the Soviets gave birth to the Pact of Aden. I returned to England on 22 July and rushed out a report to our Government which contained a

number of recommendations. First amongst those was that the UK should condemn the Soviet-inspired Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, and that it should improve upon its miserly dole of £1.5 million to that country in bilateral aid.

But the Tripartite Pact of Aden is by no means the only Soviet manoeuvre in the region. On 17 July, 1982 a new pact was formed between Malagasy, Mauritius and Seychelles, thus giving effect to a Russian move to bottle up the southern Indian Ocean. This is extremely significant in that it is already demanding the return of Diego Garcia, the UK/USA facility base which is vital to combat the growing presence of the Soviet Navy. Declaring that the Indian Ocean should be a 'zone of peace', this new alliance makes no mention of the Russian naval base at Diego Suarez (northern Madagascar) nor of another such base at Maputo. A demonstration of the true leanings of this grouping are fresh agreements with Libya—need more be said? But once again there seems to be no Western reaction that is discernible in the press or elsewhere.

Turning the corner, as it were, we come to Namibia where SWAPO is deemed to be a respectable partner with whom to deal in trying to solve this thorny question. Little mention is made of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance which is far more reliable. Added to that there is the refusal of Fidel Castro to remove his Cuban army from Angola, and it is this last which causes so much dismay in South Africa, as obviously a SWAPO controlled Namibia could make an easy passage for any advance in conjunction with an attack from Mozambique. It does not, therefore, appear that there are any real portents for peace in that part of Africa, whatever the United Nations may hope. Any compromise would undoubtedly turn to Soviet advantage.

Moving north, we come to Ghana, about which little is now heard. But that country is another Soviet pawn motivated by Libya. A reign of terror exists in Accra and as recently as 30 June, 1982 three eminent High Court Judges and a retired Army officer were abducted from their homes and brutally murdered. Law and order have broken down since December 1981 and press freedom has disappeared entirely. On 20 July, 1982, Dr. Samuel Okudzato, President of the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies in Ghana, declared that the period 21 July to 28 July be considered a period of mourning for the many who have been wantonly killed by the Rawlings regime. How much of this reaches the responsible Western press?

Ghana is also the base from where destabilisation campaigns are mounted in neighbouring countries: Nigeria, Upper Volta, Mali and Central African Republic where everywhere the hand of Qaddafi can easily be seen.

It has long been the wishful hope that the OAU can deal with all this turmoil, but that Organisation has now fallen to pieces, not just over the Polisario issue, but because so many African states have no intention of sitting at the same table as Qaddafi, let alone vote him into the chair. It is for this reason that the Afro-Arab International Committee against

Qaddafi has come into being—a courageous effort by sensible Libyans. Whilst in Khartoum, I was given photographs of the results of a recent effort to capture that town in 1976. They are truly revolting and probably too strong for the queasy Western stomach—but they are true nonetheless. And thus we come back to The Horn and to Kenya where a so-called uprising by the Air Force in August 1982 is really just another attempt to overturn a pro-West Head of State, President Arap Moi.

This gloomy overview of Africa is indeed frightening, and it will get far worse unless the West unifies its policy, a policy which must say: 'Enough is enough'. And that statement must also include the Indian Ocean and the Arabian peninsular—all part of the same threatened region so vital to us all. It is my considered view, and a view shared in both Khartoum and Cairo, that the matter is urgent. If something is not done, and done soon, we may well witness another sunset for peace in the world, and at every delay, redder glows the sunset

[Louis FitzGibbon, who contributed 'Somalia—A call for Justice' to our March issue, (Vol. 240, No. 1394) has become increasingly concerned with Soviet penetration in Africa and the Indian Ocean subsequent to a fact-finding mission to Sudan and Egypt in July. He hopes to visit Somalia, Oman and North Yemen within the next two months. Previously Mr. FitzGibbon was a co-founder and Hon. Secretary of the Katyn Memorial Fund and in 1972/73 went on a United Nations mission to Sudan. He is a Knight of Malta and a Knight-Commander of the Order of Polonia Restituta. His new book, *The Betrayal of the Somalis*, will be published by Rex Collings later this year.]

The November issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Class Differences in the Third World* by Lord Hatch, *The Warsaw Pact* by David Childs (held over from the October issue), *The Boers, the Empire and the Irish* by Hugh Munro and *Future Patterns of Disease* by J. A. Loraine.

POEM

THE CONTENTED FISHERMAN

In the manner of the 4th Century Chinese poet, Tao Yuan-Ming¹ who, having resigned his post as magistrate, returned to his farm, his chrysanthemums, and his lute.

I have been a Fisherman
For what, suddenly, seems
Many years.

Today, at last, I am aware
That the swift-flowing stream of Youth
Has become the placid river
Of Middle Age.

Now, looking into my narrow net,
I find that I have caught
A loving, beautiful, and accomplished wife;
Three sons straight as pine trees;
And an elegant 18th Century house
Which is one of the ornaments
Of a Market Town, lying
Within view of the deep woods
And the high green hills
Of the South.

What Fisherman, however ambitious,
Could reasonably ask
For more?

J. C. E. BOWEN

1. As related by Robert Payne in *The White Pony*, (George Allen and Unwin, 1949).

MIDDLE EAST REALITIES—AN ISRAELI VIEW

by Shlomo Argov

VIEWS of the Middle East are as innumerable and diverse as the many issues and interests associated with this confused and convulsed region. None, however, are more relevant than those of the parties 'directly involved.' The Middle East as seen by Israel may not be the same as perceived by others. To discount this view, however, is to ignore a very pertinent Middle East reality, namely the perception and assessment of Middle East realities by one of the major determinants of the issues of war and peace in the area. Such is the essence of our claim to be heard and maybe even heeded.

Contrary to a fairly wide consensus of governments and media, Israel does not consider the problem of the Palestinians as the central issue of our times or even of the Middle East. Bitter, complex and seemingly intractable as it is, the Arab-Israel conflict is but one focus of Middle East tensions and violence among many and as such not necessarily the most critical. Consider the state of the region as it was in the spring of 1982. The Lebanese state continued to lie prostrate, held to the ground by a Syrian army of occupation of over 20,000 soldiers—ostensibly to keep the peace between a usurping PLO and a variety of Lebanese factions struggling—when not with each other—to prevent the incorporation of their country into a greater Syrian state. Whatever prospects exist of Lebanon ever being put together again are contingent on a credible Israeli neighbour powerful enough to deter the Syrian would-be annexationists and thus keep alive the hope of a free Lebanon.

Across the border in Syria proper prevail brotherly love and bliss. Ask the people of Hama or those of them who survived the recent carnage. Much as one may try, it would be difficult to establish an Israeli connection with that bloody episode. Rather it would appear that Hafez el Assad considers his internal problems far more menacing even than the diabolical Israelis! How else does one account for his readiness to reduce the city of Hama to rubble and to inflict on its population no less than 6,000 fatal casualties and, according to some witnesses, up to 16,000. Apart, however, from a recent BBC report and a few other solitary accounts, little has been heard of the sacking of Hama and even less commented on it. Unfortunately, it is only when a demented Jew goes berserk on Temple Mount that world opinion is exercised and the UN Security Council is moved into—fortunately—impotent action.

What happened in Hama had nothing to do with us and everything to do with the present state of Arab society. Typical as it was of the Assad regime, the Hama episode was symptomatic of a society wracked with internal tensions and conflicts on practically every level of national and communal life.

On the Syrian-Iraqi border we encounter a classic example of present inter-Arab relations in the form of sealed boundaries, ruptured diplo-

matic relations and reciprocal exchanges of animosity, abuse and mutual subversion. Here we do seem to be somewhat involved, considering that both regimes accuse each other of being in the pay and employ of none other than the agents of Zionism as aided and abetted by those of US imperialism.

The next frontier offers very little cause for merriment, not only for Saddam Hussein, but also for every regime along the coast of the Arabian—or is the Persian Gulf after all? Here, at the eastern end of the Middle East—in the Gulf area—a decisive situation is presently being created that may have far more bearing on the future of the Middle East and indeed of Europe than whether or not Arafat will or will not concede Israel a conditional right to exist. In view of the gravity of the situation and the issues involved, we may be forgiven for suggesting that if only a fraction of the attention and preoccupation that are daily being expended on the Palestinian question were to be invested in a serious consideration of the dangers and opportunities being created in the battlefields of The Shatt el Arab, the West might be better equipped to meet the challenge of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict and its exploitation by the Soviet Union—especially if the military position should begin to approach—as it seems—a decisive stage. Unfortunately this is not yet the case. With no less than three intelligence fiascos to its credit, namely the collapse of the Shah's Iran, the sudden and unexpected Iraqi attack on Iran and the no less unexpected turning of the tables on Saddam Hussein, the West—governments and media alike—continues to invest far more time, attention and resources in the all-consuming issue of what to do for, or about, Mr. Arafat, than on seriously pondering the possibility of a Gulf dominated by Mr. Khomeini. Not that a Gulf dominated by Mr. Hussein is particularly to be relished.

The Gulf is hardly the only issue that has fallen victim to this almost inexplicable Western infatuation with the Palestinian question. When the history of these years is eventually written, it may well reveal this episode to have been a classic case of self-inflicted massive disinformation. Indeed, one cannot but wonder whether this has been a mere accident and not the product of somebody's very clever manipulation. In the meantime, Israel seems to be seriously implicated in the Iraqi-Iranian struggle as suggested at least by the manner in which both contestants befool each other with the ultimate charge of acting at the behest of none other than International Zionism.

Mercifully, we seem to be less involved elsewhere. No one, at any rate, has as yet accused Israel of engineering a recent coup-attempt in Bahrain, just as we have not been projected as backers either of North or South Yemen in their *tête-à-tête* at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. We also seem to be absent from the ongoing struggles in the lands along the western coast of the Red Sea and the northern coast of Africa. This is more Kaddafi territory than ours which, however, hardly detracts from its volatility as evidenced by conflict at The Horn, civil war in Chad, bloody confrontation in former Spanish Sahara and recurrent attempts

at the subversion of existing regimes from the Sudan to Tunisia.

And yet all of this catalogue of strife and woe has not elicited even a fraction of the attention and coverage that has been heaped on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arab-Israel relations are marked by two contradictory processes: on the one hand the Egyptian-Israeli peace continues to make progress and an important phase of it will be consummated with the final evacuation of the Sinai by Israel. On the other hand, sadly and paradoxically, Arab-Israel enmity continues, as yet unaffected by Israel's peace with the leading country of the Arab world.

The Arab world today possesses the largest arsenal of arms and armaments outside the United States and the Soviet Union—exceeding the collective military strength of western Europe. In other words, the Arab countries which Israel stands to face in any future Arab-Israeli war already have almost as many tanks as NATO and half the number of tanks which the Soviets are known to have deployed west of the Ural mountains and which we are told constitute the single most menacing threat to western-European defence. Israel must be constantly braced to choose between absorbing a massive first blow and resorting to pre-emptive military action, thus incurring the stigma of having fired the first shot. The most agonising decision the late Mrs. Golda Meir ever had to make was to forgo—in 1973—the option of a pre-emptive strike across the Suez Canal. While this may not have decisively changed the course of the opening phase of the war, it would certainly have saved the lives of many Israeli soldiers. Priority, however, had to be given to the need to prove that we were indeed the victims of aggression. One option decidedly *not* open to Israel is that of taking a first blow and then falling on the international community for succour and assistance.

Fortunately, we need no longer digress only on the realities of Arab-Israeli conflicts, but may also reflect on the realities of Arab-Israeli peace. We are today on the eve of the completion of the final and climatic stage of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai. Israel's contribution to the attainment of peace with Egypt was never fully appreciated. There must, however, be no mistake about the traumatic—let alone strategic and political—effects of the tragedy of Yamit and its settlements, as of the abandonment of everything else we are leaving behind us in Sinai.

When Israel came into possession of Sinai in 1967, it found a vast, sparsely populated desert, with a few narrow, poorly maintained roads and hardly any economic infrastructure and facilities. In the firm belief that development of this desert-buffer would, in the long run, be the most effective security against possible future aggression, Israel proceeded to build a network of modern roads—covering over a thousand miles—power lines, water systems and communications networks which today serve the entire peninsula.

In the fourteen years since 1968, Israel spent no less than \$17 billion on development projects in Sinai—\$10 billion for defence, \$5 billion for oil resources development and \$2 billion for roads and civilian installations. Most of this infrastructure, whose value equals that of Israel's

entire foreign debt, is now being forfeited. Staggering new outlays must now be budgeted for the relocation of over 170 military camps and installations; the transfer to the Negev of more than 6,000 buildings of various types and of tens of thousands of tons of equipment; and the construction of new settlements, homes, roads, water systems and electricity networks for the large civilian and military population that has been transplanted.

The western coast of the Sinai Peninsula is dotted with a chain of oil-fields which tap the rich geological structures beneath the shallow Gulf of Suez. Following the transfer of the northern fields to Egypt in accordance with the interim agreement of 1975, the Israeli-discovered and developed Alma field became Israel's largest single source of petroleum. By 25 November, 1979, when this field too was handed over to Egypt, its yield had reached two million tons per year, or 40,000 barrels per day, and considerable scope remained for further development, leading at the very least to Israeli self-sufficiency in energy.

It is not as easy to put a price tag on the emotional costs of the Sinai withdrawal: the uncertainty as to whether or not the Sinai Peninsula will ever again be utilised as a base for attack against Israel; the unprecedented uprooting of towns and villages; the loss of the only 'breathing space' a hemmed-in nation has ever had and the abandonment of religious and historical sites associated with the birth of the Jewish people.

Regrettably, the difficulties and traumas experienced by us in completing the final and critical phase of the withdrawal have been compounded of late by a less than helpful Egyptian attitude. This attitude was not unrelated to the general practice of laying the blame at Israel's doorstep for every set-back in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process.

However, in spite of recent disappointments, we believe and expect that the Egyptian leadership will continue to honour its obligations. The Egyptian-Israeli peace is, after all, the lynch-pin of peace and stability at our end of the Middle East.

Simultaneously with the completion of the withdrawal from Sinai and its traumas, Israel maintained its effort to create conditions for Palestinian-Israeli dialogue on future co-existence leading to the implementation of the Autonomy Plan of Camp David. Not unexpectedly, the PLO has attempted to disrupt this effort, rightly considering it a threat to its claim to Palestinian leadership. We have every intention of frustrating this PLO attempt. There should be no misunderstanding on this point: there will be no accommodation of the PLO, neither in the peace process nor in the city halls of Nablus or El-Bireh.

According to a poll recently published in Israel, some 50% of Israelis would not today have agreed to Israel's complete withdrawal from Sinai, not at any rate from Yamit and its surroundings. This regrettable finding is obviously not unrelated to the present traumatic scenes in Yamit and may well change once this bitter episode is over. At the same time it would be wrong not to see in it a reflection of the general mood of the country.

Contrary to prevailing impressions, Israelis entertained sincere hopes that the Egyptian-Israeli peace would become the first instalment in a wider settlement of their conflict with the Arab world and not remain a solitary 'separate peace'. That this has not materialised has become a source of great disappointment.

There were hopes for a respite from international pressures which, among other things, would enable the country and the people to tackle the problem of the Palestinians as called for by the 'Camp David Agreements' and in accordance with the time frame allowed. Instead, Israel has been subjected to an onslaught almost unprecedented in its history. The concessions that were made, the risks that were incurred, were all given short shrift as Israel was served with an assortment of writs and prescriptions on what it should do next. Having lived up to all of their commitments towards Egypt and fully expecting to be allowed to consummate the rest of the 'Camp David' formula, Israelis found themselves being told that now they had acquitted themselves well and pulled out of Sinai in accordance with 'Camp David' they should henceforth accept formulae and prescriptions hammered out, not in negotiations in 'Camp David', but in places like 'Venice'.

Most damaging, however, has been the psychological set-back. One cannot convert 'Camp David' into a dirty word and expect Israelis to be unaffected. One cannot dismiss all the sacrifices that have been made by Israelis and expect them to relish the idea of doing even more. Above all, one cannot tell Israelis that having given up their foremost strategic asset in the Sinai they should proceed to divest themselves of the rest of their security. However, all these set-backs and disillusionments have not been without benefit. Israel today is disabused of considerable illusions and misconceptions and much the better for it, resolved, as never before, to protect what it considers to be its basic requirements for security and well-being.

Such is the situation in the Middle East, as seen by us, and such is the manner in which we propose to grapple with it. Israel possesses some very crucial national interests and is the best judge of how to protect them.

[The above article is based on an address given to the Royal Institute of International Affairs on April 22, 1982, six weeks before Mr. Shlomo Argov, Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain, was shot and seriously wounded outside a London hotel in a terrorist attack.]

QUEENSLAND: AUSTRALIA'S CONVERSATION PIECE

by Keith D. Suter

LADIES and gentlemen: we are about to land in Brisbane, the capital city of Queensland,' so goes an old Australian joke. 'Please fasten your safety belts, extinguish your cigarettes, and put your watches back a hundred years.' Composed of the Queen's most fervently loyal subjects, Queensland's politics make it a 'banana republic'—a place where politicians start out green and finish up bent and yellow. Its premier (state government leader) is Johannes Bjelke-Peterson, who is re-elected to office every three years with the support of about 30 per cent of the population.

Queensland is probably the most talked about of all Australia's six states. In recent years, the conversations have been based on the right-wing antics of the government and the old-fashioned characteristics of the people. But increasingly the conversations are turning to even more substantial matters, such as its growing wealth and the way in which this state, more than any other, is the prototype of Australia in its third century (beginning in 1988) of European control. Having been the butt of Australian jokes for years, Queenslanders may well have the laughs in the years to come.

The state's politics for over a decade have been dominated by Mr. Bjelke-Peterson. Born in 1911 into a poverty-stricken Lutheran minister's family, he contracted polio as a child but, as with his life generally, he fought back and won (though he does still limp occasionally). He is a devout Lutheran and a lay preacher. In the midst of 1978's record drought, he led the state in prayers for rain—which duly fell the following day.

He is a firm believer in the Protestant work ethic and (unusually for a Queenslander) does not smoke, drink, gamble or swear. His considerable wealth, making him probably the country's richest state premier, is derived from his early realisation of the potential of mechanisation in agriculture, especially peanut farming. He has since diversified his income. He is assisted by his wife, Flo, who, behind a façade of rustic grandmotherly concern for scones, is a shrewd politician. She was recently elected as a federal senator for Queensland. Both have benefitted from outsiders being slow to take them seriously and to recognise their political skills.

Mr. Bjelke-Peterson entered state politics (as a Country Party M.P.) in 1947. The state had been dominated by the Labour Party for half a century. It was the world's first Labour government, elected on December 1, 1899. Among its reforms were the abolition of the state's upper house and the introduction of a free medical service well in advance of anything else ever introduced in Australia (the nearest equivalent was the short-lived medical reforms of the national Labour government, 1972-75, which have since been dismantled by the current national Liberal-

Country Party government). Labour remained in office for so long partly through its record and partly through its redrawing of electoral boundaries.

Mr. Bjelke-Peterson's first speech in state parliament was anti-socialist, pro-private enterprise, pro-rural interests, and anti-dissident. He has not changed at all. He was not, however, seen as premier material and, anyway, the Labour government still seemed set to run the state for years to come.

However, he entered parliament at a time when the 'communist threat', used so well by US Senator Joe McCarthy, was being copied around Australia by Robert Menzies' Liberal-Country Party. The Labour Party, a coalition of interests including hard-line Catholic right-wingers who opposed the Protestant-dominated Liberal-Country Party and liberal intellectuals, split in the mid-1950s. The split kept Labour out of office nationally from 1949 to 1972 and wrecked most of its state branches. (Even today, all the Labour parties are unhappy coalitions of views, though the Catholic Church no longer enjoys the influence within them it once had.)

The Queensland Labour government split and the coalition Liberal-Country Party assumed office, with the Country Party having the senior role. Mr. Bjelke-Peterson had an undistinguished ministerial career. His advancement was due largely to persistence and stamina, rather than brilliant insights or as an orator. In 1968 he was elected deputy leader within the CP. A few months later the CP leader died suddenly and Mr. Bjelke-Peterson found himself premier.

An inarticulate, blustering, old-fashioned and bluff politician, he is nonetheless Australia's most successful politician, having won the last six state elections. With the retirement, in January 1982, of Western Australia state premier Sir Charles Court, he is the elder statesman of the Liberal-Country Party coalition in terms of seniority. At a time when the Liberal-Country state and national governments are under pressure, his government is the most secure. His amazing record can be explained in five ways.

First, the electoral boundaries favour the Country Party. It was the Labour Party which first fiddled the boundaries, in the late 1940s, to augment its support in the rural areas. It devised a system where, because rural constituents are more widely scattered and therefore more difficult to contact, MPs in rural areas should have smaller numbers of voters than urban MPs. Ironically, the new MP, Mr. Bjelke-Peterson, devoted some of his early speeches to criticising the 'minority which ruled the majority'. His criticism still applies—except that he now leads the minority. The Labour Party usually receives about 40 per cent of the vote in state elections but gets only a handful of MPs.

Second, in May 1971, he acquired a media adviser—the intelligent, skilful Queensland journalist Allen Callaghan. Most Australian journalists are inclined to be lazy, since the nation's tight libel laws discourage the type of investigative journalism found in the US and to a lesser extent

in Britain. The well-written press releases by Mr. Callaghan often go straight into newspapers, with a few alterations to justify the journalists's by-lines. Callaghan and his successors have recreated the premier. The premier's speeches, though still heavy on abuse to appeal to the CP faithful, are more sophisticated in their criticisms and Mr. Bjelke-Peterson is now more subtle in finding his way out of tricky questions.

Third, Mr. Bjelke-Peterson never waits upon events. His restless energy, despite his advancing years, always encourages him to take the initiative. This was seen in 1971, when the South African rugby football team toured Australia. The tour attracted considerable demonstrations (as it was to do a decade later in New Zealand) from anti-apartheid activists. Seeing the problems in the south of the nation, he declared a state of emergency on July 14, giving the state government almost unlimited powers, not only to protect the rugby game but covering all of Brisbane. It was a master stroke. He appeared to most Queenslanders (who rate sport very highly) as a strong man, who would not be intimidated by outside opinion or left-wing activists. It split the Labour Party temporarily, since some opposed South Africa's racial policies but who did not support violence, and other members who could not understand what all the fuss was about in a sporting event. Australians everywhere treat sport as their secular (and possibly only) religion, but even so, most people outside Queensland were appalled that a state of emergency had been declared to enable a sporting fixture to go ahead.

The fourth explanation is derived from Australia's federal system. All the states were functioning in the 19th century and had links direct with London (which to some extent they still enjoy through their agents-general in London). When federation took place in 1901, many state responsibilities were kept at state level and federal-state government tensions have always constituted an important theme in Australian politics this century. It is not unusual for a federal government formed from one party to be at odds with state governments drawn from that same party. Australians may be proud nationalists but for many of them foreigners begin at the other side of their states' boundaries. State governments rarely lose votes by criticising federal governments.

Mr. Bjelke-Peterson has done well out of his fights with Canberra. His first main target was the Labour prime minister Gough Whitlam (1972-75). Their contempt was mutual. He saw Mr. Whitlam as the type of socialist he had been campaigning against all his political life. Mr. Whitlam saw him as an obstacle to national progress, whose policies were occasionally bringing the nation into international disrepute, such as the extensive violations of Aboriginal human rights. In the November 1975 political crisis, when the dying Labour government needed votes in the federal senate, Bjelke-Peterson had managed to deny Labour a crucial vote by a controversial tactic involving a Queensland senator. Mr. Whitlam went down and he added another Labour scalp to his growing collection.

The main, and possibly only, point in common which Mr. Whitlam has

with his successor, Malcolm Fraser, is their objection to Mr. Bjelke-Peterson. It is probably too soon to examine all the confrontations which the prime minister has had with him. The fact that the Country Party is the junior partner in the national government does not deter Mr. Bjelke-Peterson from being critical of that government. Mr. Fraser has surprised many people by taking an active rôle in trying to preserve the nation's environment. Two major items of the natural heritage, Fraser Island (which has nothing to do with Mr. Fraser) and the Great Barrier Reef, are in Queensland's territory. Mr. Fraser stopped the sand-mining on Fraser Island and is trying to convert the Reef into a national park and so preserve it from oil-drilling. On both projects he has collided with the premier, who is far more interested in economic development. There is growing support, even within Queensland, for moves to protect Australia's natural heritage, but the collisions themselves have done little to harm the premier's standing among Queenslanders.

Finally, Queensland is an unusual place. In a state ridiculed by the rest of Australia for its rural outlook, lack of sophistication, poor educational standards, Victorian morality (*Playboy* is still banned there and topless bathing is still not accepted formally) and super-loyalty to the Crown, Mr. Bjelke-Peterson is a winner in a state of losers. Even his Labour opponents will give him grudging admiration for the way in which he has made Queensland an important Australian state. His high personal code of honour, his happy and stable family life, his toughness, his rags-to-riches life-story are all qualities which appeal to Queenslanders.

An important tactic followed by almost all Australian politicians is the deliberate non-cultivation of a successor—for fear that he or she will want to take over before the leader is willing to go. Mr. Bjelke-Peterson is now the nation's oldest senior leader, all the more so in a nation where politicians can become members of cabinets as early as their 30s. He may soon decide to retire. But there is no one groomed specifically for his place. Australia's politics, far more so than in Britain, are highly dominated by personalities and it is not unusual for a change of leader to lead shortly to a change of government, with voters being less happy with the new premier than the alternative party leader. Once again, Queensland may be an exception, since the Labour Party is in such chaos, with two factions fighting each other, as bitterly as they oppose the state government. On the other hand, relations between the governing coalition are not always smooth and the recent state election was notable for its in-fighting which took place between the Country and Liberal Parties and the two Labour Party factions, rather than a straight contest between the government and opposition. One Labour Party hope has been that the Liberal Party will eventually break out of the coalition and, with the Labour Party, form a new coalition government, one of whose first steps would be the realignment of electoral boundaries. The Liberals have resisted this offer since there is no guarantee that they would ever form a government on their own under new electoral boundaries. But Queens-

land is known for its surprises and so anything can happen.

Queensland is moving into a new era. Instead of being Australia's backwater, it may become the nation's leading edge. This new status will be derived from three factors: the nation's growing conservatism, the concern for the environment, and its mineral wealth and other economic opportunities.

First, Australia is becoming a more conservative country. Conservatism or radicalism are impossible to quantify. What may seem 'conservative' in one nation may make it radical in another. Additionally, the pendulum never completely retraces its arc and so there is never a thorough return to a previous era since recent reforms cannot be reversed entirely.

But there are some factors which indicate a new conservatism nationally. The leaders of the national Liberal and Labour Parties are the most conservative the parties have had for a decade. The Liberal Party has rarely been noted for visionary policies. But the Labour Party, which was bursting with visionary policies a decade ago, does not offer much alternative from Liberal policies. The Whitlam era is dead. The demographic situation, with fewer young people entering society, indicates a hardening of the political arteries. For the first time in Australian history, more than half of the people will be over 30 by 1985. The elderly—and not the young—will set the community's standards. Given the nation's economic problems, the elderly will have the money, while the young will increasingly exist on the dole. Traditional working-class struggles have little meaning for the young who are in jobs; they are more concerned with protecting what they have, rather than campaigning to help the disadvantaged. It is hard to imagine that less than a century ago, with its innovations, Australia was the 'Sweden' of the South Pacific, decades before Sweden acquired its reputation of being the pacesetter in liberal reforms.

This new conservatism will benefit Queensland. While some of its social policies will still be seen as too conservative for some Australians, it is nonetheless more in line with the way in which Australia is moving. In short, it will not seem such a bad place in which to live.

Second, concern for the environment has not been a short-term boom but a permanent revolution. Just why Australians, who are noted for their political apathy, should have become so mobilised over the environment is still not clear. The revolution has cut across traditional class lines, with the 'green ban' movement, for example, bringing together the trendy middle class, the elderly blue-rinse set in pearls and the toiling building labourers, to stop the redevelopment of Australian cities at the cost of old buildings and urban greenery. The current combat zone is the Great Barrier Reef, one of the world's great wonders. It covers an area of about 250,000 square kilometres (twice the size of England) and is almost 2,000 kilometres long (about a third the distance between London and New York). It is a maze of about 2,500 reefs, of varying sizes. For over a decade, oil companies have sought to drill in or near the reef, but all national governments have opposed this, largely through the pressure of public opinion. In late 1981, the national government declared about 3

per cent of it as a national park, thereby creating the world's largest marine park. But the battle goes on for the remaining 97 per cent. There is a fear that oil companies may yet get access to the Reef.

The main implication of the Reef is that this is but one of many environmental battles which the nation will have. The state government remains determined to exploit part of the Reef but is unable to carry its own people with it. An adverse public opinion and the threat of international condemnation have never deterred Mr. Bjelke-Peterson in the past. But on this issue, anyway, he may have to back down. Queensland's role, in this context, then, is that it is a focal point for the continuing debate over the conflict between economic development and protection of the environment.

Finally, the political centre of gravity within Australia is moving north. Since 1788, the centre of gravity has been the Sydney-Melbourne axis, with Canberra coming into the picture since federation in 1901 as both cities could not agree on which should be the national capital. By standing on top of the tallest buildings in Sydney and Melbourne, an observer can in theory see half of the Australian population. The nation's wealth was originally derived from agriculture and, since World War II, additionally from the manufacturing sector. But Australia is losing jobs to Asian factories, where wages are much lower, trades unions docile and strikes almost non-existent.

The next economic leap will come from mining. The poorest states, in all three economic sectors, are Tasmania and South Australia. Victoria and New South Wales are quite strong in all three sectors. But the real growth potential is in Western Australia (itself the size of western Europe), Northern Territory (which has too few people to deserve the full status of a state) and Queensland.

More than 1,000 people per week move from the south into Queensland, thereby constituting the largest internal migration since 1788. The trend will increase so that the equivalent of a country town each year will migrate to Queensland. By the year 2000, Queensland will become the nation's second most populous state, after New South Wales, thereby replacing Victoria in that position. One-third of all new jobs created in Australia last year were created in Queensland. The population influx is a self-generating boom. Elderly people have for years been moving to Queensland, to enjoy its year-round sunshine (which removes the need for paying for home heating) and Queensland was the first state to abolish death duties and gift tax. But now younger people are also moving north.

[Dr. Suter is Dean of Students, Wesley College, University of Sydney.]

TELEVISION IN THE 1980s—THE MEDIUM IN MATURITY

by Robert Rubens

IN the classic film of theatrical life, *All About Eve* made in 1950, an aspiring young actress told a cynical drama critic that she had been offered an audition for television. The critic then replied: 'That's all television is, my dear. Nothing *but* auditions'. As a medium of entertainment and communication, television was still in its early years when that caustic line of dialogue received chuckles of agreement from film audiences. But now that television has reached its maturity, one important question remains: how far has it progressed in more than three decades?

Technically there is no doubt that it has advanced immeasurably. The visual quality of colour television is as subtle and life-like as the very best of films and the use of the television camera for close-up and long range panoramic views has reached a high point in sophistication while the speed and perfection of video recording is another remarkable innovation. But despite these achievements, the primary consideration in evaluating the development of television must be the actual quality of the programmes which are presented night after night. It is an unfortunate fact that a succession of mindless serials—thriller-adventures, domestic dramas, situation comedies—have been absorbing the attention of millions of television watchers for more than a quarter of a century. In recent years, after a programme such as *The Avengers* finally wore itself out, we were presented with *Kojak* and *Bergerac* whose main distinctions are the curious choice of surnames for their detective heroes. And when *The Waltons* had run their course we could turn with confidence to *Dallas* for another extended dose of comfortably home-spun inanity. Then there is the interminable *Crossroads* (the less said about this national phenomenon the better) and for the past two seasons vast audiences have been glued to their TV screens to watch Miss Penelope Keith pulling faces as a dispossessed chatelaine in the series, *To the Manor Born* which began as a clever idea with some amusing dialogue and could have been a charming unpretentious television play had the producers not decided to spin it out into a two-year bore.

This passion for serialisation has also extended to what the television producers presumably consider their more cultural presentations. What seems to happen is that someone in one of the BBC or ITV offices discovers a book such as *I, Claudius* or the biography of Lily Langtry and that of Edward VIII or the novels *The Bell* and *Brideshead Revisited* and then the wheels begin turning. Wigs, Roman togas, Victorian anti-macassars, flounced 1950's dresses, polished old Daimlers are dredged up from somewhere while 18th century manor houses and Vanbrugh palaces are hired along with accomplished actors, make-up artists, costume designers and script writers. And so within a matter of months

stories which could have been effectively dramatised in an hour or two are dragged out into four, eight, ten and in the case of *Brideshead Revisited*, twelve lengthy episodes. This last serialisation is perhaps the most dismaying of them all, for the original book—a beautifully written elegiac novel—is approximately three hundred and fifty pages long and there can be no possible artistic justification for having amplified it into a twelve hour dramatisation. The result was a succession of exquisitely filmed, well-acted fragments which were flat, undramatic, static and dull.

On American television, while the artistic level of entertainment is just as low as it is on our side of the Atlantic, the mass audiences are also provided with hours of chat shows each evening. These range from the light-hearted party prattle of varied groups of guests to 'in-depth' interviews with authors, statesmen and other distinguished personalities. In America, television has helped to put an end for ever to any sense of privacy and personal reticence that remained in modern life.

Aside from the fascination, sometimes bordering on voyeurism, of the spontaneous chat show, television has become in both Britain and in the United States an extraordinarily efficient and accurate medium for the coverage of every form of news event. Wars, riots, demonstrations, royal weddings, floods and fires are televised with stunning immediacy and perhaps because of this the nation has never been more well informed than it is today. Whether or not this is a good thing remains highly debatable.

There is also a great deal to be said for the televising of operas, ballets and distinguished films, for this is an excellent means of bringing artistic events to millions of people who otherwise could not afford or would not have the opportunity to see them.

Another important fact is that television has become an indispensable form of surrogate companionship for many older people often living alone. But aside from these advantages, there is no indication that any creative innovation has yet occurred in this medium. In fact the description of television as being 'Nothing but auditions' has proved to be more accurate than its author realised at the time, for one interesting recent phenomenon is that a number of talented actors have used the medium as a kind of testing ground on which to establish their reputations and in many cases their financial security before progressing to more challenging rôles in the theatre and the cinema. If these actors can make this sort of artistic progress, why can't the medium itself finally move on from its prolonged audition phase and begin to give a real performance?

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

The House in Paris. Elizabeth Bowen. Cape. £7.50. *The Prodigal Child*. David Storey. Cape. £7.50. *The Burning Leaves*. Don Bannister. Blond & Briggs. £7.50. *To Die at Sunset*. Elsa Joubert (translated by Klaas Steytler). Hodder. £5.95. *Field of Honour*. Timeri Murari. Eyre Methuen. £7.95. *Progress of Stories*. Laura (Riding) Jackson. Carcanet New Press Ltd. £7.95.

Re-reading a favourite novel after many years can be a sobering, if rewarding, experience. For many people, Elizabeth Bowen's *The House in Paris* exercised a profound and lasting influence. It broke new ground in presenting a sombre, Jamesian interior as background for a contemporary story. Every relevant detail of Edwardian claustrophobia is firmly etched in this timeless study of bitter family feuding and unrequited passion. The house of the title is in the unsmart area of Paris and although the characters barely venture outside the front door, the French capital in all its moods permeates the scene. The ageing and repulsive Mrs. Fisher lies mortally sick in her unhygienic bedroom, grudgingly attended by her hostile daughter. Leopold, a cynical, wizened-looking nine-year-old, waits impatiently in the over-furnished *salon* for his long-lost mother, who has promised to spirit him away to a proper home of his own. For him, *maison* Fisher is little more than a transit base, as it is for the one really sane person of the ill-assorted quartette, the child Henrietta, filling in a few tedious hours between trains.

Meanwhile, as the leaden-footed hours tick by, it becomes clear that there are good reasons for the tensions which oppress both adults and children. By degrees, the ghosts emerge from their hiding places and it is revealed that Miss Fisher and Leopold's mother, Karen, once loved the same man, Max. He and Karen spent an illicit week-end together at Folkestone and the result, despite rudimentary attempts at contraception, was Leopold. But there was more to this eternal triangle than mere sexual jealousy. A combination of spider and witch, Mrs. Fisher was at the centre of the tangle and seems likely to have been in love with Max herself, which reinforced her determination to downgrade the despised daughter in his affections. Her unscrupulous machinations made the ultimate tragedy inevitable. Max, never a very stable character, was understandably unable to withstand the emotional pressures and commits suicide. Shrouded in secrecy necessitated by the conventions of the post-World-War-I period, Leopold's birth was known to few people. As he himself declares, it was as if he did not exist; and he might have remained a shadow child in the home of foster parents had not his mother conceived the ill-considered strategy of reclaiming him. It is no surprise to him or the reader when the plan is cancelled, and in Leopold's bravely concealed grief is revealed the frightening extent of a child's vulnerability.

In the third and final part of the novel the curtains of time are swept aside to reveal a confused and even desperate situation for the inmates of the house. After that emotion-charged afternoon not one of them will ever be quite the same again; even Henrietta, though not directly involved, brought face-to-face for the first time in her life with loneliness and suffering. The intruder on the

scene is Ray, Karen's present husband, determined to re-unite Leopold with his mother and to give the boy a stable home. This somewhat contrived happy ending leaves unanswered a number of important questions. Would the odd, warped child settle in new surroundings and what was to become of the Fishers in their mausoleum? Perhaps it would have been inappropriate to search for and present convincing practical solutions? It seems not to matter too much. What stands out and lingers long in the memory are the many examples of Elizabeth Bowen's supreme talent and ability.

Thomas Hardy once said that an interesting and unusual story is essential to justify the thought and effort a writer needs to put into a novel. It remains perennially true, for the novelist who sets out to battle his way through an unexceptional plot is building up for himself gratuitous hurdles. This could truly be said of *The Prodigal Child*, which concerns the adoption or 'fostering' by a wealthy provincial family of Bryan Morley, second son of working-class parents, deemed from the first to be 'different'. With training and an expensive education, he promises to become a sculptor, and the problem for David Storey is to convince the reader that this rather humdrum boy does in fact possess sufficient talent to excel in a fairly unusual art form. More rewarding is the consideration of Bryan's benefactors, Harold and Fay Corregan. Harold Corregan is a bluff, small-town businessman who readily springs to life, but Fay would have repaid a more subtle investigation. Her relations with the rapidly maturing youth have unpleasant undertones. In the thirties' atmosphere of purse-proud provincialism, the wife of a successful shopkeeper was not expected to be gainfully, or even intelligently, employed. And so Mrs. Corregan has ample leisure to pursue a mindless round of pleasure and at the same time to inflame the impressionable youth with a display of ostentatious clothes and domestic luxury. Surreptitious invitations to her bedroom and steamy confidences combine to suggest an association between benefactor and protégé, the implications of which are never properly acknowledged. Throughout the novel, Fay Corregan's motives remain obscure. This could be due to David Storey's reluctance to introduce a serious strand into what is for the most part an innocuous tale of honest Yorkshire folk. As one would expect from this eminently successful novelist and playwright, the dialogue and scenic background are always convincing and the interest maintained in a group of unexciting villagers is due to his own very individual skill. Yet the novel ends up rather flatly, perhaps because there is so little to lend conviction to Bryan's ultimate fame. The consolation is that in a post-World-War-II epilogue, the lad is seen to turn his attention to a girl of his own age, leaving Fay—by this time widowed—to grow old gracefully.

The characters of Don Bannister's latest novel, *The Burning Leaves*, present not so much a problem of basic ordinariness as of being placed in a situation already over-exposed. Here, yet again, is the red-brick University of the Lucky Jim era, predictably disliked and despised by the young University lecturer, Paul Killick. The mundane small-talk of the common room is anathema to him and he seeks to relieve the tedium by offensive jokes and comments. Small wonder that his temporary contract is not renewed and he finds himself joining the ranks of the unemployed. He has one priceless asset, the undeviating devotion of his attractive wife, Wendy. Yet he seems unable to relate to her in any 'meaningful' way and it is not too much of a surprise when he lands up as a voluntary patient in a mental hospital. Here, again, we have the all too-familiar trappings: sex-crazy patients, frustrated staff and stark surroundings. Clearly, Paul Killick's prolonged stay would be of no mutual advantage, yet

when the day comes for his discharge he cunningly contrives a disappearance and sets out to flout convention by living rough. From then on, more than ever, we have the sense of *déjà vu*; slave labour in a noisome cafe, overtures from a homosexual, brushes with the police and charity of the soup kitchen variety. Desperate and near to starvation, he throws himself on the mercy of a family who, with infinite patience and good humour, set about the task of rehabilitation, so successfully that after a few setbacks and some off-beat sexual encounters, he obtains employment in a local newsagent. As a result, he feels secure enough to communicate with his wife and suggest a resumption of their married life. Not surprisingly, Wendy turns him down. Whereupon, abruptly shaken out of his new-found complacency, he returns to the real world where, despite 'cuts' and the high unemployment rate, he is immediately offered a teaching post in a comprehensive school. It is difficult to feel genuine concern for any of the characters in *The Burning Leaves*, apart from the gallant Wendy. True, we do not need to love our heroes and so it is not important that Paul Killick is treacherous and petty-minded; yet the overall reaction is one of indifference, which is disappointing, as Don Bannister's previous novel, *The Long Day at Shiloh*, had so much to say and said it so well about the horror and futility of war.

It is a relief to turn to a novel with a striking and unfamiliar background. Elsa Joubert writes in Afrikaans and *To Die at Sunset* is likely to be as successful as her first novel, *Poppie*. The scene is Angola, with flashbacks to Portugal at the time and after the African country's independence. Ana Paula's marriage is the main area of conflict, set against the regional struggle for tribal supremacy. Ana Paula is married to a coffee planter, Carlos, following an impulsive decision to embark on what she imagined would be a glamorous existence under eternally sunny skies. The reality turned out to be very different. Her new home was found to be squalid and ill-equipped, a haven for hordes of marauding insects. She might have surmounted these disadvantages had she been genuinely in love, but any affection she might have felt for Carlos was quickly dispelled by the presence of his African mistress, 'Ngia, and the *mistos* (illegitimate children). True, 'Ngia was banished from the bungalow, but Carlos insisted that the children remain, even though reduced by Ana Paula to the status of scavenging animals. As for Ana Paula herself, she looks for compensation in an aviary of exotic birds and the companionship of a small, adoring dog, though without much success. Embittered by her own childlessness, she seeks assistance from the purveyors of tribal remedies for infertility, only to find them as squalid as the circumstances from which she seeks to escape. That is the basic situation to which Ana Paula awakes as dawn breaks on a particularly momentous day to find her dog and servants vanished, and the birds slaughtered. From that moment, events move swiftly, though with a seeming timelessness: units of Congolese troops arrive to manhandle and imprison the inmates of the coffee plantation. One of the *mistos* dies for lack of drinking water, Carlos is seriously wounded, and the dog is returned disembowelled. Minute by minute, hour by hour, the ordeal is followed in close, vivid detail, building up to an almost unbearable sense of apprehension in which the heat and the blinding brightness become almost actual. In the end, the climax is something of an anti-climax, for the novel ends with the 'Captain's' helicopter visible as the merest speck in a vivid sky, and what Fate he decrees for the hostages is not revealed.

Again with an unusual background—the India of 1948—is *Field of Honour*. Here are no shootings or excessive climatic conditions but the gentle disinte-

gration of a way of life both Indians and the British had come to regard as permanent. Timeri Murari, who is at present working on a trilogy of novels on India, knows how to make his characters respond to the strains placed on them by shifts in power and opportunity. Gunboat, a second-rate white boxer with a chequered past and few qualifications, is engaged to coach Nicky, Prince of Tandhapur, for a school boxing match of particular private and personal importance. These two opposing types, supported by a selection of sleazy whites and aristocratic Indians, are upstaged by the egregious Miss Hobbs, sometime mistress of Nicky's father, and who still contrives to manage the Tandhapur estates from the fastness of her English-style 'parlour'. Yet even she is destined to become an anachronism, and so give added point to Timeri Murari's extremely accomplished account of the confusion which accompanied the withdrawal of the British Raj.

Finally, something of a curiosity, in some ways baffling and unsatisfactory, yet at the same time having its own value. It is more than fifty years since Laura Riding first became known and acclaimed as a poet and short-story writer, even though she seems never to have enjoyed a very broadly based success. In *Progress of Stories*, a selection of her work up to 1930 has been gathered together for the first time, including one recent story, 'Christmas-time'. There is a smoothly unemphatic tone about all of them. If by modern standards they lack attack and technical virtuosity, Laura Riding's shrewd comment and skilful characterisation remain undimmed by the passage of time.

Also received:

Skerret. Liam O'Flaherty. Wolfhound Press. £3.25.

Now in his eighty-seventh year, Liam O'Flaherty is a writer who can still command the reader's attention. *Skerret* is perhaps his finest novel and a reissue is very welcome. Two widely differing personalities, a man of God and a school-master, work out their own individual destinies against the beautiful but little known background of the Aran Islands.

The Strange Case of William Whipper-Snapper. David R. Morgan. Terrapin Books. £1.40.

With the amusingly and provocative titled *The Strange Case of William Whipper-Snapper*, David Morgan, poet and journalist, has produced an excellent first novel. It lingers on the little explored territory between fantasy and farce, yet with a charm and sense of purpose difficult to achieve in this category.

Across The Sea Wall. C. J. Koch. Angus and Robertson. £6.95.

Quite one of the finest of contemporary Australian writers, C. J. Koch's novel about his own home scene is full of revealing interest; but the main purpose of *Across The Sea Wall* is to explore a young Australian's view of the world beyond his native land.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

CLEMENT ATTLEE

Attlee. Kenneth Harris. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £14.95.

Lord Attlee (as he became) has for long seemed to me the most ethical Prime Minister in British history, though the great majority of our Premiers have been public-spirited men. The assessment is confirmed by my reading of Kenneth Harris's deeply impressive biography—in every way worthy of its subject.

Harris considers that Attlee is 'entitled to be regarded as a great Prime Minister'. That, on the facts given here, should be readily conceded. Moreover a man who led the Labour Party for 20 years was a wartime Deputy Prime Minister for 5 and Prime Minister for 6; who retired at a time of his own choosing full of honours, must be given high marks for toughness and astuteness. But it is on the moral plane that Attlee seems to me pre-eminent.

Humility, which we associate more readily with saints than successful politicians, was his distinguishing mark. (And any suggestion that he had 'plenty to be humble about' is particularly foolish.) He was humble both in the negative self-effacing sense and in the positive sense enjoined by the Gospels of seeking 'not to be served but to serve'. No period, says Harris of Attlee's life, was as varied and full as his 7 pre-war years in Stepney. He cut up loaves to feed dockers' children during the Dock Strike of 1911. He stood at the dock gates holding a collecting box during the Irish Transport and General Workers' Strike in 1913. When the local ILP set up its headquarters above a funeral parlour Attlee provided the furniture and part of the rent. 'The fact that he did more and talked less than any other Socialist in Stepney was widely observed.'

Half a century later, having retired from office, he began the daily routine which lasted over the next ten years. "Nearly every morning when the House of Lords was in sessions VI (his wife) drove him to Great Missenden station. He boarded the train, 'well up to the front to try and get a corner seat', and travelled in a third-class compartment to Baker Street, then to Westminster on the Metropolitan Line."

But he preserved at all times his dignity and his personal rights. When I took him in my Government car to the country funeral of Lord Alexander of Hillesborough he was the only man there in a top hat. 'Don't mind being thought a Victorian'. The corner seat below the gangway was usually kept for him in the Lords. One day he came in late and it was occupied. Clem Attlee by that time frail—almost to vanishing point—stood there inflexibly till the occupant, a bulky personage, moved.

I myself was greatly indebted to him for various government appointments, but came to know him best in the House of Lords in his last years. I fervently supported him on world government; I caused him some regret by my enthusiasm for entry into Europe. The only weakness I associate him with was an anachronistic antipathy to the Germans. Characteristically he never mentioned these feelings when I, as Minister for Germany, used to argue their cause in a manner that must have irritated him enormously. Near the end of his life as Chairman of the Anglo-German Association I asked him to be one of its patrons. His answer took me aback. Never could stand the Germans, except a maid that VI and I had once. Both got very fond of her.

Once after a debate my wife and I tried to take him and Lady Attlee to

dinner. He insisted that they should be the hosts if I would take them to a restaurant I knew. 'Don't know any restaurants'. When it came to paying the bill he asked me with some embarrassment whether I would mind paying it and he would reimburse me. 'Never been here before. Don't suppose they'd take my cheque'. With some people there might have been suspicion of affectation. Not with Clem Attlee. With his degree of humility he could probably never have become Prime Minister except through an historical accident.

There are many things in this book which I did not know. Attlee's personal preference for Aneurin Bevan over Hugh Gaitskell for example. The whole book gives a fascinating picture of the period and the man. Attlee's years in Stepney had given him a permanent rapprochement with the working class unrivalled in my experience among those of his background. His appeal was slightly different to old public schoolboys, not necessarily of his own Party. He represented in their eyes the public school ideal of service to the community. Harris quotes his wife as saying to him in the last years, 'You never were a Socialist, were you Clem?' He replied diplomatically, 'not a rabid one'. He was the most loving of husbands and the most loved. He would never have said anything to upset Vi. But in fact it was his brand of Socialism which enabled myself and many like me to call myself a Socialist whatever the precise meaning of that word.

Harris tells us that Attlee could never accept Christian theology but that most of his friends were Christians and that he had a profound respect for Christianity. His formation was deeply Christian and its influence never waned. I shall always think of him as the finest example of Christianity in its practical application to politics, and the most inspiring man I have ever tried to serve.

FRANK LONGFORD

WRITERS AND THEIR IMAGES

The Stuff of Sleep and Dreams: Experiments in Literary Psychology. Leon Edel. Chatto & Windus. £15.00.

Leon Edel, the distinguished biographer of Henry James, describes literary psychology as 'in essence a study—without therapeutic purpose—of what literature expresses of the human being who creates it'. His concern, in *The Stuff of Sleep and Dreams*, is with the ability of writers to create and use myths and symbols: his basically Freudian view of the unconscious as well as the conscious use of experience by poets and novelists embraces the possibility that some images arise unbidden in an author's mind and that he does not necessarily know their precise origin. There are two chief perils in such a study. One is that of psychologising a writer's work out of its independent existence by diagnosing personal difficulties instead of assessing the worth of a finished poem or novel. The other is the danger of representing a writer as the victim of deterministic influences: for, if he cannot help but choose particular symbols to express his meaning, he is to that extent not truly the author of his own works. Leon Edel avoids both pitfalls and in so doing he gives remarkably illuminating accounts of some of the writers we should most wish to understand. He is well able to do this because of his personal acquaintance, over many years, with, for instance, James Joyce, T. S. Eliot and Virginia Woolf.

He has the special advantage of having conversed with and having been taught by Adler in the Vienna of the early 1930s. Preferring the Adlerian interpretation of individual personality, at the mercy of mischances, to the

Freudian 'mouldings from universal patterns', Edel has linked his own biographical studies with ever-increasing knowledge of modern psychology. 'Biographers, Adler told me,' he says, 'need to remind themselves constantly of the nature of the human struggle for some form of human expression and self-assertion.' Especially, Edel thinks, these insights 'lie close to the heart of all literary creation'. He shows in his new book how authors in pre-Freudian times—Hawthorne, Dickens, Conrad and Thoreau—were aware of the stuff of dreams and of the images it presents to the imagination. He distinguishes in these and in Henry James, James Joyce and Yeats a particular form of depression which Dr. Benjamin Rush, the eighteenth century father of American psychiatry, christened 'tristimania', a word which has descriptive if not diagnostic value. A sadness, stemming from the individual's response to life experiences, particularly those of physical inadequacy felt in early childhood, colours both dreams and creative effort and cannot be overcome except by a continual struggle to symbolise it.

Singularly convincing are Edel's accounts of the images arising in the poems of Eliot, of Yeats and of other writers, not because a state of mind accounts in any way for the existence and worth of the poems themselves but because the writer could not function in ordinary life except by practising his art. A poet's symbols arise in relation to his subject-matter; but also, and perhaps essentially, they come from his own deep-seated pre-occupations. Virginia Woolf could keep her balance only by writing novels. Equilibrium could only exist in her during the process of creation. When it was done the basic depression overwhelmed her once more, for the actual writing was not a 'cure'. It simply served as a mechanism for carrying on at all. In the intervals between novels she was sustained by dependence on her husband. In the same way Eliot wrote *The Waste Land* whilst undergoing psychiatric treatment of a pre-Freudian kind by Vittoz in Lausanne: effective as it seemed to be, Eliot's return to London and to his difficult marriage with Vivien found him dependent not only on her but on his next artistic mentor, Ezra Pound, who brought the 'sprawling manuscript' into the tight final form which we know.

Integrating his fragmented world was to Eliot a constant struggle. The 'abulia' (inertia of the will) which afflicted him was overcome only when the 'objective correlative' of his poetic themes, like the expression of a deep religious faith in *The Four Quarters*, could shape and define it for him. The images of impotence, the myths of sterile kings squandering their seed in a waste land, whilst they are apparently related to an observed environment, were thrown up in the poet's mind much more by his own malaise working deeply in his unconscious experience. Others such as Tolstoy and Thoreau found a way out of 'the labyrinth of the despairing self' through living out peasant fantasies. The comforting routine of Eliot's duties in Loyd's Bank; the erection of a hut by Thoreau near a pond one mile from his mother's house, were not hindrances to the creative process but enabled it to continue, for there is a close connection between ritual and routine.

It is Leon Edel's insight into the relationship between an artist and his works, more than any psychological theories, that allows him to give new meaning to the art of biography. His book, a careful and scholarly study of his sources, is written with humour and zest. His essays on art and ageing, art and depression and on the genesis of Rex Stout's detective stories are attractive and informative. The author carries his learning lightly, though seriously, in a book that is delightful to read.

BETTY ABEL

THE THIRD WORLD WAR

The Third World War, the untold story. General Sir John Hackett. Sidgwick and Jackson £9.95.

Sir John Hackett, who is a man of many parts, has come close to adding yet another talent to his roster, that of being the author of a new form of science fiction. He writes as if it were 1987, and he describes, as in the language of official reports, the course of the Third World War that—as we now all remember—broke out in August 1985. He writes in detailed, almost clinical, fashion of the course of a War that engulfed the whole world, which among other things ended the neutrality of both Sweden and Ireland, and which totally destroyed both Birmingham and Minsk (each 'taken out' by the enemy as an indication of its power). It is, however, more than an official report, since at intervals it includes the accounts of participants like Senior Lieutenant Andrei Nekrassov of the USSR and of Senior Aircraftman Instrument Mechanic, Brian Illingworth. General Hackett writes in collaboration with the outstanding team that worked with him on his earlier study—*The Third World War August 1985*—of which this book is a follow-up, but to them he now adds as 'extra' auxiliaries Vladimir Bukovsky, Victor Suvarov and Lord Caradon. The author himself had, of course, a remarkable war record, notably at Arnheim, and later served as C-in-C Rhine Army. To the precision and the sharp cutting edge of the classical scholar that he was, and now again happily is, he can thus add the verisimilitude of war operations graphically and disturbingly told.

This is splendid reading, pure but worrying fantasy. Could it happen as he describes? Yes—and No. Would World War Three really begin over Poland? A year ago, when no doubt this book was being written, it might seem so: would it look so now? Would it not last a great deal longer than the three horrific weeks that are described here? In the light of the Russian collapse would the constituent republics all so easily break away into their component nationalisms? Would the Quaddafs and the Ayatollahs of our restless world go down automatically in the chaos? It is all just a bit too tidy—and the result is reached a shade too smoothly. In what bunker, eating what rations and in what condition, would the good general be writing this frightening memoir in 1987 if we had all been through the horrors two years before so brilliantly and almost lovingly sketched here? This is a spoof, but it leaves the reader with ugly dreams.

EDMOND WRIGHT

RUSKIN STUDIES

Studies in Ruskin. Edited by Robert E. Rhodes and Del Ivan Janik. Ohio University Press. \$20.95.

An eminent architect of the Anglo-American Ruskin alliance is Professor Van Akin Burd of the State University of New York College at Cortland, whose major contributions to the corpus are *The Winnington Letters* (Harvard University Press, 1969), *The Ruskin Family Letters* in two volumes (Cornell University Press, 1973) and *John Ruskin and Rose LaTouche: Her Unpublished Diaries of 1861 and 1867* (Oxford University Press, 1979). Upon his retirement from active teaching, at the end of 1978, he embarked on the preparation

of Ruskin's 1876-1877 correspondence with Joan Severn, from Venice—that late trip, ostensibly to prepare a new edition of *The Stones of Venice*, during which Ruskin found that there were 'A thousand things in my head pushing each other.'


It is in honour of Professor Van Akin Burd, and retrospectively to mark his retirement, that these essays are here collected. Alas, then, that the hotchpot is of uneven quality, and is outshone by *The Ruskin Polygon*, a rival sheaf of papers published earlier this year by Manchester University Press, where every contribution was of equal intellectual brilliance.

The heart of this present collection lies in five excellent essays, which may usefully be read against John Dixon Hunt's *The Wider Sea* (Dent, 1982)—the most up-to-date *Life*, with a strong grasp of Ruskin's imaginative processes. Professor George P. Landow discusses the concept of realism in *Modern Painters I and II*, and, through an examination of Holman Hunt's theories (some expressed in essays in 1886 in the *Contemporary Review*) shows how Ruskin's espousal of the Pre-Raphaelite cause is not inconsistent with his defence of Turner. Professor David Sonstroem finds a fundamental coherence in the labyrinths of *Modern Painters III and IV*. Mr. Robert Hewison excavates the contemporary political references which shape *The Stones of Venice*, with an interesting emphasis on the influence of Ruskin's father—that 'violent Tory of the old school', drawing upon the unpublished letters (in the Bembridge archives) of John James Ruskin to his son in Venice 1851-1852. Professor Charles T. Dougherty presents a commentary on *The Poetry of Architecture*—the series of articles which Ruskin contributed to the *Architectural Magazine* while he was still an undergraduate, and Professor Elizabeth K. Helsinger discusses *The Stones of Venice* in terms of a travel-history, and demonstrates how, by this stage, Ruskin's aesthetic appreciation was sharpening into social criticism.

The opening essay is a weak and badly-structured rehearsal of some of the known biographical data, which purports to correct the misconceptions and myths, but, in fact, misses the opportunity for a valuable setting-straight arranged point by point. Let one lamentable sentence suffice—'Perhaps the reason (for the non-consummation) is no more complicated than his expressed dislike for babies; but then why did he marry at all?'

More successfully, Mary Lutyens takes us, pleasurably, over the Venetian ground again. James S. Dearden, who is Curator at Bembridge and Brantwood, has prepared an impeccable bio-bibliographical study of *The King of the Golden River*—Collingwood's 'pretty medley of Grimm's grotesque and Dickens' kindness and the true Ruskinian ecstasy of the Alps'—although the preliminary biographical data should have been edited. In this specialist context, the reader does not need the information that 'John, who was a promising poet and artist, had been working very hard at Oxford during the early part of the year.' In another discipline, Kristine Ottesen Garrigan examines Ruskin's architectural approach to Venice, and his imaginative response to that architecture. Final papers deal with the influence of Ruskin on the economist, William Smart, and also on the intellectual life of modern Japan. Fluffing out sideways, indeed!

MOLLY TIBBS



THE POPULATION CRISIS

The Shape of Things to Come. A Population Concern publication. £1.75.

This admirable pamphlet provides a succinct and authoritative account of the global population crisis. It stresses the continuing salience of the problem together with its baneful effects on development, food production, employment, education and medical services. From a current world population just in excess of 4,500 million a massive further increase can be anticipated, stabilisation at a figure of approximately 10,000 not being achieved until the early years of the 22nd century.

Future outlooks *vis-à-vis* population are considered for 5 countries which combined account for nearly half the world's population. China, the earth's most populous nation with numbers in excess of 1,000 million in 1980, has clearly demonstrated that it has the political will to tackle the population problem. Its family planning programme is extensive and organised at national, provincial and local government levels; rewards and punishments in relation to reproduction are noteworthy, couples opting to have one child enjoying considerable economic benefits; population distribution is seen to be important, the emphasis being in the growth of small and medium sized cities. The aims of the Chinese policy are certainly audacious—zero population growth by the end of this century and negative growth by 2050. It behoves us to wish the Chinese all success in their titanic struggle.

India, like China, is a global population giant. It remains one of the poorest countries in the world and its population policy has never been anything but weak and faltering. The State of Emergency during which forced vasectomy was practised was deeply resented by the population and led to the downfall of the Indira Gandhi Government in 1977. Since then the emphasis has been on development rather than coercion but no notable successes have been achieved except in the state of Kerala where in 1980 the birth rate fell to 30 per 1,000. If present trends continue India's population, currently estimated at 710 million, will exceed 1,000 million by the early years of the 21st century. This is indeed a bleak prospect for India itself and for the rest of the world.

Ninety per cent of Egyptians live in the fertile Nile delta. Population growth (3% per annum) continues unabated and is now threatening the country's ability to provide adequate food for its people. Neighbouring Kenya is in an even more parlous state with a growth rate of 4 per cent per annum and the likelihood that numbers will double in a mere 18 years. The final country, Mexico, presents a slightly more hopeful picture, the average family size having fallen from 7 to five children between 1967 and 1981. Yet as a direct result of its over-population Mexico has a huge urbanisation problem and it is projected that by the end of this century its capital, Mexico City, with more than 30 million inhabitants will be the largest urban agglomeration in the world.

Over-population is humanity's tryst with destiny. Unless the problem is solved or attenuated there can be no favourable prognosis for *homo sapiens*. This pamphlet by *Population Concern* should be widely read and its recommendations eagerly discussed. For there is precious little time left to take decisions essential to the future of the world.

JOHN A. LORAINÉ

THE REIGN OF GEORGE III

Wars and Revolutions: Britain 1760-1815. Ian R. Christie. Arnold. £6.95.

This is volume 7 in a planned ten-volume *New History of England*, of which four have already appeared. The 'New' element is presumably meant to indicate an emphasis both on the impact of war, and on the social changes of the years of George III's reign. It tells 'the story', in the author's words, 'of a nation's survival at peace with itself in an age of wars and revolutions.' The account of social and economic development, however, is confined to two chapters; admirable as the picture is, in chapter one, of British life in 1760, Professor Christie admits in his Introduction that "it has been borne in upon the author during the preparation of this book, that there is much about this process of survival that as yet remains unexplained . . . The successful emergence of Britain from the great power-struggle against France is at present more readily explicable than the emergence of British society unshattered from the age of revolutions".

The author's strength, of course, is in his account of the involved political intrigues of the first 20 years of the reign. He is also aware of the turmoil outside Westminster—of the worlds of Wilkes and Wyvill, Wesley and Wilberforce. Indeed, more than most authorities he conveys a real grasp of Irish, Welsh and notably of Scottish affairs — as well, since this was the era of the end of the First British Empire, of the affairs of the Marathas and Mysore, of Boston and Philadelphia, of Gibraltar and—be it noted—the Falklands, which produced a crisis of their own in 1770. The near-war of that year was, of course, with Spain, which had persuaded the French to cede their own claims to the Falklands, and which had attached them for administrative purposes to the provincial Government of Buenos Aires. Nevertheless, in 1770 as in 1982 there is little that is new, either in Africa or in the South Atlantic. The end—if end it was—was that 'neither side was to recognise any right of sovereignty in the Falklands on the part of the other, and by a secret agreement the British government pledged that its garrison would in due course be withdrawn, though without any undertaking that the islands might not be reoccupied at a later date'.

This is a clear and well-written survey of the reign of George III, with a useful annotated bibliography.

EDMOND WRIGHT

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Diary of Virginia Woolf. (Penguin Books, £3.95). Virginia Woolf's diary covers the years 1915 to 1941, and in this volume 111, Anne Olivier Bell has edited with notes the diary for the years 1925-30. Those devoted to the Bloomsbury set and intellectual London at that time will greatly appreciate this volume, which 'corresponds to a distinct period in

her life.' In these years, the Editor writes, Virginia Woolf 'attained full maturity as an artist and at the same time achieved a secure and respected position in the world of letters'. As a corollary, she became more financially stable and socially more adventurous. These are perhaps the most fruitful and satisfying years of her life'.

The Macmillan History of Literature. (Macmillan). This history is planned in twelve volumes, under the editorship of A. Norman Jeffares. In his general Preface, he stresses 'the need for students to go beyond the reading of texts, to extend their knowledge by developing a sense of chronology, of action and reaction, and of the varying relationships between writers and society.' In this context, this series should provide a very useful historical introduction to the work of writers and poets both as to their content and contemporary backgrounds. The first four volumes now published include *Sixteenth Century Literature* (£12.00 hardback: £3.95 paperback) by Murray Roston who argues for 'the dual vision'. She argues that the 'ambivalence of a sharply actualised reality contrasting with, complementing, and merging with the nobly idealised vision is a primary source of achievement in all genres of literature' in this period. This volume covers the whole of Shakespeare. *Seventeenth-Century English Literature* (£12.00 hardback: £3.95 paperback) is covered by Bruce King who refers to the period as 'probably the greatest century of English poetry and drama' with great prose classics. This century really deserves two volumes. As it is, the author has had the difficult task of compression. Selection in treatment is always a problem. Even so, for example, he might have included more attention to John Selden. Harry Blamires writes on *Twentieth-Century English Literature* (£12.00 hardback: £3.95 paperback). He has aimed to do justice proportionately to 'its centrally outstanding writers on whom academic studies of the period have tended to concentrate, but also for a great range of lesser writers who have helped to make the age a richly

productive one.' There is, of course, scope for wide divergence of views upon recent and contemporary authors and poets.

The Annual Register 1981. (Longman, £27.00). The Annual Register was first published in 1758 under the editorship of Edmund Burke. Now in its 223rd year, the 1981 volume is edited by H. V. Hodson, assisted by Verena Hoffman. Mr. Hodson also contributes the large section on the 'history of the United Kingdom for last year. This 'record of world events' has articles of varying length on every country in the world, international organisations, special and economic trends, and sections on the arts, literature, science, religion and international and British law. Sport also receives attention. In addition there are numerous statistics, obituary notices and a chronicle of events. In any work of this nature, selection and comment must play a part, but basically the value of the Register is the narration of major events, as objectively as possible. Concision has to play its part so that, for example, in the case of some smaller territories, the account requires a knowledge of the area for the reader to appreciate it fully. An instance is the very short piece on Bermuda. In a work of this size, the occasional slip perhaps is inevitable. In the section on Law in the United Kingdom, reference is made to the unsuccessful 'libel action brought by the Unification Church against the *Daily Mirror*'. The action was in fact against the *Daily Mail*. This is referred to correctly as 'against the *Daily Mail*' in the section on religion. In the case of such discrepancies, of course, the ignorant reader does not know which version to accept without further and time-consuming enquiry.

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
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117th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

NOVEMBER 1982

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IN THE THIRD WORLD**

Lord Hatch

**JAPAN'S FOREIGN
AFFAIRS: 'THE DWARF
IN ME IS GROWING'**

Keith J. Clarke

**FUTURE PATTERNS
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and other articles together
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Incorporating The Fortnightly

November 1982

Vol. 241

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Founded 1866

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CLASS DIVISIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD

by John Hatch

A RECENT report from the ILO estimated that 80 per cent of the rural population of Zambia and 25 per cent of urban inhabitants are unable to buy the basic needs of life. They do not receive sufficient income. The minimum basic needs' requirement is taken as K100 a month (K1 = roughly £0.60). A report of the Government of Zambia states that in 1980 'The richest 2 per cent of all households earn roughly 20 per cent of the entire national household income—the same amount as the poorest 50 per cent'.


Broken down in a different way, there are in Zambia today 678,000 households classified as poor or very poor; below K80 a month in the rural areas, below K104 in the towns; 369,000 in the middle income category (K80-240 and K104-312), and 86,000 in the high income bracket (above K240 and K312).

There are, of course, many variations within these different groups. For instance, although the latest published average annual wage of Zambian copper miners was K2,521, supervisors, shiftbosses and technical foremen are known to earn up to K6,000. Not many of them are Zambians, yet this demonstrates that a considerable number of miners are still paid considerably less than K200 a month.

Nor are these differentiations confined to industry. In the rural areas average figures conceal the fact that there still remains a small core of commercial farmers whose earnings far outstrip those of the much larger number of subsistence peasants. This presents a confusing situation. The people of Zambia do not fall into any conventional pattern. Because of the dominance of copper, the labour divisions are more complicated than in most post-colonial societies. Nevertheless, it is possible, and is important, to discern where class stratification is emerging since independence in 1964, and the influences which may deepen its roots.

If one wants to understand this class stratification which today is becoming an influential feature of African life, it is no use turning to the works of Marx, Engels or Lenin. After all, little was known about the African peoples when they were writing. It was Marx himself who wrote:

This does not prevent the same economic basis—the same from the standpoint of its main conditions—due to innumerable different empirical circumstances,



natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc., from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances. (*Capital*, Vol. III, Chapter 47).

The 'empirical circumstances' were different in Africa. So, any honest Marxist will agree that Africa does not fit into the classical Marxist interpretation of history consisting of the four stages of development: primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism. A new dimension of analysis has to be added to that of Marx if the history of Africa is to be understood.

This does not mean that the tools with which Marxist writers have supplied us have to be totally thrown aside. The analysis of imperialism which Lenin and his associates offered us is still useful in relation to Africa because it extended far beyond the current populist usage of 'imperialism' and examined a whole era of capitalist development. Yet Lenin himself is unreliable on his African references. He tended to accept the data of the liberal economist J. A. Hobson, who extrapolated from his study of South Africa, a unique case, to the whole of the continent. Some modern Marxist writers, especially in France, have made valiant efforts to fill this gap. Nevertheless, welcome though these efforts may be, they are either obviously faulty or remain to be fully tested. (Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Reserches sur un mode de production africain', in *La Pensée*, No. 144, 1969 is one of the most illuminating). Meanwhile, class stratification continues to grow rapidly in African states, strongly influencing policy decisions, but without any theoretical explanatory framework.

For a proletariat to be created the focal factor can be identified as an examination of the mode of production. The separation of the producer from the means of production is held to be the crucial element in the appearance of a proletarian class.

Some Marxist theorists have tried to relate the 'Asiatic Mode of Production' with African history. Marx was guided to this theory by Engels and by his own interest in events in India. But it opens no windows on the social realities of African societies. The theory essentially depends on the presence of a despotic state and a society based on mass slave labour. Neither feature was common in Africa. There were a few exceptions—the state of Dahomey, for instance. Yet any examination of the characteristic African state or empire, Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Kongo, the city states of East Africa, were based on totally different foundations. They were formed as confederations of small tribal or clan societies, the power of the centre diminishing towards the perimeter. Tribute was paid in kind, but their productive methods were left untouched. What slaves were used, usually of a domestic nature, were normally captured through warfare against neighbours outside the empire.

As land was plentiful, though not very fertile, in this huge continent with a sparse population, migration was frequent and there was little competition for it. Nor were the factors of land seizure or large private landownership common. Most societies remained through the ages as

small, subsistence communities, organising their social life in various ways, but usually with a strong communal base. We cannot, therefore, apply the traditional Marxist interpretation of history to Africa so far as the growth of a proletariat is concerned. (Though here is a subject for much wider and deeper research.)

How is it, then, that in almost every African state there is now both a proletariat and a bourgeoisie? The data at present available points directly to the effects of European colonial rule. Zambia provides a valuable example, if only because it is an extreme case which highlights the factors which have operated over the past century throughout the continent. It was, of course, the colonial system which began the process of separating the producer from the means of production. Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) was a backwater of the British Empire until its potential copper resources came to be realised in the 1920s. From then, with a temporary decline during the recession of the early thirties, copper was king. It rose to its highest significance as the foundation of the Central African Federation—1953-1962—when it provided the wealth on which the industrial economy of Southern Rhodesia expanded dramatically.

The impact of this crucial importance of copper changed the social scene in Northern Rhodesia. Labour had to be recruited. So hut and poll taxes were imposed by the colonial administration in order to induce peasants to work in the mines. White settlers were brought in, especially from South Africa, to organise commercial farms to feed the mining community. The pattern of self-sufficient subsistence peasant farming, local markets and village craftsmen was broken.

At first, miners were usually employed on contract, often for not more than eighteen months. Thus, for a time, a considerable proportion of mining wages found their way back to the villages. To some extent this has continued ever since. Although the mining communities are now much more permanent, the custom of miners or other industrial workers retaining their stake in the villages was maintained. But this practice has rapidly weakened as migration from rural to urban areas flowed into a flood. The capital city of Lusaka, for example, had a population of 123,000 in the year of independence, 1964; today it is over 600,000.

The critical feature, however, was that, for the first time, the producers, the peasants, were separated from their means of production, the land, as they were induced either to become miners or workers on commercial farms. This has never involved the entire Zambian population; but it began the process of creating a proletariat. Once the Federation was broken up, to be followed almost immediately by UDI in Rhodesia, the imposition of economic sanctions and the consequent stimulus to import substitution in Zambia, the growth of industry expanded this infant proletariat. It did more. It created a consumer society which, although again by no means encompassing the whole national community, has increasingly dominated decision-making, especially in the allocation of foreign exchange. In an economy under siege, where, despite the legacy of domination by Rhodesia during the Federal period, imports

from the Smith regime were reduced from 34 to 11 per cent in two years, urbanisation reached 8.9 per cent during the late 1960s. Even though the majority of the new immigrants had to build shanty towns for shelter, they had broken away from the comparatively stable peasant farming community. They might not be able to buy the imports or import substitutes on the store shelves; but they aspired to do so. Food production fell, at times to the point at which the staple, maize, had to be imported.

Moreover, in two particular periods private business enterprises attracted a special stimulus. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the copper price rose dramatically. Between 1967 and 1970 it increased from £780 a tonne to over £1,000. Money became plentiful. Again, at the end of the Rhodesian war, with the establishment of an independent Zimbabwe, sanctions were lifted, the border re-opened and business deals boomed. In both cases, leading members of the Party, the Government and the Civil Service decided to enter the world of private business. They had the contacts but not the capital. Thus most of them had to seek association with international finance or commerce to seize their opportunity. This reinforced the client status of Zambia's national economy, despite nationalisation and parastatal institutions.

The consequence of these experiences is that class divisions have become apparent in Zambian society since independence. They may be hardening, especially as the newly privileged provide their children with educational opportunities denied to the majority, use private medicine and build luxury houses. It may also be that the links between the élite and the mining companies, the banks, foreign industry and commerce, and the bureaucracy become stronger and more permanent.

This class structure is still rough and fluid. The members of the two per cent rich often change, for they are composed of businessmen, commercial farmers, bureaucrats and politicians, whose fortunes vary frequently. In the labour field there is still a degree of confusion. Traditionally, the miners have formed a labour aristocracy, playing the role of 'wage-leaders'. The latest published figures (at the end of 1978) show that they maintain their lead. The average earnings of the Zambian miner at that time were K2,521 a year, compared with an average over all industries of K1,740 and a national per capita of about K350. Yet the railway workers are catching up, may now have become the main 'wage-leaders' and have certainly entered the labour aristocracy.

Somewhat below these comparatively affluent workers come the rest of the industrial employees. Construction workers, for instance, earned an average of only K1,199 in the same year and those in agriculture, forestry and fisheries no more than K723.

Still further down the scale come the unemployed, under-employed and self-employed. The 'informal' sector of the economy, small-scale craftsmen, unofficial traders, casual labourers, largely maintains the rapidly growing number of urban households.

Yet the widest gap still remains that between the roughly 40 per cent who live in the towns and the 60 per cent in the rural areas. The Presi-

dent, the Party and the Government constantly call for greater food production, for a resuscitation of rural life. This can only be practical through the provision of drastically improved services to peasant farmers. Even here differentiation is apparent. Most of what little capital has been provided for this purpose has gone to the three, out of seven, provinces along the 'line-of-rail', where communications are easier and development is traditionally concentrated. In the remoter rural areas people are literally dying from malnutrition.

Revival of the rural areas, still inhabited by the majority of the population, is equally essential if the socialist philosophy preached by the leadership is to be based on any recognisable form of egalitarianism. So long as 80 per cent of rural inhabitants are unable to purchase the essentials of life, at least half the population will remain a class oppressed by the demands of the bourgeoisie and of the proletariat. Yet where has this global problem been solved?

Recently, moves have been made in southern Africa to reduce the economic dependence of the black-ruled states on South Africa. The Southern Africa Development Co-ordinating Conference was established two years ago. It has been followed by a Preferential Tariff Agreement. These are valuable ventures into regional economic planning. They will be conditioned by the internal socio-economic structures of the participating states. Future developments in this field of African life are crucial in this context. Kenya and Malawi are committed to a mainly capitalist form of development. Tanzania and Mozambique, and probably Zimbabwe, are attempting socialist experiments related to African experience. The deciding factor may well be what develops in Zambia. That depends on the underground battle already engaged between those who would follow a western capitalist model based on class stratification and those who still strive towards an egalitarian, classless society.

[Lord Hatch was formerly Director of the Institute of Human Relations, University of Zambia, Lusaka.]

THE WARSAW PACT, COMMODITIES AND THE WORLD RECESSION

by David Childs

THE controversy surrounding the Siberian gas pipeline emphasises once again that in East-West trade politics and economics are never far apart. In the West the view persists that such trade gives NATO political leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. But the high levels of unemployment have made Western governments more appreciative of the purely economic benefits of trade with the Warsaw Pact states. However, it is likely that such trade is more important to the Soviet Union and its partners than it is to the West. Although international trade plays a much more important role in Western economies than it does in the closed economies of the East, the Soviet bloc states are keen to trade with the West because they are highly dependent on Western technology and foodstuffs. Only 4% to 5% of the exports of the Western (OECD) states go to the East. By contrast, roughly 30% of East European exports go to the OECD states and these states provide East Europe with about 40% of its imports. Roughly 80% of OECD exports to the East are industrial products. Soviet bloc exports, on the other hand, are mainly raw materials and foodstuffs with industrial products trailing well behind. In these circumstances Soviet exports of gold, diamonds, oil, natural gas and other raw materials are of key significance.

The Soviet Union is the world's second producer of gold after South Africa. Until the mid-1970s the gold fields of Siberia yielded at least half of Soviet gold production. Gradually this area is giving way to the newer fields in Uzbekistan, between the Aral Sea and the Afghanistan border. That the Soviet Union uses its gold to buy vital supplies in the West is indicated by its gold shipments even when the market price of gold is depressed:

Soviet Gold Sales

	1978	1979	1980	1981
sales in tons	430	240	80	280
average dollar price per ounce	193	306	615	460

Soviet gold exports in 1981 did of course help to depress the market. The Soviet Union is responsible for about 21% of the world's gold, but also 28% of its industrial diamonds, 13% of silver and 48% of platinum. Indeed, the Soviet Union is a leading producer of virtually all strategic raw materials—asbestos, cobalt, copper, lead, manganese, nickel, tin, tungsten, titanium, vanadium among them. All of these have been available for export.

In 1981 the Soviet Union was with 609 million tons at the head of the world league table for oil production. It was followed by Saudi Arabia, the USA, Mexico, Venezuela, China and Britain. In terms of oil consumption, the USA headed the field with 771 million tons (it produced 477 million

tons), followed by the Soviet Union (465 million tons) and Japan (249 million tons). Superficially then, the USSR would seem to be in a good position. It has, however, many commitments and controversy surrounds estimates of its future potential. In 1980 the Soviets exported some 90 million tons to Eastern Europe and other Communist states, and up to 60 million tons to other destinations which brought in about 10 billion dollars in hard currency. In the West estimates vary about the Soviet Union's ability to go on increasing its production. All agree, such expansion will be costly, physically difficult and will require at least some outside technology. Energy projects currently take up over one-third of Soviet investments. More investments can only mean less of something else. The known reserves are in inhospitable places like Siberia which will be expensive to exploit. Yet the Russians should not be underestimated in this type of venture. They have already shown themselves highly skilled and tough in relation to their present Siberian undertakings. The CIA predicts the Soviet bloc will be considerable importers of oil by 1985 forcing them to look to the OPEC states for their extra needs. But one estimate from Shell¹ predicts a continued, though smaller, export surplus in that year followed by further decline after that.

In the Warsaw Pact states as elsewhere coal has once again increased its appeal in the last few years. Due to earlier modernization coal supplied only about 29% of Soviet energy needs at the end of the 1970s. Production has been falling. The Soviet coal industry suffers from years of relative neglect, low productivity, poorly maintained equipment, much of it not up to the latest standards, and a growingly disadvantageous location. As the old seams in the Western part of the Soviet Union, the part where much of its industry is still located, wear out, production is shifted eastwards to the underpopulated and less inviting areas. Of the Soviet Union's allies Poland and Czechoslovakia are large producers ranking fourth and seventh respectively. They too, however, suffer from some of the same problems as the Soviet coal industry. The most modern Soviet-allied economy, East Germany, has no hard coal. East Germany exploits its extensive deposits of brown coal.

Recently, natural gas has come into prominence as a fuel substitute in the Soviet Union. Production is currently increasing at about 7% per year. In 1980 it was responsible for 26% of the USSR's energy needs. Of the 435 billion cubic metres produced in 1980 55 billion were exported, roughly two-thirds to Eastern Europe and the remainder to Western Europe for earnings of around 3 billion dollars. The Soviet Union imported some 10 billion cubic metres from its neighbours. With the world's largest known reserves the Soviet Union's main problem is how quickly it can exploit them. The principal restraints seem to be how quickly pipelines can be laid to transport the gas from Siberia, and whether the USSR will get the key equipment from the West such as large-diameter pipes, compressor stations and gas treatment units. The controversial Siberian-West European pipeline is the biggest East-West commercial deal ever which, although costly, will give the Soviets an estimated 8 billion dollars a year for 25 years.

Although the Soviet authorities do not face an active and open environmentalist party as do some Western governments there has not been any massive development of nuclear power in the Soviet Union. In 1981 only 5% of its electricity was generated from this source. This compared with 37.7% in France, 14.6% in West Germany, 14% in Japan, 12.3% in the UK and 12% in the United States. The Soviet Union is committed to the expansion of nuclear power. Summing up the position of the Soviet bloc on energy one can conclude (cautiously) that given the present level of technology and pattern of consumption it does appear that these states will face shortages in the near future. How the Soviet leadership will overcome these shortages is a matter of speculation.

If energy is a critical area for the Soviet economy agriculture continues to be its achilles heel. For a fourth year in a row the Soviet grain harvest is below target. This is a serious situation for the Soviet leadership. Soviet agriculture suffers from climate, terrain, tradition and rising demand due to the rising expectations of Soviet consumers. Having admitted that these are factors largely beyond the control of the Soviet leaders it must also be said that Soviet agriculture is less efficient than agriculture in most Western states. To produce a given quantity of any crop or livestock Soviet agriculture needs more men and materials than would be acceptable in modern Western states. A distinguished West German expert has estimated, for example, that to produce 'an additional 100 pounds of pork (live weight), Moscow has to produce or import not 350 or 400 pounds of corn, as Japan or West Germany have to, but up to 700 pounds and some protein feed in addition. With West feed conversion ratios, Soviet grain imports could be roughly halved!'" Among the factors leading to such a situation this source mentioned: the poor state of premises for livestock; irregular feed supplies; the inferior breeds of farm animals; a poor work force mainly of elderly and unskilled labourers; lack of incentives.

Obviously the Soviet Union will remain an importer of agricultural products for some time. It has sought to diversify its supplies in order to reduce dependency on the United States. It has wheat agreements with Argentina and Canada, agreements covering dairy products with New Zealand and Sweden, agreements with India and Thailand to import rice, tapioca and other products, and an agreement signed in July 1981 with Brazil to buy mainly soybeans and cocoa beans. Argentina will also provide the Soviet Union with beef. The Soviet Union, in addition, buys a wide range of agricultural products from other countries including Britain.

It is against this background of inadequate agricultural and energy supplies and poor industrial performance that one must view the Soviet Union's continuing attempts to import Western technology and grain. Politics apart, the Soviet bloc's ability to import from the West is limited by mounting debts, reducing its credit worthiness, and the falling value of its exports. The world recession has reduced demand for Soviet energy and reduced even further the demand in the West for Soviet and East European industrial products.

Much has been written about Poland's debt which has grown from 800 million dollars in 1971 to 23 billion dollars in 1981, an increase of 2,775%.

All the other members of the Soviet Union's alliance have increased their indebtedness to the West during the last ten years. The Soviet Union's own debt has risen from 1.1 billion to 23.7 billion, an increase of 2,055%. The debt of the Soviet Union and its six East European clients stood at 81.4 billion in 1981. This was roughly the equivalent of all the money held deposited in the USA's second largest commercial bank, Citibank, and the National Bank of Detroit in 1980. Or it was roughly the equivalent of the combined GDP of Bulgaria and Rumania in 1979. A large amount of money then by any standards!

Net indebtedness of Soviet-bloc states in billion US dollars

	1971	1980	1981	increase since 1971
Bulgaria	0.7	3.2	2.3	+ 229%
Czechoslovakia	0.2	3.5	3.6	+ 1700%
GDR	1.2	9.9	11.4	+ 850%
Poland	0.8	22.1	23.0	+ 2775%
Rumania	1.2	9.6	10.0	+ 773%
USSR	1.1	17.5	23.7	+ 2055%
Hungary	0.8	7.4	7.4	+ 825%
Total	6.0	73.2	81.4	+ 1257%

In terms of their per capita burden both the GDR (East Germany) and Hungary had higher debts than their allies and the East German debt of 11.4 billion did not include monies owed West Germany under separate arrangements. Obviously, their individual debts represented different burdens to individual East European states. East Germany and Hungary, despite their higher per capita debts, were in better shape to pay than Poland, Czechoslovakia or Rumania. But they too are under pressure as demand for their industrial products falls in the West. In the past the Soviet Union has been able to a great extent to offset its rising external debts against the higher prices it has charged for its oil and other raw materials, and by sales of gold and by charging hard-currency for its extensive arms deliveries to such states as Libya. Recently, this situation has changed to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the number of states whose economies it must support has grown. South Yemen, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Angola have joined Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Poland as charges on the Soviet economy. Cuba, despite Soviet help, has recently announced that it needs an extra ten years to pay its existing debts. It owes Western banks over 3,000 million dollars. Its debt to the Soviet Union is many times this amount.

It is impossible to say just what effect its increasing economic difficulties will have on the Soviet Union. Could there ever be scenes in Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev like those witnessed in Poland in the last two years? Some Western observers believe that the Russian people are so used to austerity, shortages and hardship that they will continue to obey their leaders who will, in any case, blame their economic ills on imperialist machinations, bad weather and a handful of corrupt officials who can, in any case, be shot to assuage public anger. Others incline to the equally

valid and prejudiced view that, sooner or later, the generation of Juri Gagarin and Evgeny Evtushenko, and those who have come after them, will demand a more rational and relaxed way of ordering the Soviet Union's economic and political affairs. Whatever happens, it is ironical that the Western slump, which Lenin and Stalin believed would enable them to 'bury' capitalism, is hitting the East as hard as it is damaging the West.

NOTES

1. Jeremy Russell 'Energy In The Soviet Union' *The World Economy* September, 1981.
 2. Professor K. Wädekin *Foreign Affairs* (New York) Spring, 1982.
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[Dr. David Childs is reader in Politics at the University of Nottingham. His latest book, *The GDR: Moscow's Germany Ally*, will be published by George Allen and Unwin in November 1982. Hardback £8, Paperback £4.95.]

The December issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Whither Chinese Foreign Policy?* by Gerald Segal, *Britain and the Pipeline* by Gerald Frost, *Police Accountability and the Scarman Report* by K. P. Poole and *Trollope After A Hundred Years* by Park Honan.

JAPANESE FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 'THE DWARF IN ME IS GROWING'

by Keith J. Clarke

IN 1868, a tiny figure joined the back of the 'International Marathon Race'. The front-runners, headed by the mighty frame of the US, with the arrogant Frenchman, the aristocratic Bulldog with entourage and the efficient Germany hardly noticing the entrance of the newcomer. The pace became so fierce in the 20th century that fighting broke out amongst the competitors. Groups formed and savagery took place. The race nearly came to a halt. All were dismayed by their behaviour and the carnage they had wrought on each other, but none more so than the little figure who had been working his way up the pack. He swore never to fight again and was bandaged up by the leading group. The race continued; still with the same front-runners pounding ahead. But the Japanese runner concentrated on nothing but catching up. Slowly, through the fifties, sixties and seventies, he felt the power in his muscles growing. Suddenly, the realisation broke. There was only one competitor in front.

In economic terms, Japan had become the second largest economy in the free world. But the cries from latterly overtaken competitors, that Japan was an economic giant but a political dwarf, brought home the reality that front-runners have to do more than succeed economically. There is a political responsibility to discharge, to see that all contestants, however far behind, still remain in the race. The last five years have seen Japan become aware of this responsibility and take steps to shoulder it.

In 1977, Takeo Fukuda, then Prime Minister, acutely aware, through his personal experience in Europe during the thirties, of economic mismanagement's ability to lead to military debacle, and conscious of similar forces building up from the results of the first oil crisis, began to look for ways to raise the living standards of the 'South'. He conceptualised the idea of the Pacific Basin Cooperation; the vast region of the world encompassing both rich and poor, developed and developing nations, those with raw materials and those with advanced technology to help develop them.

However, the dictates of domestic politics determined that Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira should inherit the mantle to bring the dream to reality. In January 1980, Ohira toured the whole of the Oceanic region explaining Japan's concept of Pacific Basin Cooperation.

In his televised speech delivered at a luncheon given by Australia's Prime Minister Fraser in Melbourne, Prime Minister Ohira pointed out that the 'Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept', which he had proposed, was not designed to become an exclusive bloc. He went on to say:

Most forms of regional cooperation to date have been founded upon common language, common culture or common traditions and they have strengthened their bonds through homogeneity. Therefore, it may well be asked whether it is possible to create a new cooperative relationship and hence to create a new culture, out of these Pacific countries with their different cultural and historical

backgrounds and their different stages of economic development. Yet I believe we can overcome these difficulties if we create regional cooperation, recognising and respecting each country's cultural independence and political self-determination.

Prior to the speech, Mr. Ohira said in Canberra that he would not refuse China, USSR and South Korea if they wanted to join the community. Likewise, Foreign Minister Okita explained in Sydney on 19th January that Mr. Ohira's Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept was also open to both China and the USSR. At the same time, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials said that the Pacific Basin Cooperation community should start initially with Japan, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and five ASEAN member countries.

The validity of this concept should not be judged on instant results, or apparent lack of them; after all, it took some years for the EEC to become a reality. Rather, its significance was that Japan began to look outwards and not inwards. As former Foreign Minister Dr. Okita said in an interview with the *Japan Times* a year later: 'There is urgent need for Japan to change some of its basic attitudes. The country cannot prosper in isolation from the rest of the world. Admittedly, we Japanese have been much inclined to think only of how to preserve our own interests to such an extent as to have invited foreign criticism that we are narrowly selfish.'

After the sudden death of Prime Minister Ohira during his election campaign, Mr. Suzuki was left to carry the torch. In January 1981 he further cemented relations with ASEAN and summarised his visit in Bangkok at the end of the tour, saying that, 'firstly, Japan would take an active political rôle in the maintenance of world peace and the development of the world economy in a manner commensurate with Japan's growing national strength, but with the determination never again to take the path toward becoming a military power.'

Secondly, Japan would concentrate in its economic cooperation with ASEAN on 1) rural development and the promotion of agriculture; 2) the development of energy sources, an area of urgent concern; 3) the development of human resources by promoting 'ASEAN Human Resources Centres'; 4) the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises, and 5) continued support and cooperation for ASEAN countries' determined efforts to achieve industrialisation.

Thirdly, in parallel with economic cooperation, Japan would expand its cooperative relations with the peoples of ASEAN in the cultural, educational and academic fields by proposing a programme to promote ASEAN regional studies.

Fourthly, jointly with the efforts of ASEAN countries, Japan would strive for a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian problem. Once peace has been restored in Indo-China, Japan is ready to cooperate as much as possible in the reconstruction of Indo-China.

In June this year, Prime Minister Suzuki outlined his country's latest thinking on the Pacific region in a widely acclaimed speech at the East West Centre in Hawaii. Noting the increasing mutual interdependence of nations and the dynamic growth of the Pacific region, he saw the 21st

century as being the age of the Pacific. Calling for the current cooperation to be turned into solidarity, he outlined five principles to achieve this goal.

First, the Pacific must be, as its name implies, an 'ocean of peace', as the foundation of the continuing existence and prosperity of every people. Second, the Pacific must be an 'ocean of freedom'. 'It is the free exchange of people and goods that will accomplish the development of this region. We must be vigilant against any developments that would hamper this free exchange.' Third, 'the Pacific is an "ocean of diversity"'. It is essential for us to cultivate a spirit that respects and accepts the originality and independent initiative of every Pacific nation.' Fourth, 'the Pacific must be an "ocean of mutual benefit"'. We must actively use every means at our disposal, be they political, economic or cultural, to increase our mutual interdependence and understanding and thereby work for the development of all Pacific nations.' Fifth, 'the Pacific should be an "open ocean"'. Just as the waters of the Pacific connect with the waters of every other ocean, so must our circle of solidarity be lined with every other region of the globe.'

Mr. Suzuki said it was his firm belief that the peoples of this region, considering their long familiarity with the ocean and the natural affinities born of common origins, can cooperate on the basis of these principles for the advance of the great Pacific age. Thus, it is clear that Japan's long-term relations with countries in the Pacific region is well thought out, is based on the realities of life and has a cohesion which gives plausibility to its eventual realisation.

But what of Japan's relations with the rest of the world? In this area Japan has followed a low profile since World War II and has only recently showed signs of taking any initiative and this mainly in response to pressure from the Western industrialised nations. Consequently, those who have argued that Japan does not have any cohesive foreign policy, but shows signs of pragmatism on specific issues, have a strong point. However, those making such observations by way of criticism may have missed the point, that as a defeated power attempting to catch up with the West, most people in Japan thought it proper to follow the guidelines laid down under the San Francisco Treaty and devote energy first to restructuring the infrastructure, followed by tentatively competing in the economic sphere on the international scene. The reactions of the West to Japan's success in the aftermath of the two oil crises of the seventies, compounded by a world recession, brought trade issues into the political arena. At the same time, international events in Afghanistan, Poland and the Middle East allowed Japan to respond to the criticism that she was 'an economic giant and a political dwarf' by acting in concert with Europe, and not merely following an American line.

Experience gained in initiatives towards the Pacific region was useful in following a more positive rôle on the wider international scene. In January 1980, a forum of Japanese business leaders, through the powerful Committee for Economic Development, said in their annual report that:

Japan will need to change course in the 1980s and build 'a new kind of order'

in respect of its economy, defence and political system. On the political front, the report urged radical reforms including the creation of an American presidential-style aide system to strengthen the Prime Minister's leadership by providing advice from intellectuals responsible solely to him rather than from Government bureaucrats.

In general terms, the report advocated effective measures to assure active international cooperation, particularly with friendly countries.

In the same month, Japan's Ambassador in the UK, Naraichi Fujiyama, said in his New Year message that the time had passed for the industrialised countries of the world to compete with each other. Rather they must work together to cooperate in the pursuit of prosperity and that sufficient effort had not been made at understanding on both sides.

This period marked a turning point in Japan's foreign relations and as voices were calling from within Japan for a more independent and positive line, Prime Minister Ohira laid down the country's tough stance towards Russia over the invasion of Afghanistan.

On the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the Prime Minister stated that in Japan's opinion, this action 'could not be justified on any account' and urged 'the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces'. As to what action Japan should take against the USSR, the Prime Minister proposed five points:

- 1) To continue Japan's efforts on the basis of solidarity with the US and in cooperation with other friendly countries in Europe and other parts of the world.
- 2) To continue the study and implementation of appropriate measures including the tightening of the export controls in Cocom.
- 3) Not to shun these measures even if they meant sacrifices on Japan's part.
- 4) Not to engage in any activities which may undermine the measures taken by other friendly countries or to lessen their effect.
- 5) To give positive consideration to the requests for economic cooperation by the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, particularly Pakistan, for the purpose of maintaining the stability of the region.

At the same time, Japan acted in concert with Europe and the US over the taking of hostages in the US embassy in Iran. Ohira called this 'an unlawful act which threatened the basic order of the international community.' He said that Japan would continue to give active support to international efforts, including those of the UN and would act appropriately, in cooperation with the US as well as European and other countries, to achieve an early release of the hostages.

Mr. Ohira indicated a strong resolution to deal actively with international questions by outlining as the basis of Japan's stance:

- 1) the unfaltering mutual confidence which was the cornerstone of Japan-US relations, based on the Japan-US security arrangements; and
- 2) the intention to strengthen the cooperative relationship with other countries of the free world, including those of Western Europe.

The Foreign Minister of the day, Dr. Saburo Okita, outlined Japan's future political rôle, saying that Japan must:

- 1) make a more positive contribution to the maintenance of the world peace and to international economic prosperity.
- 2) pay greater concern to world events and play a responsible rôle commensurate with her international position in the 1980s;
- 3) contribute to the stability and relaxation of tensions in the Korean Peninsula and cooperate for the creation of an international climate for the resumption of dialogue between the North and South;
- 4) continue to strengthen the dialogue which Japan had been conducting with the PLO.

On Western Europe, Dr. Okita stated that cooperation between Japan and Western European countries was desirable to contribute to world peace and prosperity in the 1980s. He added: 'Japan intends to build a broader relationship of cooperation with these countries.'

He pointed out that Japan could make an active contribution by, among other things:

- 1) making constructive use of its economic strength and technological abilities for world development, especially for the economic development of poorer nations, and
- 2) a constant awareness that politics and economics are irrevocably linked in today's world.

Referring to foreign observers' comments depicting Japan as 'an economic giant and political dwarf', Dr. Okita said that, in future, Japan should gradually narrow this disparity in its international involvements. It should also attempt to draw the domestic and international perceptions of Japan's international influence closer together.

In the event, further action did hit Japan and brought a realisation of new politics to the Japanese people. Hard working—not a few businessmen were disappointed at the suspension of new credit to the USSR as a protest over Afghanistan, and hard playing—disappointment was intense amongst sports fans at the decision to boycott the Moscow Olympic games.

Japan's cooperation with the West over Poland never became clear, not because it did not exist but because the chess-loving Russians achieved a stalemate situation without actually having to invade the country. Various concrete contingency plans seem to have existed, but eventually allowed a re-statement of Japanese policy, that each country has the undisputed right to determine its own internal affairs and that force is not an acceptable method in settling international disputes.

The last five years have seen Japan develop a policy towards the Middle East independent of the United States, although very often it runs a parallel course. Nowhere more so than in the Israeli incursion into Lebanon are Japan's principles,—of non-violence in settling international disputes, and the belief in the rights of individual groups to exist in peace,—more clearly demonstrated.

Having suffered heavy criticism from the Arabs in general and the PLO in particular, during the middle-seventies, for being too tied to the US pro-Israeli policy, Japan has slowly developed an active policy demanding mutual recognition by both sides. Whereas Japan points out that the PLO

is not the only voice of the Palestinian people, it has a representative in Tokyo, its leaders have been received at top level and it was Japan's resolution condemning Israel's incursion into Lebanon that was adopted on 5th June, 1982 by the United Nations. Even at that early point, acting Foreign Minister Miyazawa roundly criticised Israel's action, demanding that they retire home forthwith. This was immediately followed by sizeable aid to Lebanon through the International Red Cross and intense diplomatic activity to pressurise Israel to cease hostilities.

Japan's basic position on the Middle East question is that, if desired, the Palestinians must be allowed their own sovereign state and that this must be achieved by peaceful means, with Israel talking to the Palestinians and both sides recognising the rights of the other to exist. Broadly speaking, Japan's line is closer to that of the EC than that of the US.

Japan is probably the strongest proponent amongst the industrialised nations that disarmament is vital for the future survival of the world. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still fresh in the memories of half the population. Yet at the same time it is recognised that relative peace has been maintained since World War II as a result of an equilibrium between the major powers. Japan's policy towards disarmament was clearly outlined by Prime Minister Suzuki at the UN second special session on disarmament on 9th June this year. He pointed to three aspects of the efforts to achieve enduring peace through disarmament:

- 1) to reverse the trend of the ever-increasing arms race by promoting mutual confidence among states, particularly pursuing nuclear disarmament;
- 2) to utilise the human and physical resources released by disarmament to alleviate the poverty and social instability which breed conflict;
- 3) to strengthen and reinforce the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations in order to promote disarmament.

He said 'only through complementary effort in all three aspects—military, economic and political—treated as one functionally organic strategy, can we open the road to lasting peace. Even a thousand mile journey has to start with a single step' and called for feasible measures in the prevailing situation of peace being maintained by the balance of military power. Mr. Suzuki urged the Soviet Union to abolish all ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear missiles throughout its territory, and the United States in response not to deploy its planned new missiles in Europe. Secondly, he called for a halt to the arms race and appealed to every state to participate in the partial test ban treaty. Thirdly, Mr. Suzuki noted that the non-proliferation treaty formed the most important foundation to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear weapon states. He urged anew that all states, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, which have not acceded to the treaty, should do so at the earliest possible date.

Japan supports the establishing of non-nuclear zones, where suitable conditions exist. The peaceful use of nuclear energy has to be developed in a way compatible with non-nuclear proliferation; the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons must be prohibited; complete disarm-

ament has to include conventional weapons; and the unrestricted international verification unit within the framework of the US to ensure mutual compliance and national security during disarmament.

On the relationship between disarmament and development, the Prime Minister pointed out that current military expenditure accounted for 6% of gross world product; and that released resources resulting from disarmament should be devoted to economic and social development, thus bridging the gap between developed and developing nations and contributing to world peace and the harmonious expansion of the world economy.

With regard to the third 'pillar' of disarmament, Mr. Suzuki said that in order to arrest the arms race and to realise concrete progress in disarmament, a system had to be set up which could respond promptly to international conflicts. This was to be achieved by further intensifying and enhancing the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations and strengthening its functions, thus contributing to the prevention of international conflicts and fostering trust among states, and under the authority of the United Nations, opening the way to progress in disarmament.

Japan requests that the US speedily carry forward its studies on three points: first, the role of the United Nations in the prevention of international disputes and their peaceful settlement; second, the system of cooperation among member states in the peace-keeping operations of the US; third, the possibility of establishing a mechanism whereby both global and regional military situations could be monitored and made public as deemed proper.

Japan's own defence policy is fraught with numerous difficulties and currently a cause of serious debate from Government level to the man in the street. The cornerstone policy is the security agreement with the US established after the Second World War. The constitution forbids Japanese military personnel to travel outside territorial waters.

Incorporated within Japanese policy are three non-nuclear principles, of not possessing, manufacturing or introducing nuclear weapons. The late seventies saw an increase in defence spending at the strong request of the US. Within Japan there is not unity over this policy which now sees defence as the highest budget at around 1% of GNP and increasing by over 7% in the current budget, more even than welfare. Although riots against the Security Treaty with the US are no longer seen, the population is divided, with many of the older generation and those coming from school adhering to the pacifist line following the events of the Second World War. However, with the Russian troops active on their four Northern islands and increasing their presence in SE Asia, many see defence as a necessary evil.

Not surprisingly against such a background, the actual defence policy within the Self-Defence Forces is somewhat unclear and equipment and back-up systems tend to be outdated. However, the present Government is committed to increasing its share of defence responsibility under pressure from the US and this budget continues to edge upwards.

More importantly from the point of view of Asia and the developing world is Japan's Overseas Development Aid Programme. Having been doubled between 1977 and 1980, it is on target to double again by 1985. It is in this area, rather than the military one, which Japan wishes to travel for the future prosperity of the world and her own country.

Bilateral relations with the United Kingdom are treated by Japan as a very high priority. The autumn visit by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to Japan did much to establish stronger ties between the two countries. Much ground work still needs to be done, but according to Japanese sources the Foreign Offices of both countries have agreed to conduct regular top level consultations on major issues, such as the position of the Soviets in East-West relations, Asia, the Middle East and economic co-operation. These consultations will be aimed at broadening the scope of cooperation and sharing a common perception on major international issues.

Both governments feel that it is increasingly important to cooperate politically on major issues. Consequently, it is vital to understand the other's perception and position, even if total agreement is not forthcoming. It appears that both Prime Ministers, when meeting in Tokyo, attached importance to the formation of a political framework between the two countries. In the past, although individual issues, such as trade, were discussed often at a time of disagreement, the bilateral relations lacked a conceptual framework. Closer cooperation across the board can be expected in the eighties which will not be confined to trade issues.

To sum up Japan's foreign policy is difficult as it is early days since such policy was overwhelmingly linked to trade considerations. However, as the Japanese have learned to harmonise amongst themselves as a nation, the perception now exists that the nation must harmonise with the rest of the international community, accepting responsibility commensurate with its economic size. As to methods and goals these may not be so far away from the ideals expressed by Lyndon Johnson at the inauguration of the East West Centre in Hawaii in 1961: 'To this centre we shall bring the wise men of the West and we shall invite the wise men of the East. From them we shall hope that many generations will learn the wisdom of the two worlds united here, and to use that wisdom for the purposes and the ends of mankind's highest aspirations for peace and justice and freedom.'

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WILL FOSSIL FUELS CHANGE OUR CLIMATE?

by James Avery Joyce

WORLD-WIDE concern has mounted in recent years over an increase in the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This increase, if it continues, is expected to change the world's climate, with significant social, economic and even political implications. Speculation has raised fears of impending disaster, due to rising sea levels and erratic weather changes. The question has already been examined by several scientific organisations and it is now clear that there exists an international issue involving many controversial and divisive questions.

A scientific problem of such global proportions obviously calls for an international effort to assess the magnitude and character of the issue. But in 1977 the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) Executive Committee recognised that the state of knowledge did not permit reliable predictions to be made, so WMO decided to launch a global research and monitoring project. Accordingly, a group of experts was called together just over two years ago by the International Council of Scientific Unions, the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organisation to prepare this assessment. Their joint report was issued in January 1981, not as an official document, but as representing the judgment of a panel of scientifically knowledgeable individuals.

What is the scientific basis underlying these fears and apprehensions? Plant and animal life on earth depend on the cycling of elements such as nitrogen, oxygen, carbon and sulphur through the soil, air, water and biosphere. But our attention here is focused on the carbon cycle. Large reservoirs of carbon are stored in the oceans, in the atmosphere and in the biosphere ('biomass'). It has been found that a particularly large reservoir is in fossil fuels—coal, oil and gas. Hundreds of gigatons of carbon dioxide (a gigaton is 10^9 metric tons) are interchanged annually between the oceans and the atmosphere and between the biomass and the atmosphere. That interchange goes on in the ordinary course of nature.

But man has a propensity for upsetting the balance of nature. As hard fuels are used more and more to meet human demands, so carbon is released into the atmosphere primarily as carbon dioxide. In this manner, more than five gigatons of carbon are being transferred to the atmosphere annually, causing an increasingly serious disturbance. Simultaneously, human manipulation of forests and vegetation provides a further imbalance in the natural interchange of carbon. It is the combined effect of these perturbations that is responsible for the increase in carbon dioxide. And scientists are now claiming that the major perturbation arises from the use of fossil fuel.

They believe that of the five gigatons of carbon released into the atmosphere each year from fossil fuel, approximately one-half remains in the atmosphere. The other half is partitioned between the ocean and the biomass. Most important, however, is that this increase in carbon dioxide

is slowly changing the atmosphere's energy balance, resulting in a temperature rise at the earth's surface and in the lower layers of the atmosphere. Experiments so far carried out strongly suggest that the carbon dioxide concentrations that might be reached early in the next century, as a result of the projected consumption of fossil fuels, would increase the global average surface temperature by 1°C or more.

But would such a global rise in temperature really matter in the long run? Since it is the temperature difference between the poles and equator that drives the weather systems, which influence temperature and rainfall patterns, it is probable that regional ecosystems, including agricultural production and water supply, will be materially affected. And because ocean currents, upon which fishing production depends, are largely wind-driven, protein harvest from the sea could also be affected. Finally, a significant warming in the Antarctic could result in the disintegration of that vast glacier, forcibly raising the sea level by several metres throughout the world.

However, there was general agreement among the WMO/ICSU/UNEP team that such an impact on sea level was not imminent. Yet the probability that these potentially serious impacts might be realised is sufficiently great, the experts state, 'that an international commitment to a programme of co-operation in research is required to reduce uncertainties, so that the dimensions and time-scale of the problem can be more reliably ascertained'. It should be emphasised, they say, that the CO₂ problem affects developing as well as developed nations and therefore calls for a special partnership of effort. They therefore conclude their report by inviting 'the attention of the whole scientific community, the nations of the world, and the three sponsoring organisations WMO/ICSU/UNEP, to examine an issue whose implications command urgent and universal attention'.

The great interest of this report is that it slips in by a side door, as it were, and comes as a rude shock to the ongoing debate on world energy resources. When the UN General Assembly called for a Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, it stated that the sources of energy are seven in number. They are: biomass conversion; fuelwood; charcoal; peat; draught animal power; oil shales; and tar sands. Draught animals apart, all fuels have in common that they are either living material or were once alive. Oil shales and tar sands are, of course, only one step away from conventional oil, whose cheapness has made it the most popular fuel in the world.

In fact, 80% of total commercially-traded energy is still fossil hydrocarbon fuel-oil, natural gas or coal. It is only in China that the new and more renewable sources of energy play any more than a modest role. Among them fuelwood is most important, providing 10-12 billion megawatt hours out of the 13-15 billion MWh contributed by all the new and renewables lumped together.

The prime mover in creating living and fossil fuels is energy from the sun which, by the action of chlorophyll is able to turn carbon dioxide and water into carbohydrates and other plant tissues. Are not oil and coal

themselves the transformed tissues of plants which were photosynthesised up to 300 million years back by the same chemical mechanisms only recently elucidated by modern biochemistry?

Earthscan, a London-based environment information unit, has linked the expected temperature rise with global food production. It believes that, while a warmer world would mean reduced grain production in the USA and USSR, which would become drier, it could mean greater grain yields in the Third World. Growing levels of carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere, which rose between 14 and 25% in the last 120 years, is clearly raising global temperature levels. If this level doubles by 2020, as some computer projections suggest, global temperatures will be some two degrees centigrade warmer than today. Though a 2°C rise would make Europe, the USA and the USSR drier, it would make North and East Africa, West Asia, India, Mexico and West Australia wetter, and thus agriculturally richer.

These over-all changes will undoubtedly have profound political consequences. The USA, where the environmental and scientific lobbies have gained strength, favours international action; Western Europe and the Soviet Union are less enthusiastic. Earthscan points out: 'CO₂ is part of the problems of growth-population, economic, industrial growth towards a world where there is less inequality between North and South. In that context the CO₂ issue is an integral part of the most important problem confronting the human race.'

There is obviously a good deal of sorting out to be done by someone before we reach the end of this century. And that 'someone' can only mean a closer and more deliberately planned co-operation of the family of UN agencies and technological services. (No one has yet drawn ideological frontiers across the earth's atmosphere.) And there are so many other *fin de siècle* demands the human race is making on our one World Organisation. Is it not a pity that it is the arms race planners who have all the money they want and have 50% of our scientists in their pockets?

[Dr. Joyce is a consultant in the Division of Human Rights at the UN European Headquarters in Geneva.]

STREAMS OF LIGHT

by John Elsom

IN the year 2000, if we should be so lucky, a don will arise, an academic Hercules, ready to tackle a definitive history on how cablevision came to Britain.

I do not know his name, but I can imagine what he should be like. He would not be a woman, because he would have to appreciate the *macho* determination with which different interests have been pursued. He would not be a young go-getter, with a grant from British Telecom and a career to make. He would be someone whose age, status and inclinations had lifted him somewhat above the struggle. Ideally, he should have a private income, and his colleagues would think him dotty and obsessed; a Betjeman among Betjemans; kind to children and wild flowers, and with some compassion for the human condition. He would read Trollope during his working hours and technical literature for fun. He would have some understanding of the corridors of power. He may even have strayed into government himself, by letting himself be appointed to a *Select Committee on the Preservation of Roman Aqueducts*, but he would not be so intoxicated by the prospect of unbridled influence that he would welcome further elevation, to the ranks, perhaps, of an Arts Council Advisory Committee.

He would know that his life's work lay elsewhere, in detailing with accuracy and an eye for scandal how Britain in the 1980s came to be encircled with thin beams of light, or not as the case may be. He would be capable of treating idealism and self-interest with an even hand; and when, in the year 2020, he would lay down his pen (having never yet acquired the mastery over a typewriter, let alone a word-processor), he would do so in the knowledge that his 2½ million words have not been wasted, though no publisher exists to publish them or reader to read them, and his sole beneficiary is a bank deposit box in Croydon.

But his story will be one of Homeric proportions, relating how civilisations were or were not transformed, how human pride once more frustrated human hopes (or not), how man took over the mantle previously assigned to the gods. No other contemporary theme, not even the development of nuclear power, has quite so many implications for our future. Behind the development of cablevision are the battles of ideologies, of moralities, of commerce, of national and international interests; and one convenient image draws all these items together, that of light, pulsating light, which can either be clouded through a myriad of distorting threads of glass or beam through with a clear intelligence.

He will have to start by clearing away the confusions, not least those attaching themselves to the word cablevision. There is nothing revolutionary about cablevision, if we simply mean that a cable brings signals to a television set or another kind of receiver. The Report on Cable Systems, published by the Information Technology Advisory Panel in February

1982, revealed that more than 37% of the households in France with television sets use a cable system. This simply means that there is one aerial for a block of flats or a small district, which has many cables leading from it to the individual television sets. This provides greatly improved reception than could be obtained through individual aerials attached (also by cable) to individual TV sets and also prevents a forest of masts on the roofs of flats. Nowadays, with the arrival of international television transmitted by satellite, such small-scale cablevision networks become particularly desirable, for the dish aerials required to pick up satellite signals are larger and more cumbersome than the thin aerials which can detect the local, stronger impulses from national or regional transmitters.

But cablevision in this sense is not an innovation, merely an extension of what has been in operation for years. The revolutionary aspect of modern cablevision lies in the nature of the cable itself, of which there are two main contenders—the coaxial cable or optical fibres. The coaxial cable consists of a central copper wire, surrounded by insulation, along which high frequency electromagnetic signals can be transmitted with much less attenuation than would occur if the 'twisted pair' cables currently used in the telephone system were used. Therefore, much more information can be carried along one coaxial cable than can currently be transmitted down a 'twisted pair' cable. Our present television is restricted partly by the nature of the cables and also by the difficulty of picking up signals transmitted 'through the air'. If coaxial cables were introduced into Britain, the range of channels available to our television sets would be increased from 4 to between 25 and 50.

This in itself opens up television to a wide variety of additional uses. It would be possible, for example, to extend the Open University programmes, to have minority and local programmes, to provide ethnic and community services and, through satellite television, to receive programmes from other countries. It is also possible to extend even the range of 50 channels by connecting them to mixer units, whereby each channel can be opened up to the potentiality of another coaxial cable—offering 50 more channels. Hence, the owner of a television set which is connected to a national cablevision system using coaxial cables would have hundreds of channels at his disposal—at least, theoretically, although in practice there could be many limitations, not least by how the cables were installed, who owns them and how they were financed.

The 'optical fibre' system replaces the copper cable with hair-like threads of exceedingly pure glass, which relays light impulses with very little distortion or 'attenuation'. Its technology is more complicated than for the coaxial cable, but its potentiality is even greater. An optical fibre cablevision system would have a range in excess of the current telephone service. It opens up the possibility of two-way television systems; and the appendix to the Report on Cable Systems provides a brief, although mind-boggling, list of those services which such cablevision could provide—shopping by television, conducting all kinds of business operations from banking to signing contracts, from meter-reading, burglar and fire alarms,

information services to opinion polling and betting.

Cablevision by optical fibres opens up the possibility of a communications system which eventually could encompass the world. It could link homes to all libraries. It could bring the Third World into suburban living rooms in London, and, in time, vice versa. And therein lies the first of many rubs, for could our political systems survive the onrush of such new knowledge? Could our commercial systems do so? Could our social structures, based as they are more on ignorance than knowledge, do so? Could our minds even begin to grasp the potentialities which technology has opened up? And is not the ingrained instinct of authority designed to repress such a diversity of information, much of which must threaten the mandate by which it rules?

After the publication of the Report on Cable Systems, with its general enthusiasm for cablevision, there has been a subtle gathering of the anti-cablevision forces. Outright opposition has been muted and most politicians, as well as those connected with television, seem to believe that sooner or later cablevision will come. The arguments have been about what kind of cablevision it will be, the nature of the controls and franchises; but when you bring all these arguments together, the result is so formidable a coalition of interests that the whole future of cablevision is thrown into doubt. That is one reason why the word cablevision is both useful and dangerously misleading, for it is possible to introduce a limited form of cablevision which would effectively frustrate its wider usage.

Our Trollopian don, anachronistically translated to the year 2000, would have to pick his way through this complicated web of qualms, intrigues and minor power battles; and perhaps in his researches, he may add a footnote on our Liberal Arts Panel. Through the prescience of the chairman of the Media Committee, Francis Coleman, the Liberal Party was forced to consider cablevision in 1980, at a time when most people in Britain thought that cablevision, which had been the subject of several indifferently successful local experiments, was a lost cause. To most Liberals, the prospect of cablevision is very attractive. It offers the prospect of a truly pluralistic expression of views, and Liberals, who have suffered along with other minority parties, are convinced that the BBC, the IBA companies and most newspapers are biased against them. It also opens out the possibility of community television, not dominated by national interests; and so, in our case, we were early converts to the cause and generally delighted when, two years later, Mrs. Thatcher's government seemed equally enthusiastic, establishing the Hunt Commission to gather reactions to cablevision, as described in the Technology Advisory Panel's Report.

Thus, in the summer of 1982, the arguments for and against cablevision, either in principle or in practice, have drifted to and fro. Individual submissions from various interested bodies to the Hunt Commission have been made public; and at the Edinburgh Festival, there was a television conference which dragged on for an interminable number of sessions, in which many hares were started and ogres paraded, none of which added

much to our sum of knowledge about the subject. Many bitchy remarks were passed about the state of television in the United States—is it as bad as all that?—and buckets of cold water were thrown on those who dared suggest that cablevision was anything other than a new technological toy.

At this conference, however, it was possible to detect three main lines of opposition to cablevision, on the grounds of cost, cultural standards and social control. They have to be considered separately, although they are, in fact, interrelated.

In the Report on Cable Systems, the cost of providing cablevision to half the households in Britain was estimated at £2,500 million. It therefore represents a very large investment by government or by a consortium of business interests. This figure is certainly too low. A system based upon coaxial cable would cost nearly twice this amount, while an optical fibre system would be more expensive still.

Who would be able and ready to spend this amount of money, and what would they require in return? The Liberals in their party manifesto insist that British Telecom should instal the cable, with financing from government, and that individual cablevision stations, together with individual television users, should rent the use of the cable. The analogy would be with the telephone service which similarly brought great benefits from a high outlay of capital. But could any government, particularly one of a Thatcherite persuasion, undertake such a scheme at a time of economic recession. The answer partly lies in what one conceives cablevision to be. If we believe that it is just an extension of the existing television service, then the cost is certainly high; and the weakness of the Report on Cable Systems is that it envisages that the introduction of cablevision should be 'entertainments-led'. 'Because the initial attraction of cable systems centres on new channels for broadcast entertainment, news, sport, etc., the implications for current and future broadcasting services have to be considered.' (Summary: paragraph 5.)

An 'entertainments-led' cablevision programme would undoubtedly lead to low-cost solutions—the choice of coaxial cable, rather than optical fibres; the wiring of towns and cities, but not country areas; the division of the rich, who can afford to pay high rentals, from the poor, who cannot; and other complications. This aspect of the Report has given the critics of cablevision an open target. Cablevision, they argue, is a dilettante idea, socially divisive and completely out of tune with the true needs of our society. Their views have been reinforced by the fact that the debate about cablevision has so far been dominated by the television companies, not least the BBC.

But the television companies are not the most impartial of witnesses. Certain commercial companies, such as Granada, have investments already in cablevision; and therefore advocate the liberalisation of all restrictions on television, currently imposed by the Home Office. Their argument is that cablevision should be financed by a mixture of methods, including PAY TV, subscription schemes, advertising and the like. The BBC, however, sees its position in television threatened by cablevision. Hence, there

have been dire warnings about the lowering of television standards, about the flood of pornography and cheap cowboy movies, about the domination of British cablevision from foreign companies (notably the United States) and about the loss of social cohesion which the national services provide. How can 'political balance' be maintained in the free-for-all of cablevision?

Granada would take as its image that of the public library. You are not forced to maintain 'political balance' in a library. You do not tell each customer who borrows a Marxist book that he or she should borrow a capitalist book as well. The customer has the freedom of choice. The BBC's image is that of the Tower of Babel, where the babbling of many tongues leads to social anarchy.

Both views are the product of vested interests, which is not to suggest that they are necessarily wrong, but that they are necessarily partial. Indeed, the full potentiality of cablevision will only be recognised if it is not thought to be 'entertainments-led'—if the consequences for business communication, information services and all the other uses are properly incorporated into the discussions. This would inevitably lead to the 'higher cost' solution, using optical fibres, wiring the villages and country areas as well as the towns and subsidising initially the development programme to keep the cost to the consumer at a low level.

But what could tempt a Thatcher government into the provision of such subsidies, particularly when it is so determined that British Telecom should be a private company? The answer could lie, ironically, in the recession. By chance, Britain is a world leader in optical fibre research; and so any decision by the British government to undertake optical fibre cablevision is likely to be influenced by the thought that it would be creating a major new industry for this country, one with great potential for exports. If Michael Foot at the Labour Party Conference so lightly proposes doubling the output of steel in Britain, without much consideration as to where this steel should be sold, then the opportunity is offered to Mrs. Thatcher to retort that bolstering up uneconomic industries by subsidy is not a politically responsible act—whereas investing in a growth industry like cablevision is.

But can any political party with delusions of grandeur seriously contemplate a truly free cablevision system? The BBC may be at 'arm's length' from government, but only if it is considered to be acting 'responsibly'. During the Falklands crisis, a Panorama programme dared to be mildly critical of the government's position. The furore lasted for months. Under cablevision, it would be very difficult to prevent programmes infinitely more hostile to the government from being aired. Liberals and libertarians would see this as a great gain in freedom of expression; and if cablevision were simply a national issue, their views might well win the day. But cablevision is also through satellite international; and therefore in times not just of war, but also of intense commercial competition, a free cablevision service in Britain might well operate against what some consider to be the national interest. If every country had a free cablevision service—

free, that is, from political or commercial interference—then the effect would surely be to increase international understanding and perhaps to transform standards of international behaviour. But if only one country, or a small group of countries, had free cablevision, a situation might arise, analogous to that envisaged through unilateral disarmament. Other countries might follow our moral example, but if they don't, we could be left defenceless in the propaganda battle.

Very few politicians in Britain seem prepared to contemplate an unregulated cablevision system; and the methods of regulation could amount to a censorship, either direct or indirect, more severe than that currently practiced in Britain because the stakes are higher. Nor is political censorship the only threat. If cablevision comes to provide the main information services to the country, then who will control the information? The government? Private companies? Or can some mysterious new *quango* be invented to guarantee freedom of information? Can we afford to be libertarian?

I believe that we can and should—but I am not sanguine as to whether we will. Indeed, I suspect that our Trollopian don will be forced to tell a dismal story—about how we, having been offered light, chose to see through a glass darkly, or coaxial cable, as the case may be. I also fear that we will not be allowed to read that story for, by the year 2020, new industries, new governments, new social systems will be threatened by it.

CANADA PASSES THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACT

by Tom Riley

AFTER many years of debate, lobbying, public pressure and two years winding its way through the Parliamentary process, Royal Assent was given to Canada's Access to Information and Privacy Act on 7th July this year.

Advocates for some form of a freedom of information law in the UK see the passage of the Canadian Act as a breakthrough which will give impetus to their efforts. This stems from the fact that here in the UK opponents both in the Government and Whitehall to the kind of law passed by the Canadians say that in a Westminster style government there are severe limitations.

The new Canadian Act allows for a two-tier appeal mechanism in the event of a rejection of an information request. The first is to an Information Commissioner (or in the event of denial of personal information to a Privacy Commissioner which will be part of the same office.) This office will have extensive powers to investigate any complaint.

The Commissioner will be allowed to have entrance to any data bank (manual, computerised or in any other form) and enter any premise in the course of his investigations and call any witnesses needed.

He will also have the right to take the citizen's case to the courts if the Minister decides not to release a document when the Information (or Privacy) Commissioner has recommended it. Thus the final appeal is the courts where the judge may look at any document (with the exception of Cabinet documents, extensively listed in the Act, which are totally exempt from the ambit of the Act.)

It is this latter point, the review to the courts, which freedom of information antagonists most object to, in the Westminster style of Parliamentary Government. These critics argue that under this system a Minister is responsible to Parliament and Parliament alone and his decisions cannot be subject to review by the courts as these are political decisions which are beyond the competence of the courts.

However, this view is widely rejected by the freedom of information lobby here in London. James Michael, author of *Politics of Secrecy* (Penguin, 1982), and one of the drafters of the private member's Bill put forward by Liberal MP Clement Freud, which almost reached its final parliamentary stages in 1979 before the Labour Government fell, said that 'the Canadian Bill following the Australian Freedom of Information Act passed earlier in the year should demonstrate that this type of legislation is possible in a Westminster style Government'. This reaction was universal among those favouring this type of law.

Peter Hennessy of *The Economist*, a long-standing crusader for more openness in Government in this country, said the passage of the Canadian

Bill 'has blown sky high the Whitehall classic alibi for more administrative secrecy. In the past British ministers and senior officials have been able to say what was good for Washington was not good for London because of our different democratic traditions'.

Mr. Hennessy went on to point out that

Ottawa is built on the Westminster model of Parliamentary democracy and an impartial career civil service. By de-stuffing itself of ancient constitutional nonsense, designed simply for the convenience of civil servants and politicians in power at any given moment, Ottawa has become a shining beacon for those who are determined to inject Freedom of Information into the most secretive administrative system in the world. Mrs. Thatcher will not thank Mr. Trudeau for giving heart to British advocates of government in the sunshine.

Advocates for a strong freedom of information bill in all Commonwealth countries where there has been intensive lobbying for legislation, have always maintained that such an appeal to the courts is vital and would not erode the concept of ministerial responsibility and Crown Privilege (i.e. the right to withhold documents from the courts in the public interest).

Those favouring this type of law with judicial review have argued that in other instances the courts are constantly overriding ministerial decisions and that there is no difference when it comes to access to government information. It has been argued that true access to government information necessitates an independent appeal mechanism. As to the question of political decisions the Canadian Access to Information Act has built into it certain clauses which gives the Minister final political say in crucial areas such as international affairs, national defence, Federal/Provincial relations, criminal investigations or certain economic interests affecting the country.

In these instances a judge if presented with such a case may not rule as to the validity of the argument for exemption as laid out in the Act but may only make an assessment of the reason behind the Minister's decision to withhold. What this means is that the judge can only decide whether the Minister acted in good faith. In all other cases he rules on the exempt clauses in the law (those sections which set out what information is exempt from release) with the final exception of Cabinet discussions and decisions over which the judge has no say. This final exemption was introduced by the government after two provincial court cases which ruled Cabinet documents must be presented to the courts. In one case in British Columbia the judge ordered the Cabinet Ministers to appear before the court in camera to discuss what had been said in Cabinet in that particular case.

Prime Minister Trudeau told a Parliamentary Committee on May 2 this year that this was what worried him most of all as he feared that if the Act was not amended Cabinet responsibility and Cabinet collectivity would have been eroded. He said it would have put an undue restraint on free discussions in Cabinet with Ministers worrying over what they said becoming subject to publication in court. Amendments to handle these objections were subsequently put before the Parliamentary Committee studying the Bill and passed. The Act was then approved in the House of Commons on June 28 by a vote of 191-23 and then passed through the

Senate on July 7 and given Royal Assent. The operational date of the law will be announced at a later date this year. The Government announced that they wish to appoint an Information Commissioner first, and establish the office.

In brief, the Access to Information Act (the Privacy Act is explored in greater depth below) calls for the burden of proof to be on the government to show why a document should not be released. It has a time limit of 30 working days for the information to be either produced or denied (with a further extension of 15 working days if the request should properly be with another department). The Act allows for further time extensions if the request will take a long time to fulfil, but the applicant must be informed and may lodge a complaint with the Information Commissioner. (The Government Department concerned must also inform the Information Commissioner if there is to be an extension.) A fee of up to £10 can be requested for search of a document plus reproduction costs. An additional search fee, as to be set out by regulations, may be determined if more than five working hours are spent in a search. However, fees may be waived if it is ruled it is in the public interest to do so.

If in the course of an investigation the Information Commissioner, or one of his delegated assistants, finds evidence of criminal wrongdoing he can report this to the appropriate enforcement agency (and has an obligation to do so).

An index of classes of information kept by a government department is to be produced (and updated yearly) and in this shall be included information as to where a person may apply for information.

The Information Commissioner shall be appointed by Governor in Council with full approval of both Houses of Parliament (the House of Commons and the Senate) and shall be responsible directly to Parliament to whom he shall report once a year. If in the course of his investigations he decides there is a case of extraordinary circumstances he may make a special report.

A Special Parliamentary Committee is to be set up which shall be responsible for the Act and they will review the Act within three years for any necessary changes.

Any Canadian citizen or permanent resident may apply for information and a clause in the Act allows for regulations to be drawn up to extend the right of application to non-Canadians (this is different from both the American and Australian Acts, which stipulates that anybody may apply).

The second part of this new law is the Privacy Act which repeals Section 4 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, Protection of Personal Information, Canada's current Privacy Act and now incorporates this with the Access to Information Act. This is seen as a progressive move as it will make it more difficult to deny information under the Access to Information Act on the grounds of violation of personal privacy and vice versa under the Privacy Act on grounds that it falls under a Freedom of Information request.

The new Privacy Act defines personal information, generally, as 'information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form' (this includes automated data banks) and lists out fifteen different categories which fall under the definition of personal information.

These include 'information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age or marital status of the individual', information relating to medical or criminal or educational history, any identifying number or symbol, address, fingerprints or blood type of an individual, personal opinions or views of an individual 'except where they are about another person or a proposal for a grant, award or prize to be made to another individual by a government institution', 'the views or opinions of another individual about the individual', and other similar categories.

The Act also lays out to what degree the Government is prohibited from collecting information about an individual, specifying that it must relate directly to '...an operating programme or activity of the (government) institution'. The Government must also make efforts to collect the personal information directly from the individual except where the person involved gives consent, or if it is covered by another statute which will allow the Government institution to collect the information. In that case, the Government institution has the duty to tell the individual the purpose for which the information is being collected but this does 'not apply where compliance... might (a) result in the collection of inaccurate information; or (b) defeat the purpose or prejudice the use for which information is collected'.

The Act calls for personal information to be kept for a reasonable amount of time, as prescribed by regulation, so that the person has an opportunity to gain access to the information; it also says reasonable steps shall be taken 'to ensure that personal information that is used for an administrative purpose by the institution is accurate, up-to-date and as complete as possible'. Regulations are to be set out on how to go about disposing of the personal information gathered. Sections 7 and 8 of the Act lay out clearly the exceptions which apply in which personal information may be given out by a Government institution. It goes on to state that the information must be used 'for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled... or for a use consistent with that purpose'.

On the question of personal information banks the Act decrees that all personal information used for an administrative purpose or is 'organised or intended to be retrieved by the name of an individual or by an identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to an individual' shall be included, but the exception relates to information that has been transferred to the Public Archives for archival or 'historical purposes'.

An index is to be published on a periodic basis of not less frequently than once a year of all the personal information banks held by an institution. Certain particulars are to be laid out in the index, and include which government institution has control of the personal information bank, an identification and description of the bank, the title and address of the appropriate officer to whom the request shall be made or an

indication, where applicable, that a data bank is an exempt bank.

A person shall be allowed to request correction of the personal information if the 'individual believes there is an error or omission', 'require that notation be attached to the information reflecting any correction requested but not made and (12) (2) (c) require that any person or body to whom such information has been disclosed for use for an administrative purpose within two years prior to the time a correction is requested or a notation is required under this subsection in respect of that information (i) be notified of the correction or notation and (ii) where the disclosure is to a government institution, the institution make the correction or notation on any copy of the information under its control'.

A request for access to personal information shall be made in writing and a response must be given within thirty days that the access is to be given and then the request itself fulfilled. An extension of fifteen days is granted if the request needs to be referred to another institution where the information is more apt to be but a notice in writing must be given of the extension. If the person is dissatisfied with the extension or the time taken a complaint may be lodged with the Privacy Commissioner. If the person is denied the information or informed it does not exist the individual must also be informed, in writing, of the right to lay a complaint with the Privacy Commissioner.

The head of a Government institution has the right under the Act to indicate whether personal information exists or not in the event of a denial of a request. If a person is not informed of a denial of their request within the time limits set out then it is assumed the request is denied and a complaint may be lodged with the Privacy Commissioner. The person has a right to examine the information as to be set out by regulations, if the request is approved, and to have a copy made, also to have the information in either English or French.

The Act lays out quite extensively the process for making complaints to the Privacy Commissioner. Under this new legislation the Privacy Commissioner will fall under the Information Commissioner but the Act states that the Information Commissioner can also be the Privacy Commissioner.

The new Privacy Act, when it comes into force in Canada, is seen as an improvement upon the current legislation. However, as with the Act currently in place, the problem is still going to be to inform people of their right to inspect their own personal files kept by Government. The basic flaw in the legislation is the lack of a comprehensive educational and public relations programme to achieve this widespread awareness.

[Tom Riley is Executive Secretary of the International Freedom of Information Institute. He is co-editor of *Freedom of Information Trends in the Information Age* to be published by Frank Cass and Co. late in 1982.]

POEM

SENIORITY

It seems like more than half a year
since formally they disposed of me
with food and drink and laughing friends
and from the management, a gift
ironically to measure time.

At first it seemed that there was much to do :
the garden and of course the house
but counting every room there's only eight
to decorate, plus stairs and hall;
I'd do them all, would funds permit,
but there again—for whom, for what?

For my wife, of course, and for her pleasure
a major task in choosing tones and patterns
and this or that in carpets which in any case we can't afford.
For her, the same unending tour of stores and markets,
friends for coffee, meetings, social evenings
in which I never did participate.

Is woman more adaptable
has she been trained for this
or did her patterns alter long ago
when fluids dried, and when the litter left the nest,
and did all this occur beyond my sight,
and if so, why, and why did I not see?

Those other things I thought I'd do —
write, study, paint: no use, too late,
all that I'd intended to create
must have been indexed, stored and lost
in cells my brain discarded years ago.

Now, I have the whole slow day in which to contemplate
the torpid turmoil of my brain-snail,
in which to practice stillness,
steel myself against the cold,
learn the tricks of waiting and of silence.

Five dozen years and five I've had
and five perhaps remain;
five years in which I must acquire
the ways of chill and quiet,
five years in which to serve
a full apprenticeship for death.

MIKE SHIELDS.



FUTURE PATTERNS OF DISEASE: 1. THE GERIATRIC TIDE IS FLOWING FAST

by J. A. Loraine

FOR most of human history population has grown slowly and in the early years of the 20th century it seemed as though this trend would persist indefinitely. In 1900 the planet housed 1,500 million people and by 1930 the overall total was only 2,200 million. Then an unmarked transformation took place as the pace of growth accelerated rapidly *pari passu* with a decline in mortality rates. By 1959 world population had reached 3,000 million: by 1976 the 4,000 million mark had been passed and now in 1982 the global total exceeds 4,580 million. For 2000 AD the most reliable projection available is for 6,100 million and for 2020 7,700 million. Accordingly, within the space of 100 years, between 1920 and 2020, a five-fold increase in human numbers is likely to have taken place. This is quite unprecedented by any standards.

How, when and at what level will global population growth rate eventually cease? Will it be because death rates fall dramatically with improved care, nutrition and hygiene following the lodestar of development, modernisation and acculturation? Or will development programmes lack appropriate dynamic and the horsemen of the apocalypse—war, famine, disease and death—extract their ineluctable toll? Stabilisation of world population at the level of two children per family will undoubtedly be a matter of extraordinary difficulty, complexity and challenge. But that it is certainly feasible is suggested by the fall in overall global growth rate in the last twelve years—from 2% in 1970 to 1.7% per annum now. Different regions of the world are likely to attain stabilisation at varying times—from the middle of late 21st century in the case of Western Europe, North America and the USSR to the early 22nd century for Africa where the rate of population growth will continue to be very rapid for several decades. The figure for eventual stabilisation varies greatly, depending on the authority consulted, but that most widely quoted is 10,000 million, an increase of 2.5 fold on today's total.

Of these 10,000 million people very large numbers will be dependent on their fellow citizens and will be drawing support from people of working age. Already in 1982 41% are in this category—35% below age 15 and 6% above age 65. That the proportion of persons in our society over the age of 65 has been steadily increasing is well known. Indeed in the last 100 years their proportion of the total population has risen from 3 to 10%. This trend can only persist for the foreseeable future—for the next two decades and during the 21st and probably also throughout the 22nd century. Currently the fastest growing section of the whole world community is the over 60s. In 1950 they accounted for 1 in 12 people; by 2050, barring a nuclear holocaust, 1 in 7 individuals will be in this category.

Amongst the elderly the proportion of the very old will rise disproportionately. This is especially so in the case of women who in industrialised

countries already have a life expectancy at birth ranging from 6 to 8 years longer than that of males. Developed countries in which the trend for women to outlive men is especially marked include France, Finland, the USA and the USSR and in the first mentioned 2.3 million out of the 7 million elderly people are widows. In 1975 29% of men and 39% of women in the developed world were in the very old category (over 75); by 1990 the corresponding figures are projected to be 34 and 45% with ever rising numbers as the 21st century unfolds.

Europe is currently the earth's most elderly continent with 13% of its 490 million people over 65 years old. The German Democratic Republic has 16% in this category, Austria, Federal Germany and Sweden 15%, Belgium, Norway and the UK 14%, France, Luxembourg, Hungary and Switzerland 13%. The figure for the USA is 11% and for the USSR 16%. In the latter recipients of old age pensions increased from 16 million to 33 million between 1966 and 1980 and pensioners as a group rose from 6.8 to 12.4% of the total population.

It should be stressed that individual countries in the developed world have aged at different speeds. In Britain it took 60 years (from 1905 to 1965) for over 65s to increase from 5 to 12%. The comparable time in Sweden was 105 years (between 1855 and 1960), in France 170 years (1790-1960). Japan had only 5% of its population over 65 in 1950; but by 1982 the figure had risen to 8% and, at that rate, the projection for 1995 is 12%.

Amongst the developed countries the Soviet Union is unique in making outstanding claims for superlongevity. Normally the number of centenarians in the population is about 2 to 3/100,000. But in regions of the Caucasus and particularly in Georgia a much higher proportion is claimed with individuals stated to have attained ages of 120, 130, or even 150 and 160 years. Unfortunately, however, these assertions which have enjoyed widespread publicity in the mass media, have never been properly authenticated. Valid documentation, in particular reliable censuses, is just not available; birth records and internal identity cards only came into general use in the USSR in the early 1930s; there is a strong possibility that documents were falsified by deserters during the First World War and in the imbroglio following the Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent Civil War; there is even the suggestion that the legend of Soviet centenarians was related to the fact that J. V. Stalin, himself much interested in this phenomenon, was a Georgian!

The assumption has been widely made that only the industrialised countries need feel concern about their ageing populations. This view can no longer be upheld for in the future the most spectacular change in age composition will take place in the developing world. In 1970 there were 150 million over 60s and 10 million over 80s in the Third World; the corresponding figures for 2000 AD are likely to be 247 and 26 million. Latin America and East Asia will show the most pronounced changes. In the case of the former the overall increase in population over the next two decades is likely to be 60% but the 60+ age group is projected to rise

by more than 80%. Countries in Latin America in which the geriatric problem will be especially severe in the early decades of the 21st century include Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Venezuela.

In the world's most populous country, China, the population is currently estimated to be approximately 1,000 million with an overall annual growth rate of 1.4%, a figure very low for a developing nation. But by 2000 AD over 60s in China are likely to have doubled and by this time will constitute about 11% of the population. Medical resources in China, although greatly improved since the Maoist revolution of 1948, will undoubtedly find this extra load very difficult to bear.

It is generally agreed that the triumphs of modern medicine, particularly in the realm of high technology, have done little to lengthen the human life span. Life expectancy has undoubtedly increased during this century; but this has been mainly due to the prevention and treatment of diseases in early life thus allowing more and more people to reach what appears to be an immutable upper age limit.

What would be the effect on longevity if the main 'captains of the men of death'—coronary heart disease and cancer—were emasculated or completely conquered? In the USA, where numerous studies in this area have been undertaken in recent years, it has been estimated that if coronary thrombosis and cerebrovascular accidents were successfully eliminated the net increase in life expectancy at birth would be approximately 12 years; also if cancer no longer existed as a killing disease about two years of additional life expectancy would accrue. Prevention of all accidents including deaths produced by motor cars would lengthen the expectancy by only 0.6 years and complete eradication of tuberculosis by less than 0.05 years. Information of a similar kind is in the process of being accumulated in other developed countries and is likely to be comparable with the US experience.

It has been said that senescence with its 'melancholy, long withdrawing roar' begins at puberty. Certainly as one ages the scene contracts, colours tend to fade, vigour is lost and the strains and stresses of everyday life become more obtrusive. Geriatric medicine differs from other specialties in not being concerned with a circumscribed group of diseases. Instead it is polyglot, diverse and generalist and it has clinical, preventive, remedial and social aspects.

In elderly individuals numerous diseases frequently co-exist and a single diagnosis is quite rare. Physical and psychological problems are often seen together; often the social milieu is one of hardship, impoverishment, poor nutrition, depression and inadequate family support.

Mental deterioration due usually to arterial thickening in the brain is of the essence of geriatric medicine. The pathway of senile dementia invariably leads downhill. Forgetfulness, mental confusion, deterioration of personal hygiene, disorientation in space and bizarre changes in behaviour are amongst the symptoms frequently observed. Stroke is one of the most important problems of old age and is now markedly increasing at the world level. Apart from paralysis directly attributable to stroke

major intellectual defects can also follow the event and difficulties with speech may be particularly catastrophic as far as the individual patient is concerned.

Incontinence affecting bladder, bowels or both is a dominant problem of geriatric medicine. To the doctor a patient's incontinence may be a relatively minor problem. But to the individual himself it may cause morale to plummet and it may become the ultimate indignity and disgrace. This is especially so if in case of urinary incontinence an indwelling catheter has to be lodged on a permanent basis and here the analogy of the ball and chain is not inappropriate. Falls in old people are frequent and important. Poor vision, failing mental processes, lack of postural control and tremors of limbs and body contribute to their occurrence. Environmental factors either in the home or in institutions are crucial to the genesis of falls and require to be closely scrutinised if these distressing occurrences are to be obviated.

Disease of bones and joints are common in the elderly and are a major source of disability. Sometimes as in the crippling condition known as osteoarthritis articular cartilage is lost; here obesity is a definite predisposing factor and adequate treatment of that condition can lead to significant improvement. Sometimes the fundamental defect is a reduction in the total amount of bone in the skeleton—a condition called osteoporosis—or is due to an overall lack of calcium (osteomalacia). A malady known as Paget's disease and named after one of the doyens of British surgery, Sir James Paget (1814-1899), is also relatively common in the elderly. The usual symptoms are pain and multiple fractures in association with characteristic findings on X-ray. As of this writing the cause of the condition remains quite obscure.

Hypothermia is *par excellence* a disease of elderly people. As one ages the delicately balanced mechanisms which control and influence body temperature are progressively eroded with the result that one is less aware of being in cold surroundings. In northern latitudes the risk to old people is, of course, compounded by the fact that ambient temperatures are often much too low. As conventional fuels, particularly oil and natural gas, become scarcer and as energy costs, reflected in domestic heating bills, continue to soar the incidence of hypothermia can only rise. Unless rational energy policies are adopted in which conservation and the use of renewable sources are paramount, hypothermia could become a major scourge of patients in the 21st century.

The management of death in old age is now receiving increased attention. Death in the elderly often has a different quality from that in younger people. Feelings of bitterness, tragedy and personal loss may recede; there is a recognition that life is finite; sometimes the patient may be drowsy, comatose and confused. Under such circumstances excessive therapeutic zeal tied to sophisticated diagnostic techniques and policies of heroic interventionism may seem strangely unreal and inappropriate.

Good terminal care in the elderly should have two major aims—to preserve dignity and to inculcate respect. The preservation of dignity

necessitates freedom from pain and suffering, as much mental tranquillity as possible and a harmonious marriage between independence and disability. There should be respect not only for the patients themselves and their emotions but also for the feelings of their relatives. In the management of the terminally ill too much attention still tends to be given to the disease process *per se* and too little to the special needs and problems of the individual who must always be viewed in the holistic and not in the purely technical sense. Undue preoccupation with the provision of inpatient geriatric services in some parts of the industrialised world, particularly in North America, has tended to cloud the benefits which accrue to many patients from domiciliary care. The latter, of course, must have available adequate services of an interdisciplinary nature in which members drawn from a variety of the caring professions participate and co-operate.

The ageing of populations is a global dilemma which will certainly not disappear. Instead it will become ever more dominant in the years which lie ahead. The caring professions, particularly medicine and nursing, must acquire more adequate understanding of ageing and there is a clamant need for instruction in geriatrics increasingly to permeate medical and nursing curricula at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Expansion of geriatric services at the global level is, of course, a *sine qua non* for the 21st century and beyond. Society has the right to demand that governments face up to this problem and set in train new forces of instruction and imagination in order to deal with it. If they do not, future generations will rightly impugn them before the bar of history and say of them as did Winston Churchill of the Baldwin administration in the 1930s that they were 'decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all powerful to be impotent.'

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THE EDINBURGH FESTIVAL (1982) IN RETROSPECT

by Alasdair Steven

THE Edinburgh Festival claims to be the most comprehensive Arts Festival in the world: a proud and expansive boast, but one which is justified when one considers that apart from the official Festival—which is itself a kaleidoscope of the Arts—there is the Fringe, the T.V. Festival, the Film Festival, the Jazz Festival, and on the windy heights of the castle the spectacular Tattoo. The city has not been called the 'Athens of the North' for nothing. It must be one of Europe's most beautiful, and I would suggest, best preserved cities. Not a skyscraper in the centre of the town, and the 'New Town' is jealously preserved by the natives as an example of how the modern and the old can live side by side. The Royal Mile has been lovingly restored and the great boulevards which connect Charlotte Square and St. Andrew's Square are still very much as Adam intended them, although the traffic in Edinburgh is horrific at Festival time and parking even worse. To pull down the old statutes and buildings would be a crime. Edinburgh has a very distinct sense of history and it is this pride in their own city which has helped to foster the annual three-week jamboree. The Festival started in 1948 as an after the war festivity and Edinburgh seemed as good as anywhere else to host it. From those beginnings has grown a Festival of world importance and a spirit of well-being that is seldom experienced except at Christmas. The Fringe, however, grew simply because the city is famed for its churches, and as churches have church halls it meant that Fringe companies could adapt the halls for three weeks with ease and perform, as often as not, with difficulty.

It should be remembered that these young groups take on the responsibility for the halls and, ensuring they meet fire requirements, Licensing Authorities see they have everything required. The hard work put in by the groups—over 500 this year—speaks legions for their dedication and enthusiasm. They put on everything from the standard to the avant-garde, from the shocking to the esoteric, from the inspired failure to the plain dull. Personally I doubt if we will ever see again the combined talent of the 'Beyond the Fringe' team. Times have changed and the Fringe is now a very different animal. It is now a vast theatrical event and is used by many theatrical groups with professional actors who use it as a launching pad for their season. Not only can they attract good audiences but, more important, they can entice some members of the press to give a much needed quote for their ensuing tour. The Fringe is no longer the place to mount the weird new author. It is very much more the home of the established playwrights, and the groups are by and large falling into the same trap as the West End commercial theatre: that of playing safe in order to attract the public. This coupled with an endless collection of Late-Night frivolities has rather taken the bite out of the Fringe this year.

The Festival itself is not immune from either hardship or criticism. It is not the fault of the imaginative Artistic Director, Mr. John Drummond,

that he has the most limiting set of theatres. The charming, but totally inappropriate, Kings Theatre is the only place large enough for Opera, but the stage and backstage facilities are archaic and the size of the performing space makes it suitable for only 18th Century Opera. That immediately gives Mr. Drummond little or no choice of European Opera Houses. It also means that all the grand Richard Strauss, Wagner and Verdi operas just can not be considered. The Lyceum is a beautiful theatre and the large cavernous Assembly Hall is the venue for the major orchestras of the world. Many other venues, from Gymnasiums to the Church of Scotland Assembly Rooms, are pressed into temporary service and it is noticeable this year that far fewer such halls are being used. Mr. Drummond says that he had nothing particularly suitable for these places. I would suggest, however, there is a far more worrying reason—money. The Festival is basically financed from three sources. Half comes from ticket sales, a quarter from the Scottish Arts Council and a quarter from the Edinburgh Council. Ticket prices are now as high as they have ever been. Both Councils seem to fight annually, and give as little as possible to this jewel in the Summer Festival crown. It seems extraordinary that the three weeks of the Festival, as has been estimated, brings around £20 million in additional revenue to the City. For this the Edinburgh Council disburses from its coffers £430,000, or $\frac{1}{4}$ p on the rates.

With 900 shows on offer it is possible to give only some idea of what the Fringe is all about. There is, however, something stirring for we have seen the birth of the off-fringe tycoon. There have been two large venues created (at a cost of some £100,000 each) to cater for a great many productions. One is a tent in the hole in the ground in which the City Fathers were to build an opera house some twenty years ago; the other the Assembly Rooms where Sir Walter Scott read the Waverley novels for the first time, and where, in more recent times, the over-luxurious Festival Club was based. However, the entrepreneurs have entered and will now only take the shows which they think will sell tickets and it must be added the groups who can afford a rumoured £1,100 for a two-hour slot. They are excellent venues although the tent was a trifle noisy for some of the opera. Though somewhat smacking of heady commercialism they have given the Fringe respectability. Certainly the Assembly Rooms seemed to be buzzing at all times of the day and night and were much better equipped technically and sound proofed than last year. For example, I saw there an intriguing play about the Rosenbergs who were sentenced to death in the early fifties after getting involved in an atomic spy ring. Although all the performances were good in *Ethel and Julie* I noticed a young actress called Kath Layden giving a wonderful account of the horrified mother. The Cambridge Mummers often dish up the most weird fair of the Fringe. This year I confess to a slight disappointment in what they had on offer. They presented a play based on Conrad's *The Secret Agent* which, while being acted in an effectively stylised manner, was far too long and blessed with some of the most inappropriate songs I have heard. At one stage a quartet of pathologists broke into a jolly ditty in the mortuary! However,

there were two enticing performances from Tilda Swinton and Andrew Normington. The prestigious Traverse, too, hardly shone this year. I saw a play about Shelley and Byron called *Blood and Ice* by Liz Lochhead. It was far too wordy and never seemed to capture the excitement of their characters or of their wives. The best new play I saw was a first play by a student from Hull University. The quaintly titled ZTC Company performed Stephan Chambers' *Occam's Razor*. While it drew too heavily on Beckett to be genuinely original (a better title might have been *Stealing from Godot*) there was a depth of understanding of human despair which I found truly compelling. Certainly, as a first play it was an auspicious piece of craftsmanship.

The main Festival threw up some strange successes this year. It was thought that the Opera would be very strong. In the event neither was it well patronised nor noteworthy. The Dresden Opera produced an exciting *Ariadne auf Naxos* but a very below par *Seraglio*; Scottish Opera did a somewhat lacklustre *Manon Lescaut*—sadly in need of a genuine tenor in the role of Des Grieux—and La Scala Milano had a success with Rossini's *La Pietra del Paragone* but not quite that with Handel's *Ariodante*. The Welsh Opera presented their *Tamburlaine* for just two performances. The 'hits' came from the puppets of Colla Marionettes of Italy. In two delightful programmes they entranced Edinburgh audiences and played to packed houses and rave notices, all deserved. The American Theatre brought Moliere's *Sganarelle* and Wedekind's *Lulu*. Such are the vagaries of this Festival that both were booked out in advance and proceeded to be a great disappointment. This brief résumé must leave out many things—the Tattoo, morning concerts and art exhibitions but there are two items which have to be included. The opening concert with Abbado conducting as fine a quartet of soloists as has ever been assembled for Verdi's stunning *Requiem*. It proved a tremendous send-off for the Festival and was transmitted live on T.V. The other event of note was *The Marriage* (from *The Gogol*), written and directed and starring Peter Ustinov. It proved something of a disappointment in that while the play part was being enacted—the actors have been waiting for six years for the second act of Mussorgsky's opera—it was a lot of fun with some pungent comments on Imperial Russia; but the opera itself was memorably uninteresting and there was unease in the house. Ustinov gave a bravura performance but the piece is a slender one. However, as one came out of the Lyceum Edinburgh was *en fête*. Handel's Firework Music was being relayed across the City and fireworks were going off from the Castle: it all looked breathtaking; even the rain stayed away. The wind, alas, did not. It blew, as it always does in Edinburgh.

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CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

IT has taken *A Little Night Music* five years to reach London. The reports of it from the 1977 Venice Film Festival were gloomy. It eked out a meagre three-week run in New York, where the original stage show had played for two years. Accordingly, no British distributor was interested. Its Austrian producer, Sascha Wien Film, at that time planning, with government support, a programme of films in English, with international talent, went out of business. The film was issued on video-cassette here a few months ago, and it was put into the Curzon for a three-week run, to be followed by other bookings, if successful.

Its director, Harold Prince, directed the Broadway show, and like most of those on which he has worked with the composer Stephen Sondheim, it was very much his conception. He originally wanted to base a period musical on Schnitzler's *La Ronde*, but that was unavailable; so he bought instead the rights to Ingmar Bergman's film *Smiles of a Summer Night*, which has a not dissimilar basic idea and is in itself based, as Bergman said, on a play by Marivaux. Sondheim's score is a brilliant and tuneful pastiche of Ravel. Undoubtedly, Prince hoped that this film would enable him to make his mark as a director: many of his Broadway shows had been filmed by other hands—*Cabaret*, for instance, was a great success for Bob Fosse, one of his Broadway rivals. Prince himself had directed a black comedy some years ago, *Something for Everyone*, also known as *Black Flowers for the Bride*, and although it attracted a minor cult following, it did not suggest that his stage reputation would be repeated in films. Prince's talent, or at least his taste, is brought into question by *A Little Night Music*, since he chose as his star Elizabeth Taylor.

Admittedly, he got her for a remarkably small salary, since, as her ex-husband, Richard Burton, admitted, she needed a good film. She had had a decade of flops—and that should have been a warning to Prince. And even when she was a box-office star she had not exactly been a favourite of the critics. I must say that I was surprised that he preferred her to Glynis Johns, who had played the role in New York, or Jean Simmons, who had done it in London: of these two ladies, Miss Johns got the better notices, suggesting that Miss Simmons experienced first-night nerves. I saw both. On the night I went, Glynis Johns was performing with little zest, and the show seemed a dismal thing—at least when she was on stage. I caught Jean Simmons late in the run, at a *matinée*, and the show was enchantment from start to finish. Simmons was not only incredibly beautiful, but she was enjoying herself hugely—and consequently we enjoyed her. She has done little stage work, but there it is: she had a magical presence. Although there are three or four other leading roles, the piece clearly stands or falls by the actress who plays Desirée Armfeldt. The reports from Cannes suggested unequivocally that Miss Taylor was awful, and she is: dumpy, petulant, over-made-up, a small

presence with a small voice. Prince's other mistake was to treat his material as if it was original or profound. Bergman's film, made before he achieved international recognition, had been disliked in Sweden—even by its producers, who considered it, in Bergman's own words, 'lame and too long'. The subject, which is amorous intrigue, requires the sort of gaiety Lubitsch could achieve, and Prince follows Bergman in being much too solemn. The film is pretty, though, as photographed on sunny lawns and around baroque mansions, and stylishly played by Len Cariou and Hermione Gingold (both from the Broadway cast), and Diana Rigg.

It has at least one musical number, 'A Week-end in the Country', which works, and that is one more than *Annie* has. This film arrived without delay, since its producer is not a small European company but Columbia Pictures, whose investment was in the region of \$25 million. Columbia had paid \$6½ million for the rights—not \$9½ million as reported, which was, the company's president explained, a 'hype' figure: but it remained the highest sum ever paid for a movie property. Therefore, to be successful, *Annie* had to take at least \$40 million at the box-office, and such figures are achieved only by two or three runaway successes in any year. These days the public goes to see only the same movies: there is little interest in the middle-of-the-road film. The studio's ledgers in recent times are heavy with red ink, as in the notorious case of *Heaven's Gate*, which cost even more than *Annie* and managed to take in a mere \$1 million. *Annie*, as a stage show, ran for years in New York and London, but the film was a doubtful proposition, based as it is on a comic strip about a cute little orphan, and containing such—to me—equally dubious conceits as a singing F.D.R. It had no notable songs, unless you include 'Tomorrow', which isn't very melodious in the first place. Columbia's advertising campaign used it for the slogan 'The Musical of Tomorrow', but it looked fairly desperate. This is clearly a musical of the day before yesterday. The company tried to protect its investment by assigning the direction to John Huston—which reminds me, at least, that in the heyday of screen musicals, neither Joseph L. Mankiewicz with *Guys and Dolls*, nor Fred Zinnemann with *Oklahoma!* exactly covered themselves with glory. Still, Huston's work has always revealed his ability to learn from past mistakes, his own and others, and in *Fat City* and *Wise Blood* he proved himself to be as much in tune with the times as any film-maker fifty years younger. What he has done to *Annie* is a matter of conjecture: its 'book' is, again, a dull thing, and he has tried to treat it lightly. It still isn't worth filming, which leaves the musical numbers—and he has said that he was going to leave the handling of them to those expert in such matters. Well, if they were you wouldn't know it: every time one of the numbers starts to work up to something, the camera cuts away to something else. They never get up steam. One, 'Let's Go to the Movies', takes place in Radio City Music Hall, with its platoon of ushers and its justly famous dancers, the Rockettes: but it is niggardly in showing them. All that can be enjoyed is Carol Burnett's comic strip orphanage gorgon—certainly not the 'Daddy' Warbucks of Albert Finney, a role that requires

the genial presence of such players as Gene Lockhart or Guy Kibbee. So why did they spend so much on *Annie*? Because it had family appeal, like *The Sound of Music*. They couldn't have been more wrong.

The star of *The Sound of Music*, Julie Andrews, turned up earlier in the summer in *Victor/Victoria*—and that makes three failed attempts this year to resurrect the Hollywood musical. If anyone could do it, it's Miss Andrews. Unlike Miss Taylor, she can sing, she is pretty, she can play comedy, she has a delicious personality—but she cannot do it single-handedly. Her husband, Blake Edwards, wrote and directed *Victor/Victoria*, and he, like Prince, proves himself no heir to Lubitsch. I simply do not understand why these people do not look more closely at the films they are imitating. All the great musicals, from *The Love Parade* to *Singin' in the Rain*, move swiftly; they are irreverent. *Victor/Victoria* has a serviceable story (it served for two musicals in the Thirties, one German and one British). It concerns an out-of-work girl singer who pretends to be a boy and becomes the toast of Paris as a female impersonator, which leads to farcical complications when a tough gangster (James Garner) falls in love with 'him': thus there are certain comic scenes in an hotel—and they should romp along. They don't; they—if you'll forgive the pun—drag. The musical numbers in this case are excellent, with Robert Preston in the cast—and, like Miss Andrews, he is an expert practitioner of such matters. But even the songs would have been better if they had been in the idiom of the period.

I have seen one superb musical lately—or semi-superb, if you will, since only the second half of it is a musical. This is Stanley Donen's 1978 spoof of the films of the Thirties, *Movie, Movie*, which, at the time, disappeared before I had a chance to see it. It failed, I think, because there had been too many spoofs of old movies, most of them inaccurate or ill-judged (sometimes there seemed to be half-a-dozen playing off-Broadway), and also because people did not associate George C. Scott with light-hearted fare. In the first part, a parody of old boxing movies, called 'Dynamite Hands', he plays a veteran trainer, Gloves Malloy, and in the second, 'Baxter's Beauties of 1933', he is a driving Broadway producer, Spats Baxter. George C. Scott is too laid-back in fact for his two roles. Larry Gelbart and Sheldon Keller wrote the screen-play, packing both sections with the naivety, the drugstore philosophising, the smart alec jokes and the short-hand aim at audiences' emotions which we remember from old Warner Bros. movies. Donen's recreation of the stances and visual style of those films is effortlessly right: he had done some inferior work in between, but I haven't admired him so much since *Singin' in the Rain*. He and his designers did not have the financial resources available to Busby Berkeley in parodying one of his numbers, but they succeed nevertheless, and we leave the theatre (or switch off the set) feeling younger and happier, which I think is what the making of musicals is all about.

The matter is worth considering, since movies today seldom give us much to think about. Few of us would hesitate if asked to choose between

the mindless musicals of the past and the mindless comic strips and science-fiction adventures which have been clogging our cinema screens all summer. Steven Spielberg, who last year offered the relentlessly trivial *Raiders of the Lost Ark*, has come up with *E.T.*, which has made more money more quickly than any other film yet made. In America, that is, since it hasn't yet been shown here. Apparently it concerns a creature from another planet who is left on earth and befriended by a small boy. The distinguished writer-director, Joseph L. Mankiewicz, responsible for such literate, witty scripts as *All About Eve* and *A Letter to Three Wives*, observed to me recently that it is charming, but of the intellectual level of the old Lassie pictures. The British cinema industry cannot wait for *E.T.* to arrive: cinemas here have had a disastrous summer. Weekly admissions, which were over sixty million at the height of movies' popularity, fell to less than one million in May for the first time since records were kept. I'm afraid that *Raiders of the Lost Ark* and *E.T.* won't reverse the trend—for which the growth of the video industry is as yet only a factor. As I write, some promising foreign-language films are about to open in London, and I hope to cover them in my next column. If they are not worthwhile, I shall have to write about what is available on video or from the BBC and ITV. I do not wish to discuss *Conan the Barbarian*, *Star Trek 3* and *4* or *Rocky IV*, *V* and *VI*, nor do I think you will want to read about them. It is all profoundly depressing.

[David Shipman's *The Story of Cinema, Volume One: From the Beginnings to Gone With the Wind*, with a foreword by Ingmar Bergman, was published last month by Hodder & Stoughton at £14.95. His earlier two-volume *The Great Movie Stars* will be issued this month for the first time in paperback, by Angus & Robertson at £6.95 each.]

CORRESPONDENCE

Dear Madam,

Having read 'The Ocean' by Howard Atkinson (*Contemporary Review* No. 1400, Vol. 241) I would like to have the opportunity to make the following comments.

In these days of mass communication, national statistics and media dominance the use of the cliché has never been more poignant. For the very individuals who pontificate on the 'why's' and 'wherefores' of our Economic Policy are those very people least acquainted with the realities which they espouse to comprehend.

In attempting to empathise, the government minister, chief academician, top civil servant or press spokesman, who may have been quick to forget the riots of summer '81, will reach into his back pocket for the 'Tragedy of Unemployment', 'recession', 'social divisiveness', '13.5', 'trends', 'plateau', 'forecast', 'interest rates' and, inevitably, 'productivity'.

But the wiser man, who is neither seen nor heard, will quietly take his back seat and say not a word, for he realises the futility of words, the repetition of the cliché and the inefficacy of economic prattle. Hence the vast silent majority in the country today.

The unemployed person is very unique. He or she must have great strength of character, the will to survive and unshakeable inner confidence. He must be able to withstand great depths of loneliness, inadequacy and frustration and still attempt to come out on top. Do our policy makers know anything of this helplessness and depression, can they really understand such problems? I think not.

And this is why our country is and will continue to be in such bad shape. Not because there is a worldwide recession: America will recover, West Germany, Europe, Japan will all prosper. But in Britain the war lies within ourselves, our attitudes. We are antiquated and we are scared to admit it.

We have a vast wealth of human resource and creative potential wasted on the dole. Why do we not tap this resource? Is it because we have not enough jobs to offer—our economic theory would lead us to believe this. Consider however that the fault may lie in our rigid attitudes, structural environment and what I will term 'closed consciousness'.

A man presents himself for a job and he must possess precisely the correct qualifications, a stable work background, and he must demonstrate a total commitment to the occupation. Furthermore he is in competition with at least 100 other applicants on average. What realistic chance does the individual stand if his background, qualifications and apparent commitment are below the par sought by the employer? Naturally the employer will not hire this man—he has no need to, there are plenty of others to chose from.

But what of the applicant himself? He knows he could have done an excellent job, he may have had diverse work experience in a number of other fields, and he would have worked his heart out for the employer if

only he had been given the chance. He is rejected and depressed, for this is not the first time this has happened to him. But much worse is the fact that his efforts have been thwarted once again and his creative potential has been checked. The more his potential is checked, the more he must learn to adapt to his new situation and accept his uncreative role in the ranks of the unemployed. In other words, the rigidity of the employers' requirements are stifling the very potential which they seek to develop. And the country as a whole suffers into the bargain.

It is the Government's stated philosophy to encourage new businesses and hence to develop creativity. But it is going about its business in precisely the wrong way. As noted, the effects of its policies of deflating the economy and so increasing unemployment is to stifle, rather than develop, creativity. And there can be no hope of any recovery until the Government realises and is prepared to act upon this fundamental error.

We must create the right atmosphere for new growth by going straight to the grass roots of our problems—by fostering a new air of opportunity, rejecting previous hiring rigidity, throwing our 'closed consciousness' to the wind and adopting an air of openness and trust where freedom of information and real democratic principles thrive. Only the Government has the power and authority to help achieve this transformation and it is imperative that it do so while there is still time. Those with the power to make their opinions felt should urge this new approach for upon it rests our economic survival.

Whilst it may never be too late to save the country, for the rejected and despondent out of work it can never be too soon!

Yours faithfully,

G. A. CAIN

Dear Madam,

A tendency to enact conflicts on public forums through conferences and committees and an inability to absorb naturally disputing factions, such as the Militants at present, is a permanent feature of the Labour Party. The current dilemma is characterised in trenchant style as the 'Militant Anachronism' by Paul Rose (September issue, No. 1400, Vol. 241). He rightly detects the totalitarian authenticity of intolerance in the concept of a Vanguard Party which pre-casts a one-party state. Yet does he really come to grips with the fundamental problems of the British Labour Party, namely, its hopelessly entwined preoccupation with the meaning and definition of freedom?

For the Conservative Party freedom is a simple matter of non-intervention from outside, briefly a postulate of 'freedom from'. It is the concept of an independent, immobile and self-supporting class, ideologically supported by classical philosophy. This, however, merely represents to the Labour Party a condition to remain poor and continue living in slums. An abstract idea is darkened by the impressions of a class which is ill-placed and ill-favoured. The point of departure on the significance of

freedom is a directive by Hegel and Marx which is on the look-out for 'freedom to'. They are both searching for growth and development. 'The development of human power is the true realm of freedom', argues Marx.

The difference in interpretation between Conservatives and Labour is reflected quite strongly in the actual controversy which has been fuelled by the left and right wings of the Labour Party itself. The right wing claims to feel apprehensive of the imposition of any potential restrictions and scrambles for shelter under the umbrella of parliamentary freedom. The left, on the other hand, stands for centralised democracy and relies hopefully on a preferential, generally ambivalent choice of political priorities, bearing in mind the dictum of Marx that 'the overcoming of obstacles is itself a liberating activity'.

The problem which separates the two wings is how to equate parliamentary freedom with poverty and unemployment? The fundamental issue within the party surfaces again and again as a conscience-searching, catalytic quest accompanied by self-confessional drama and martyrdom. It is the Achilles heel which makes the Labour Party most vulnerable and constantly exposed to the hostile trivia of the media. The projection of a gladiatorial tournament looks self-evident and convincing simply because—and this is its tragic twist—the participants themselves have accepted a falsified, media-fabricated version which can only be rescued now by what E. P. Thompson describes as 'the plurality of conflicting views'.

Yours faithfully,

Aberdour, Fife.

ALFRED LANDOR

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

LORD CARVER'S POLICY FOR PEACE

A Policy For Peace. Field Marshal Lord Carver. Faber and Faber. £12.50.

'I can face with equanimity', writes Field Marshal Lord Carver, 'the criticism frequently levelled at me by Ministers of the Government, that I am the only living British ex-Chief of the Defence Staff to hold the views I do.' He adds, with apparent satisfaction, 'Throughout my military service I have been accustomed to being out of step.' The face that gazes at us from the cover of his book is, indeed, that of a highly cerebral man who has no reason to suppose that on defence matters there is anyone better equipped than himself to discover and proclaim the truth. Whatever one may feel about his conclusions, it is surely a credit mark, not only for him but the services, that a man so independent, such a military *enfant terrible*, should have reached the top of the greasy pole.

What are these conclusions of his which would appear to annoy other service leaders? In a crucial passage, he tells us that most people, through the technicality of the subject, tend to one or other of two extreme positions. They either support the total abolition of nuclear weapons or they are convinced that we, either Britain or the West as a whole, must have at least as many as the Soviet Union, type for type, or preferably more. Carver asserts that 'both these extreme views are misguided and could be disastrous'. He insists that 'there is another policy that could preserve peace and reduce the likelihood that mankind will be subjected to the horrors of a nuclear war'. On paper, therefore, Carver's views should be equally unwelcome to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and to the present Government and Chiefs of Staff. But from my observation in the House of Lords he causes much more annoyance to the latter. For an ex-Chief of Defence Staff to say these things! Really! C.N.D. champions pick out those remarks of his which suit their purpose.

What, then, does his third option amount to? It is impossible to do justice here to its technical merits or the criticisms levelled against it. The essence of his doctrine can be stated simply. One quotation gives a good idea of it: 'The deterrent to war is therefore both nuclear and conventional. To insist that the nuclear deterrent must remain an essential element is not to say that the vast arsenals on both sides are necessary to maintain a stable balance. They have been brought about very largely by the search for superiority and for forms of limited nuclear use. Once it is accepted that those are vain objectives, a large part of the arsenal is seen to be superfluous, particularly that deriving from concepts of fighting a limited nuclear war (for instance, artillery shells and most of the bombs intended to be delivered by aircraft). An invulnerable retaliatory force, capable of a certain degree of "assured destruction" is all that is needed for a strategic force.'

The practical implications for British policy are that we should strengthen our conventional forces and that we do not need an independent nuclear deterrent of our own. Everyone interested in defence agrees with the first proposition, but I cannot myself visualise this country accepting the second in practice. The Labour Party in opposition have often shown themselves sympathetic to it, but in office they have stuck to the independent nuclear deterrent

as firmly as the Tories. Nor do I wish to imply that if I had any vote in the matter I would cast it on Carver's side. No one taking a long view can be sure that America will always defend us and if American support was ever withdrawn we would be compelled to do all in our power to protect ourselves.

But nothing but good can come from this courageous challenge by a great military expert to those who decide our military destinies. We can at least be sure that the critics of the present government policy are equipped with enough technical knowledge to give their arguments a more or less equal chance in the life and death debate.

FRANK LONGFORD

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Global Collective Security in the 1980s. Edited by Geoffrey Stewart-Smith.

Foreword by Dr. J. M. A. H. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO. Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. (139 Petersham Road, Richmond, Surrey). £9 or £18 hardback.

'Although the Soviet Union had clung tenaciously to the empire accumulated by the Czars, nevertheless they managed to persuade many people that they represented the genuine voice of liberation from Imperialism.' Thus the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hurd, in one of the addresses delivered to the First Annual World Balance of Power Conference held at Leeds Castle, Kent, in August 1981, and collected in this useful volume by the Foreign Affairs Research Institute which organised the meeting.

UN and many governments and well-meaning people accept the definitions and valuations of 'colonialism' and 'liberation' propounded by the Soviet Empire and International Communism. The Foreign Affairs Research Institute endeavours to counter such Soviet propaganda successes and to alert the world that is free or would like to be to the Kremlin's aims as expressed, for example, in what Professor Richard Pipes terms 'the so-called Brezhnev doctrine' which 'violates every international statement of principles signed by the Soviet Union including the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act'.

Other informed and illustrious contributors came from Australia, France, Japan, Jordan (in the person of its eloquent Crown Prince), Norway and Malaya. Canada's Brigadier Maurice Tugwell rightly insists on truthful propaganda and the seduction, not destruction, of the Soviet Empire.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON, M.P.

ECONOMICS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Falkland Islands Economic Study 1982. 3 maps. H.M.S.O. 1982. £7.80.

As a Magdalen undergraduate in the thirties, 'Eddie' Shackleton had an active interest in the Polar Regions, both by paternity and by inclination. There is something reassuring in the fact that after a half-century which has seen the liquidation of the British Empire, Lord Shackleton presides over an updated inquiry into the affairs of the Falkland Islands and the British Antarctic Territories. This is a revision of the survey carried out under Lord Shackleton's Chairmanship in 1976, aided by a team of experts. Now, as then, Lord Shackleton was the only political member of the team. It was not the purpose of the inquiry to suggest what the political future of the Falkland Islands might be, but the work carried out by the group is clearly intended to

provide the facts and forecasts upon which future political decisions might be based. Nobody, whether in a public or a private capacity, could pretend to an informed opinion on the future disposal of the Islands without reflecting upon this report.

For this purpose, the report should be read in the light of the comparative figures of expenditure required of Government per person per year: for St. Helena £615 per person and for the Western Isles of Scotland £644. The estimated expenditure per Falkland Islander per year is £3,245-£3,786. This figure excludes certain social welfare benefits, and, apparently, the very substantial cost of maintaining a garrison in post-invasion conditions. The Report adds that the Falklands economy is now at a critical stage, and that if funds are not forthcoming for the proposed changes and development, the alternative is the 'considerable' cost of supporting the Islands over a long period of decline.

These figures and conclusions must be set against the individual studies made by the Committee of proposed developments in agriculture, fisheries, tourism, wool and skin processing, alginates and hydrocarbons. In every field examined, the difficulties appear to be formidable and the chances of success uncertain. The Committee effectively disposes of the easy optimism about hydrocarbons which has been current in political circles. Even if very substantial deposits were to be found—and the results of preliminary investigation are disappointing—the difficulties of weather, sea depth and location, not to mention the military risks to offshore installations, appear to make worthwhile developments of oil or gas reserves most unpromising, at least in this century.

The Committee finds that the establishment of air communications is 'an absolute priority'. Without these, economic development would be impossible and the social problems foreseen would be aggravated to the point of being 'unacceptable to the majority of Falkland Islanders'. This, for reasons of geography, means cooperation with Argentina. In the last resort, therefore, it emerges from the Report that a solution to the international political problems raised by the status quo, is the only foundation upon which a satisfactory future for the Falkland Islands might be established.

Seen against the background of a straitened British economy and growing commitments in NATO and in the European Community, it is apparent that this report will be of no help to those who argue for the retention of the Falkland Islands or its Dependencies under British rule. If the economic, military and political costs involved in such retention are to be justified, it will have to be on other than economic grounds. It can hardly be that the desire of a population equivalent to that of one English village, to live in the place and manner of their choice, regardless of the cost and of the politico-military situation, can be allowed to dictate British policy. Indeed, for reasons of time the Committee was unable to visit the Falkland Islands. There is, therefore, no certainty that after all that has passed, and in view of greatly altered prospects for the future, a majority of the inhabitants would prefer continuing life in the Islands to any of the alternatives which might be offered to them. In all periods of our history, British people at home and overseas have had to accommodate themselves to the exigencies of changing times. It is not the purpose of a review to enter into alternative policies, but this reviewer cannot avoid the conclusion that this careful and even-handed examination of facts and prospects gives little hope of a viable future based upon the political *status quo*.

PETER SMITHERS

URBAN BIAS

City Bias and Rural Neglect: The Dilemma of Urban Development. Michel P. Todaro with Jerry Stilkind. The Population Council, New York.

This public issues paper of the New York based Population Council deals with issues of fundamental importance, viz, the problem of over-urbanisation faced by contemporary developing nations. It is noted that the cities of the developing world are growing at a rapid rate . . . some are becoming unmanageable. Massive rural-urban migration has many causes but the authors consider that a major explanation is policy-makers 'urban bias' and neglect of the rural sector.

The facts about the rapid rate of urbanisation in the Third World are not in serious dispute: to exemplify, in 1950, only four of world's 15 largest cities were situated in less developed nations, by the end of this century, twelve will be and Mexico City is projected to then have a population in excess of 30 million. Some of the large cities of Asia are already 'bursting at the seams' and the prospects facing the residents of cities like Calcutta, Jakarta and Bangkok are daunting indeed.

Serious problems of over-urbanisation can, in the author's view, only be overcome by the activation of policies which are more evenly balanced between the needs of the urban areas and the requirements of the countryside. The current urban-bias needs to be removed, especially the special privileges which are accorded urban industries. A greater volume of agro-support services need to be provided to the deprived rural areas so as to increase agricultural productivity and help arrest the massive rural-urban migration that is taking place.

Todaro persuasively argues for more vigorous rural public works programmes and small-farm development and also stresses the need for more governmental decentralisation. There is also the crucial need for policies to promote dispersed urbanisation and for much higher levels of investment in agriculture and rural non farm enterprises. All the policy prescriptions are advanced with a strong conviction and the author's demonstrate an obvious commitment to their subject. The book is very well written and very readable . . . the reviewer is tempted to offer the suggestion that it would be nice if a few more economists could write on such profound topics, as well as Michael Todaro. If they could, the readership of economics books would surely rise substantially.

RAYMOND J. G. WELLS

THROUGH THE HOLOCAUST

Upon the Head of the Goat. Aranka Siegal. J. M. Dent. £5.95.

Inevitably, *Upon the Head of the Goat* will be compared with the *Anne Frank Diaries*. The situation is roughly comparable, the moving story of a young Jewish girl caught in the organised Nazi persecution of the Jews. Yet there are differences. The *Diaries* are the spontaneous outpourings of a surprisingly mature child and the frequent reissues, films and legal wrangles have combined to invest Anne Frank with glamour, even sanctity in view of her early death. Aranka Siegal, on the other hand, survived the holocaust to build a new life in America, marry and have children.

In *Upon the Head of the Goat*, she tells the story of her own childhood, thinly disguised as the fictitious autobiography of a young Hungarian, Piri Davidowitz. Piri's early years were similar to those of many children all over

the world. A warm and tolerant family life was presided over by Babi, the Jewish land-owning grandmother, who tilled her fields and tended her livestock tirelessly. Religious celebrations and storing the fruits of the earth were the foundations of a happy, disciplined existence which seemed destined to continue for ever. Yet, like a creeping corrosion, outside forces were at work to decimate it. Almost imperceptibly, the daily life of the young Davidowitz was disturbed by public ostracism and humiliation, until the final journey by cattle truck to Auschwitz.

Aranka Siegal contrives to make the retelling of this sadly familiar story seem worthwhile, although the laconic style and snatches of unconnected dialogue tend to rob the characters of vitality. Nonetheless, a convincing picture emerges of what anti-Semitism really meant in practical terms to hard pressed adults and their bewildered children. Seen through the eyes of one family unit, the organised annihilation of a large section of Europe's population seems more than ever incredible. How did it happen: how was it ever allowed to happen? At the present time, when the inquest seems about to begin all over again, the publication of *Upon the Head of the Goat* is very timely.

ROSALIND WADE

NEW LIGHT ON THE ARTS COUNCIL

The Politics of the Arts Council. Robert Hutchison. Sinclair Browne. £7.95 (hardback) £3.50 (paperback).

As a casualty of a recent Arts Council cut (I was administrator of the CV One Theatre Company, a small scale touring company axed in March this year) it was with extra interest that I read Robert Hutchison's book about the Arts Council.

His excellent opening chapters indicate the discreet strings attached to the arms-length principle and the interconnexions at the top through family and old school tie. There are humorous touches in the correlation between the Arts Council's expansion and Lord Goodman's and the case of Lady Anglesey's overflowing bath. This trickles into the footnotes where we learn of Lord Donaldson's confusion between Exeter and Plymouth, Lord Coldstream's mustard seed and C. V. Wedgwood's silence during three years' service on the Arts Council.

But the humour palls as the consequences of these idiocies are sketched; the time and money devoted to the national companies contrasted with the niggardliness towards the small organisations. As some Arts Council Officers stated in December 1974 to the Council's directorate:

Because the sums involved are small, budgets and proposals have been scrutinised by the relevant committee with a fastidiousness which is not usually apparent when the budgets of large companies are examined...

Thus a double standard operates. There is the squeezing out of the amateurs, the indifference to community arts, the closed circle of recipients of handouts in the visual arts and literature area, the ambivalent attitude to the National Youth Theatre and the general lack of any real assessment of what the Arts Council is doing. Weaving its way through the text are the Arts Council's bland utterances massaging away the problems.

The kernel of the book is depicted by two items; Richard Hoggart's opulent description of the Charity Gala Night at Covent Garden and the open letter to Melvyn Bragg from the Federation of Workers, Writers and Community

Publishers, requesting for the 'n'th time a few thousand pounds, which concludes;

The working people of this country are the major contributors to the financing of the Arts. We ask that some of their money be used for them.

Mr. Hutchison has done a service by writing down what many people know or suspect. It is fascinating to have extra information on the Arts Council's origins; but knowing through the Independent Theatre Council so many people and small organisations whose livelihoods depend on the deliberations at 105 Piccadilly, I felt he still had not been able to come to grips with the Arts Council's decision-making process.

As Mr. Hutchison admits, the book is nothing like exhaustive. Perhaps the quoted 'usual mellow dusk' has fallen on his endeavours. Already, worthy noises are heard from the Director of the Arts Council, Sir Roy Shaw, on the book's publication.

Mr. Hutchison ought to get on with the other books he says need writing on Arts Council, especially the one suggested about the development and influence of the Council's policies on the various art forms.

EDWARD GRIST

THE TURIN SHROUD

Verdict on the Shroud; The definitive book, based on new evidence. Kenneth E. Stevenson and Gary R. Habermas. Robert Hale. £8.50.

It is impossible to review this book with any detachment, although the authors plea for exactly that. This is an attempt to prove to agnostics, nominal Christians and committed believers that the shroud in Turin is the one that covered Jesus and is absolute proof of the Resurrection. The initial tone in which they propose their arguments is one of unrelieved forbearance for the unbelievers, saintly tolerance towards the uncommitted and a hushed earnestness that is utterly intolerable.

Unfortunately for their case their methods of establishing the truth are no different from the legion of books in this genre: a lacuna is clarified by proposing the almost improbable as a supposition and to proceed from that supposition to a conclusion that confirms their theory. The least iota is seized upon in this effort. Any careful consideration of a suggestion that might go far to destroy their argument is left unmentioned or dismissed. If they and others truly believe that this relic is what they claim, and miraculous to boot, well and good.

But how did the image, in negative form, become so firmly imprinted into the fabric of the shroud after only three days and three nights of entombment? How did it survive the ravages of time for five centuries to emerge as the mandylion in ancient Edessa? In hiding another four centuries, word of it came from Constantinople where it had lain, folded in four so that it resembled Veronica's veil, yet the cloth had not cracked or rotted in the creases. Rescued by the Templars, of course, after the fall of Constantinople, it made its way to France following the suppression of the Order. In the fourteenth century it was touted as a holy relic, much disapproved of by the local clergy. At last it made its way in 1453 to the House of Savoy. The authors claim that proof of the authenticity of the cloth lies partly in the evidence of cotton in the threads and the pollens of Near Eastern provenance. Yet no indigenous seed-dust from France nor Northern Italy in over five hundred years' residence seems to have contaminated the shroud.

About one thing the authors are most assuredly right: the iconography and

the anatomical and historical details would be absolutely impossible for a late medieval forgery. But what assurance do we have that the cloth in Turin, having been seen, photographed and studied several times since 1898, is the same as the one given to the House of Savoy in 1453?

FELIX BRENNER

VICTORIAN INTELLECTUALS

The Transformation of Intellectual Life in Victorian England. T. W. Heyck. Croom Helen. £14.50.

The author of this book is a Professor at North Western University in Evanston, and he brings a transatlantic detachment to this study of the emergence in nineteenth-century Britain of an 'intellectual' class. It is a more valuable study than its title and impressive methodology suggest, since they give it a strongly academic flavour and structure; it is clearly thoroughly backed by massive reading and research. Its conclusions, however, go far beyond those methodically spelt out here. It is clear that the English class system—and it is much more an English than a Scottish phenomenon—is rooted less in the land and feudal values and the English love of a lord than in the strongly élitist features of English urban and intellectual life as it developed in the nineteenth century. Writers—hitherto gentlemen and men of leisure—came from many backgrounds, and now had a steadily expanding market for their books, essays and reviews. It became the fashion to scorn industry and its wealth, this urban poverty of manufacturing life and the dirtying of hands. A revolution was pushed through in Oxford and Cambridge so that a base and a haven became available for the scholar that was privileged and—until the 1900s—exclusive. And the new Universities, which might have been technical and scientific in their emphasis—as was originally intended and as many in Germany remained—were soon imitating Oxbridge. Professor Heyck's study throws fresh light on the origin of what is now a matter of urgent analysis: what is the rôle and purpose of University life when it is overwhelmingly publicly financed? And he is interesting on the development of 'professional' history, and on the importance of people like George Gissing and P. G. Hamerton. This is an unusual, a perceptive and a well-written study.

ESMOND WRIGHT

SHORTER REVIEWS

Hugh Gaitskell (Oxford University Press. Paperback. £5.95). Philip M. Williams' acclaimed biography of the British Labour Leader was first published in hardback in 1979. It is now published in an abridged version in Oxford Paperbacks. It is unfortunate that the author has had to abridge this edition, although the flow of narrative has been preserved and there are over 450 pages of text. The advantage of this edition is that it contains new material from Gaitskell's 'recently-discovered letters

to his mother in 1926-28', when he was at Oxford and Nottingham and during the General Strike in 1926.

The New Pelican Guide to English Literature (Penguin Books). This is designed in nine volumes as an enlarged and revised edition of the *Pelican Guide to English Literature* published in the 1950s, under the general editorship of Boris Ford. The two volumes now published are Vol. 5 *From Blake to Byron* (UK £2.75; USA \$5.95) and Vol. 6 *From Dickens*

to Hardy (UK £2.95; USA \$5.95). There is a brief General Introduction by the Editor, Boris Ford. The plan of each volume is 'to provide the reader with four kinds of related material', namely 'a survey of the social context of literature in each period', a literary survey 'describing the general character of the period's literature', 'detailed studies of some of the chief writers and works' and 'an appendix of essential facts for reference purposes'. Each subject has its own contributor. For example, D. W. Harding writes on William Blake and Shelley. Lionel Trilling discusses Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park* and Malcolm Bradbury *Emma*. Patrick Cruttwell covers Walter Scott and R. O. C. Winkler, Wordsworth's poetry. Keats and Byron are discussed by, respectively, William Walsh and J. D. Jump. In Volume 6, contributions include R. C. Churchill on 'the genius of Dickens', Robin Mayhead on Tennyson, Derek Travers on 'the Brontë Sisters and *Wuthering Heights*' and Matthew Arnold by J. D. Jump. Leo Salinger has a piece on Robert Browning. Among other articles are Gerard Manley Hopkins by F. N. Lees, George Eliot by Laurence Turner, while G. D. Klingopulos discusses 'Hardy's Tales Ancient and Modern'. These are useful volumes, particularly for the general reader who wants an introductory survey. This is not literary criticism in depth.

La Fontaine Selected Fables. (Penguin Books. U.K. £1.50; U.S.A. \$3.95. James Michie has translated this selection, which is now published in the Penguin Classics series, being first published by Allen Lane in 1979. It includes twenty-two fables, with an Introduction by Geoffrey Grigson. La Fontaine drew largely, of course, from Aesop's classical Greek fables. A larger selection would have been welcome in this volume.

Our Last First Poets: Vision and History in Contemporary American Poetry (University of Illinois Press. £9.57). This is a brilliant critical study by Cary Nelson of the American poets of the 1960s and 70s, with particular reference to the way in which the individual poets, such as Theodore Roethke, Galway Kinnell, Robert Duncan, Adrienne Rich and W. S. Merwin, reconciled the poetic vision with the political realities of America's involvement in the world struggle. The poets' disillusionment with idealism, their difficulty in keeping to a position of aesthetic detachment, and their effort to continue to believe in the place of poetry in modern society all contributed to the resurgence of 'open forms'—i.e. types of free verse. Cary Nelson's ongoing analysis of often dense and difficult imagery is masterful, and the development of his theme illuminates all poetry. (R.W.E.)

The Macmillan Dictionary of Biography (Macmillan. £6.95). The paperback edition of this useful reference volume will be welcome. Barry Jones and M. V. Dixon are responsible for bringing together within 854 pages biographical summaries of 7,000 men and women, drawn from every walk in life, in every age, throughout the world. Qualifications for entry range from the truly great to the notorious, including Jack the Ripper and the convicted murderer, John Reginald Halliday Christie. In the result, all entries are very short, and their value lies more in factual data than in critical assessment. Many entries have brief bibliographies, but these themselves are rarely sufficient for any sustained study. An example is the entry on the first Duke of Marlborough. There is no mention of Sir Winston Churchill's exhaustive and erudite four-volume *Marlborough, His Life and Times*.

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CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

117th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

DECEMBER 1982

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PIPELINE**

Gerald Frost

**WHITHER CHINESE
FOREIGN POLICY?**

Gerald Segal

**TO BURY BEVERIDGE
OR TO PRAISE HIM?**

Brynmor John, M.P.

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Incorporating The Fortnightly

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The October 1982 issue was numbered on the inside page as 1402 incorrectly, when it should have been 1401. Please correct accordingly. The November issue is numbered correctly as 1402.

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POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE SCARMAN REPORT

by K. P. Poole

PARLIAMENT is at arm's length from the provincial police. Local police authorities are not subject to general directions from the Home Secretary (though he has various powers of intervention), and as Mr. Henry Brooke explained in the debate on the second reading of the bill for the Police Act 1964 he is not directly responsible for the efficiency of provincial police forces. As will appear, the powers of local police authorities over their forces are also limited. An opportunity for Parliament to review how representatives of the community can exercise influence over police policy and administration may occur if as expected a Police Bill is introduced in the 1982-83 session—but probably not if the Government can help it. The main object of this article, therefore, is to consider provisions which are unlikely to appear in the Bill, and assess the propriety of their omission. The task is prompted by the *Scarman Report on the Disorders in Brixton in April 1981* (Cmnd. 8427).*

Lord Scarman's inquiry was carried out at the Home Secretary's request under Section 32 of the Police Act 1964, an Act which purported to clarify the relationship between chief constables and provincial police authorities and assimilate the county and borough position. Earlier, borough watch committees, as local police authorities, had claimed powers over chief constables similar to those exercised by other committees, powers limited only by particular legal provision and the dictates of administrative morality. The county police, administered by a standing joint committee comprising equal numbers of magistrates and county councillors, had both in law and practice enjoyed greater autonomy. The chairman of the county police authority and the chief constable may well have worn the same regimental ties, while the watch committee chairman may have had the borough chief constable in his pocket—or vice versa. This is of course no more than an impressionistic cameo, but it is fair to say that as a general rule shared unspoken assumptions provided the cement for

tranquil relationships. (Exceptionally the picture was marred. The disension in 1959 between Nottingham Watch Committee and the Chief Constable, Captain Athelstan Popkess, was one of a number of incidents¹ concerning chief constables that preceded the appointment, in 1960, of the Royal Commission on the Police.)

The 1964 Act did not substantially disturb existing relationships, but rather sought to place them within a defensible statutory framework, albeit one in which chief constables enjoyed an independence that granted them a privileged position by comparison with their local authority chief officer colleagues. Lord Scarman recited the statutory provisions in paragraphs 5.59 and 5.60 of his report. The chief constable has direction and control of the force. The police authority (a police committee comprising two-thirds county councillors, one-third magistrates) have the duty to maintain it, setting its size and equipping it, subject to the Home Secretary's approval. They select their chief constable and may retire him 'in the interests of efficiency'—in both cases again subject to the Home Secretary's approval. They may request reports from the chief constable on the policing of the area, but the chief constable may decline to supply information if he believes that to do so would be contrary to the public interest or that it is unnecessary for the discharge of the authority's functions. 'The scope of these exceptions is as obscure as the scope of those functions' wrote the constitutional lawyer, S. A. de Smith, and it is indeed odd on the fact of it that a chief constable should be in the position of determining the extent of his own accountability—that so far from having to take orders from his police authority he may even, if upheld by the Home Secretary, refuse them 'unnecessary' information. But according to Mr. A. W. Lyon, M.P., speaking in an adjournment debate on 5th April 1982, only once has a chief constable refused to make a report upon request—and he was not upheld by the Home Secretary. This statistic may be misleading: police authorities may have refrained from pressing requests in order to maintain working relationships.

Lord Scarman records (para 5.62) that the evidence he received was that

on the whole, the statutory machinery works well. But . . . many police authorities are somewhat uncertain of themselves and do not always exercise the firmness which the statute envisages as necessary to the discharge of the awesome responsibility to secure the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for their respective areas. I would remind them that section 4(1) of the Act makes it their *duty* to exercise for that purpose the powers conferred on them by the Act . . . the statutory provisions . . . do emphasise that the relevant principle is not independence [of chief constables] exclusive of responsibility but independence and accountability.

It is possible to argue that the powers of police authorities are wider than conventionally understood. The 1964 Act places the police force under the direction and control of the chief constable: about the direction and control of the chief constable himself it is silent. A military commander like a chief constable has 'direction and control' of his forces but how he uses them is a matter for government decision. The Police Act, however, gives police authorities the particular powers already men-

tioned, and the maxim of interpretation *expressio unius exclusio alterius* is restrictive. Certainly it seems unlikely that Lord Scarman was urging a generous interpretation of the law. In paragraph 4.59 he uses words to which no chief constable would be likely to take exception.

Neither politicians nor pressure groups nor anyone else may tell the police what decisions to take or what methods of employ, whether to enforce the law or not in a particular case, or how to investigate a particular offence. The exercise of police judgement has to be as independent as the exercise of professional judgement by a doctor or lawyer. If it is not, the way is open to manipulation and abuse of the law, whether for political or for private ends.

Although this passage does not appear to rule out decisions by police authorities on particular lines of policing policy, elsewhere (para 5.64) he recommends that chief officers of police should encourage police authorities to express views on their policies in order to maintain community support.

'Expressing views' is milk and water stuff, but it is probably as much as the law allows at present. Mr. Jack Straw, MP, introduced a bill in the 1979-80 session of Parliament which would have given police authorities power to settle policing policies, subject to appeal by the chief constable to the Home Secretary. The bill made no progress, but *prima facie* the proposal has merit² and in the House of Commons on 25th March 1982 Mr. Roy Hattersley spoke in the same vein. Not all the law can be enforced all the time, and when a decision has to be made whether, for example, to mount a drive against a particular type of offence which is becoming prevalent in a police area, it seems more in keeping with a representative system of government that it should be made by accountable laymen than by an official whose own judgement cannot be wholly value free (though there can be little doubt that chief constables genuinely believe in their own 'impartiality'). In practice, however, the attempt to draw a dividing line between general policy and day-to-day operations seems scarcely likely to succeed, and even if a form of words could be found it would probably provide a recipe for altercation between police authorities and chief constables who were already at arm's length.

It may appear surprising, nevertheless, that the associations of local authorities have failed to press a case for the extension of police authority powers. The Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) believe that 'elected members must have an effective say in the policing policies in their localities. . . A good relationship with chief constables is essential, and although the existing powers and duties of police authorities are wider than is often assumed to be the case, nevertheless there is a need to define more adequately the strategic responsibility of the police authority for the policing of its area'.³ 'Define more adequately' is less than a trumpet call, and the blood is scarcely stirred by a more recent recommendation that 'the present tripartite arrangement between the Home Secretary, the police authority and the chief constables should be reviewed as a matter of urgency';⁴ but the AMA's statements do gently echo the stronger claims of the (now defunct) borough police authorities. Non-metropolitan county police authorities, though now drawn more

closely into the county administration than the pre-1964 standing joint committees, generally lack ambition to disturb the status quo. They inherit a different tradition and, predominantly conservative in composition at most times, not disposed to associate enhanced police authority powers with the introduction of left-wing politics into police administration. Lord Scarman's proposal for statutory change was, it might seem, modest.

Police committees would, I believe, act more vigorously and with greater confidence if, instead of a power of uncertain extent (as under the existing law) there were imposed on them (and upon chief officers of police) a statutory duty to co-operate in the establishment and supervision of liaison committees, or other consultative machinery, at police divisional and sub-divisional levels (para 5.65).

The Home Secretary has tip-toed around this recommendation. In a debate in the House of Commons on 10th December 1981 he declared that he had 'not ruled it out' and equally negatively that he did not regard the establishment of local liaison committees as 'irrelevant to the policing of crime in this country'. In October 1982 he was still equivocating. In the interim circumstantial reports in *The Times* and elsewhere on 21st January forecast statutory provision to govern consultative requirements, but the kite was flying the other way by 6th May and no mention of forthcoming legislation was contained in the Home Office circular commending local consultative arrangements between the community and the police which was sent to police authorities, chief constables and others on 16th June. Lord Scarman's proposal gained support from the AMA⁵ and Mr. Alderson but was opposed by the Association of County Councils⁶ and Mr. Anderton and by the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (according to Mr. Alderson, but unconfirmed). An article by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner in *The Times* on 3rd December and the Leicestershire Chief Constable's evidence to the Race and Immigration sub-committee of the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (1981-82 HC 106), both unsympathetic, may have been representative of the police view.

It will take a brave Home Secretary to override professional opinion, but the profession is under something of a cloud, and he may yet persuade himself to do so. The closing paragraph of the circular reminds police authorities that he already has powers to 'lean on' them to secure his policy objectives but Lord Scarman plainly believed these powers to be inadequate. The pros and cons of creating a specific statutory duty to consult local communities about policing problems and methods are nicely balanced. If drawn in general terms it might fail to rise above the level of aspiration, but if spelt out in detail it would be inapt to meet the great variety of local circumstances recognised in the circular. However phrased it might prove empty of results or at worst provide a forum for confrontation rather than co-operation. Community activists do not necessarily represent a community. To the extent that consultation proved productive it would render emptier still the role of police authorities as outlined above. Goodwill, it may be thought, cannot be legislated for; but

this seeming platitude does not do justice to Lord Scarman's belief that a statutory corset is necessary to support the maintenance of consultation in time of stress; and it has been observed that institutions and procedures can engender, as well as reflect, attitudes of mind.

The optimist may conclude that all that is needed to alert chief constables to the need to keep in touch with local opinion is for police authorities to take to heart paragraph 5.62 of the Scarman Report quoted above, and for chief constables themselves to note the passage in paragraph 4.73: 'the proposition that [consultation] interferes, or may undermine, independence of judgement is a *non-sequitur*; for consultation informs judgement: it does not pre-empt it'. And perhaps too much should not be made of differences between chief constables and police authorities which have come to the surface only in a few urban areas. The President of the Police Superintendents' Association was reported in *The Times* on 22nd September 1981 as estimating that 35 out of 43 police authorities in England and Wales were not 'posing any problems'. An alternative interpretation is that at least some of those 35 authorities fail to act as effective sounding boards for local opinion. When Lord Allen of Abbeydale, a former Home Office Permanent Under-Secretary of State, asked in a debate in the House of Lords on 13th April 1981 whether police authorities did in fact play this role, the reply given by the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Lord Belstead, was somewhat evasive. And the separate question whether county councillors take advantage of their powers under section 11 of the Police Act to question police committee chairmen about the policing of the county area was not raised at all. But in any case it may be that the value of sounding boards is overstressed: they may serve only to magnify differences of opinion.

Are there alternative structural or institutional changes that might enhance local police administration, balancing the professional and representative elements? A passing reference may here be made to the position in the metropolis, where the police authority is the Home Secretary and local elected representatives play no formal part; or as Lord Belstead put it in the April 1981 debate 'people living in the metropolis have the good fortune . . . to have their police authority directly represented in parliament'. The present Greater London Council take a different view, have established their own non-statutory police committee (the *vires* of which must interest their legal advisers) and have contemplated promoting legislation to create an elected and influential police authority in London. The Labour party and the AMA also seek some democratisation of Metropolitan Police administration. Lord Scarman (paragraph 5.68) adopted the traditional Home Office view—there were good reasons for the national accountability of the Metropolitan Police and Parliament was unlikely to agree to a change. (The reasons usually stated are that policing a capital city involves special tasks—in particular protection of the seat of Government and the diplomatic community.) But he thought the police might be tempted to ignore local opinion because of the absence of local involvement in police

administration (paragraph 5.67). Consistently therefore with his proposals for the provinces he recommended (paragraph 5.69) a statutory framework for consultation between the Metropolitan Police and the councils at borough or police district level and (paragraph 5.70) saw a case for an advisory board or other consultative arrangement between the Home Office, the Commissioner and the London boroughs on policing the metropolitan area as a whole. Recent shortcomings in the Metropolitan Police may add weight to the case for an administrative shakeup. Reference to the Greater London Council is noticeably absent from Lord Scarman's recommendation.

Other possible institutional changes can be contemplated. To protect policing from the play of party politics (a not uncontroversial aim) the precedent of an intermediate body, on the analogy of a passenger transport executive, suggests itself—at least until policies actually adopted by passenger transport executives come to mind. A suggestion with contrary implications is that the quota of appointed magistrates should be removed from police committees. This is the view of the AMA (pre-1964 borough watch committees were comprised exclusively of aldermen and councillors) and the presence of magistrates was put to Lord Scarman (who declined to comment) as an imperfection in the system of accountability (para 5.63). Their removal would certainly rectify a glaring breach of the separation of powers (the temptation must exist for magistrates on the bench to give the benefit of the doubt to members of 'their' police force), but could scarcely be expected to do anything to bring police authority and chief constable closer together.

Yet another proposal, associated with Mr. Anderton, who is concerned about the existence of party-motivated police authorities, is their substitution by 'non-political' regional police boards. It is not difficult to envisage operational advantages in larger-scale police forces and, at least in principle, to reconcile their existence with the development of consultative machinery at community level which Lord Scarman advocated. The questions arise who is to appoint the boards; how non-political persons are to be found and to whom they are to be accountable (on the assumption that they are not to be elected). 'Gone are the days', wrote Mr. Anderton⁷ 'when chief constables could look confidently [to local councillors] for unqualified encouragement'. A non-political board he may thus seem to define as one that offers unqualified encouragement to the chief constable. As such its usefulness might seem in doubt, especially to a quangicide Administration. But a non-political board need not necessarily be packed with sycophants; and though it may not be possible to find entirely satisfactory answers to the questions posed, independently-minded regional boards, if empowered to 'open up' police administration⁸ within their areas, might yet offer a balance of advantage over local police authorities in their present form.

Lord Scarman makes no reference to the possible invention of a police ombudsman, again presumably because the idea is outside his terms of reference (though he had something to say about the investigation of

complaints against the police—on which there is no need to comment here). In any case the provision of an ombudsman with the limited powers enjoyed by existing holders of that post would be marginal to the central issue of control and accountability. An ombudsman operating within a more active system of administrative law might have a more significant role to play, as will presently be suggested.

There may be little to be achieved, it is submitted, by tinkering with the formal balance of powers as between police authority and chief constable or legislating for procedural improvement in the relationship. Where, exceptionally, chief constables exhibit the arrogance and idiosyncracies of *prima donnas* in uniform, and laymen cannot understand, or do not admit, that there are competing values that need to be reconciled in most decision-making, the two components will never fuse into a perfect instrument for maintaining the fabric of society—for keeping the peace in a manner even-handed and acceptable to the local community. Too much reliance has perhaps been placed on political accountability. The question arises whether the courts, by judicial review, cannot set precedents which would help to establish the boundaries of reasonableness in the conduct of police operations. Lord Denning's pronouncement in *R. v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn*, [1968] 1 All E.R.763, that the chief constable is 'not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself' was somewhat oracular, even though accompanied by the opinion that the courts can indeed grant *mandamus* against a chief constable if he fails to do his duty. But what his duty is under given circumstances is the point at issue, and the courts have been reluctant to intervene in operational discretion—a recent example being *R. v The Chief Constable of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary*, [1981] 3 All E.R.826, when the Central Electricity Generating Board were denied an order of *mandamus* requiring the police to evict demonstrators from a Cornish farm.

It is possible, however, to imagine the courts playing a more active role. The Law Commission, Justice and the Society of Conservative Lawyers have all pressed for an extended code of administrative law and the institutions to make it operative. So far they have been rewarded only by a valuable, but minimal, change in the rules of the Supreme Court. An ombudsman acting as Officer of the Court with power, of his own initiative, to refer *prima facie* unreasonable and therefore *ultra vires* behaviour by police authorities or chief constables could be expected to provide a bracing context for the execution of their functions, and the court's decisions to build up a useful body of precedent. An ombudsman so empowered might impinge upon the *parens patriae* obligations of the Attorney-General, but the time is ripe to pick over the disparate and little-investigated powers of that panjandrum and perhaps narrow the range of his responsibilities.⁹

It is often argued that the courts ought not to be involved in policy decisions. But the contention is not that they should substitute their conclusions for those of the prescribed decision-takers; rather that they

should, more modestly, act as guardians of reasonable behaviour. This is a familiar role, even if it is naive to deny that the courts are a repository of 'establishment' values. If taking politics out of policy-making is not a contradiction in terms the judges seem to be the best recourse to this end. Their conclusions would not be beyond dispute—even reasonable men may disagree over the boundaries of what is reasonable—but at least they could provide a measure of detachment.

NOTES:

1. See (e.g.) T. A. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales* (London: Constable, second edition 1978) p. 270; G. Marshall, *Police and Government* (London: Methuen 1965) p. 10.
2. Mr. John Alderson, until recently Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, is sympathetic in principle to extending the powers of police authorities subject to the approval of the Home Secretary in particular cases. Mr. James Anderton, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, is not. Their contrasting opinions on 'community policing' and other matters have received wide publicity. See (e.g.) Mr. Alderson's Child and Company lecture 'The Police—Where Now?' given in the Inns of Court School of Law on 18th March 1982 and Mr. Anderton's second Lord Hewlett memorial lecture 'The Reality of Community Policing', 12th March 1982.
3. *Municipal Review*, February 1982.
4. Report of the Working Party on Accountability (*Municipal Review*, July 1982).
5. *Municipal Review*, July 1982.
6. See ACC evidence to the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, (1981-82 (HC 98-vii)).
7. In the lecture mentioned in note 2.
8. See G. Marshall's reference to accountability of the 'explanatory and co-operative' mode in his chapter entitled Police Accountability Revisited in D. Butler and A. H. Halsey, *Policy and Politics* (London: Macmillan 1978).
9. See P. Archer, *The Role of the Law Officers* (London: Fabian Society 1978).

*The Brixton Disorders April 10-12 1981. Report of an Enquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Scarman, OBE. (HMSO £8.36).

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BRITAIN AND THE PIPELINE

by Gerald Frost

EXPLAINING why European governments have ordered the companies participating in the construction of the Yamal pipeline to defy President Reagan's economic sanctions, Mr. Francis Pym, the British Foreign Secretary, told a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in New York, '... there must be links between the two halves of Europe—political, economic and cultural. We are convinced that as long as those exchanges and contacts are on a reciprocal basis we have nothing to lose and much to gain'. There is nothing in the Prime Minister's occasional remarks on the nature of Soviet totalitarianism which suggests that she agrees with those sentiments; her widely reported sense of outrage at the President's action stems from different factors. She is evidently concerned with the possible effect on British trade and jobs, and the electoral consequences of supporting her major ally in this instance. Her claims and those of her Ministers that American sanctions violated the sanctity of contract and therefore threatened the whole basis of international trading relations did not one suspects weigh heavily with her—and not only because those claims are very feebly based.

Nevertheless, while the Prime Minister may not share the views of her Foreign Secretary on relations with the Soviet bloc, a great many others do, including a large number of MPs on both sides of the House, a majority of European MPs and most of the European Heads of State. Those views are a reflection of what has now come to be called European foreign policy, the broad outlines of which were spelt out in Mr. Pym's speech. It is important to recognise that the pipeline is very largely a result of that policy since, without a consensus on a range of issues among European leaders, it would never have been built. The pipeline, it is clear, is a creature of government, not the market place, the product of Western European subsidies, export credits and guarantees. Indeed, the Soviet achievement is that it has contributed relatively little to the project.

Though no prose stylist, Mr. Pym's remarks (echoing the even more aggressive comments of Sir Roy Denman, the EEC Ambassador to Washington, a few days earlier) therefore merit close attention. In them we can obtain a glimpse of many of the factors which will determine future relations between America, Europe and the Soviet Union. For those who dreamt for decades of a truly independent European foreign policy, joy will leap unconfined—although how durable the joy and the independence will turn out to be is another matter. For those who, to use Malcolm Muggeridge's phrase, believe that for all its blemishes America is the only possible mainstay of freedom in the latter part of this century, it is a frightening glimpse.

The principal source for anxiety is Mr. Pym's assertion that there are no risks entailed in entering into trade deals with the Soviet Union. Even

if it transpires that those risks are worth taking, a number of things are clearly at stake in the case of the pipeline construction.

First and foremost the Western Alliance, the bulwark against Soviet expansion in Europe, has had fresh injuries inflicted upon it and may now be doomed. Second, a great deal of money may also be lost since the Soviets are to pay for the construction of the 3,600 mile pipeline with pre-determined quantities of gas at above the market prices at a time when demand for gas is falling and supplies increasing. There is also the danger to which many have pointed—that the Soviet union might threaten to cut off these supplies as a means of blackmailing western Europe.

In his speech Mr. Pym made it clear that he regarded such fears as being pretty naive. Those who knew their way around the chancelleries of Europe had weighed up the pros and cons very carefully and had concluded that even after the pipeline's completion energy dependency upon the Soviet Union would not be sufficient to provide the Soviet leadership with a credible instrument of blackmail. In any case, it would be against the Soviet Union's own interests to act in this way since few countries would subsequently wish to enter trading relations with the Soviet bloc. Mr. Pym's idea of what constitutes a credible weapon of blackmail may of course vary from that of you or me. More importantly it may vary from that of the Soviet Union. While it is true that West Europe's dependency on the Soviet gas will be small in proportion in relation to total energy consumption, Italy will be dependent upon it for 30 per cent of its natural gas supplies, France for 35 per cent and West Germany for 38 per cent. In some areas of France and Germany the degree of dependency will be considerably greater. Moreover one would have to be truly gullible to suppose that the Soviet Union would necessarily use the threat to cut off supplies in isolation from the very considerable economic, military and economic pressures which it could apply as a means of influencing or 'Findlandising' the European democracies. Indeed the Soviet Union has a whole arsenal of blackmail weapons at its disposal to which the pipeline may be regarded as a powerful supplement.

The suggestion that the Soviet Union would never jeopardise its prospects of Western trade with other countries in the interests of ideological or strategic interests is plainly absurd. In the Soviet Union economic interests are customarily subordinated to those interests. If economic factors were paramount the Soviet leaders would feel obliged to liberalise their economy and to reduce the extraordinary high proportion of national product devoted to defence: they clearly intend no such thing.

The Soviet Union retains an expansionist ideology—an ideology which cannot permit the liberalisation which economic interests predicate. It has been said that the Church of England would be willing to give up thirty-eight of its thirty-nine articles rather than one part of its income. The priorities of the Soviet Union being rather less easy going than the C. of E., are quite the other way around: it would rather jeopardise its economic interests than sacrifice one element of its credo. In any event, the claims that the Soviet Union has no 'past form' in employing economic

blackmail—a frequent assertion by those in favour of the pipeline—is simply untrue. I am grateful to my friend, John O'Sullivan, the *Daily Telegraph* columnist and Editor of the Washington based quarterly, *Policy Review*, for listing eight occasions when the Soviet cut off or threatened to cut off energy supplies. Those occasions were: in 1948 against Yugoslavia, in 1961 to Albania, in 1956 against Israel and Hungary, in 1962 to China, in 1968 against Czechoslovakia, in 1980 when the USSR threatened Europe and Japan if they supported United States sanctions over Afghanistan (which they failed to do), and finally last year when it threatened to cut off Poland's oil supply unless Solidarity were crushed. It should also be borne in mind that the Soviet leadership can ensure that it remains largely immune from any economic hardship which results from such measures.

There are other risks which the West takes when it trades with the Soviets. The first lies in the largely unrestricted flow of technology. Authoritative studies show conclusively that while the Soviets are very good indeed at pure science they are very poor indeed at applying it. One such study—by Anthony Sutton of the Hoover Institute—showed that 95 per cent of Soviet technology was based on Western technology. Soviet advances in space borne technology—now being developed for military purposes—and recent breakthroughs in missile systems depended crucially on technology transfer.

Finally, there are the strategic and geopolitical risks resulting from increasing trade with the Soviets at a time when the principal members of the Western alliance has decided that it will no longer permit its partners to compensate for the economic failings of its major enemy.

The pipeline controversy has not of course produced the present rifts and splits within the Western Alliance; it has merely reflected different interests and perceptions. But for many Americans it may be the breaking point. The policies of American isolationism have been gaining momentum for several years; this process is now rapidly and frighteningly accelerating. Giving European defiance of US pipeline sanctions as a reason the US Senate Appropriations defence sub-committee voted on September 23—by 12 to one—to reduce US troops strength in Europe by 23,000. Some American politicians clearly see this as the first step in the full scale withdrawal from the European continent; others, as a warning shot to wayward allies. This latter group has obviously been disappointed: the senate committee decision went strangely unreported by the European media and has had no detectable impact on European opinion.

It would seem therefore that Mr. Pym's claim that there is nothing to lose in trading with the Soviets is highly contentious—a phrase which curiously enough he used to describe the rationale behind US sanctions. There is a great deal to lose: the Alliance upon which we still depend for our security and ultimately our liberty, property and lives, as well as a considerable amount of money. Mr. Pym's related claim—that there is much to *gain* from trade with the Warsaw Pact Nations—is equally contentious. Free trade is mutually beneficial by nature. Unless other

parties to a deal see some advantage to themselves it will not take place. But trade between the Soviet bloc and the West is not free and cannot be so because of the command structure of the Soviet economy and because of the strict political criteria to which it must conform. Moreover, because of the widely held view that trade will help 'civilise' the Soviet Union, Western governments have gone out of their way to facilitate it, either through subsidies, cheap loans or by export guarantees. Like Mr. Pym, Dr. Kissinger once believed that increased US-Soviet trade would help to establish 'a web of constructive relationships' that would give the Soviet Union a stake in peace by making it more conscious of what it would lose by a return to confrontation. Dr. Kissinger has since changed his mind.

There is very little in the history of the last two decades to suggest that trade or cultural exchanges—again quite unequal in scope and character—have had the predicted effect. The rapid growth of theatre nuclear weapons targetted at Europe, the ruthless crushing of the Czech and Polish attempts at liberalisation, the invasion of Afghanistan and the use of proxy forces in Africa, South America and Cambodia, have all occurred during the present era of increased trade between Europe and the Soviet Union.

Since the Soviet Union has not behaved better in its external relations, perhaps Mr. Pym has other benefits in mind. In the case of the pipeline, his colleague, the Trade Secretary, Lord Cockfield, points to the jobs which has been created at John Brown. But one strongly recalls that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 'drys' have always argued that jobs cannot be created in aggregate by the use of subsidies. This is because subsidies inevitably have to be paid for out of general taxation and resultant loss in aggregate spending power is bound to destroy unidentifiable jobs elsewhere in the economy. Thus, to create a job for Peter is to destroy the job of Paul as well as to cause much economic dislocation. It may be argued of course that a bit of phoney job creation is still necessary—because people simply do not understand that the government does not possess the ability to create jobs, having frequently been told the opposite by neo-Keynsian economists. If government does not seek to do the impossible in this respect, public opinion will be outraged, or so the argument runs. Social cohesion will dissolve and the incumbent government will not be re-elected. However, if there is any merit in this argument, it does not of course follow that we should subsidise Soviet construction projects. After all, we have our own economic wastelands in which to invest. Why destroy Paul's job in order to create one for Ivan? Moreover, as we have recently learned, Ivan is quite likely to be a political detainee or a prisoner of conscience who is being forced to provide slave labour in conditions which are brutal beyond belief—thanks of course to the largesse of the Western taxpayer and politicians such as Mr. Pym who believe that Western trade has a civilising influence upon the Soviet Union.

Similar arguments apply to the claim that Soviet bloc trade can provide

a stimulus to jolt the Western economies out of recession. Professor Peter Bauer, the noted critic of Third World aid, has denied that we benefit from such wealth transfers because the recipients spend some of the money on Western purchases. It is, he says, rather like arguing that a shop-keeper whose premises are robbed on Monday receives a net benefit if the robber returns on Tuesday to spend the proceeds of his crime. Much the same objection can be advanced against those who favour stimulating the European economies by way of Siberia. Thus, the benefits of trading with the Soviets are very difficult to discover.

As for the argument that the American sanctions undermine the basis of trading relations because they violate the sanctity of contract, it is difficult to take this seriously. The principle that contracts must be honoured is an important one in ordinary circumstances, although few presumably would wish to say that it is one that should take priority over all other considerations. If the year were 1938 rather than 1982 and the pipeline in Germany not Siberia, should we maintain that contracts between British companies and the Nazi government must remain inviolate?

But even if one decides—perversely in my view—that the principle of contract is more important than strategic imperatives it is still not clear that the Europeans are in the right. In ordering their respective General Electric licensees not to ship equipment to Russia, the French and British governments invoke the principle of extra territoriality. They claimed in effect that America was trying to extend US law to Europe, but as the *Wall Street Journal* recently pointed out, both John Brown Ltd. and Alsthom Atlantique, the newly nationalised French concern, signed contracts which said that they should not bridge US export control rules. The contracts which they signed state that the 1949 US Export Act, which Mr. Reagan was later to invoke on foreign policy grounds, must be observed. President Mitterand and Mrs. Thatcher have since ordered their companies to breach those contracts. Although the matter is still being contested, it would seem that a very good cause can be made for saying that it is the French and British Governments rather than the US administration which currently presents the major threat to the sanctity of contract.

It may be objected that, legalities apart, the US should not attempt to tell Western Europe where its interests lie. It may urge, advise, consult, request, but it may not instruct. Such sentiments come ill from politicians who in some instances complain that the Carter presidency had failed to provide clear leadership. Moreover, it is also claimed by State Department officials that consultation with America's allies over the price to be imposed on the Soviet Union following the Jaruzelski coup was quite exceptionally detailed and extensive but, despite this, European co-operation was simply not forthcoming. Given that military responses to the Polish crisis had to be ruled out for political and strategic reasons, only economic sanctions remained. The record of the last year suggests that even in this respect European Heads of State were not prepared to

follow any initiative which either imposed a significant economic cost to themselves or a significant economic penalty upon the Soviet Union. Inevitably some Americans have concluded, perhaps rightly, that majority opinion among the political leaders of Europe is that it is better to have two super powers as friends than one and that this is a possible and desirable basis for a united European foreign policy. That is precisely the conclusion which a great many Americans will have drawn from Mr. Pym's speech.

An alternative interpretation is that Britain is currently seeking to act as middle man in the current dispute between Europe and America. Such a role would create the opportunities and scope for the British Foreign Office whose capacity for studied ambivalence is unsurpassed. It is also one that might appeal in some respects to the Prime Minister. Following the departure from high office of Herr Schmidt, Mrs. Thatcher is the foremost European Head of State, having proved her worth during the Falklands crisis in terms which are universally recognised. The role of 'middle man' would confirm her as an indispensable figure on the world stage. It is devoutly to be hoped that she feels no such temptation.

The gulf between current American and European positions is unbridgable without significant concessions by one or the other. There can be no easy compromise between those who believe that the Soviet Union can be appeased and those who believe it should be forced to pay a price for its aggression, between supporters of an independent European policy and the advocates of strong US leadership of the Alliance, between those who think it is possible to liberalise the Soviet Union through subsidised trade and those who believe that such exchanges only tend to enhance the Soviet Union's military capacity while confirming its impressions of Western gullibility. Hard choices are therefore unavoidable; it is to be hoped that Mrs. Thatcher makes them wisely.

No less daunting is the President's predicament. He has to decide whether the Alliance is more likely to be saved by concessions to the Allies—such as the just pronounced ending of pipeline sanctions—or by pressures to persuade Europe to take a tougher line in its dealings with the Soviets. Until his change of heart it might be said that the President was being cruel to be kind. It is to be hoped that his new policy of unequivocal kindness will not prove fatal.

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WHITHER CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY?

by Gerald Segal

MAO Zedong—the Great Helmsman as he was called in China—was said to have kept a firm guiding hand on China's ship of state. Sailing the choppy waters of international relations could never have been an easy task, but it was made all the more dangerous for China's need to avoid wrecking on the Scylla of the Soviet superpower, or on the Charybdis of United States power. Mao often claimed to have a detailed navigation chart for these voyages, but both he and his trusty first mate, Premier Zhou Enlai, often seemed to hurriedly return to the desk drawer in search of yet another chart. The resulting shifts in direction on rough waters often left Chinese, as well as foreign observers, distinctly seasick. But it is now nearly seven years since Mao's and Zhou's death in 1976, and there is still little evidence that the suitable foreign policy charts have been located or a calm course set. Should we persist in seeking a pattern for Chinese policy, or should we settle for the more normal great power tendency to be pragmatic and flexible?

This habit of claiming to have a coherent policy until the last moment when it was changed for another supposedly coherent policy, is fairly typical for most great powers, and indeed it is fairly typical for past Chinese foreign policy. Supposedly coherent world views were often little more than rhetoric. Students of Beijing's foreign relations often suggest that traditional China held a simplified Sino-centric world view which placed China and its emperor at the top of a pyramid of power. China's supposed superiority meant that no state system of equal political entities could be accepted.¹ But while China may indeed have maintained such a world view, it could rarely have confidence in its accuracy. Certainly the outside world never accepted such Sino-centrism.

However, these Chinese delusions were relatively unimportant when imperial China faced no urgent pressure from the outside world. To be sure there were invasions of China, but the invaders soon found themselves swallowed up by the dominant Han culture. At the same time, the challenge of Western power, bringing with it at least an equally developed civilisation, posed problems that China was not allowed to ignore or avoid by delusion. By force of arms, and by making use of internal Chinese decay, Western ideas of foreign policy were forced upon the Chinese. The state system, competing nation-states, and the coming of Marxism-Leninism to China, led to China's rapid inclusion into an international system it had long shunned.

Beijing's entry into the established system was neither accompanied by any coherent perception of the world, nor even a coherent misperception. Indeed it can be argued that China still has not found this coherence of outlook. Of course there have been phases of supposed confident uniformity in Beijing's policy, but none has stood up to the test of international relations' complex and changing reality.² From 1949 there

were seven years of confidence in the Soviet alliance, followed by seven years of slide to the Sino-Soviet split. The next seven years from 1963 found China taking on both superpowers. In the last decade Beijing has leaned more towards the United States against a perceived Soviet threat, but China has rarely been satisfied with this policy line. Leadership debates on foreign and domestic policy continued sporadically, from Lin Biao in 1971, through the anti-Confucious campaign of the mid-1970s, to the anti-Deng Xiaoping and later anti-Gang of Four campaigns of 1976-78. More recently even Chairman Hua Guofeng tumbled from power and foreign policy issues are still debated, albeit in veiled fashion in the Chinese press.³ Thus China, like other great powers, faces a complex future. Where has its foreign policy been in the past seven years since Mao's death, and do the next seven years appear likely to be lean or fat? Unlike the biblical Joseph, no ability to predict the future can be claimed. But an analysis of the post-Mao era does make plain the uncertain and even changing nature of contemporary Chinese foreign policy.

No aspect of foreign policy is as crucial to China as its relations with the Soviet Union. This enduring reality stems in large measure from the facts of geography—a long and relatively unpopulated frontier. It is reinforced by the facts of history—a long and disturbing history of invasion and instability. It is further aggravated by the facts of ideology—a supposedly common belief system in Marxism-Leninism over which both China and the Soviet Union claim true inheritance. Finally, the reality is kept ever present by contemporary military power—the deployment of at least 50 divisions of troops on either side of the frontier.

In the light of these unpleasant realities, it is amazing in retrospect that anyone, let alone three American administrations, could have seen the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s as anything but a temporary aberration. But since it is undoubtedly easier to hold a simple image rather than accept the complex grey tinges round the edges, so it was always easy for the United States to misperceive firm Sino-Soviet unity. A similar, and perhaps opposite misperception is to see Moscow-Beijing relations as necessarily locked in enmity.

Sino-Soviet relations have regularly been the topic of debate in China.⁴ Since Mao's death in 1976, China watchers have claimed to see even more debates, often hidden between esoteric communication.⁵ The thrust of the argument by some groups in China seems to be that the fierce rivalry with Moscow does not serve Beijing's interests. While the Soviet Union remains a crucial power to be closely watched, it is more a potential than an imminent threat. Moscow is said to be over-extended around the world and in deep trouble at home. It is supposedly incapable of controlling unruly Poles or Afghans, let alone pressuring western Europe or swallowing a bit of China. These voices of change in Beijing also point to the perils of mortgaging Chinese policy with other powers, especially the United States, to the obsessive desire to build an anti-Soviet coalition.

It would be misleading to label these Chinese voices as 'pro-Soviet', for they certainly are under no illusion about China's need to remain

vigilant. But they do see some limited benefits in a modicum of Sino-Soviet detente. Indeed it can be argued that such detente is already underway. Whether in response to recent Soviet overtures to China, or merely a decision to test gingerly the once icy waters of Sino-Soviet relations, Beijing has clearly taken some steps to improve relations with Moscow.⁶ Sporting teams have been exchanged—conjuring images of previous 'ping-pong diplomacy'. Trade delegations have been sent—suggesting a return to at least more normal and natural cross border exchanges.

Those skilled at reading both Chinese and Russian tea leaves are increasingly confident that some moderation in Sino-Soviet relations is already underway. The doubters of course still exist, and some will no doubt never be appeased. After all, there are those who to this day claim that the Sino-Soviet split was a communist ruse. No doubt there will be those who will persist in rejecting any notion of Chinese detente with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, to a certain extent such scepticism is healthy.

China insists that the Soviet Union must take concrete action to prove its sincerity in inter-communist detente. They have a point. In the early days of Sino-American detente, Washington 'proved' its intent by withdrawing the 7th Fleet from the Taiwan straits. Similarly, the Soviet Union could achieve a great deal by at least symbolically withdrawing some troops from the Xinjiang front. No large scale reduction in either Chinese or Soviet forces along the frontier is likely. Both sides rightly remain wary of their exposed positions and unlike the Soviet Union's western frontier, their troops in the east are relatively thin on the vast open ground.

China could not hope for much more than symbolic withdrawals of troops from the frontier. Successful border talks might follow, but the dispute is in fact more political than territorial. What China wants is an admission of the inequality of earlier border pacts, but no change of the status quo. Such progress is possible, but only in a much improved political climate. There are few signs that the weather will change that dramatically. Neither is there much confidence that the modicum of detente will mean major troop reductions. China's burden of military spending will remain high, but less lofty than it would have to be if expensive modernisation was deemed crucial in the face of an imminent Soviet threat. Thus a modicum of detente is possible, and is in fact already underway in limited degrees. Further progress hinges on Soviet gestures and Chinese broadmindedness.

You might not know it from reading some Western journalists and academics ecstatic articles on Sino-American relations, but China has never looked on the United States as favourably as it did the Soviet Union in the 1950s. China undoubtedly had, and still has, delusions about United States foreign policy, but it has not perceived Washington as anything but a temporary and tacit ally. Beijing's detente with the United States was based on an appreciation of growing Soviet power

and declining American power. So long as the United States could be coaxed into containing Soviet strength, then Washington served a useful purpose.

Already by the time of Mao's death it was clear in Beijing that the rapprochement with the United States was rooted in marshy ground. Chinese ethnocentrism led Beijing to assume the United States would do almost anything as long as it was anti-Soviet. China neither understood the basic dilemmas of US foreign policy—the need both to compete and coexist with Moscow—nor did it understand the basic complexities of US domestic politics which produced public policy debates and electioneering. Washington's semantic games between Ford/Kissinger and Carter on the word 'detente' in the 1976 election campaign ensured that the leader who succeeded Mao in the same year would see the United States as an uncertain partner in anti-Sovietism.

If the Carter presidency was enigmatic to westerners, it was downright mystifying to the Chinese. Normalisation of Sino-American relations in 1978 was balanced by the much detested SALT pact. But matters were to get worse, not better with the Reagan victory in 1980. Despite an almost harder anti-Soviet line than that espoused in Beijing, Reagan seemed to China as a step backward from the Carter era of normalisation. Nowhere was this more evident than in the strong Reagan support for Taiwan. To date, the American president has done nothing to placate Chinese concerns. The August 1982 Sino-American statement on arms sales to Taiwan was a bit of meaningless diplomatic verbiage that pleased no-one. Nor could the agreement be claimed to have been as expedient as the 1972 Shanghai Communique which allowed cracks to be papered over while progress was made in other realms.

The problem with China's continuing inability to fathom United States policy lies in Beijing's lack of appreciation of the American ideological and political system. Reagan's hard line on the Soviet Union is applauded in China, but the Chinese remain concerned with grain sales to the Soviet Union, START, and above all American arms sales to Taiwan. United States foreign policy interests remain different from those of China in many important respects. Reagan, as with previous US presidents, must live with Soviet power, appease western allies and above all mollify domestic political extremes. It may have taken a while, and China may not yet have fully understood why the United States acts the way it does, but China seems to show signs of giving up hope of signing on the United States as a staunch ally in the Chinese definition of anti-Sovietism. The problems in Sino-American relations are neither short-term, nor bound exclusively to the Taiwan issue. United States interests are those of a superpower with a continuing desire to be active and strong in Asia. Bases in Japan and the Philippines and interests in Korea, Southeast Asia and the Pacific basin are not tied to the Taiwan question.⁷ Nor can the United States as a superpower, with responsibilities for avoiding a nuclear holocaust, afford to play Chinese games of anti-Sovietism.

Coupled with a modicum of Sino-Soviet detente, China is therefore moving to greater equidistance between the superpowers. In the more crucial Asian arena the Soviet Union will remain a greater concern for Beijing. But elsewhere, for example in the Middle East or Central America, United States power will likely be the focus of Chinese disapproval. The United States can of course continue to trade in important goods with China, but Chinese delusions about the role of United States power are slowly giving way to a less pretentious pragmatism.

In the 1960s era of 'two-fronted' opposition to both superpowers, China claimed that while it was a member of the third world opposing the first world of the superpowers, there was a second world of developed western states that could also help fight United States and Soviet power. This second world dimension of Mao's 'theory of three worlds' was always the more outrageous component of an already peculiar doctrine. In the 1960s the west Europeans, Canada and Japan never forged any important links with China and only after Sino-American detente was there a brief flurry of interest that China would after all tap the second world. But once again the Chinese dream was a delusion.

This so-called second world is not only an incoherent grouping, but more importantly it was even less likely than the United States to play silly Chinese anti-Soviet games. The second world states did become interested in the potentials of economic relations with China, but the Deng Xiaoping economic reforms were soon found to be unworkable and above all too costly. The second world also saw Chinese delegations hurrying from factories and military bases, but in the end turning out to be nothing but voyeurs—gawking but not buying.⁸

More importantly, the second world was even less likely than the United States to be interested in crude-anti-Sovietism. After all, it was precisely these states that were trying to cool American ardour in imposing sanctions on the Soviet Union, whether it be of the born-again Carter type after Afghanistan, or the righteous Reagan type after Poland. Coupled with west European exasperation with China's inability to pay for trade (especially in recession the Europeans could accept no other terms), the vast majority of the second world was a great disappointment to China.

The only possible exception to the gloomy picture of the second world was its Asian members—Japan. In this case several crucial factors altered the equation. Tokyo's anti-Sovietism became more clear after 1978 and there was less desire in Japan to live peacefully with Soviet power. Similarly, in economic terms Japan and China had more to offer each other, if only because as neighbours the costs of trade were lower and Japan's modernity and quest for cheap energy, had much to complement China's available resource wealth and desire for modernisation.

However, this fact of being neighbours also had its drawbacks. As the recent Sino-Japanese disagreement over text books and historical records indicates, the history of Sino-Japanese relations is far from uniformly

favourable. What is more, there are important potential clashes in such areas as disputed islands or Japan's desire for a peaceful Asia in which to carry on trade relations. Sino-Japanese relations are the only important remnant of Beijing's delusions about the importance of the second world, even if they do have distinct limits. Further improvements in relations would of course be beneficial to China. But the fact that such an improvement is only possible with Japan and not western Europe, seems to stamp China as an Asian great power; a status hardly approaching that of a superpower with a global role.

In that much discredited three worlds theory, China of course claimed to be a part of the third world. In many senses this was true, China was poor, agricultural and less developed. But more importantly, in at least tacitly implying it was the leader of the third world, China was well on the way to being a great power with superpower pretensions. As the third most powerful nuclear and conventional military machine, with continental defences and a huge GDP, China's very power made a mockery of its self-appointed third world status.

China, as a regional power with global pretensions, finds itself in a class below the superpowers, but above the west Europeans or Japan. China also shows signs of coming to terms with this ambivalent status in the third world. It seems to have largely abandoned the idea of competing with the superpowers in aid for developing states. Nevertheless, China continues to see its own security and national interest as tied up with global events from El Salvador to the Lebanon. But like many powers, China has no uniform world view in which to understand these events. Indeed Beijing has shown a great deal of ambivalence and confusion in reaction to recent events. In the mid-1970s, even before Mao's death China had a tendency to shoot itself in the foot by supporting regimes largely on an anti-Soviet basis. This anti-Sovietism may have been a sort of coherent policy, but it led to strange bed-fellows—e.g. Pinochet's Chile. Now China sees a less coherent third world, and pretends less to have a clear policy for a complex world. Most recently, as Beijing has begun to see an equal superpower evil in regional conflicts, China has taken a more 'plague on both your houses' line. Such signs of a frustrated policy at least indicate greater honesty than previous delusions about a useful three worlds theory.

If China is neither a member of the third world, nor can find many allies in the second world, then how is it to navigate the waters between the two superpowers? The question is only perplexing if one insists on finding a single coherent doctrine to explain and predict Chinese foreign policy. No such simplistic doctrine exists. If one only listens to what China says to the west Europeans, one might be forgiven for thinking that the three worlds theory is alive and relevant. If one only listens to what the United States is told, one might be forgiven for thinking that the anti-Soviet coalition is merely passing through a rough patch. If one only listens to what the third world is told, one might be forgiven for thinking that the world was locked in a North-South conflict. These

different emphases from China, with their many shades of grey in between, only reinforces the belief that there is no coherence in Beijing's policy.

Some seek to explain this incoherence by suggesting that western analysts are merely ethnocentric. These observers tend to twist not so gently in the wind when China changes policy charts and tacks in a different direction, all the while claiming coherence and continuity. All too often China's so-called 'inscrutability' is nothing but confusion in Beijing or, more charitably, a recognition of the complexities of the world. The Chinese may well be just as inscrutable to themselves as they are to us.

As Chinese politics enters a new phase of pragmatism and an absence of a plan in domestic policy, so it also seems to enter a similar phase in foreign policy. Indeed the primacy of the domestic realm, and the desire to have a peaceful and low key foreign policy that serves this internal objective, is the key to China's contemporary external relations. Some outsiders will grab passing Chinese models and others will seize their own western images and theories to explain Chinese actions. What seems more likely is that there is no model of any sort, and China has settled for the healthy, pragmatic aphorism: 'there is no path—paths are made by walking'.

NOTES:

- (1) John Fairbank, ed. *The Chinese World Order*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).
 - (2) Michael Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs*. (London: Croom Helm, 1978).
 - (3) Gerald Segal, 'China's Security Debate', *Survival*. Vol. 24 No. 2. March/April 1982.
 - (4) Thomas Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism* (Santa Monica, Rand R-1902-NA. Nov. 1977. Kenneth Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s*. (Santa Monica (Rand R-2342-NA, July 1978).
 - (5) Harry Harding, 'The Domestic Politics of China's Global Posture' in Thomas Fingar ed. *China's Quest for Independence*. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980).
 - (6) *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty*. RL 94/82. 26 Feb. 1982. RL 138/82. 24 March 1982. *International Herald Tribune*, 10 Feb. 16, 18, 23 March 1982.
 - (7) William Tow and William Feeny eds. *U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security*. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982).
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MAFIA CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY IN ITALY

by Tim Parks

ON Friday, September 3rd at exactly 9.21 in the evening, Italian police chief, General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa was murdered with his wife in the centre of Palermo, Sicily. Two cars plus a large motorcycle drew up alongside the general's car in a busy street. The youth on the back of the motorcycle opened fire on the chief and his wife with a Kalashnikov armour-piercing machine gun of Russian origin. At the same time two men stepped from side streets at each side, both armed with machine guns, and joined in the massacre. Other gangsters in the two cars fired a hail of bullets on the car behind the General's in which his bodyguard travelled. One of the two guards was killed. Neither fired a shot.

Such a ruthless assassination bears all the hallmarks of literally hundreds of similar murders in Palermo and Naples in recent years. There can be no doubt that it is the work of the mafia. To a foreign observer there may not appear to be anything particularly special here, for one reads of such murders in Italy every day. The truth, however, is quite the contrary. The death of Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa is the most politically significant assassination in Italy since that of Aldo Moro in 1978 and represents a profound challenge to the power of the state and to Italian democracy.

Over the last two decades General Dalla Chiesa has become a legendary name in Italy. Through the 60s and the 70s, as police chief in Palermo and then Milan, his rigorous use of modern police methods in a country whose police force has always been disorganised with confused responsibilities and a hopelessly complex chain of command, were remarkably successful. Everywhere admired for his dedication and brilliant organisation, it was he who was called upon to re-organise the top security prisons in 1977 after escapes had reached the ludicrous level of one a day. Immediately Dalla Chiesa took over the escapes ended. In 1978 when the kidnap and assassination of Christian Democrat leader Aldo Moro made the Red Brigades Italy's number-one enemy, it was again Dalla Chiesa who was brought in to solve the problem. And with immediate results. A long series of successful raids gradually broke down the terrorist organisation until in January '82 the fatal blow was struck. The so-called *Digos*, specialist anti-terrorist police, broke into an apartment in Padua and arrested the kidnappers of Dozier. Following this operation literally hundreds of Red Brigades members were rounded up in every major city in Italy, including the killers of Moro. Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa became known as the man to confront all emergencies, the only policeman known and loved by the Italian people.

The emergency in the spring of '82 was (and still is) the mafia, an enemy older and certainly stronger than the Red Brigades. Since 1st of January this year alone the mafia has accounted for more than 190 deaths in Naples and 104 in Palermo. In Naples 87% of shop owners admit

paying 'protection' money to the various mafia clans. But the main activity of course is the drugs trade, presently reckoned to be worth 1,000 million dollars in Sicily, a considerable slice of the entire gross product of the island.

Ever since the unification of Italy in the 1860s it has been hoped that in the climate of a modern democratic state with fair institutions and even-handed justice the banditry that has always plagued the youth of Italy would somehow fade away. Particularly after the Second War, when Italy experienced the economic and industrial boom that was to put it more or less on a par with its European neighbours, it was assumed that with rapidly growing prosperity and a more mobile, open, modern society the mafia simply would not be able to survive. In fact the opposite seems to have been the case. The South has not experienced the same prosperity as the North; its society has remained closed and poor. The mafia on the other hand has grown richer than ever on profits from the lucrative heroin trade and in a modern world with unlimited funds they have been able to adopt modern, more devastating methods; better communications, better weapons, more ambitious tactics. Is it they, rather than the society as a whole or the police, who have moved with the times. In Naples alone, full-time active service members of the mafia are now known to number over 5,000. In the area around Palermo there are over 7,000; considerably more than the police force appointed to combat them.

Over the last few years the situation has grown steadily worse and in the early spring of this year an inter-clan war broke out that far-exceeded all records for the number of corpses left on the street. In May, with the murder of Sicilian Communist Party leader Pio La Torre, matters came to a head. General Dalla Chiesa was called in to tackle the situation and named as head of the police force in Palermo. Many saw this as the first concrete sign from the government that it meant to meet the mafia challenge head on and assert its authority as the people's democratically chosen rulers. The lift in morale in the island and most particularly in Palermo was immediate. With Dalla Chiesa a sense of the possibility of defeating the mafia was born.

But the appointment was not without its detractors. It is generally accepted — it has even been publicly declared by Prime Minister Spadolini himself — that the mafia has now infiltrated every area of public life in the south. Hence, there will have been many seemingly 'beyond suspicion' who trembled at the arrival of Dalla Chiesa. In all there was sufficient opposition, particularly from the regional Sicilian government, to ensure that, although appointed as police chief, the General was not to have any of the special powers he had enjoyed as head of the anti-terrorist squad. For the first time, at 61, Dalla Chiesa complained directly to the press about his political superiors and spoke of the impossibility of combatting the mafia without the complete confidence and support of the government and without very large powers of co-ordination between the various police and tax inspection bodies.

But despite these limitations the General began well and systematically,

investigating every area of commerce and movement of money on the island. His main intention was to break the link between the front line of the mafia directly involved in the drugs trade and the numerous banks and financial organisations who collaborate in the operation by re-cycling and investing the so-called 'dirty money'. According to his colleagues he was already in a position to establish a list of top suspects. Expectations were extremely high.

Hence the immensity of the blow when Dalla Chiesa went down like so many others in a hail of bullets. Throughout the country the reaction was one of disbelief, shock and bitter anger. A slogan written on a wall at the scene of the crime the following day announced, 'Here died the hope of the honest people of Palermo.'

But more than the massive sense of disillusionment, the nature of his death, the perfectly organised assassination at a pre-determined street corner at a pre-determined time, can only indicate precise inside knowledge. The police chief's moves were naturally an extremely well-guarded secret and the inevitable and chilling suspicion must be that somebody in a very high position gave the word. In fact it was just a few days after the murder that the General's son, Nando Dalla Chiesa, himself an expert on the mafia, accused the regional Christian Democratic government of being partly responsible if not actually involved. The list of arguments he produced is extremely disturbing. It was the Christian Democratic party that had continually blocked the anti-mafia laws which Pio La Torre tried to introduce—laws extremely similar to the special powers Dalla Chiesa was asking for. Then, during his period as police chief the regional government refused at every point to meet with Dalla Chiesa to discuss tactics and areas of collaboration. At his funeral, in condemning his murder, not one of them used the word mafia. Various high government officials are known to have recently attended the funerals of mafia bosses. In the emergency government session called immediately after the murder, the local government representatives made every possible attempt to block the appointment of a new 'super police chief' who would have the special powers Dalla Chiesa wanted. Finally, one week after the death when Dalla Chiesa's private safe was opened, the papers documenting the results of his work in Palermo and indicating possible suspects were missing. The conclusions to be drawn are obvious enough.

Thus in the seven or eight months since the Dozier kidnap, the focus of public concern in Italy has switched entirely from terrorism to the mafia and organised crime in general. The government's immediate reaction to Dalla Chiesa's death has been strong, the immediate passing of Pio La Torre's anti-mafia laws and the appointment of a new police chief with precisely the powers his predecessor was never granted, but the fight ahead will be an extremely long one and it remains to be seen whether Spadolini's shaky coalition and, more critically, Italian democracy as a whole will be equal to the struggle.

ISRAEL IN LEBANON— BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE

by David Capitanchik

PRIOR to 6th June 1982, Israel went to war only in cases of self-defence. Since that date the country has been deeply divided over whether it was legitimate to launch a war when a threat to the country's security was possibly imminent, but which certainly did not endanger her existence.

In the first days of the Lebanese conflict, the overwhelming majority of Israelis would have agreed that military action was necessary to remove the threat; few would have argued with the immediate military objective proclaimed by ministers as the establishment of a zone of some 25 miles, in which there would be no PLO presence and instead an effective international force to prevent attacks upon Israel's northern townships and settlements. What was less clear and far more contentious was what political aims the government had in mind. How were any military gains to be exploited so as to further the cause of peace?

The goal of a fully sovereign and independent Lebanon with a strong and legitimate central government capable of exerting its authority over its entire territory is widely desired, not only by Israel but also by most of the international community. But whatever the outcome of the Lebanese crisis, the goal of peace between Israel and the Arabs is to be sought elsewhere, in the resolution of the Palestinian problem in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza. This article, then, discusses the causes and outcome of the Lebanese war before turning to what has been called the 'unfinished business', namely the pursuit of peace.

From the time of the Lebanese civil war in 1975-76, down to the summer of 1981, the PLO managed to establish in southern Lebanon a considerable military capability. The internal war had resulted in the effective collapse of the central Lebanese authority and when this was brought to the attention of the world most strikingly by the crisis of 1982, the country was seen to be divided into a number of mini-states. The area around Tripoli north of Beirut, the western half of the capital city itself and a large part of the south of Lebanon, including the cities of Tyre and Sidon, virtually constituted a Palestinian 'state-within-a-state'. The PLO had acquired large amounts of long-range artillery and prodigious quantities of ammunition, including mobile Katyusha rocket launchers which could easily be hidden in bunkers and orchards. When fighting broke out in July 1981, considerable damage was caused to Israeli towns and settlements in the Upper Galilee and short of invading southern Lebanon, the Israelis found it exceedingly difficult to respond.

The ceasefire negotiated by the U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib in the summer of 1981 appeared to be a fragile step in the direction of peace. Although various intermediaries were involved, (in addition to Mr. Habib himself the Saudi Arabians for example were active in bringing about

an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinian and Syrian forces in Lebanon) it did seem to augur well for the possibility of political negotiations replacing military confrontation. But as it transpired, Israel and the PLO interpreted the ceasefire differently. In Israel's view the cessation of hostilities applied to actions launched against Israeli targets anywhere in the world, not just to the border between northern Israel and southern Lebanon. In the PLO's interpretation the ceasefire applied to the Lebanese border only and not to guerilla activity on the West Bank and Gaza strip or, say, London where an attempt to assassinate their Ambassador precipitated the Israelis' onslaught on Lebanon.

However, it soon emerged that the PLO was using the ceasefire for another purpose. This was to continue more effectively the process of transforming itself from a guerilla/terrorist type of organisation into a regular army. In the long-run this could either have caused serious damage to Israel by itself, or it would have enabled the PLO to participate actively in an eventual Syrian offensive. The Israelis had grounds for believing that this would be launched against them within a year or two.

In the event, the Israelis went to war in 1982 for the first time with overwhelming military advantage. Their forces had their usual superiority in training, morale, and leadership. But unlike previous wars, they were also superior in equipment and this made it possible for them to neutralise the regular Syrian forces which had constituted the main, if not sole, component of an Arab peace-keeping army deployed in Lebanon since the civil war. Israeli spokesmen have insisted that it was their original intention to avoid contact with the Syrians, although since they were located within the 25 mile operational zone a confrontation between them would have been difficult to avoid. The Israeli army did deploy substantial forces on the Golan Heights in order to deter any Syrian offensive in that sector. However, the major engagement with the Syrians took place elsewhere in the Bek'aa area of Lebanon over a limited period of roughly 48 hours from 9th to 11th June. The brevity of the fighting was due mainly to two major defects in the Syrian order of battle. They suffered from a serious inferiority in the air and demonstrated marked deficiencies in the reliability of their air defences. These two factors alone not only contributed to Israel's stunning military victory in this war, but is almost certain to put back for some years the possibility of any serious Syrian offensive against Israel.

In 1973, 50 Israeli aircraft were shot down by ground-to-air missiles in the first three days of the war and, in all, in excess of 100 planes were lost by missile attack. In 1982, the Israeli Air Force was able to destroy the entire Syrian surface-to-air missile system in Lebanon without losing a single aircraft.

On the ground, notwithstanding the advantage of occupying more favourable terrain, Syrian armoured losses were ten times those of the Israelis. Syrian tank losses have been put at about 400, while up until the cessation of the main fighting at the end of July, only some 30-40 Israeli tanks had been described as write-offs.

There is little doubt, however, that it was Israel's performance in the air which led to an early decision on Syria's part to seek an immediate ceasefire after the clashes of June 9th-11th. Indeed, the Syrians did not hesitate to comply when the Israelis made known their intention to stop firing unilaterally on Friday 11th June. Moreover, the Syrians made no attempt to broaden the conflict to include the Golan Heights nor did they make any serious effort to put up a fight in the Beirut area.

Most military analysts agree that the destruction of the Syrian surface-to-air missiles in the Bek'aa on 9th June, meant also the end of the idea which had emerged from the experience of the 1973 war that it was possible for the Syrians to severely restrict Israeli air power. Their immediate response was to throw large numbers of aircraft into the air with disastrous results. In what has been described as 'one of the major air battles in modern history' the Israelis demonstrated their total superiority in both manpower and equipment and, above all, in command and control. About 100 Syrian combat aircraft were shot down, while the Israelis lost no planes; neither in air battles nor in destroying the SAM missile batteries.

The Israelis believe that it was not the aircraft which were to blame for the Syrian defeat. The failure lay in the Syrian aircrew and, above all, in their command. There was no doubting the courage of the pilots who fought as bravely and with as much determination as their soldiers on the ground. In the Israeli view, in the air training and command were very poor, while on the ground the Syrians suffered from a lack of flexibility in handling major formations, sharing little of the 'Israeli *penchant* for switching forces'.

The fighting between the Israelis and the PLO was a very different affair. The Palestinians fought with considerable determination and desperation. But they did surrender in large numbers once they realised that they would be taken prison by the Israeli army rather than be killed. Moreover, although they were in the process of transition from being guerillas to becoming conventional soldiers, they still tended to fight in small groups.

In the light of later events and the tragedy of Beirut, there has been much controversy both in Israel as well as abroad over whether peace for Israel's northern border could have been achieved by its forces remaining within the 25 mile zone defined as necessary by Messrs Begin and Sharon. They were, of course, determined to ensure that the PLO would never be able to return to southern Lebanon and therefore it seems always to have been their intention not only to destroy the PLO infrastructure in that area, but also to expel them from the Lebanese capital. Indeed, by initially defining the aim of the operation as securing the 25 mile zone and nothing further, they were to cause great confusion as the goals appeared to be expanding, while the fighting continued and became prolonged. Whatever aims the ministers responsible set themselves at the outset, it always seemed that the war would continue until international, and especially American, pressures forced the Israelis to stop. In other words, confusion over the political conduct of the war was due

in part to the personalities of such figures as Prime Minister Begin, Defence Minister Sharon and Chief of Staff Eitan and the way in which they carried out their responsibilities. But it was also due to uncertainty in Israeli government circles about international reaction to the total conception of the incursion into Lebanon. This seems to have involved the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon and the total destruction of its infrastructure throughout the country; the evacuation of the Syrian peace-keeping forces and the creation of a strong central Lebanese government which would not only maintain internal law and order, but also create the conditions for another peaceful border between Israel and one of her Arab neighbours.

If the war aims do in fact prove to have been confined to these three or four purposes, then it might be possible to argue that one should not allow the manifest horrors of the conflict to obscure any tangible new political opportunities that emerge from it. For one thing, while the Syrians and elements of the PLO still occupy an important part of Lebanon, both have suffered very heavy military defeats. In the case of the Palestinians, their main effort in the wake of the war must inevitably be directed towards seeking a political instead of a military solution to the problems of their relationship with Israel. Previously, the Palestinians were never able to aspire to a solution because the PLO resisted any idea of compromise. All opposition to its agreed position was silenced by assassination. The inevitable weakening of this aspect of the PLO's activities, the dispersal of its forces to different Arab lands putting them under the control of effective governments, could well open up the possibility of meaningful dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories.

For its part, Israel has a vital interest in the demilitarisation of southern Lebanon. Thus it ought to be possible for Israel and Syria to achieve at least an implicit agreement based on mutual recognition of their respective interests in avoiding military confrontation in Lebanon. There are grounds for optimism, lacking before the war, that as a result of Operation 'Peace for Galilee', the Syrians will be prepared to negotiate a withdrawal from the country, even though there is long and tough bargaining ahead on the way to securing it.

Politically, the Israelis will derive some benefit from the exposure of the weakness and fragmentation of the Arab world. Moreover, as the deep involvement both militarily as well as diplomatically of the Americans shows in their efforts to resolve the affairs of the Lebanon the position of the West in general, and the United States in particular, has been strengthened rather than weakened by the war. The Arabs' reception of the Reagan Plan is further evidence of this. Finally, a situation has been created, as shown by President Amin Gemayel's appearance and reception at the current session of the UN General Assembly, in which a central Lebanese authority can now emerge, even though its strength and relationship with Israel might be questionable.

More than one Middle East observer has pointed to the curious lack of a 'Grand Strategy' in Israeli military thinking. None of Israel's wars,

including the most successful, ended with a political settlement, although one did result from the war of 1973. Then, the strategic concept was provided by an outsider, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and not by either of the two principal parties to the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. Not that having a 'Grand Strategy' by itself is a prescription for peace if that strategy is mistaken. The 1982 Lebanese War might well have created the conditions for a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. But it has not brought about the destruction of the PLO, or of terrorism, or a solution to the Palestinian problem. So if it was the strategy of the present Israeli Government to strengthen its control over the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza by doing so, it has not succeeded.

The Palestinian question, as seen by the PLO, is now at the forefront of international concern and attention. And this is by no means due solely to the so-called 'drama of Beirut' and the massacre. It has come about principally because of the failure of the Israelis to exploit the weakness of the PLO by pre-empting it with an offer to the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories of full and genuine autonomy. Nothing less than full self-government in everything except foreign and security affairs would do. The PLO, which should have been weakened by the war has, if anything, strengthened *its* hold on the territories because of the absence of an Israeli initiative likely to encourage the emergence of a moderate Arab leadership. The Reagan Plan certainly offers such an opportunity but, unlike 1973, the injection of a workable 'Grand Strategy' by the United States which is likely to lead to a political settlement is hampered by the lack of a Henry Kissinger among the Americans, and a government in Israel prepared to respond positively by exploring it further.

For the time being the Lebanese war is over and it could well have some positive results. But there remains the 'unfinished business'—the solution to the Palestinian problem which would be acceptable both to Israel and her Arab neighbours. Perhaps it is worth noting the comment of an expert military observer, summing up the lessons of the Lebanon: 'The Israel Defence Forces . . . may reflect with some irony that a campaign in which the military machine had never functioned better should be one that earned more international opprobrium than all the country's previous wars combined.'

It is an awesome paradox, and one that was very far from the Israeli Government's intentions at the outbreak of the conflict, that only a political initiative on Israel's part to solve the Palestinian problem would, as one noted commentator has put it, 'completely justify the war both strategically and morally.'

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TO BURY BEVERIDGE OR TO PRAISE HIM?

by Brynmor John, M.P.

MANY people in our country have little or no idea about the extent or spread of Social Security Benefits. Indeed, when I speak of Social Security Benefits I realise that I risk the misunderstanding that equates these with Supplementary Benefits, with charity, with hand-outs. Not the least puzzling feature of the way we look upon these benefits is the lack of understanding of how many people are entitled to one or more of them. In one way or another half the population has an entitlement, with pensioners, parents and the unemployed constituting the greatest number.

The current Social Security budget is £32 billion. That is easily the biggest spending department, larger by 2½ times than the much discussed Defence budget, and two and a half times the size of the Education programme. It is roughly 12% of the Gross National Product, is 28% of all public spending and 37% of the spending of central government. Since the introduction of the National Insurance scheme in 1949 this has risen from £640 million, which in 1981 prices would have been £5,900 million, to £27 and a half billion in 1981. This was an increase in *real* terms of 365%.

In 1949 it had been 5.1% of the GNP but in 1981 11%, a reflection of rather more than the general rise in living standards. So you would expect this to be a fiercely scrutinised, hotly debated and closely argued subject. It is not. It is a subject in which pressure groups thrive, pressing their cases and their priorities upon the political parties. Yet the popular voice is weak and the intervention of elected representatives is small as a percentage and spasmodic in approach.

It is true that this is because of the imperfect understanding of the scope of the benefits and because of the shifting categories of beneficiaries. Whatever the reason, it is so weak that many of those entitled to benefits do not claim them. In Family Income Supplement the 'take-up' is only fifty per cent, and only seventy per cent in major benefits like Supplementary Benefit and One Parent Benefit. It is ironic that all the incidents of cheating, which gave popular tabloids such attacks of frothy indignation, constitute a small fraction of the benefits lost by people (£6 million a week in Supplementary Benefit) and lost without comment.

So why is public interest so low? We know that there are technicalities in the subject which terrorise many who would otherwise participate in the debate. The pity is that this fear of the technicalities obscures the fact that there are many great principles involved and that terror prevents them being actively discussed.

To understand the background of this situation it is necessary to go back to the Britain of the Fifties. The term then fashionable was Butskellism, a broad consensus on policy thought to exist between the two major parties. It is generally remembered now as part of the bitter debate on the Labour Party about the supposed willingness of right

wingers to administer the economic system with minimum change. Less well remembered, but nevertheless all important in this context, is that its second limb was an affirmation that the Conservative Party accepted the Welfare State it once opposed. That system had been introduced in the late 1940s as a result of the Beveridge Report of 1942. Where such a consensus is thought to exist, it becomes otiose to reargue the fundamentals constantly.

However, the passage of time does effect changes in the way in which people regard these matters, exposing the unfulfilled expectations and discredited assumptions of the original scheme. In short, any political charter needs renovation and cosy complacency denies it that opportunity.

Forty years ago Sir William Beveridge and the succeeding legislation set up the institutional structure and framework. Upon it we have piled benefits and conditions but we have not changed its basis. Forty years on I think it is high time we reconsidered it. If that were not so it would be the most remarkable legislation since the laws of the Medes and the Persians. Recent developments seem to hold out the hope of such reconsideration. On the Conservative side the furor which has accompanied the consideration (or non-consideration) of the Think Tank Report has been sharp. The Report may have been a matter of principle, or it may have been a matter of economics (that powerful spawner of new principles), but it did seek to distance the Conservative Party of the 1980s from the Conservative Party of the 1950s.

Labour Party interest has been centred on two of the props of the Beveridge system, namely the contributory principle, which led to its description as National Insurance, and the existence of 'earned' or automatic benefits within that system, and the means testing of benefits which fell outside. In the hope that this may signal the beginning of such a debate let me mention some of the relevant factors which need to be considered.

No contemplation of this subject can be undertaken without recognising the changes which the Welfare State has brought about. Advances in medicine and affluence mean that a much higher proportion of people reach retirement age and beyond. In 2009 there will be 9.7 million retired people. By 2029 these will have risen by two million. During the same time the working population actually falls. Many more of the people of pensionable age will survive into their eighties—at which age there is much more of a need for a mixture between financial benefits and medical help. I doubt whether any part of the world has adequately foreseen this. It has burdened all the welfare systems, whatever their inspiration, not least in the severely compartmentalised Social Security system of the United States of America. It is a quantitative problem but also, and certainly in the United Kingdom, a qualitative factor. This is the demand that retired people should share in any increase in the real wealth within society. Many pensioners have called for pensions for married couples at half the average industrial wage and single people at one third. That again adds an additional call, in advance of the earnings linked pension scheme coming to fruition.

That is what the Think Tank saw and, with the true logic of the king

who kills the messenger bearing bad news, proposed that the Government should abandon its attempt to ensure that such pensions should even keep pace with inflation. It is here that I part company totally from the Report. The report, as indicated, was on financial not philosophic grounds. If it is not to be discussed this is reassuring, but it does not remove the underlying financial imperative which led to the idea being floated. I do not believe that there would be any support for the proposition that such a cut in pensions should be allowed. If there were then that, too, is significant because it marks such a flight away from the Welfare concept as to signal, even more than whether the Government will contemplate penury in old age, the death of the idea of the Welfare State as we know it.

The discussion of this, the most obvious question of linkage, leads us to a deeper consideration, namely, whether benefits should be linked to a person's earnings. This is a debate which is as yet unresolved. Recent Labour Governments have supported the idea for pensions and for a wide range of other benefits in the more short term. We felt that for some time a person needs an underpinning of his previous standard of living—the earnings related benefits. The Conservative Government has abolished earnings relation for short term benefits such as unemployment benefit but not because of a philosophical acceptance of equality. The average savings of abolishing such benefits, namely £11.20 a week in respect of the unemployed and £13 a week in respect of the sick, lead one to suppose that it was overall cost which weighed most heavily. Is it as I believe desirable to restore them? Is it now practicable given the changed balance between employment and unemployment? Finally, what priority would we allocate to this restoration as opposed to the many other priorities which face us?

Secondly, if these quantitative and qualitative explosions face us, was Beveridge right in asserting that the Social Welfare system should be funded by specific contributions, in other words a National Insurance scheme? As time goes by the idea of this as a total method of financing has been gradually abandoned. In 1982-3 forty-five per cent of such expenditure will be met from general taxation, eight per cent more than in 1975-6. The argument which has always been strong has been the psychological one, namely that if people contributed towards their benefits, and if they believed that they had 'earned' their benefit, their involvement with it would be very close. The reality is different. As we have seen, the contributory proportion present or historic meets only just over half the cost. Because of the expenditure being present and not matured every generation at work contributes towards the funding of its own present benefits and the pensions of its predecessor generation. It does this, as we have seen, out of a mixture of direct taxation and current, not invested, contributions.

This has already had an unwelcome reaction from the Government. If the scheme is not 'funded' why should not the Government use it as a source for taxation towards the National Revenue? Nothing else can explain the 2½% increase in National Insurance contributions in the

last three years because no pretence has been made that this was related to funding requirements. Instead, the surpluses in the National Insurance Fund have grown. Additionally, there has always been an earnings 'ceiling' which has thrown the main burden of the Fund onto average or lower wage workers whilst the higher earners do not contribute their proportion. Many feel cheated by these facts, particularly if they then find that the benefits they thought they were 'buying' (such as earnings related benefit) are abolished by a Government just when they are needed.

If it is true that this Beveridge framework was governed by the concepts of his era, were not the benefits for which the revenue was to be expended also a limiting factor? Sir William Beveridge certainly erred in thinking as he did that Supplementary Benefit (then called National Assistance) would be a highly exceptional state of affairs. Two quotations from Beveridge will suffice to show his views: 'National Assistance is an essential subsidiary method in the whole Plan' and 'The scheme of social insurance is designed of itself when in full operation to guarantee the income needed for subsistence in all normal cases'. There are six and a half million Supplementary Beneficiaries—so that its role as an ultimate safety net has turned into something totally different.

As a main result of this, means tested benefits are a very prominent feature of the whole. Is this right or should we abolish all relationship between the means of applicants and payments? For example, the Resolution passed by the recent Labour Party Conference asserts, cryptically, 'that benefits should be non-means tested'. In some cases which can be freed from means testing and which not is easy to decide. It should be possible to abolish prescription charges. Could it, however, be done in respect of Heating Allowances or Extra Nourishment? And could means testing be abolished without replacing the whole edifice of Supplementary Benefit? Would the abolition of means testing mean the payment of a Housing Allowance to everyone?

Uncertainty of what the phrase means certainly extends to how much it will cost—for that is certain to be huge. These questions are unanswered in the absence of a replacement scheme and perhaps they are unanswerable, for means testing is not only a method but a process of assessing, and it may be that it is not the financial concept which is meant but the process by which it is done—the intrusion, humiliation and deterrence from claiming benefit.

Beveridge incompletely foresaw, as everyone incompletely foresaw, the range of benefits which would be considered desirable. More and more benefits have had to be devised as non-contributory to cater for categories outside the contributory system (such as Non-Contributory Invalidity Pensioners) or those not within the system for long enough to build up an adequate contribution record. It has brought into question the whole question of whether a contribution record should be a test for benefit even if contributions should continue to be the method of funding the scheme. So for the future it would be reasonable to expect, by reason of the numbers of recipients and the range of benefits, that more of the expenditure will be found from general taxation. In such a future

is it reasonable to maintain the diminishing funding of the scheme through contributions, because of the psychological boost to the payers or psychological barrier to the Treasury, or not?

Greater point is added to this question because of the growth of private work-based schemes of sickness benefit and more particularly of pensions. The scale of such schemes is greater than anticipated. That commands extra expenditure from the person's pay packet and confers extra benefit on him. Beveridge could hardly have had this sort of insurance scheme in mind. About ten million people are in schemes which are contracted out of the State Pension scheme. Strangely, this has not yet led to a slackening of pressure upon the State scheme, in the main due to the larger number of persons outside such occupational cover at present. Some of the inadequacies of these schemes will also force the State to be involved. Those weaknesses are generally poor transferability, inadequate inflation proofing, and scandalously bad treatment of those who have for one reason or another to leave the scheme early. Though the Pension Schemes may fight determinedly, there is now a strong case for Society to take a close interest in schemes which have such a wide spread and I believe that we will need to consider regulation. We have also seen the phenomenon of the 'floating off' of the first eight weeks of statutory sick pay and that, too, will have to be carefully reviewed to see if it has, indeed, lived down to its chaotic inception.

Most importantly of all we need to review the area where low paid employment and receipt of welfare benefits overlap. Passporting to other benefits, and a regressive system of Income Tax towards the low paid, does sometimes mean that low-paid families are caught in a poverty trap. But both categories suffer disproportionately from the major scandal in our present Welfare State, namely our wholly inadequate treatment of children. At any income level that is somewhat of a reproach but amongst low income families (the two categories) 36% of the families have three or more children and 14% four or more. For all families the figures are 20% and 5% respectively. Child benefit has been allowed to fall in real terms since 1979 and many people are condemned to poverty and many children to seeing equality of opportunity as a mockery. I insist that a first priority must be to pay the extra £2 a week which will give child benefit equality with child support for short term National Insurance beneficiaries in 1979, but more than this we need a much more fundamental consideration of what we as a Society devote to the maintenance of children, the form it takes and its sensitivity to age.

Finally, we need to take a fresh look at the way in which individual rights are asserted within the scheme. The initial theory was that by removing the procedure from the Courts a claimant in person could contend with the Department on equal terms. Unfortunately that has not proved to be so. The claimant has the scales heavily weighted against him or her, a mismatch made more acute by growing reliance upon the doctrine of precedent in Tribunals. We will have to examine our system (or rather systems) of Administrative Law, and one of the main spurs towards that is provided by the present working of the Social Security

system. We are at a fateful point in the history of the Welfare State. Subjective impression and objective evidence alike serve to confirm that the present Conservative Government has made of the system it inherited a worse one. Because of its economic policies (and notably the rise in unemployment) it has not made it a cheaper system.

An incoming Labour Government would want to put the worst iniquities right and to do so as quickly as possible. The time has come, however, when we can no longer content ourselves with specific improvements alone. The British pride themselves on their pragmatism but no system can totally outgrow the philosophy which alone gives it coherence. Ad hocery eventually loses its ability to command public support and buries in its undergrowth of detail the simple principles of humanity which created the initial scheme. To say, therefore, that there is a need for a new Beveridge is in part no more than a recognition of the passage of time and the changed factors which that passage of time has witnessed. In externals the United Kingdom of the 1980s is not the United Kingdom of the 1940s.

My advocacy of a new Beveridge is not so mechanistic, however. The United Kingdom of the 1980s needs no less than its 1940s counterpart a reaffirmation of the compassion, the zeal for improvement and the recognition of the mutual dependence by which alone it can scrape away the warts of self-interest and reassert its claim to be a humane and just society. Many of the values temporarily held by many people are inimical to that, appealing to cynicism and greed. These are qualities capable of dividing a country but not uniting it, as we must do to reverse its decline. Our forefathers saw this at a time when it was harder to see it. A new Beveridge, as I propose, would galvanise those to whom the original is as boring as breathing.

In short, I come to praise and reinforce Beveridge, not to bury him.

[Brynmor John has been Labour Member of Parliament for Pontypridd since 1970. He served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence 1974-76 and Minister of State, Home Office 1976-79. He is at present Opposition Spokesman for Social Security.]

FEED THE HUNGRY

by Thomas J. Clogger

FEED the hungry or, if the phrase is too harsh—those people of the areas of the world who are in 'acute distress'. But it is easier to talk about it than to alleviate the pangs of hunger or cure children suffering from malnutrition and other diseases.

It is a strange paradox that there are countries with vast herds of cattle; with chickens laying eggs that people will not eat and tons of edible fish in the seas and rivers—but who will eat them? So, the inhabitants of these countries live in the midst of plenty, even though malnutrition is endemic and calls for international aid.

The Muslim and his brother, the Semite (at least the strictly orthodox) will not eat pork or other meat, nor fowl unless killed by the ritual slaughterer. In India the life-giving monsoon rains often fail and tons of grain has to be imported. Yet here is a land with 250 million largely superfluous cattle roaming the streets and living safe within the Pale of Hinduism. They cannot be killed—they are sacred! The rich fishing grounds of India's coastal waters are scarcely tapped, but catches brought in are exported as the people will not eat fish. Some Indians will not even eat eggs. A former World Bank official said in Auckland that India must use her sacred cows to fight off starvation. Dr. C. P. McMeenan, now a farming director in New Zealand, told a meeting on international problems:

If Indians are prepared to starve rather than eat these animals, then I have no sympathy for them. If only half of the sacred cows were made use of, India's milk production would increase enormously. India will not succeed if she does not change her philosophy. Her sacred cows will eat her out.

In Africa there are hundreds of tribes, many of them closely related ethnic groups, who by a strange anomaly, differ widely in their eating habits. One tribe may have a certain type of food against which a neighbouring tribe has a rigid tabu. Again, there are tribal preferences which are the result of the African's system and form of life. So pastoral people such as the Masai and Nandi live, when possible, on milk and blood, but they will not normally eat meat with milk on the same day. To do so is tabu, because meat and milk mixed in the stomach will react on the cows and cause their milk to dry up.

All Africans eat meat, with certain reservations as to kind. All Africans eat various kinds of vegetables, some cultivated, some wild. Some tribes will eat the meat of almost any animal, including monkeys, though few, if any, will eat animals like lion or leopard, or scavengers like jackal or hyena. Tribes which live where fish are easily procured like the Balla and Baganda, will eat fish. Others are revolted by fish, the Nandi saying that they are no better than lizards. Eggs and fowl are not often eaten by Africans, though the Balla and Baganda eat both. The Akamba, a large tribe domiciled in Kenya will eat fowl but not eggs or fish. In addition many of the tribes of the coastal area of East Africa are Muslim

and so their choice of food is restricted by certain religious prohibitions.

There are also food tabus for women, and again these differ from tribe to tribe. In the Wachagga tribe which lives on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania, certain kinds of food are regarded as food for women, and are not, or only rarely, eaten by men. Such food is blood, boiled fish or fish fried in oil; a mixture of blood and sour milk. A pregnant woman is not allowed to eat black peas as it is believed that if she does the child will be diseased. She must not eat together with another woman who has had a miscarriage and fatty food is avoided for fear that the child will grow too big. The Wahaya tribe live on the western shores of Lake Victoria in Tanzania and, theoretically, the majority of the Bahaya are Christians and on the surface civilised and progressive citizens. Every Muhaya is a member of a clan and has to obey certain clan rules and there are about 150 clans. Marriages inside the clan are not allowed. With marriage the woman becomes a half-member of the husband's clan. She has to obey her own clan rules as well as those of her husband's, as long as she lives with him. When pregnant she must observe the husband's clan rules more strictly than when she is not—the rules are mostly in the nature of food tabus. There is a tabu on edible grasshoppers in that a married woman is not allowed to eat the hoppers she has caught; these have to be offered to the husband. She is allowed to eat hoppers offered to her by her parents if she visits them and they are on the menu.

In South Africa, there is the same striking difference in food among Africans, particularly in the use of fish. On the one hand, the Nguni-speaking people of South Africa (i.e. the Swazis, Zulus, Pondos, Xosas and Fingos) as well as the Basutos class fish with cold-blooded reptiles, which they strongly abhor and despise as food. This general aversion (shared by the Nandi of East Africa) probably has its origin in the belief or superstition that spirits of the departed may return to the deceased's former haunts in the shape of snakes and other reptiles. But throughout Southern Africa, whether the indigenous population be fish-eating or not, the flesh of animals is the great dietary desideratum. Where possible, it is the main course as well as the dessert of the meal, whether the animal has been slaughtered or has died of disease or hunger.

In East Africa, pregnancy tabus are many and vary from tribe to tribe. In the Wahaya tribe, a pregnant woman must not walk under a stick bearing a heavy hand of bananas, or else the child might get 'caught' during birth.

African superstitions are born of experience garnered over the centuries. Bearing in mind that the Africans and their witch-doctors appear to have knowledge of medicine and poisons that baffles the modern scientist, and a firm belief in the potency of such medicines, it is understandable that the question of food contamination plays a large part in their beliefs.

ANTHONY TROLLOPE AFTER A CENTURY

by Park Honan

TROLLOPE appears to be the most self-confident novelist among the readable Victorians. He seems immune to a virus of laboured artistry which infects his contemporaries and develops into an epidemic among our 'Moderns' such as Joyce, Woolf, Forster and even Conrad. There is an earlier exception in Walter Scott—prolific, certain, relaxed—but even near the outset of the century we find in Jane Austen a novelist who polished the 'labour' out of her writing and yet who is almost too concerned to be artistically adequate.

But Trollope seems to be immune. Considered with Dickens, Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, and Meredith, he is the least self-consciously inclined to oblige readers with new aesthetic structures, or to play and fret with complex meanings, symbols, myths, or poetic flights. The Flaubertian precedents in diction and style affected him not at all. They were late in coming to England, and by the time Henry James codified Flaubert's notion of the artistic novel in *The Art of Fiction* (1884) Trollope's gloriously homely career was over. He had been dead two years, and his disarming apology for not being an 'artist'—the posthumous *An Autobiography* (1883)—was then being read by clergymen, politicians and their wives who had seen their neighbours (if not themselves) pictured with good sense, fun, some satire, and mainly a redeeming intelligible straightforwardness in Trollope's novels.

An Autobiography made James uneasy. Yet Trollope's claim that he had written by the clock, or that he wrote an 'allotted number of pages' daily in a ship-cabin between Marseilles and Alexandria to produce *Doctor Thorne* could not have upset James, who had a rational view of inspiration. (James often wrote or dictated a predetermined amount of work in a day.) What irritated Henry James was Trollope's reduction of the novelist to a cloth-maker whose notion of *quality* was that it might be as good, or as low and humdrum, as the trade would bear.

'I was moved now,' Trollope had written frankly, 'by a decision to excel, if not in quality, at any rate in quantity. An ignoble ambition for an author, my readers will no doubt say. But not, I think, altogether ignoble if an author can bring himself to look at his work as does any other workman. . . . It is not on my conscience that I have scamped. . . . Had I taken three months of idleness between each they would have been no better. Feeling convinced of that, I finished *Doctor Thorne* on one day, and began *The Bertrams* on the next.' No, not ignoble to regard one's work 'as does any other workman'—but then one's novels, in James's view, may have no more significance than so many fitted floorboards, servants' frocks, or tri-cycles. 'Art,' wrote James a year after *An Autobiography*, 'lives upon discussion, upon experiment, upon curiosity, upon variety of attempt, upon the exchange of views and the comparison of standpoints.' If art does, then surely Trollope, who, despite his friendship with George Eliot,

exchanged 'views' mainly with postal employees (since Trollope worked daily as a Postal Inspector), *must* have produced very flawed novels.

James looked for the flaws. There are signs in his cavils that he came up against the problem of Trollope's artistic (or craftsmanly) self-confidence. Elither Trollope was sublimely confident, or perverse.

He took a suicidal satisfaction in reminding the reader that the story he was telling was only, after all, a make-believe [wrote James]. These little slips at credulity are very discouraging, but they are even more inexplicable. And 'when Trollope suddenly winks at us and reminds us that he is telling us an arbitrary thing, we are startled and shocked in quite the same way as if Macaulay or Motley were to drop the historical mask and intimate that William of Orange was a myth or the Duke of Alba an invention.

It is surprising how often James's complaints about flaws, and especially about Trollope's authorial intrusions, still turn up. 'There are a good many examples of such "suicidal satisfaction"' in Trollope's novels, wrote James Pope-Hennessy in his life of Trollope in 1971, 'examples in which he seems to treat both the reader and himself with scorn.' The conviction that novel-writing is a craft and not an art 'presumably, inspired these exasperating asides. Had he ever discovered that posterity would consider him as a great artist he would have turned in his grave at Kensal Green' (*Anthony Trollope*, Panther Books edn., 1973, p. 160). Since Pope-Hennessy—although apologies for Trollope's intrusions and for his art began before 1971—we have been told often enough Trollope was a great artist. But I remember when reading Robert Polhemus's tactful, suggestive *The Changing World of Anthony Trollope* (1968) how often Trollopian ask us to take the 'artistry' on good faith; 'One really has to read this part of *Can You Forgive Her?* to see the delicate mastery . . .', wrote Mr. Polhemus.

At his death centenary, I think we still see Trollope as a natural, self-confident genius, downgrading his art so that his affinity for places and people and his inventiveness may burble up in . . . words, words, words. Was James partly right? Had he seen novels as artful, and exchanged more 'views' with artists, wouldn't his work be better?

But if *Candide* was written in three days, and *Rasselas* in seven, rapid or steady composing isn't harmful. If Arnold talked far more often to schoolchildren than to artists, James's 'discussion' and 'exchange of views' may not need to precede the writing of good prose. (List the artists Jane Austen knew.) Art surely thrives on inwardness and pressure, on a desire to give permanence and stability to a world whose values are unnoticed by others or in danger of being obscured by evanescence, neglect or untoward forces. Always fixed against change and conservative in this sense, art—whether in a Picasso girl or *Barchester Towers*—constantly re-creates for us the exact time of its composition. The Victorian pressure for reform, change, and improvement was incessant. R. H. Super's fresh research in *Trollope in the Post Office* (University of Michigan Press, 1981) reveals Trollope in a dogged Post Office bureaucracy where his superior, Sir Rowland Hill, sometimes met the pressure for reform by proposing an unlikely scheme and taking credit for a modified scheme put forward by his subordinates. One could hardly oppose reform in the Post Office. It is

interesting, and paralleled in Arnold's experience with the education Committee, that Sir Rowland's reforms might look well on paper at the expense of morale. Sir Rowland, for example, 'breathed fresh life into every branch of the service'—to quote his nephew's article in the *D.N.B.*—by setting up 'promotion by merit.' That sounded well, but Trollope vainly opposed it as 'injurious' in May 1863, since it meant promotion would go to 'the best man, let the merits of those who are to be superseded be what they may.' Even if a man has given his best services, or married on the assured belief he will be promoted, he will lose promotion if someone better qualified comes along at the last hour. 'No amount of excellence is safe,' wrote Trollope in the *Post Office*, 'because a greater amount of excellence must always be possible.'

To know whether a man be absolutely fit or unfit for certain duties is . . . beyond the capacity of any officer however intelligent and observant to say who is most fit. Zeal recommends itself to one man, intelligence to a second, alacrity to a third, punctuality to a fourth, and superficial pretence to a fifth. There can be no standard by which the excellence of men can be judged as is the weight of gold. (Anthony Trollope, quoted by R. H. Super in *Trollope in the Post Office*, pp. 53-54.)

His words in the bureaucracy are supported by his novels. His opposition to inhumane change underlies George Eliot's affectionate remark about Trollope as a man 'clinging to whatever is.' Trollope certainly tried to understand the changing world under his feet. Having in childhood feared change and wondered what his mother would do next, and hoped for it, as his miseries were endless and cruel, he needed to get the blurred flux on paper to understand it. His act of recording 250 reassuring words every fifteen minutes (his typical rate) relieved him enough to permit him to see the forces of change as comic, personal, ironic, pseudo-romantic, partly absurd, even partly benevolent. Trollope does well when he turns these forces into a fine circus of freaks—as Slope, Mrs. Proudie, Bertie, and Signora Madeline Vesey Neroni in *Barchester Towers*—where, with light and comic Homeric overtones, the Trojan horses among the Towers dart and squirm into the nerve-centre of his world, as I tried to show in my review of Mr. Polhemus's book. But when Trollope views the forces of change as impersonal, or implies that an unlocated source of evil pre-dooms society, he is less successful. Rich and filled as it is, *The Way We Live Now* (1875) is not a satisfying whole as the Barsetshire novels are. He personified forces of change to his own satisfaction and ours, at his best, and showed that the conservative, stabilising characters are at last fortified by the changers who have threatened them. Who would deny that Madeline or Mr. Slope, Lady Arabella Gresham and her sister-in-law Lady de Courcy, ultimately strengthen the forces of stability in *Barchester Towers* and *Doctor Thorne*?

He knew that nothing is more stable than landscape—and few novelists have anything like his fine sense of landscape and place. With Dickens, we may be with a guide who knows London blindfold—as Browning said—but also with a guide who is unsatisfied by a real city, and who pitches his words at a poetic level above the place he knows. With Trollope, we feel no such thing. Rather we sense a loving geographical particularity. And it

is worth reading his place descriptions closely, to find the author *in* them.

Here, in *Doctor Thorne*, is Greshambury House (are we to think of Gilbert White's Selborne?):

Greshambury consisted of one long, straggling street, a mile in length, which in the centre turned sharp round, so that one half of the street lay directly at right angles to the other. In this angle stood Greshambury House, and the gardens and grounds around it filled up the space so made. There was an entrance with large gates at each end of the village, and each gate was guarded by the effigies of two huge pagans with clubs, such being the crest worn by the family; from each entrance a broad road, running quite straight, running through to a majestic avenue of limes, led up to the house. This was built in the richest, perhaps we should rather say in the purest, style of Tudor architecture; so much so that . . . it may in some measure be said to be the finest specimen of Tudor architecture of which the country can boast.

It stands amid a multitude of trim gardens and stone-built terraces, divided one from another: these to our eyes are not so attractive as that broad expanse of lawn by which our country houses are generally surrounded; but the gardens of Greshambury have been celebrated for two centuries . . . Greshambury Park—properly so called—spread far away on the other side of the village. Opposite to the two great gates leading up to the mansion were two smaller gates, the one opening on to the stables, kennels, and farm-yard, and the other to the deer-park. The latter was the principal entrance to the demesne, and a grand and picturesque entrance it was. The avenue of limes which on one side stretched up to the house, was on the other extended for a quarter of a mile . . . and what with the massive iron gates . . . the spot was sufficiently significant of old family greatness.

Trollope is intrusively here, to give the highest praise to the house ('the finest specimen of Tudor architecture of which the country can boast', 'significant of old family greatness'), but there is no hint of that 'suicidal satisfaction' James found in his reminding the reader that the story is only make-believe. Greshambury House seems to exist. One would like to visit it, or view it from the lime avenue. But just after it is so set in our minds, Trollope in Chapter 2 begins in one of those pernicious and 'discouraging' little 'slips at credulity' to mumble, as James would say, about whether Dr. Thorne or Frank Gresham is to be 'our hero' and whether it isn't boring to have a chapter full of locale and another, to come, of character description:

I quite feel that an apology is due for beginning a novel with two long chapters full of description . . . It can hardly be expected that any one will consent to go through with a fiction that offers so little of allurements in its first pages; but twist it as I will I cannot do otherwise. . . . This is inartistic on my part, and shows want of imagination as well as want of skill. Whether or not I can atone . . . is very doubtful.

Here is James's 'inexplicable' Trollope, not just wasting words (advancing his story in no way) but giving his game away. A good Trollopian might reply that after reading two chapters of *Doctor Thorne*, James's own openings seem a little febrile in being taut, selective, and self-consciously artistic. And James had no strong devotion to locale: his settings subserve his portraits of a Lady, of Mrs. Gereth and Mona Brigstock, of Strether. Trollope is English, in giving even his sketch of a house that moral pressure Ruth apRoberts finds in him, in *The Moral Trollope* (1971). He stands, I think, between Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park* and Forster's *Howards End* (with Waugh's *Handful of Dust* and *Brideshead Revisited*

as whimsical and sentimental aftermaths), since his first concern in a novel is to establish, firmly, the worth of an area of combat, or the value of the place that is fought over. A cathedral town is worth something. Or he supposes that Greshambury House from the Tudors and guarded by 'two hugh pagans' is worth an outside protector such as Dr. Thorne, and an inside inheritor such as Frank Gresham, who struggle (through Mary) for its proper continuance. Trollope's authorial intrusions and apologies bring his discussions of such a house into our real world. 'This is inartistic on my part.' Most of the intrusions are deliberately artless, outside of art, to remind us with matter-of-fact urgency that English locales matter more than stories about them, life matters more than art. They say that something (Greshambury House) is outside the novel, and almost too difficult to bring into it, slightly outside and beyond Trollope's deft control. Mary Thorne, for example, is so important in his story—'my heroine'—that poor Trollope has to confess:

Of her personal appearance it certainly is my business as an author to say something. She is my heroine, and, as such, must necessarily be very beautiful; but, in truth, her mind and inner qualities are more clearly distinct in my brain than her outward form and features. I know that she was far from being tall . . .

He can be sure about only some notion of Mary's quality, which his novel must illustrate. As in *Mansfield Park* in which Fanny Price is the standard of value, and we wait for Edmund's eyes to open to his pearl of price, so in *Doctor Thorne* the question is when Frank, who is 'lackadaisically sentimental' and 'certainly an arrogant puppy, and an egregious ass into the bargain' will be worthy of his Mary—and Greshambury and England.

And what is likely to change an arrogant puppy and egregious ass into a man, after all, sooner than a battle with agents of social change? Trollope's slow, patient battles in the Post Office bureaucracy are related to the pace and direction of his novels.

Still, we cannot say at his centenary that he always succeeds. Only the ardent Trollopian will deny some of his work is slack and deplorably written. And though, I know, the ardent will fret over any ranking of his novels, it seems to me that Michael Sadleir's *Trollope: A Commentary*—first printed in 1927—does what the ardent neglect, and displays critical brass of a kind Trollope might approve in its classifying of his fiction. I suppose that nobody will defend all of Sadleir's 'classes'. Even if it is convenient to speak of six 'Chronicles of Barsetshire' and four 'Irish novels' which, from *The Macdermots of Ballycloran* of 1847 to *Castle Richmond* of 1860, at least, are critically neglected, we seldom hear how good they are. The Irish tide may be turning, if apRoberts' paper on Trollope's *Macdermots*, at last summer's badly advertised Trollope Conference in England, is any sign. It is impossible to speak of some novels as those of 'Manners' and others as 'Social Satires,' when these features are mixed in his novels including the 'Irish' and 'Political.' But Sadleir's rather egregious asterisk-ranking, though debatable and prejudiced, is a good feature: when we no longer find *The Claverings**** better than *Orley Farm* (one star), or this worth arguing over, we won't read Trollope. The ranking system is only bad in failing to account for freshness of tone, and local

appeals, in indifferent structures: for example, *The Warden* (1855) and *La Vendée* (1850) are unstarred by Sadleir, as I would not star them in his system, though the first is fresh as the dew and the second of unusual historical interest.

The Political Novels need to be acclaimed for their females (Lady Glenora or Lady Dumbello), and Trollope's women remind us that he had immense sentimental energy. (But he wept mainly over *The Three Clerks*.) He invests his women with a romantic intensity that seems realistic. If he did not, we would not feel the sexual power of a cripple (Madeline) or the worth of struggling towards—and for—a heroine such as Clara Amedroz in *The Belton Estate* (1866). 'In no other novel is the essence of Trollope so concentrated' as in *Belton Estate*, wrote Sadleir, a long novel with a simple plot, and that is because Clara's matrimonial dilemma becomes as vital to us and to Will Belton as the world's riches. Trollope's women are glittering prizes or strong threateners, or both, as his mother was both to him. They are complex and unknown enough to surprise us in a long story, and they suggest, too, that the seemingly 'inartistic' in Trollope and his tendency to regard moral worth in his changing England and in the bureaucracy in which he drudged to be of more consequence than 'art,' are two of the prime factors that give him great power and very high artistic stature.

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The January 1983 issue of *Contemporary Review* includes the first of a series of articles on *The Significance of Southern Africa* by John Hatch (Lord Hatch), who has just returned from two years as the first Professor of Human Relations at the University of Zambia. The articles will cover developments in the Republic of South Africa, the emergence of apartheid; the impact of South Africa on the region; the effects of the Portuguese revolution on Angola and Mozambique; the Zimbabwe settlement; the influence of the Frontline States; and the effects of the international economic system on southern Africa. Also included in the January issue: *Britain and Argentina: Some Reflections* by David Stephen, *The Crisis in Yugoslav Self-management* by D. A. Dyker, *The Northern Ireland Assembly—The Reasonable Option* by John Stewart and *Naples of the Baroque Age* by Ernie Money.

ARTS SUPPORT IN AMERICA: A MODEL CITY

by Holly Hill

AMONG the many concerns Americans share with citizens throughout the Western world is how their arts institutions can survive, much less thrive, through a period of severe economic stress. Frank Hodsell, President Reagan's choice for Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts, declared in January 1982 that:

... the Endowment was never intended to provide the major portion of funds needed for our artistic development. We have a different tradition than the Europeans.

The Endowment's purpose is to be a catalyst. . . My philosophy, and the one the Administration I represent is committed to, is that the private sector must be awakened to come in with more strength. While it has traditionally provided well over 90 per cent of the funds available to the arts, with inflation and other economic constraints, it must do even better.

In Louisville, Kentucky, the private sector is doing just that. With a metropolitan area of just under a million predominantly blue-collar workers beset with their share of economic worries, Louisvillians are not about to let their city lose its status as a model community for the arts. How they have achieved and are maintaining this position is a story communities throughout the Western world might envy and, wherever possible, emulate.

At present, the local arts group with the highest visibility—a growing fame that rivals the city's vaunted Kentucky Derby—is the Actors Theatre of Louisville (ATL). V.I.P. weekend at the ATL's annual Humana Festival of New American Plays, only six springs old, draws the cream of international theatre notables. Already two plays premiered at the Festival, *The Gln Game* and *Crimes of the Heart*, have won Pulitzer Prizes. 1982's V.I.P. weekend drew over 300 luminaries—critics, agents, institutional theatre artistic directors and literary managers, and commercial theatre, film, television and literary moguls—from some twenty-five countries spanning six continents. Dotted among the internationals were local C.I.P.s—Kentuckians who, through their financial support and volunteer work, made this extraordinary event possible.

'There's something unique in terms of Louisville's historical development in its orientation around the arts', says Wendell Cherry. An art collector of international reputation, who in 1981 paid \$5.5 million, the highest price yet for a Picasso painting, Cherry is Chairman of the Kentucky Center for the Arts and President of Humana, a Louisville-based private hospital company. Humana underwrites the ATL Festival of New American Plays and is a major arts supporter. 'No city ever got to greatness by filling potholes', Cherry comments. 'Every now and then in history there comes a time when there's something that is a little different, that has meaning and substance, and I think that's what has happened with the arts in Louisville'.¹

The international attention gained by the ATL Festival is only one example of Louisville's emergence as a model community where the arts

can flourish. The city, which celebrated its bicentennial in 1980, had a theatre in 1810, more than twenty years before it had a racecourse. Community interest in the arts was unusually intense—in 1851 tickets to three Jenny Lind concerts were auctioned for up to £175 each. Several amateur music groups had organised by 1822, and an Exposition stimulated interest in music and the visual arts in 1883, the same year that Louisville hosted the American premiere of Ibsen's *A Doll's House*, starring Helen Modjeska.

The resident arts groups which distinguish Louisville today began to thrive after World War One. The J. B. Speed Art Museum, housing a noted collection of Gothic and Renaissance art, was founded in 1925 by one of the city's prominent families, and attracted over 200,000 visitors in its first two weeks. The move towards a professional orchestra began in 1931, and by the 1950s the Louisville Philharmonic Society (now called the Louisville Orchestra) gained world-wide attention by commissioning two new operas annually and a total of forty-three orchestral premieres for four years. Many of the new works were recorded and played on radio stations throughout Europe.

In 1948, progressive Major Charles Farnsley founded the Louisville Fund, the first community arts fund of any city in America. Today, explains its President Allan Cowen, the Greater Louisville Fund for the Arts 'bases its organisation on a corporate model and in its attempt to support the arts tries to run as a highly efficient corporation. Only 5% of our operating costs come from the Fund campaign—the balance is generated from short-term investments.' Every year the Fund conducts a money-raising campaign. In the 1981 campaign, 40% of the donations came from businesses, 14% from employee donations, 10% from the city and country governments, and 36% from individuals. The 1982 drive began on a spectacular note—only seven weeks into the campaign the 1981 total of \$1,225,000 had already been passed. Reports Allan Cowen:

In new gifts from small businesses, which employ maybe twenty-five workers or less, we raised almost \$3,000, based upon contributions ranging from \$25-\$1,000. That's an astounding accomplishment, because those are the people most sensitive to the economic downturn.

Each Fund gift is matched up to 33% by a special challenge grant from the Governor through the Kentucky Arts Commission. New this year is a challenge corporate grant from Brown-Forman Distillers, which is matching every first-time gift of \$25 or more with an equal amount. The Fund campaign net supports an average of 14% of the funded agencies operating costs. Those agencies make up the rest of their budgets through earned income, foundation grants, membership dues and special benefits.

Alexander Speer, Administrative Director of the Actors Theatre of Louisville, explains the operation of ATL's budget:

Our budget for fiscal 1982 is \$2,700,000. Approximately 66-68% of this is raised from income earned by season and single ticket sales, with perhaps 2% coming from the theatre's bar and restaurant. The remaining 32% of our budget comes from grants and contributions.

Almost 8% of our total budget comes from the Fund for the Arts. Within Fund regulations, each of its member organisations is allowed two money-

raising events. We hold a fall *Les Boutiques des Noels*, from which we receive booth rentals and a percentage of the sales from merchants who come from all over the country to sell their products. A Patrons Party held in conjunction with *Les Boutiques* brings its yield to between \$25,000 and \$35,000 a year. Our second fund-raiser, a Dream Auction of luxury items, raises \$50,000 to \$60,000. In addition, the Fund allows us to ask for individual contributions of up to \$50 per person or \$100 per couple, and for this we have an annual Angel Campaign. We also have several major corporate underwriters of productions, all of which are cleared in advance with the Fund.

ATL, which has the largest per capita subscription audience for any regional theatre in America, is one of thirteen arts organisations served by the Fund. Other Fund members also have noteworthy records. According to Allan Cowen, the Louisville Orchestra and the Louisville Ballet have sold-out seasons. In its thirtieth season, the Kentucky Opera Association, the twelfth oldest opera company in the United States, was virtually sold out. Stage One, the Louisville Children's Theatre, served 52,000 children last year. In addition to its member organisations, the Fund also gave \$20,000 in mini-grants to help the metropolitan area's 110 small arts groups.

Louisville's arts-sustaining activities owe a great deal of their success to volunteers working throughout the community. Actors Theatre of Louisville's Producing Director Jon Jory estimates that Actors Associates, ATL's nearly 300-member volunteer group, supplies over half a million dollars worth of money to the theatre's operating budget through in-kind services. July Miller, ATL Director of Community Relations, describes some of those activities:

Between the five and nine o'clock shows on Saturdays, the Actors Equity contract requires that we feed the actors. The dinners are all prepared at home and served by volunteers. They have that loving personal touch, besides being free. Financially that's obviously helpful. What it also does is make volunteers feel affection for the theatre through personal contact with the actors, crews and staff, and make the theatre workers able to see people from the outside world. We want there to be a double value, for the theatre and for the volunteers, in anything we do.

Other in-kind services provided by the ATL Associates include leading tours of the theatre for thousands of schoolchildren and for other visitors every year, picking up actors at the airport and welcoming them, taking theatre personnel to doctors and other appointments, cueing actors, and preparing and serving food for strike nights and for receptions. The Associates and a special usher corps usher for the theatre's 700 performances a season. In addition to in-kind services, some 1,100 ATL volunteers participate in fund-raising activities.

Many volunteers work for several organisations at once. ATL Associates President Pat Jenkins is also chairman of a four-day benefit for Preservation Alliance, an organisation which strives to preserve Louisville's historical sites. She is a board member of the Association of the Louisville Orchestra and chairman of its annual auction, and she belongs to the Ballet Associates of Louisville. Like most volunteers, Pat Jenkins began with one organisation—a small community theatre—and found herself taking on increasing responsibilities, as well as benefitting

from the new friends she made:

I now have lots of friends from New York, and I never knew anyone from New York. A playwright and his wife from Bath, England, stayed with us for three weeks while his play was being done at ATL, and now my family has a standing invitation to visit them in Bath. For me, personally, the best reward is all the people I've met.

While volunteers are the backbone, business and government are the muscle of Louisville's arts structure. Direct corporate involvement on a large scale is relatively new. Industrial expansion over the last thirty years and the home-grown development of Humana brought an expanded base of support for the arts. One of the first businesses to initiate arts efforts on its own was the Liberty National Bank.

For a local business with about a thousand employees, Liberty involves itself in a formidable array of activities. Bank President and 1982 Louisville Fund for the Arts campaign chairman Billy Joe Phelps explains:

An annual Run for the Arts, which the bank sponsors and manages, raised over \$12,000 in three years for the Fund and expects to raise as much as \$20,000 this year. Liberty also underwrites a race at the Hard Scuffle Steeplechase, an internationally recognised sporting event which helps support the Kentucky Opera Association.

The bank is involved with the Louisville Ballet in a number of ways. For a production of *Cinderella*, Liberty provided funding, assisted in promotion, included ticket order forms in its Master Charge statements, held a children's poster contest for the ballet's programme cover and exhibited the entries in its branches, and sponsored a special performance for the bank's employees and their families and friends. It also invited the Ballet to create an original dance using masks to complement an exhibition of masks in our own gallery.

With thirty-six branches and a main office in downtown Louisville, Liberty has been buying local art for its buildings for more than twenty-five years. Since 1976, when it opened a gallery in its downtown branch, Liberty has held an average of seven exhibitions a year there. Ceramics, prints of limited edition books created by hand, fabrics, contemporary art glass, and masks by local, national and international artists have been featured. Workshops, lectures, films, and related activities have taken the visual arts even further into the community. 'The performing arts have always been big in Louisville,' comments Liberty vice president Ted Frith, Sr., a Fund campaign worker and board member for the Louisville School of Art. 'But it takes a lot more in the community to move the visual arts forward. As far as what goes on in contemporary art, this bank is the institution that has taken the lead.'

In addition to corporate grants and volunteer time, another method of business arts support is employee donations. Businesses that sign up offer payroll deduction plans. According to Allan Cowen:

only six companies participated in 1977, our first year, and we raised \$2,700. There were twenty-nine companies in 1981, and we raised close to \$200,000. This year, before the campaign was two months old, the employees of First National Bank had increased their giving 300%, from \$5,100 to \$17,500. Gifts are basically of a dollar per pay period—every two weeks—from a large number of employees. At First National, \$8,000 of this year's total is from first-time donations.

Volunteer and business support for Louisville's arts is augmented by

that of local and state government. Some of this is subtle, almost hidden, as Cowen explains:

For the longest time, this state charged 5% sales tax on admissions. Through selective advocacy, we got that tax repealed two years ago. That's a way that the state didn't have to put any money into the arts, but still increased earned income for the arts by five per cent. That's a lot of money.

Jefferson County's chief executive, Judge Mitch McConnell, states:

The county government contributes annually in excess of \$100,000 to the arts, which in our budget is a fairly significant gift, and the city also contributes. The fact that arts fundraising works at all, with Allan and the Fund leadership setting ground rules that everyone plays by—such as the agencies not being able to go separately to the county for support—that is amazing. In politics we would never be able to pull that off. Every candidate is out hustling his own contributions. It's difficult for this community to agree on a lot of things, and I think the ability to get together sets the arts apart in Louisville.

The give-and-take between business and government leaders may account for the burst of corporate donations to the arts in the last few years, particularly gifts to endow the new Kentucky Center for the Arts, which began construction on its \$32 million project in 1981. A goal of \$6 million in contributions from businesses and individuals was quickly exceeded, and the goal reset to \$10 million. That was raised, and the goal reset to \$12.7 million. The Center, scheduled for opening in the fall of 1983, will provide a home base for five residents arts groups and will be used by numerous other country and state arts organisations and by visiting national and foreign groups. Allan Cowen muses:

You could put the Kentucky Derby in any city, in the sense that the Derby just happens to be in Louisville and people come to that horserace. However, people don't move here because there's a Kentucky Derby, and companies certainly wouldn't relocate here for that reason, and they do. Let's face it, the arts are this community's strength.

¹ The interviews quoted in this article were conducted in Louisville in March of 1981 and 1982.

[Holly Hill is an Assistant Professor of Speech and Theatre at John Jay College of the City University of New York. She has contributed theatre reviews and arts features to such publications as the *Wall Street Journal*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Soho News*, *Broadway Playbill*, *Horizon*, and *American Arts Magazine*. She is Associate Editor of *Encyclopaedia of the New York Stage in the 1920s* and is at present working on a study of Terrence Rattigan.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

ART OF THE ANGLO-SAXONS

Anglo-Saxon Art: A New Perspective. C. R. Dodwell. Manchester University Press. £35.00.

The latest volume of the Manchester Studies in the History of Art, this is not intended to be another survey in the majestic Kendrick tradition on this subject, but a development of the theme on how far Anglo-Saxon art can be interpreted in terms of its contemporary sources. Professor Dodwell bases his account mainly on two kinds of evidence, written documentation and the figurative representations in the art of the period. The result is one of the most distinguished contributions to English art history which has been produced for some time.

The interest shown by the Anglo-Saxons in resplendent surfaces, he suggests, means that our information about their artists is weighted in favour of those who worked in gold. Conversely, this is distorted by the fact that artefacts which had bullion value tended to disappear over the years. The crafts of the goldsmith, the jeweller, the enameller, the illuminators of precious manuscripts and the makers of lavish costumes and vestments were those for which the Anglo-Saxons showed their highest regard. The Word of God itself was described by the chronicler as consisting of jewelled gold, the heavens were 'resplendent with starry gems', the sun 'a gladsome jewel'. The phoenix 'beautiful and winsome and gloriously adorned' became a symbol of the Divine in this Northern climate just as the pelican had. Both in religious and secular art, and the articles created for each purpose were often interchangeable, radiance, bright colouring, lustrous and reflective surface and the very valuableness of precious metals became a yardstick of aesthetic worth. Fire, architectural change, melting down of precious objects to meet the danegeld, taxation, charitable needs or even the sheer greed of those in charge of them, accounted for many of the items which were felt to be the highest artistic achievements of the time. St. Aethelwold, in the tenth century, declared that he could not endure the continued existence of dumb metal whilst man, who had been created in the Image of God and redeemed by the Blood of Christ, died of starvation and want. Others were less generously inclined. Churches, monasteries and treasures throughout the country were pillaged by a succession of Viking and Danish raids, by the Normans, who despoiled England to enrich foundations in their native homeland, and even by the avarice of other English Christian marauders. The Conqueror himself was responsible for the transfer to the Continent of many works of art:

He sent to Rome [wrote his biographer, William of Poitiers] more abundant wealth in gold and silver than would be believed if we told it . . . in a thousand churches in France, the memory of the King will be celebrated in perpetuity, some received extremely large gold crucifixes, remarkably adorned with jewels, many were given pounds of gold, or vessels of the same metal. What the least monastery enjoyed from amongst his largesse would splendidly adorn a metropolitan basilica.

His followers, including the newly-appointed Norman bishops and abbots, followed suit in this.

Many of the riches which adorned eleventh century England were taken abroad, eventually to disappear with the exigencies of the Capet and Bourbon kings or at the Revolution. Little that remained, which was of any monetary value, survived the eventual effects of the Reformation, particularly since the

devotional practices of Anglo-Saxon faith placed so great an emphasis on the preservation and presentation of sacred relics. The outcome has been that we have to build up a picture of what the overall quality of Anglo-Saxon art was like either from an interpretation of isolated masterpieces like the Lindisfarne Gospels or the (English-made) Bayeux Tapestry and such, generally early, works as are recovered through archaeological sources, like the Sutton Hoo treasure or by the detailed analysis of the sources which Professor Dodwell has now skilfully prepared for our consideration. Since this is the first time that this type of comparative interpretation has been used to anything like this extent, his book is obviously challenging in character, but the outcome of this approach is an overall presentation of an impressively well-balanced case.

Some of his conclusions, though often controversial in themselves, are of especial value in serving to try and place available objects in their general context. The Minster Lovell and Alfred jewels were, he suggests, so small that they were probably dropped unnoticed (? in an emergency) by their owners. The Kingston brooch was so diminutive in size even to be noticed by somebody making an official search. This may have resulted, despite their intrinsic value, in creating what is today a completely unbalanced picture of the grandeur of Anglo-Saxon achievement.

This ill-fortune of Anglo-Saxon works in precious metals [Professor Dodwell writes] is all too well-known to the specialist, but it needs stressing, since it was exactly this work that the Anglo-Saxons cared most about. The gold embroidery, which they also greatly admired, has suffered even more, and only five small examples remain from the Christian period.

The problems facing the art historian in trying to build up a coherent picture from such fragments as the small pieces of a stole found in St. Cuthbert's coffin and now in the Durham Cathedral Treasury are obviously comparable to those which would confront anyone attempting to describe the classical period of Athenian art if the whole of the Elgin Marbles and other comparable material had vanished before any record had been made of it.

One tantalising aspect of the art history of the period is the extent to which links existed, even at an early date, between the work of the Anglo-Saxon artists and craftsmen and quite far-flung European and Near-Eastern sources. The presence of Byzantine material, such as the Anastasias dish, even in early burial sites like Sutton Hoo, is a case in point. That it was a two-way traffic is clear from the outcome of Professor Dodwell's researches. Many Anglo-Saxon manuscripts and different types of artefacts were sent over the years as gifts or else commissions to various parts of the Continent and English skills in designing and executing such items were highly regarded before the Conquest over a wide area. A particularly rewarding part of his enquiries lies in the conclusions to which he comes on the complex question of how to interpret the enigmatic fabric referred to as *purpura*, substances particularly associated by the Anglo-Saxons with the distinctive and costly. Professor Dodwell's arguments for identifying this with the shot-silk taffetas imported from the Near-East through the English merchants at Pavia seem to me extremely persuasive. He also provides a useful analysis of the relationship between the existing traditions of English art and the enforced imposition of Norman tastes following the Conquest, a divide which is probably wider than some authorities have been inclined to suggest.

This is an expensive book, but a lavishly illustrated and very well-documented one. Both the University of Manchester and Professor Dodwell, who is director of the Whitworth Art Gallery there, deserve our congratulations on it.

ERINLE MONEY

OSWALD MOSLEY

Rules of the Game. Nicholas Mosley. Secker & Warburg. £8.95.


It is difficult to be fair to this book. Impossible, perhaps, for the present reviewer, a great friend of Sir Oswald Mosley's widow, with whom Sir Oswald enjoyed nearly half a century of very happy married life. There is nothing to be said against sons writing the lives of their fathers, as Sir Winston Churchill, Sir Harold Nicolson and a number of others have demonstrated. But surely some reticence is to be expected of a son with full access to his father's papers. No one can deny that the young Tom Mosley had many affairs with women, but the details supplied here seem to be remarkably tasteless. A very different picture should emerge when his whole life is recorded. It was said of Sir Oswald Mosley more than once that he could have been a Prime Minister of either political party. Who can possibly say what his political destiny might have been if he had not taken the fatal step of starting the new Party in 1931 which led on to the Fascist disaster?

In 1930, myself recently down from Oxford, I had a long talk with Sir Oswald Mosley at Cliveden, the home of the Astors. He had recently resigned from the Labour Government after one of the greatest resignation speeches of the century. He was fêted by large numbers of important persons and still had a big following available to him in the Labour Party. Conservatives like Harold Macmillan and Robert Boothby, who emerges from this book with the utmost credit, and a young Socialist M.P., Aneurin Bevan, looked towards him expectantly. And then he threw it all away. When I met him towards the end of his life, nearly 50 years later, he often mused, though always without bitterness, on what might have been. But never from the point of view of his own ruined career in politics, always from the angle of whether, if he had stayed in the Labour Party, he might have helped to avert the war.

A German Chancellor once said that real statesmen are animated by two motives only—love of country and love of power. The precise balance between these two dominant factors varies from man to man and between a man at one stage in his life and the same man at another. It was, politically speaking, tragic, that Sir Oswald Mosley reached the top so easily, so quickly, and while he was still so young. He was only 34 when he resigned from the Labour Government. Ambition and impetuosity and impatience were still too strong in him. One feels that his decisions would have been different later on.

Nicholas Mosley supplies many interesting details which most of us were unaware of or had forgotten and which are rightly brought before the younger generation for the first time. He is a gifted writer, as he has proved in earlier books. He informs us that towards his father he felt 'nearly always love'. One hopes respectfully that in the next volume that fact will be more evident.

What one does not find here is any indication of what it was in Tom Mosley that attracted rising young politicians of all parties at the beginning of the thirties. His son lays great emphasis on his command of words, which was indeed remarkable, all the more because his academic education had been limited by the war. And no doubt there was something magnetic about his public persona which appealed to large crowds. But, speaking for myself, a very sceptical young Conservative at that time with high academic standards, I was deeply impressed by a kind of political vision which I did not find elsewhere. I am sure that the young politicians of all parties who gathered round him were conscious of the same inspiration. We all know where he finished up,



politically. But meeting him again so many years later, with traumatic events intervening, I would say that that largeness of outlook had never left him, or, if it had, returned to him well before the end.

FRANK LONGFORD

A BRILLIANT BOOK

Winston Churchill. Martin Gilbert. Companion Volume V, Part 3. Documents: *The Coming of War 1936-1939*. Heinemann. £75.

The 'Churchill Industry' by Martin Gilbert has now become rather complicated for the general reader. Let me explain. I reviewed Volume V itself in 1976. Since then, there have been two of what are called *Companion Volumes* (also reviewed by me in this journal). This particular one deals month by month with the years 1936-1939—hence the title *The Coming of War*. Like the other *Companion Volumes*, this one consists of innumerable letters to and from Winston Churchill, some to Clemmie and the family, others concerned with finance and his vast literary output, many, of course, on defence and kindred matters. The index of persons mentioned takes up 50 pages at the close of the book and there are brief biographies of every person mentioned (including this reviewer) on each of the 1,623 pages. I mention this personal point only because, if I have any criticism of the brilliant 'industry' of Martin Gilbert and his wife Susie, I think they could have dispensed with some of the letters. And yet, because I lived through these years as a Junior Minister in the National Government and knew most of the chief characters, I have enjoyed the interplay of personalities, important and less important.

Winston Churchill, ever since 1929, had endured every sort of set-back, politically, financially and even physically (he was knocked down by a taxi-cab in New York). His answer to all these set-backs was hard work, completing *The World Crisis* and, in this volume, completing *Marlborough* and starting *A History of the English-speaking Peoples*; writing articles for *The Standard*, *The Telegraph*, the *News of the World* and also for American papers; making innumerable speeches in the House of Commons and increasingly in the major cities of Britain, Manchester, Sheffield, Bristol, etc. Some of these were collected in books published by Harrap in 1937 and 1938 under the titles *Great Contemporaries* and, most important, *Arms and the Covenant*, edited by his son, Randolph. In a word, Winston Churchill, by 1939, was read and known and admired, not only in Britain, but literally all over the world. His horizon widened and also his accumulation of new friends, such diverse characters as Norman Angell, Walter Citrine, Wickham Steed, Sir Montague Burton, Sir Arthur Salter and even the late Philip Noel-Baker. What a change from the Page-Crofts of the die-hard group surrounding him over the India Bill! On October 12, 1936, he wrote to N. B. Foot: 'You must understand that my work is extremely heavy, as I have many engagements in my constituency and elsewhere, but I have to earn my living by writing.' Let me add that his articles in *The Standard*, with syndication, earned him £140-£150 a piece.

I quote from a speech at Manchester, April, 1938:

We must be, in the main, a united nation. . . . Our party must carry the Trade Unions with them. Non-conformists, Churchmen and Catholics must work for a common end . . . the unattached flowing mass (which can nevertheless decide elections) must have a real awakening and a clear goal. In May, 1938, the *News of the World* published an article entitled 'Why not "The United States of Europe"?'.

Here was a man, not only debating the minutiae of every aspect of defence, but also dictating, between speeches on foreign policy, such asides as this gem to Lord Halifax:

I am very glad you enjoyed Mde. Curie's book about her mother. She is as beautiful as she is clever. . . . I am ashamed to say that I have not found time to read it, being at the moment horribly entangled with the ancient Britons, the Romans, the Anglo-Saxons and the Jutes, all of whom I thought I had escaped forever when I left school. (Obviously a reference to the *History of the English-speaking Peoples*.)

I give one more example of the value of Martin Gilbert's industry. In September, 1938, the late Robert Birley, whom many of us respected in the educational world, when he was Headmaster of Eton, wrote to Randolph Churchill, a former pupil: 'On the day of the Munich agreement I did something I have never done before or since. I ran away from school. I simply could not face the school. So I asked the second master to carry on and my wife and I went up to London. We were walking miserably round St. James's when we met Ronnie Cartland. We talked and very soon found that we felt exactly the same. We both agreed that somehow in the end your father would save us from the disasters that we felt were inevitable and that if it had not been for him, we should have felt absolutely helpless.' Ronnie Cartland, whom I remember, was the first M.P. to be killed in the ensuing war.

It is true that this volume records, for example, the full minutes of an important discussion led by Sir Austen Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury to Prime Minister Baldwin and Sir Thomas Inskip (some thirty pages), July 28, 1936 and Winston's broadcast, October 16, 1938 to the United States, printed in the form it was delivered (10 pages). Neither of these has been recorded before. But the countless human and humorous references in unexpected letters and messages confirm my verdict that Martin Gilbert has excelled himself in this brilliant book.

KENNETH LINDSAY

THE TRADE UNION CONNECTION

Trade Unions in British Politics. Edited by Ben Pimlott and Chris Cook. Longman. £6.50.

It is a curious paradox that Labour's trade union ties constitute one of its great strengths, even at a time when public attitudes are generally hostile to those very Unions. Indeed, Trade Unionists themselves have moved from majority support for their own Party and this must be a cause of concern for Labour.

The Taff Vale Decision precipitated the birth of a Party whose primary task was to defend Trade Union rights. The uneasy alliance with Socialist theory or theories is reflected in the strange and sometimes strange happenings with the 'Labour movement.'

It is vital to understand the important role of Craft Unions in the early stages. Equally, those who react instinctively against the Union bogeyman should reflect that the Trades Unions have been one of the major factors in deflecting workers from direct action and violence by becoming part of the establishment. The present Government's hostile attitude is therefore hardly conducive to a partnership for industrial advance.

The essays in *Trade Unions in British Politics* are vital reading for students of history and politics, industrial relations and other disciplines. Ben Pimlott and Chris Cook have assembled a distinguished group of contributors, not least in their variety of viewpoints and academic backgrounds. Curiously, Trade Unionists and employers are notable by their absence.

Half the book is directed to historical perspectives such as the strengthening of the Unions by two World Wars. I conclude that simultaneously the Unions

acted as a brake on radicalism within a Party which it considered more valuable as an instrument of trade union political purpose.

On the other hand, we are privy to analyses of the Unions and C.N.D., the Unions and the media. Ben Pimlott, on the former topic, is right when he describes last year's move to the left as following in the wake of long-established Constituency Party views—it was the one occasion when the block vote was for, rather than against, a leftward move.

Most vital is the reappraisal of 'The Decline of Working Class Politics' considered by Barry Hindess. 'Class is no longer a good predictor of voting behaviour—Labour has lost support for its policy positions within the working class,' he writes, but fails to come to grips with the decline of that 'class' in our complex social structure.

Perhaps what the book lacks is continuity and a real assessment of how much power within the state is possessed by the Trade Union Movement. Is it a countervailing influence to the dominance of multi-nationals or the overwhelming Oxbridge dominance in our society? How should unionism respond to concepts of a national incomes policy or participation in management and ownership? These are unanswered questions in a book that does not make for light reading, but provides a perspective from which to focus attention on future problems not considered in a rather backward-looking examination of the relationship of Trades Unions to politics.

PAUL ROSE

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Transfer of Power 1942-47. Vol. XI *The Mountbatten Viceroyalty* (H.M. Stationery Office. £70). This latest volume covers 'The Announcement and Reception of the 3 June Plan, from 31 May until 7 July, 1947.' These were momentous weeks, in which the new plan involving partition was accepted in principle both by the Muslim League and Congress, and the Independence of India Bill was published early in July. In between, there was an immense amount of work being done, including the development of policy, negotiations with and between the League and Congress, the growing crisis in the provinces to be partitioned and the critical situation in Calcutta, military and civil administrative problems, the future of the Interim Government, and the Indian States. There was the appointment of Sir Cyril Radcliffe as Chairman of the Boundary Commission. In a despatch to the Viceroy on 15 June, the Governor of Bengal foresaw the future: 'Generally, the atmosphere of

fatalism continua. It was ordained from the first that the communities should massacre and loot one another; nothing can alter this; unity means ruin of one kind, and partition ruin of another; if there is to be ruin anyway, partition seems the simpler and perhaps the less bloody form of it' It is not surprising that this volume should contain the whole of, or extracts from, 563 documents. They are drawn mainly from the records of the India Office, the Cabinet and its India Committee, and the Mountbatten archive. The Editor-in-Chief, Dr. Nicholas Mansergh, and the Editor, Penderel Moon, have written a valuable Introduction in which they provide the thread for appreciation of the documents. As in the case of earlier volumes, the editors have enjoyed free access to the material and the selection is their own. The purpose of the series 'is to make available to scholars in convenient printed form the more important historical records relating to the Transfer of Power in India.' These

volumes, brilliantly prepared and edited, have become essential to the study and understanding of these events.

Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics (George Allen and Unwin. Hardback £14.95; Paperback £6.95). Professor George W. Breslauer has taught Soviet Politics at Berkeley, University of California, since 1971. In this erudite study, he examines 'the means by which Khrushchev and Brezhnev attempted to build up their authority as leaders.' There is Khrushchev the post-Stalin reformer and innovator, yet caught up in the basic conservatism of the Soviet system; Brezhnev the conservative with a more consensual style of leadership, and thereby more enduring. He points to both the contrasts and similarities. With the death of Brezhnev, it is of particular interest to have Professor Breslauer's account of the pattern by which the new leader established and then consolidated his authority. 'During the stage of political succession, the leadership is divided over questions of power and policy, but for that very reason has a collective interest in appeasing the masses through budgetary reallocations. This is reflected in the pumping of funds into consumer-orientated sectors (wages included). The Party leader is tempted to discredit his rival by demonstrating that only his programme can markedly advance the interests of national security and consumer satisfaction without sacrificing traditional values.' When the power struggle has been decided and fear of the masses has gone, and ascendancy achieved, the leader is then able to promote a massive programme, on paper, at least, less dependent on the earlier restraints. Shall we see now a repetition of this process?

Edwardian Interiors (Barrie and Jenkins. £15.95). Alistaire Service writes with authority in his latest

superbly produced volume, 'Inside the Homes of the Poor, the Average and the Wealthy.' With the help of plans and photographs, he describes vividly the characteristics particular to homes in the early years of this century before the First World War. This is also, inevitably, a social survey of the stark contrasts between the hard and harsh lives of the very poor and the affluent classes. It is very much a story of classes, each living in conditions appropriate to their class category. The book contains 120 illustrations in black and white and 14 in colour.

Glued To The Box (Jonathan Cape. £7.95). Perhaps because it is the newest, despite the attractions of the video recorder, television seems to be the most ephemeral of the art forms. Its general level is something along the lines of a Gaumont-British newsreel and a 'B' picture from the forties. As a result, the standard of criticism has never reached the heights of, say, James Agate and Pauline Kael on the cinema. Clive James, long-time television critic for the *Observer*, has done his best to elevate this somewhat base form of journalism to an art form. He is a genuinely funny writer, although, as has been shown on his own recent TV series, he is not always able to distinguish the bad from the merely sad. In this, his latest collection of essays from 1979 to 1982, he deals with the dog-training of Barbara Woodhouse, the British efforts in the Olympics, a score more of films to which he brings a new dimension of thought, politicians and the regular television series such as *Minder*, *Shoestring* and *Kung Fu*. The criticisms may well prove as ephemeral as the art forms, but whilst we still remember the programmes before they are consigned to the shelves, are ignited, or merely self-combust, the comments are entertaining as well as being acutely observant. (J.M.)

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